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ABSTRACT
The present thesis discusses an issue which has received less 
attention within the legal context than it perhaps deserves. 
Competitive offers, once relatively rare, are likely to be used 
increasingly by bidders as a means for external growth and 
expansion reflecting the recent internationalisation of markets. 
Since competitive offers are part of takeover processes as a whole, 
they cannot be considered in isolation or be kept distinct.
Chapter one considers the relationship between competitive 
offers within the scope of takeovers and other parallel techniques 
of acquiring control. This involves a consideration both of the 
aspects of control and motivation which appear as common 
dominators in any merger or takeovers practice.
Chapter two highlights the attitude of supervisory institutions 
in the field. Further details are given in the subsequent chapters. 
Chapter three considers both the legal and the extra legal 
requirements relevant to competitive offers. However, in the 
absence of specific rules governing competitive offers, the general 
rules shall apply. Chapter four discusses some of the protective 
measures for shareholders either before trading or once trading 
begins in their securities. As an additional protection chapter five 
looks at the directors' fiduciary duties.
Whilst there is widespread concern about defensive measures 
used by the target company's directors, there is less concern about 
the offensive tactics an offeror might use to overcome the offeree's 
obstacles. Therefore, chapter six focuses not only on the likely 
implications of any defensive devices but also on the offeror's
purchase techniques as well. However, in the present study both 
tactics are treated as an integral part of the whole operation of 
takeovers.
On the subject of competitive offers, the aim of the thesis is 
twofold: first, to analyse whether or not competitive offers are 
sufficiently regulated by the provisions of existing rules in both the 
U.K and France; secondly, it considers at what point shareholders 
involved are protected.
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INTRODUCTION
In modern times, the takeover process, once relatively 
uncommon and, in broader terms, seen as unethical, has become a 
daily event. Increasingly frequently takeovers techniques and 
devices are becoming familiar to the financial community. 
Moreover, the regulator has taken extreme care to avoid tipping the 
balance of regulation either in favour of the target company’s board 
of directors or to the advantage of offerors. Legal mergers and 
other alternative devices, in addition to being tax free, were 
generally allowed to proceed unless they were detrimental to 
competition and/or the public interest. Equally, the history of 
takeovers demonstrates also both its beneficial and detrimental 
aspects, thus it is subjected to various regulations. Whilst legal 
mergers and takeovers are governed by different provisions, both 
are subject to the unified Code of mergers control in so far as they 
adversely affect competition and other wider issues of the public 
interest.
Until recently, competitive offers or takeovers activity fell 
outside the ambit of most securities market regulations. This thesis, 
however, is a study of the competitive bid in the context of the 
legal phenomena of share mergers. The importance of the thesis is 
attributable to the following considerations. First, the recent 
increasing use of takeovers in several states. Second, save the wide 
range of disagreement over the desirability of facilitating or 
hindering takeovers activity, recent experience demonstrates that 
takeovers are contributing to the growth of selected companies to 
reflect the recent extension and development of markets beyond
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national territories. This trend is further encouraged by the 
implementation of projects like the progressive European 
Community’s effort to complete the single or internal market. 
Finally, the implications of takeovers are often significant. 
Substitution of one set of control for another, for example, usually 
produces substantial policy changes of the target company. As a 
primary implication, there is a change of the controllers who may 
not share identical and common concerns, management methods, 
skills or opinions on the direction and policies of the company in 
question. In the light of the foregoing considerations, it seems most 
likely that, with the increasing tendency towards the 
internationalisation of markets in particular the European desire to 
implement the objective of a single market, any takeover attempt 
will inevitably prompt or induce various other rivals to enter the 
adventure. Indeed, this implies that barriers to takeovers should, 
normally, first be removed, or at least their deterrent effects could 
be reduced, by the implementation of future and specific provisions 
based on unified legislation. Nowadays, of course, many takeovers' 
attempts are either blocked or aborted before reaching the 
competitive stage. It is worthwhile to mention that in the absence 
of rivals, most takeovers are either agreed or contested. Sometimes, 
but relatively few, competitive offers for control of public listed 
companies are launched. Hence, whilst takeovers involve public 
(whether listed or unlisted) and private companies, both as offerors 
and offerees, the present thesis concerns listed public companies 
because, prima facie , their shares are freely transferable. It is this 
feature which, besides various other advantages be they economic, 
financial, commercial and/or, social, contributes to the development
of competitive offers.
At the present time, competitive takeover offers are relatively 
few, and governments have not considered it necessary to enact 
detailed rules governing such particular situations either by 
legislation or extra legal regulation. Furthermore, because the offers 
in question are recent, they have yet to generate research or 
commentary. This study is intended to discuss whether the existing 
regulations contain sufficient provisions to deal with competitive 
offers, the focus will be on two E.E.C member states, the U.K and 
France, which have introduced rules relevant to takeover offers. 
The reasons for choosing the U.K and France as models or bases for 
the present discussion, relate to the following facts; (1) they possess 
the most developed takeover offers regulations; (2) they adopt 
different systems and policies toward the regulation of takeovers;
(3) their regulations contain some specific provisions relating to 
competitive offers. Although it is still too early to see how this law 
will develop, it is also the intention of the present thesis to note 
some of the implications of the recent concern of the E.E.C for the 
regulation of takeovers.
With these preliminary considerations in mind, it is possible 
now to turn to the construction of the present thesis. The thesis 
consists of six chapters. The significance of the first chapter is that, 
as a matter of theory, it contributes to a better understanding of 
merger and takeover patterns. However, the emphasis is on share 
mergers since they are the most desirable methods for speedy 
expansion and growth. It begins by discussing the manner in which 
the relevant regulation deals with the variety of issues pertaining 
to takeovers and mergers. Additionally, it isolates and defines a 
number of concepts. Then it considers the main classifications
under which mergers and takeovers may be subsumed. In 
considering such issues, this chapter will, first of all, discuss and 
assess the question of the definition of takeover offers. It sets out 
its main distinguishing characteristics as well as the major types of 
takeover. In this connection, the focus will be devoted to the 
discussion of a number of conflictual obstacles facing acquirers 
which, in the main, operate as barriers to takeovers. Discussion will 
also be devoted to one of the most common and vexed aspects 
pertaining to the concept of control and motivation for acquiring 
control and defeating unwanted offers. It also outlines some issues 
that are likely to render companies vulnerable to takeovers.
The second chapter discusses the supervisory institutions and 
their policy toward takeover activity. It will demonstrate their 
common similarities as well as differences. Stress will be on their 
effectiveness in policing the process of takeovers. Some factual 
background will be provided. The thesis will note the impact of the 
E.E.C harmonization plan on national supervisory bodies.
The fourth chapter will deal with the conduct of competitive 
offers. It begins by discussing the existing provisions governing 
competitive offers and conditions of making offers. Second, focus 
will be on the announcement of offers; the preparation of the offer 
document as well as circulars; their communication to shareholders 
involved, including display of documents and, most importantly, the 
effect of subsequent rival offers. These include legal and financial 
effects which a subsequent offer may produce, including 
consideration of the direct and post-effect on the target company.
Whilst chapter four stresses the major requirements, including 
the effects of any subsequent offer, the fifth chapter discusses
shareholders' protection. First, it begins by considering information 
disclosure and its purpose. Furthermore, it discusses the various 
methods whereby information disclosure is circulated or released to 
shareholders whose shares are sought to be acquired. It stresses 
the role of the directors and their responsibility and also evaluates 
the kind of remedies available to reduce the likely detrimental 
effect on shareholders interests.
Information disclosure is designed, fundamentally, to present 
to public investors a certain minimum degree of transparency 
which, on the one hand, may enable them to identify the controllers 
of their company as well as the location of its key assets. On the 
other hand, it aims to detect the likely effect on the good
performance of the stock market where the shares of the target
company are traded. It is also of vital importance in chapter five to 
discuss what duties are owed by directors in the particular
situation of competitive offers.
Takeover offers may be undertaken with the full knowledge
and cooperation of the company being acquired. They may also be 
contested. In the latter situation, a battle of tactics and devices
result. This thesis notes that some of the tactics are not exclusive to 
the target company to frustrate offers. They may, equally, be
undertaken by offerors themselves against each other. Notably, the
use of relevant regulations to deter offerors and appeals to the 
relevant Court may also arise in this context. Nowadays, it is 
becoming frequent that directors of the target undertaking may be 
unwilling to lose the control which offerors seek to obtain.
Alternatively they may employ various tactics at their disposal to 
keep the independence of their company. Although varied, such
tactics have become commonplace. Additionally, defensive or 
offensive tactics which are typically appropriate to one offer in one 
particular country may be wholly or partly inappropriate or even 
illegal in another. However, whilst there is presently widespread 
and growing concern about the kind of defensive measures that are 
used by the board of the target company against unwanted 
offerors, there is much less discussion about how far and what kind 
of strategy the offeror might use to gain control. The present thesis 
not only notes, but also stresses, the* offeror’s sophisticated 
techniques of circumventing the offeree's remedial or preventive 
manoeuvres. Hence, in situations where a friendly approach is 
rejected or where there is no answer at all by the target company 
directors or, where it is expected to be turned down, there are 
various techniques at the offeror’s disposal to secure a position of 
control, or at least to become a substantial controller in the target 
company. As a preamble to its takeover strategy, the offeror may 
gradually begin buying on the market. He may also gain his battle 
of control through a proxy fight. But the success of both tactics 
assumes sufficient financial and other alternative support. Finally, 
the offeror tries to use the most popular and the quickest 
alternative i.e a takeover offer, in particular when resistance is 
expected. These activities both form the final concern of this thesis 
within the framework of the last chapter. It considers, first, the 
offensive tactics undertaken by offerors to avoid frustrating 
attempts to secure control. Second, it discusses the offeree's 
preventive and remedial defensive measures at its disposal. The 
impact on shareholders interests and, principally, the attitude of 
the relevant regulators are also considered. Both the offeror's and 
the offeree's tactics, for the purpose of this thesis, may be seen as
one part of the whole operation which either involves the change of 
control or maintains the independence of the target company. 
Besides, the attitude of the relevant authorities is of paramount 
importance if shareholders' confidence is to be maintained.
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CHAPTER ONE 
TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS 
S E C T IO N  ONE: DEFINITIONAL FRAMEWORK OF MERGERS 
AND TAKEOVER OFFERS
Mergers or concen tra tions1 are complex phenom ena and have 
long been the source of controversy. They give rise to confusion, 
uncerta in ty  and conflicts. Furtherm ore , they  have now here  been  
defined as such. In o ther words, they  have been  given d iffe ren t 
definitions in d iffe ren t contexts. It is w o rth  re ite ra tin g  th a t  th is 
thesis concerns the com petitive bid in the context of th e  legal 
phenom enon of share mergers.
Conceptually, regardless of fiscal and m onetary  implications, 
notably accountancy and other related issues, mergers of companies 
are dealt w ith  w ith in  two major contexts. First, concen tra tion  of 
com panies are ana lysed  w ith in  the a rea  of co m p etitio n  and, 
th e re fo re ,  are  su b jec t to the  p rov is ions  on th e  co n tro l  of 
concentration. Second, as far as securities m arke t regulations are 
concerned, concentration  of com panies is dealt w ith  w ith in  the 
con tex t of ta k e o v e rs  (share  m erg e rs )  and legal m e r g e r s . ^
1- The European Community uses the term "concentration" w h i le  in 
both the USA and U.K the most familiar expression is of ten  restricted to 
"merger".  S imilar e x p r e s s io n s  in c lud e  ' tak eover s ' ,  'a m a lg a m a t io n '  
acquisit ion’ and 'fusion', 'combination' or 'consolidation'. See French D. and 
Saward H., A Dictionary of Management (New &, Revised edn) (London, Pan  
Books L td .1984) .  For con ven ien ce ,  th rou gh out  this th es i s  the term  
concentration and merger are used interchangeably.  Similarly, the problem  
also arises in respect of other terms like 'undertaking', 'companies', 'societe', 
'corporation' and so forth. See infra n. 5.
2-  This distinction has recently been brought into ex istence  by  the  
E.E.C. proposed Directive on Takeover Bids And Other Bids, see infra n.14.
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However, in the aggregate, both control of concentration and legal 
m erger fall ou tside am bit of th is thesis, b u t it w ould  ap p ear  
misleading if no discussion of these considerations w ere  included, 
how ever brief. As a s ta rting  point for th is ch ap te r ,  it seem s 
necessary  to begin considering the definition of concentration  laid 
down by the E.E.C’s Regulation on the control of concentration , 
because it seem s to inco rpora te  com m on fe a tu re s  re la ting  to 
change, transfer or acquisition of control, be it effected by takeover 
offers, s ta tu to ry  amalgamation, contracts or by any o ther re la ted  
arrangem ents. Second the focus will be to classify, in so far as they  
are classifiable, the various forms of concentration of undertak ing  
and th e  in te rp la y  or co m p atib ili ty  of the  v a r io u s  r e le v a n t  
regulations in the context. Thirdly detailed consideration  will be 
devoted to takeovers or share mergers
1 . 1 -  D E F I N I T I O N  OF MERGERS OR C O N C E N T R A T IO N
The E.E.C regulation defines concentration between undertakings as:
(1) A concentration shall be deemed to arise where:  (a) two or more 
previously independent undertakings  merge, or (b) one or more 
persons already controlling at least one undertaking, or one or more 
undertakings acquire, whether  by purchase of securities or assets, 
by contract or by any other means, direct or indirect control of the 
whole or parts of one or more undertakings.  (2) An operation,  
including the creation of joint venture....(3) For the purpose of this 
regulation, control shall be consti tuted by rights, contracts or any 
other means which, either separately or jointly and having regard to 
the considerations of fact or law involved, confer the possibility of 
exercising decisive influence on an undertaking, in particular by: (a) 
ownership or right to use all or part of the assets of an undertaking:
(b) rights or contracts which confer decisive influence on the 
composition, voting or decision of the organs of an undertaking. (4)
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control is acquired by persons or undertakings which; (a) are holders 
of the rights or entitled to rights under the contracts concerned, or 
(b) while not being holders of such rights or entitled to rights under 
such contracts ,  have  power to exercise the rights  deriv ing 
therefrom.^
W ithin the context of this thesis, it is proposed not to use the 
te rm  concentra tion ' b u t 'm erger ' since the  la tte r  te rm  is more 
fam iliar and can be w idely  d raw n so as to cover a w ide range of 
m erger (in the  more lim ited sense) and ta k eo v er  activity. The 
Regulation excludes from the scope of its application the creation of 
jo in t v e n tu re s  p ro v id ed  th e y  are  no t in te n d e d  to d is to r t  
com petition  b e tw e e n  u n d e r ta k in g s .4 The Regulation does not 
app ly  to c red it  in s t i tu tio n s  or o th e r  f inanc ia l in s t i tu tio n s  or 
insurance  com panies provided th a t  they  do not exercise voting 
rights in respect of transactions and dealing in securities en te red  
into for their own account or for the account of o thers or provided 
th a t they  exercise such voting rights only w ith  a v iew  to preparing 
the sale of all or par t of th a t undertaking^ or of its assets or the
3- Council Regulation (E.E.C) No.4 0 6 4 / 8 9  of 21 Dec.1989,  on the  control 
of concentrations between  undertakings. (O.J. L.3 9 5 /1  of 21 .12 .1989) .  For the  
background of this regulation since 1973,  see Amended proposal for a Council 
Regulation (E.E.C) on the control of concentration b e t w e e n  undertakings,  
COM (88) 97 Final (Brussels, 25th  April.1988). This proposal has its origin in 
the 1973 Proposal for a Regulation on the control of concentration b e tw een  
undertakings  (O.J. No C.92 of 31 s t  Oct 1973) ,  am ended  severa l  t im es  
respectively in 1982 (O.J. C 3 6 /3 ,  12.2 82), in 1984 (0 J. C 5 1 / 8  23 .2 .1984) ,  in 
1986, (O.J. C 324 /5 ,  17.12.1986) and in 1988 (O.J. C 130/4  of 18.5.88).
4-  See Article 3.2 of the merger control regulation, supra n.3.
5-  The express ion  "undertaking" is an E.E.C. term. For convenience ,  
the terms; 'company', 'societe' and 'undertaking' wil l  be used herein  after 
interchangeably.  The term "undertaking", however ,  has been  developed by  
the European Court to include almost all types  of economic enterprises,  f irms  
or companies. In certain circumstances parent company and its subsidiaries  
are v iewed  as being a "single economic unit". See the Joined Case.6 & 7 / 7 3 ,  
Instituto Chemioterapjco Italiano (I.C.I) and Commercial Solvent  Corporation
10
sale of those securities and th a t  any such sale takes place w ithin  
one year of the date of the acquisition.6 It is equally  im portan t to 
m en tion  th a t  ex em p tio n s  from  the  app lica tion  of the  E.E.C 
Regulation, ex tends to covers rece iversh ip  involved in situations 
relating to liquidation, winding up, insolvency and the like.7 W hat 
is interesting, for the purpose of this thesis, is th a t  the E.E.C Merger 
Regulation is concerned w ith  the question of voting control only, 
and only in so far as such rights are used to de term ine directly or 
ind irec tly  the com petitive conduct of an undertak ing , and thus 
distort competition to which the aim of such regulation is directed, 
The im portan t point for this thesis, is tha t this thesis deals w ith  the 
legal aspects of acquiring such control by means of com petitive 
takeover  offers. This means th a t  economic com petition be tw een  
undertakings may have little relevance to the context of this thesis.
In practice, m erger can be effected  b e tw een  u n d er ta k in g s  
which ca rry  out similar or dissimilar activities (at the  same or 
d ifferen t point in the production or d istribution  process) w h e th e r  
they  are involved in activities of commercial, industria l or financial 
character. But, perhaps, the most re levan t factor, for the purpose of 
im plem enting any objective appears through the change in control 
from one undertaking  to another, be it by takeovers  or by o ther 
parallel means as will be noted in the subsequent chapters.
(C.S.C) v. E.C.Com m i s s i o n . ( 1 9 7 4 )  E.C.R, 223,  at paras 3 7 / 2 .  Legally,  the  
definit ion of "undertaking" within  the concept of concentration does not  
appear in either articles 85 or 86 of the Rome Treaty as such but, it has been  
advanced by analogy with article 80 of the E.C.S.C Treaty of 1951.
6-  Article 3.para 5, supra n.3.
7-  Ibid, at para (b).
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1 .2- DEFINITION OF TAKEOVER OFFERS
A- LEGAL DEFINITION OF TAKEOVER OFFERS
It is generally agreed th a t  the definition of a takeover offer is 
its most troublesom e aspect. The term  itself is full of dilemmas and 
paradoxes.8 It is also im portan t to mention th a t takeover offers or 
bids and their equivalent French offre publique d ’achat (O.P.A.) or 
offre publique d 'echange (O.P.E.) are phenom ena w hich have an 
inde term inab le  philosophical m eaning.9 In general, the h istory  of 
public offer regulation in France does not provide a clear basis for a 
definition of public offer as such. But w h a t is clear is th a t  article 69 
of the  A rre te  M inisterielie of 1973 confines the  public offer 
defin ition  to those opera tions  which, a fte r  contem plation , the  
control of the ta rge t com pany might pass to the initiator, or the 
offeror 's  existing control might be increased . In 1973, ce rta in  
lim itations on the expression of public offer w ere  im posed by the 
A rrete of 6th March 1973 relating to the Reglem ent General de la 
Companie des Agents de Change. According to th a t  regulation , 
public offers w ere limited to transactions conferring on the offeror 
an acquisition of at least 15% of the offeree's issued capital. Such a 
level might be reduced if the offeror a lready  holds shares in the 
offeree com pany and the am ount the offeror seeks to acquire will 
resu lt in it holding more than  the majority or the total of its share 
capital. Recently, the 1989 regu la tion  of public offers adop ted  
ano ther  m inim um  thresho ld  of control b u t the phenom enon  of 
public offer rem ains w ithout definition. P resum ably  this could be 
explained by two factors: first, the French legislator considered it
8- Cohen M.H, Tender Offer or Takeover Bids (1968)23  Bus Taw. 611.
9-  Ibid. See also The Developing Meaning of Tender Offers (1 9 7 3 )8 6  
Harv.L.Rev 1250.
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far b e t te r  to leave definition to its re le v an t public institutions; 
second, it may have been set aside because the re lev an t regulation 
in France is in a state of transition and confusion.10 Notably this is 
because of the  public offer ac tiv ity  is still in the  course of 
developm ent and new means and new techniques of avoiding the 
difficulties c rea ted  by this phenom enon  are continuously  being 
developed. In 1966 (the time the regulation relating to public offers 
w as in troduced), for exam ple, the French regu la to r  questioned  
w h eth e r  or not a competitive offer could be subjected to the rules 
of ’’auction”. While the com petitive offer is a recen t phenom enon, 
the auction traces its origins to the mid. 16th century, a tim e w hen  
most auctions w ere Court ordered sales imposed on deb to rs .11
In Britain, Section 428(1) of the Financial Services Act 1986 
defines a takeover offer as:
an offer to acquire all the shares, or all the shares of any class or 
classes in a company (other than shares which at the date of the 
offer are already held by the offeror), being an offer on te rms which 
are the same in relation to all the shares to which the offer relates or, 
where  those shares include shares of different classes in relation to 
all the shares of each class.12
The Panel on Takeovers and M ergers considers tak eo v ers  as 
being offers which include "takeover and merger transactions however
10-  For an overall discussion see mainly, Bronner R., Bourse de Valeur,  
at para. 175 et  seq in Encvcolpedie Dalloz.Societes. 1978; Bezard P., Les Offres 
Publioues  d ’Achat ( Paris, Masson, 1982); Loyrette J., Les Offres Publiaues  
d ' A c h a t (Paris, Dictionnaire,  Andre Joly, 1971);  Trochu M., Les Offres 
Publiques d'Achat (1967)  Rev. Dr. Com 695; Malan F., Les Problemes Souleves  
par les O.P.A (1 9 7 0 ) T.C.P 2304; Boitard M., Les Offres Publiques d'Achat (1970)  
13 Rev.Eco.B. Nat.Paris. p. 51.
11- Newsweek, the International Magazine, Sept. l8th,  1989,  p.43.
12- Financial Services Act, 1986, Sch. 12, substituted Sections.4 2 8 - 4 3 0  of 
the Companies Act 1985.
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effected, including reverse takeovers, partial offers, court schemes and also 
offers by a parent company for shares in its subsidiary". Additionally, the 
Code on takeovers  and mergers  p rov ides  a defini t ion of cash 
purchase w here  the consideration consists of a debt. It s tates tha t  
purchases for cash include contracts  or a r rangem en ts  w h e re  the 
cons idera t ion  consists  of a deb t  in s t ru m e n t  capable  of being 
redeemed in less than three y ea rs .13
One takeover  offer which will be discussed within  the scope of 
this definitional f ramework,  is tha t  which is commonly understood 
as an a t t e m p t  to obtain de jure  control  of an o th e r  com pany  
(target)  usually exceeding 50 % of voting control or at  leas t  to 
occupy a position of de facto  control. Whilst the City Code drew  up 
a v e ry  broad definition, the F.S.A. em phasized  the  quan t i ta t ive  
criteria of shares. Presumably, the F.S.A. seeks to cover questions of 
compulsory acquisition of shares held by the remaining minority of 
shareholders towards full integration of the acquired company. This 
might be true  because provisions t rans fe r red  to the  F.S.A. w ere  
conceptually f ram ed  under  the 1985 Companies Act to deal w ith  
such sorts of acquisitions.
At the Community level, takeover  offers, as well  as var ious  
other ancillary offers have been dealt  w ith  by the proposal for the 
th i r te en th  Council Directive.14 This Directive defines a takeover  
offer as:
an offer made to the holder of securities carrying voting rights in a 
company or convertible into securities carrying such rights (i.e., 
shares, convertible bonds, subscription rights, option and warran ts )  
to acquire their  securities for a consideration in cash or o ther
13- City Code, definition section, as amended in 1989
14- COM (88) 823 Final submitted by the Commission, on 19.1.89, ( 8 9 /  C 
6 4 /0 7 )  (Brussels, Feb.16th,1988); O.J. C 6 4 /0 8  of 14.3.89.
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securities, the purpose of the offer usually being to acquire control of 
the company or consolidate the offeror's existing control, and the 
offer being made conditional upon sufficient offerees accepting it to 
achieve the offerer objectives.15
The definition applies only to securities carrying unrestr ic ted  
r ights  to vote at  the company's  general  meeting. That is to say, 
securit ies w i thou t  such fea tu re s  are i r re lev an t  By contrast ,  the 
British self regula tion rela ting to takeover  bids ap p ea rs  much 
wider.  Furtherm ore ,  as may be understood, the E.E.C definit ion 
covers companies whose shares are listed on the official list of the 
Stock Exchange, w h e r e a s  bo th  the  Brit ish and th e  French  
regula t ions  apply  to listed and unlis ted  companies .  It  could, 
pe rhaps ,  be a rgued  th a t  the  exclusion of com pan ies  w hose  
securities are not listed on the official list of the Stock Exchange 
from the scope of application of the directive appear to be justified. 
First, the E.E.C. legislator seeks to cover a certain size of takeovers;  
and second, it left  o ther  sorts of ta k eo v e r  opera t ions  to the  
discretion of the national authorities.  Then w h a t  m a t te rs  for the 
purposes of the E.E.C. directive is the size of companies involved 
and the substance of an operat ion which involve an im m edia te  
change of control from one company to another. Specifically those 
opera t ions  which involve the change of control cross-  border .  
Accordingly, sales and purchase  of shares  on or off the  Stock 
m ark e t  th rough  var ious  devices o ther  th an  tak eo v e r  b ids  are 
subjected to the disclosure directive in s tead .16 Finally, one may 
add another consideration which may be re levan t  in this context, 
tha t  the supervision of the re levant  authorities, although vital, does
15 - Ibid, at para 9.
16- COM (85)791 Final, 23.12.85,  O.J. C 3 5 1 / 1 2  relating to information  
disclosure.
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not appear in the definition. In conclusion, one should welcome this 
defin it ion in the direc t ive  as an a t t e m p t  to cover  the  most 
troublesome aspect within the definitional f ramework.
B -  T H E O R E T I C A L  D E F I N I T I O N  OF T A K E O V E R  OFF ER S
On a theore t ica l  level, French au thors  as well  as Brit ish
academic w r i te rs  have not, in the main, a t tem p ted  to define the 
takeover  bid. As regards the competit ive offer, it appears  th a t  it 
has not been conceptualized so f a r .17 It is w orth  highlighting tha t  
ou ts ide  the  European  Community, pa r t icu la r ly  in the  U.S.A. 
rela tively few w ri te rs  have a t tem pted  the definition of takeover  
offer as such .18 As cited above, the few  exceptions are those 
British or French textbook w ri te rs  who have a t tem p ted  to define 
tak eo v e rs  w i th o u t  success. For instance, W einberg  def ined  a 
ta k e o v e r  offer  as "a technique for effecting either a takeover or a 
merger".19 Moreover, as to the distinction b e tw een  f r iend ly  and 
opposed takeover offers, he states tha t  if an offer is made through a 
takeover, the bid is f requently  against the wishes of the directors of 
the offeree company. But if the directors of the ta rg e t  com pany 
favour such a bid, friendly takeover  is identical to merger .20 Does 
this  mean  th a t  the takeover  offer techn ique  (p ro c ed u re  and 
requirements)  can be appropriate for effecting both legal and share 
merger  alike? If this is so, w hy  the existence of the  s ta tu to ry
17- Pennington R.R, .Company Law (4th  edn.) (London, Butterworths,  
1979) at Ch. 27 p. 802 , in particular p.806.  In France, the confusion arises in 
relation to the distinction b e tw een  "competitive offer" and "auction"..See 
supra n.10 & 11
18- The Developing Meaning of Tender Offer, supra n.9
19- Weinberg M.A and Blank M.V, Weinberg and Blank on Takeovers  
And Mergers (4th. edn.), at para 106, (London, Sweet and Maxwell 1979).
20- Ibid
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scheme w h e reb y  a legal merger is carr ied  out? As a m a tte r  of 
procedure, legally speaking, both  transactions are quite distinct, 
a l though their  ult imate  effect may correspond. The in te rac t ion  
b e tw een  legal merger  and share m erger  ( fr iendly  tak eo v er  or 
merger by consent) has been  explained by Professor Pennington 
and lately was incorporated in the E.E.C draft  directive on takeovers  
and other bids, tha t  f r iendly takeovers  are often commercially and 
economically the equivalent of s ta tutory m erger .21 By invoking the 
question of consideration in respect of offers, Weinberg recognised 
th a t  for a takeover  involving a listed public company, it is not 
possible to draw a clear distinction in effect be tween a cash bid and 
a share for share bid.22 P re su m ab ly  because now adays ,  th e re  
exists no offer made w ithou t  al ternatives.  Besides, the r e lev an t  
British regulators always oblige offerors to introduce (only for an 
exchange offer) a cash alternative.23
F i n a l l y ,  i n  h i s  r e p o r t  s u b m i t t e d  t o  t h e  E.E.C., P r o f e s s o r  
P e n n i n g t o n  s u g g e s t e d  t h a t  "the definition of a "general bid" must be 
determined by the types of transactions it is desired to regulate, and not by the 
inheren t  judicial character  of a general  bid for shares" .2 4 H e  h a s  a l s o  
p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  "the expression ' takeover bid' suggests tha t  to come within it 
a bid must be one which, if successful, will result in control of the offeree passing 
to the offeror, or at least in the offeror acquiring control by assembling a holding 
of blocks of shares which together carry control".25
21-  Pennington R.R, Report on Takeovers And Other Bids. (X I /5 6 /7 4 -E ,  
1974); COM (88) 834 Final p.3 para 6, supra n .14
22-  Supra n.19
2 3 -  City Code, Rule 11. In cash offers, offerors are not obliged to offer  
an exchange of securities alternative offer.
2 4 -  The term "general bids" referred  to covers  ta k e o v e r  bids,  
consolidated bids and partial bids. See Pennington report at p.3, para 1, Supra 
n.2 1.
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In France, the focus is on cash offers (offre publique d ’achat). 
Most academic writers  consider an offre publique d'achat (O.P.A.) as 
an operation w h ereb y  a person or undertaking  makes an offer to 
ano the r  u n d e r ta k in g ’s sha reho lders  ( target)  to pu rchase  the ir  
shares, w ith in  a l imited period of time, at a price substantia l ly  
higher than  the cur ren t  m arke t  quotation of those shares,  for the 
pu rposes  of obtaining control, or reinforcing th a t  control. The 
offeror 's  co m m itm en t  is ir revocable ,  b u t  condi t iona l  upon  a 
minimum level of acceptance, unless the offeror already owned a 
substantial proportion of the voting rights control in the target .26
It is undeniably true tha t  it is impossible to provide a perfect 
definition covering the whole issue of takeovers. Indeed, the  great  
difficulties are ap p a re n t  since the use of takeovers  gene ra tes  a 
wide variabil i ty  of techniques, factors and implications. W hen it 
comes to questions of technique, they  are var ied  and d e p e n d en t  
largely on the strengths and weaknesses  of the parties in offers. As 
to factors and implications they  can only be assessed on a case by 
case basis. Take, for example the following e lem en ts  involved, 
which will be taken into account throughout this thesis. They are;
(1) characteristics of the target company and the offerors;
(2) type of offers (complete or partial);
(3) the sort of consideration offered and the type of securit ies 
desired to be acquired in the target;
(4) the aspect of offers which may be domestic or international;
25-  Ibid, at p.61 and 62 of the report.
2 6 -  Compare, for example,  with: Loyrette J., Les  Orfres Publ iques  
cj.Achat, supra n. 10, at p.65; Bezard P., Les Offres Publiques d'Achat. supra n. 
10, at section one, p. 14; Trochu M., Offre Publique D'Achat, supra n.10;  
Bronner R., Bourse de Valeur, at p.14, supra n.10; Lee W.L and Carreau D, 
Moyens de Defence a L'Encontre D’une Offre Publique D'Achat Inamicales en  
France, (1988)  Receuil Dalloz. Chronioue III, p .15.
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(5) com petent  organs which closely monitor such operations, 
the involvement of the host country government;  and
(6) the re levant  place w here  takeovers are carried on (whether 
on or off the Stock Market), the size of companies and the num ber  
of offerors involved.
As for the implications, they  may be legal, such as the change 
of control from one hand to the other; economic, principally where  
there  is an adverse effect on competition and other wider  issues of 
public interests;  and social in respect  of employees. For instance, 
dismissal  or ear ly  r e t i r e m e n t  due to economic or commercial  
reorganization of the company.
In conclusion and at the  r isk of over  simplification, two 
definitions of takeover offers may be suggested. One is narrow  and 
assumes tha t  to come within its scope of application, an offer can be 
limited to those involving de jure  control, no matter  w he the r  such 
an offer is made to all shareholders, one class of shareholders ,  or 
classes of them. This definition is based on the assumption th a t  an 
offer or (offers) confines the scope of the ir  application to an 
acquisition of the majori ty of the voting rights control exceeding 
50% effect ively  exercised at a genera l  meeting of the  ta rg e t  
com pany.  Hence, anyth ing  below th a t  level is au tom at ica l ly  
ex c lu d ed .27 The other definition is broad and applies to de jure  
control as well as the acquisition of de facto  control even if the de 
fac to  control confers on the holder the majority  of control a t  a 
genera l  meeting.28 But in any definition the invo lvem en t  of the
2 7 -  Even if the holder already occupied a position of d e  f a c t o  control  
and seeks to reinforce its control to below 50%. However,  voting agreements  
are also excluded, because they are not the result of takeover offers.
2 8 -  Practically, control does not necessarily mean 51 % of the voting  
right control in a company. See infra section 3 of chapter. 1
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29supervisory body is vital and should not be neglected
As far as the competitive offer is concerned, which is discussed 
in detailed consideration in the subsequen t  chapters,  it is always 
subsumed under  the form er  definition which restr icts  its scope of 
appl ica t ion to acquisit ions of de ju re  control. To em phasize ,  
experience illustrates tha t  w herever  a competitive offer is involved, 
the change of control (50% or more) is inevitable i.e., immedia te  
dependence  of the  ta rg e t  com pany on the  successful  r iva l  is 
achieved. Besides, w he the r  or not a competi tive offer is involved, 
most securities market  regulations lay down a triggering level (say 
30%) after which any access places the holder under  the obligation 
to make a general offer for the whole body of shareholders  of the 
ta rge t  company in which such proportion is held. The minimum 
level required  to be attained is e i ther 50% as in Britain or 2 /3  of 
the voting rights (where an offeror prefers to limit his acquisition) 
in France.3°
S E C T I O N  T W O :  C L A S S I F I C A T I O N  OF ME R GE R S
Typically, i r re sp ec t iv e  of the  size and the  ty p e  of the  
companies involved, any classification of mergers may be divided 
into two distinct field of activities. One is the economic classification 
of m erge r ,  com m only  k n o w n  as ho r izon ta l ,  v e r t i c a l  and  
c o n g l o m e r a t e . 3 1 The other is the legal classification of m erger
29-  See Trochu M., Offre Publique D'Achat, supra n.10
30-  See infra, Ch.3.
31 -  A number of academic writers deal with  such topics. See mainly,
Hopt K.J, E u r Q p e a n  M e r g e x  C o n t r o l .  Legal and Economic A na lys i s  on
Multinational Enterprises . (Vol.l ),  (Berlin & New York, Walter De Gruyter,  
1982); Kay M., Company Mergers and The E.E.C ( 1 9 7 8 H.B.L 88; Raybould D.M., 
Controlling Mergers Through Competition law (1983)4  Co.Law. 56; Brodley J.F,
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within the context of the securities markets  known as legal merger 
and share merger.  Both classifications will be outl ined below in 
turn.
2 .1-  ECONOMIC CLASSIFICATION OF MERGERS
A- HORIZONTAL MERGERS
Horizontal- mergers involve the combination of two or several 
undertakings at the same level in the production or distribution of 
goods or services, w he the r  they compete with each other  or not.32 
This does not imply the necessity of being at the same stage of 
deve lopm ent and prosperity. Just as it may take place with in  the 
food or services sectors, it may also be effected be tw een  companies 
within  industry, for example the merger of two steel producers  or 
between motor car manufacturers.
B- VERTICAL MERGERS
Vertical mergers involve the absorption of under tak ings  in the 
productive  or d is t r ibut ive  chains. Take, for instance, a m erger  
be tw een  a manufacturer  and a wholesaler or, a wholesaler  w ith  a
Joint Venture And Anti-Trust policy (198 4 )9 5  ITarv.L R ev . 1 *52 1: Potter C.L, 
Centralized European Merger Regulation: A Viable A lternat ive  ( 1 9 8 5 ) 2 6  
Virg.T.Int‘1 Law.2 19: Whish R., competit ion Law (London, Butterworths,  1985)  
(now 2nd.edit.  1989); De Rechmeont J. Les Concentrations d'Entreorises et  la 
Posit ion Dominante (Paris, Societe de Journal Des Notaires et  Des Avocats,  
1971); Reynolds, Merger Control in The E.E.C, (1 983 )17  T.W.T.L 407; Pass and 
Sparks, Control of Horizontal Mergers in Britain (1 980 )14  T.W.T.L 135; O.E.C.D, 
Competition Policy And Joint Venture,  (1986);  Swann D. Competit ion and 
Consumer Protection , (London, Penguin Books, 1979).
32-  As in the air transport sector, the merger betw een  British Airways  
and British Caledonia. (The Independent,  12th Nov, 1987).  In the food market,  
the mergers  b e tw e e n  the Swiss undertaking,  Nestle;  and the  Brit ish  
undertaking Rowntree both chocolate manufacturers .(Times ,  May 17th,  
1988).
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reta iler  w ith in  the field of food, textiles,.or in any o ther  field of 
bus iness .  Such a com bina t ion  m ay also occur b e t w e e n  a 
manufacturer ,  a wholesaler  and a re ta i le r  in the  same field of 
business or be tw een  a m anufac tu rer  and producer  of the  same 
product or goods.
C- CONGLOMERATE MERGERS
Conglom erate  m e rg e rs  invo lve  a co m b in a t io n  b e t w e e n  
undertakings whose activities are substantially different from each 
o ther  and none of them compete w ith  the other.  For instance, a 
tobacco manufacturer  predicts tha t  the cigarette m arke t  may not in 
the long term be profitable, decides to diversify or to acquire new 
businesses other than  tobacco, such as a combination w ith  drink, 
perfume or food companies. Since conglomerate mergers  involve 
companies with completely distinct or independent  businesses,  they 
are generally considered to be less likely to ham per  competition. 
This would be so if no joint financial forces are u n d e r ta k en  in one 
field against competitors to deter new entry  in the market .33
2 .2 -  LEGAL CLASSIFICATION OF MERGERS
A- STATUTORY MERGERS
The s ta tu tory  merger is a situation in which the shareholders  
of the ta rg e t  undertaking,  after the completion of merger,  will 
automatically be shareholders of the acquiring under tak ing  or of a 
new undertaking formed as a result .34 The obvious consequences
33- Begg D, Fischer S, and Dornbusch R., E conom ics . (2nd.edn),  Ch.6 at 
p.358  et  seq. (London, MacGraw-Hill Book Company (U.K) Ltd.); Kay M., 
Conglomerate Mergers (1969)JJLL 265.
3 4 -  U.K. Statutes: The Companies (Mergers and Divisions) Regulations,  
1987 (S.1.1987,  No.1991),  introduced into Company Law in a se lf-contained
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of this k ind of combination is that ,  as the  ope ra t ion  involves 
under tak ings  b u t  not individuals  as such, after  complet ion one 
becom es the  acqu ire r  while  the  o the r  ceases  to exist. The 
shareholders of the integrated undertaking or undertakings, as the 
case may be, become shareholders  of the  acquiring undertak ing  
w h e th e r  already existing or newly  form ed for th a t  purpose. The 
transaction involves a universal  t ransfer  of assets and liabilities 
from the acquired to the  acquiring undertaking .  Ultimately the 
approval of shareholders as well as creditors of both parties to the 
transaction is unavoidable. Art 19, para 2 of the E.E.C third directive 
added another consequence of great significance that:
...no shares in the acquiring company shall be exchanged for shares 
in the company being acquired held either (a) by the acquiring 
company itself or through a person acting in his own name but on its 
behalf, or (b) by the company being acquired itself or through a 
person acting in his own name but on its behalf.
section of the Companies Act. 1985. The mergers and divisions in question  
may take place in the U.K. by means of compromises  or arrangements  
governed by sections: 4 2 5 -4 2 7  of the Companies Act 1985.  These Regulations 
amend the Companies Act 1985 by inserting a new  Subsection.427A and a new  
Sch.l5A. These regulations implemented the E.E.C. Directive 7 8 / 8 5 5 ,  cited 
below. Sections.4 2 8 - 4 3 0  of the Act relating to Compulsory Acquisit ion of 
Shares, forming Part XIII A of the Act have been amended and repealed by  
the Financial Services Act 1986,  Sch.12. French Legislation: The Loi No.8 8 -1 7  
of 5th Jan. 1988 relating to Fusions and Scissions des Societes Commerciales,  
modifying the Loi No.66-537 .  E.E.C Directives: Third Directive 7 8 / 8 5 5  of 9th  
Oct.1978 concerning Mergers of Public Limited Liability Companies (O.J L 
2 9 5 / 3 6  of 20th Oct. 1978); The Council Directive No.8 2 / 8 9 1 /E.E.C. relating to the 
Divisions of Public Limited Liability Companies (OJ No.L 3 7 8 / 4 7  of 2 1s t  
Dec.1982);  Tenth Directive on International Mergers of  Public Limited  
Companies (O.J. C 23 of 25th Jan. 1985); This Directive, derived from the "Draft 
convent ion  on international mergers" (Bull. 1 3 /7 3 ) ,  w as  adopted by  the  
Commission on 4th Jan. 1985.  COM (84 )727  of 8th Jan.1985; Opinion on the 
proposal, COM 7 5 / 6 7 1 ,  OJ C 3 0 3 /1  1, 26th.Sept 1985 and O.J. C 3 0 3 / 2 7  of 25th  
Nov.l 985.
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It is worth  mentioning tha t  the E.E.C. harmonisation directives 
in the field of s ta tu tory  mergers  provide two dist inct k inds of 
definition. First, merger by acquisition; and second merger by the 
formation of a new company.
( 1 ) - MERGER BY ACQUISITION
Article 3 of the directive provide that;
Merger by acquisition" shall mean an operation w h e reb y  one or 
more companies are wound up without  going into l iquidation and 
transfer to another ail their assets and liabilities in exchange for the 
issue to the shareholders  of the  company or companies being 
acquired of shares in the acquiring company and a cash payment,  if 
any, not exceeding 10% of the nominal value of the shares so issued 
or, w here  they  have no nominal value,  of the ir  accounting per
value.35
(2)-  MERGER BY THE FORMATION OF A NEW COMPANY
Article 4 provides that:
Merger by the fo rmation of a new company" shall mean the 
operation whereby  several companies are wound up without going 
into liquidation and transfer to a company that  they set up all their 
assets and liabilities in exchange for the issue to their shareholders of 
shares in the new company and a cash payment ,  if any, not 
exceeding 10%.of the nominal value of the shares so issued or, where  
they have no nominal value, of their accounting per value.
3 5 -  Compare re sp ec t ive ly  w i th  French Loi No.6 6 / 5 3 7 ,  Art.371 as 
amended by the Loi No 88-17,  Art. 1, supra n.34; and the British Companies Act 
1985, Art.427.A, inserted therein by the Statutory Instrument No.1991 of 1987.  
With respect  to the E.E.C. mergers' definit ion cited above,  compare  w i th  
French definition laid down by la Chambre Civile de la Cour de Cassation du 
24.1.46 as "Le terme fusion suppose la reunion d’au moins deux societes pre-  
ex istantes ,  soit  que l'une absorbe l ’autre, soit que l 'une et  l'autre se 
confondent pour constituer une societe unique" noted in (Dalloz 1946 .146);  
(1973)26  Rev.Trim.Dr.Com. p.592. paras 27
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The major difference in both the U.K and France concerning 
such a definition and the implementat ion of the E.E.C. directives in 
the field of mergers is that, in the UK, such mergers take place by 
means of compromises or arrangem ents .  The scheme is p repared  
under  the supervis ion of the court. The final draf t  of the scheme 
may not have effect unless a court sanction is received. In France, 
by contrast, fusion of societes may take effect by an administrative 
decision w h erea s  the court's  role becomes re le v an t  in case of 
litigation or where  the dissenting creditors petition the court. But it 
should be noted tha t  proceedings before the court do not have a 
suspensive effect on the implementat ion of the transaction.36 The
E.E.C a p p ro a c h  a p p e a r s  to r e f le c t  b o th  c o n c e p ts .3 7 The 
harmonisation objectives in the field of company laws should not, 
normally, only be directed to collect the best  business practice or
3 6 -  For further reading in respect of statutory mergers,  see  mainly,  
Baudeu G., Protocoles et Traites de Fusion (Paris, Librairie Technique,  1968);  
Retail L., E u s io n e t  Scission de Societes. Etude luridiaue. Financiere. et  Fiscal. 
(4th edn.) (Paris, Sirey, 1968); Cheminade Y, Nature Juridique Des Societes  
A n o n y m e s  ( 1 9 7 8 )  R e v .T r im .D r .C o m . .plS: Martin G.J, La Notion de la 
Fusion.( 1 9 7 8 )  Rev.Trim.Dr.Com. p. 12; Fusion et  Scission in (Encyclopedie  
Dalloz, societes,  1978);  Champaud C.L, Les Methodes de Groupement  Des 
Societes,  (1 9 6 7 )  Rev.Trim.Dr.Com. at p .1003; Bejot M„ La Protection Des
AcliQimaires  Externes  Dans Les Grouoes  de Societes en  France et  en
A l le  m a e n e  (Bruxelles Etab. Emile Bruylant, 1976).  In Britain, though  
prominence is given to takeovers,  statutory mergers is effected by means of 
compromises  and arrangements,  supra n.34.  For further consultation,  see  
notably,  Pennington R.R., Company L a w . (4th edn.) supra n.17; P a l m e r ’s 
Co_mpanv Law. (24th edn.) (London, Stevens and Sons, 1987 ); Gore Brown F., 
Gore Brown on Company Law (44th  edn.) (London, Jordans and Sons Ltd. 
1986); Wooldridge F, G t_ q u p s  of_Companies . The Law and Practice in Britain . 
France and Germany. (London, Institute of Advance Legal Studies, 1981);  
Gower L.C.B, The Principles of Modern Company Law. (3rd.ed.)  (London,  
Stevens and Sons, 1969)
37-  See generally,  Art.2, 6, 16, 20 and 22 of the Third Directive, supra
n.34
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the member states' common existing rules, but also to focus on their  
conflicting aspects in the hope of eliminating areas of divergence. 
Presumably, conflicting matters  or the divergence of rules may be 
e l iminated through an adequate  and continuous cooperation and 
understanding which the E.E.C. seeks to establish.
B- TAKEOVER OFFERS (SHARE MERGERS)
According to the  E.E.C. proposal for a council d irec t ive  on 
takeovers,  the expression share mergers is used to denote various 
techniques w hereby  securities are bought and sold within  or off the 
m arke t  place. However, takeover  offers techniques often involve a 
change of control from one company to another. Perhaps  the basic 
difference be tw een  s ta tu to ry  mergers and takeovers  is th a t  the 
form er  involves the disappearence of the ta rge t  under tak ing  or, 
undertakings,  w hereas  the la t ter  usually involves the  economic 
dependence  of the ta rge t  com pany .38 Besides, u nder  s ta tu to ry  
merger,  parties to the offer must be under tak ings  w h e re a s  in a 
takeover  an offer may be made for the control of the  ta rg e t  
company either by companies or by individuals. Unlike takeovers,  
s ta tu tory  mergers require  the prepara t ion  of a merger  draft,  the 
approval  of the general  meeting of the merging companies  and, 
ultimately,  the authorisation of the re levan t  au thori t ies  (in due 
legal form) prior to merger being carried out. The use of takeovers,  
by contrast, does not have the protection of the rep resen ta t ion  and 
w arran t ies  made in s ta tutory mergers. The acceptance or rejection
3 8 -  Distinction b e tw e e n  statutory  mergers and share mergers  is 
incorporated into the E.E.C. proposal  on the 13th Council Directive on  
Takeovers and Other Bids, COM (88)823  final, supra n.14 This directive is 
concerned with  the practice of takeovers, known in France as "public offers" 
and in Britain as "takeover 'bids’ or 'offers'".
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of a takeover  offer by the shareholders of the ta rge t  company is 
based on vo lun ta ry  and individual self de te rm ina t ion  but, in a 
s tatutory merger, the decision w hether  or not to approve the deal is 
by a majori ty of 2 /3  or 3 /4  at a general meeting of the merging 
companies.3° Furthermore, legal merger is always effected tax free 
while cash takeover  offers are not.
( 1  ) -  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  A N D  N A T I O N A L  T A K E O V E R  OF F E RS
It  cannot be disputed  tha t  the re  exist  two major types  of 
takeovers .  One is in te rna t iona l  or c ross -border .  The o the r  is 
domestic or national. This classification equally  applies to legal 
mergers.  In te rna t iona l  takeovers  involve at least  one or more 
overseas offerors for the control of a domestic ta rgeted  company. 
National takeovers  are those which involve two or more locally 
resident companies, one of which will gain the majority of control of 
the other.40
Perhaps the most critical area in in ternational takeovers  today 
is direct investment.  Some countries welcome it, such as Britain. 
Others impose rigorous conditions and restrictions such as fiscal and 
other monetary  implications as well as political issues. The te rm  
investm ent consists of any investm ent  made directly or indirectly, 
w hether  for the purpose of acquiring new ownership, reinforcing an 
existing acquisition or establishing a new branch of business in the
3 9 -  Statutory mergers of the type  cited above are of predominant  
concern in France , supra.n.34 to 36
40- It is worthwhi le  to mention that national or international takeover  
offers may take one of the following forms. They may be agreed, contested or 
competitive.  Gower states that "The choice of methods to be em p loyed  wil l  
sometimes be dictated by circumstances". Among the most obvious  factors  
that are likely to decide what method is chosen w h e n  a choice is available are 
tax and stamp duty considerations. See Gower L.C.B., The Principles of Modern  
Company Law, p.631, supra n.36.
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host country. Thus, in ternational  takeovers  are not mere capital 
m ovem ent from one country  to another.  They contr ibu te  to the 
development of the host country.41
As th e y  stand, both British and French regulations prohibit  
certain takeover  offers involving mergers of competi tors which are 
expected to have, after completion, an adverse effect on the public 
in te res t  or competition. The criteria applied may vary .  In some 
instances,  the nat ionali ty  of foreign offerors could have  a v e ry  
important  bearing on the failure or success of offers, while in other 
situations many other characteristics of the foreign acquirer  could 
have grea t  implications on the probabil i ty  of success. Take, for 
instance, the financial sector. Takeovers involving a ta rge t  company 
operating in the financial sector, such as banks, can presen t  special 
difficulties and may, as a practical matter,  be impossible .42 Take 
ano ther  example which  is quite  dissimilar to the  fo rm er .  This 
involves an aspect of m anagem ent  in engineering activities. In 
1980, the United k ingdom ’s Monopoly and Mergers Commission 
investigated the takeover  offer made by a USA offeror (Enserch 
Corporation) for the control of a British company (Davy Company). 
The M.M.C findings were  on the grounds tha t  Enserch Corporation 
could not prove tha t  they  could fit w ith  the type of activities the 
ta rge t  com pany operates .  Therefore,  it could not be a suitable  
owner of the British company. Moreover, the M.M.C concluded tha t
4 1 -  Earl P and Fisher F.G, In te rn a t io n a l  Mergers And Acquis it ions  
(London, Euromoney Publication,  1986) ,  Cooke T, I n t e r n a t i o n a l  Law of 
Mergers And A cquis it ions . (New York, Blackwell  Inc,1988); Ffrench H.L, 
International Law of Takeovers And Mergers , Southern Europe. Africa and  
The Middle East (Quorum Books Ltd. 1987),  Ibid (Asia, Australia and Oceania) 
(1986).
42-  Earl k  Fisher, International Mergers And Acquisit ions, supra n.41,  
at p.30
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the proposed chain of command from the USA to Great Britain 
would w ea k en  the m an ag em en t  of Davy ( target) .  Finally, the 
takeover offer was disapproved, not because of the adverse  effect 
on competi t ion or the public in terest ,  bu t  it w as  solely on the 
ground of poor fitness with an overseas purchaser(Enserch).43
In conclusion, the tests  which appears to be applied to disallow 
fore ign  acqu ire rs  of a locally r e s id e n t  com pany,  o th e r  th a n  
competition and the public interest, seem to exhibit a wide range of 
variabili ty and rests  within the discretion of the re levan t  authority  
of the host country.
I t  is becoming cus tomary  in in te rna tiona l  takeovers  th a t  an 
overseas offeror, in order to have any local presence in the country 
in which it wishes to expand its business, f requent ly  prefers  a lack 
of majori ty control and to re ly  on the influence of its appoin ted  
nominees instead. This technique, however,  is often v iew ed  as a 
f i r s t - s tep  tow ard  majority ow nersh ip .44 Nevertheless,  it is time 
consuming and is costly. Finally, it could be argued tha t  following 
the implementation of the project of the single market,  competi tive 
offers may at tract  or occupy the prime concern especially of those 
holding sub s tan t ia l  pe rcen tage  of voting r igh t  contro l  in E.C 
companies.43
43- Ibid
44-  Ibid, at p.28
4 5 -  Recently in the U.K. the D.T.I issued a consultat ive document  
seeking the v ie w s  of the financial community as to which barriers pose the 
greatest  problems for U.K companies within  the E.C. See D.T.I, Barriers to 
Takeovers in the European Community, A Consultative Document (Jan.1990).  
The focus is directed,  inter alia, to cross holding,  unequal vot ing  rights,  
proxy voting, identification of shareholders and poison pills.
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(2 )-  FORM OF TAKEOVERS
As indicated above, the re  are two types  of takeover  offers. 
They may either be national or international.  Both types  may take 
one of the  following forms of takeover  offers; agreed  (fr iendly 
offer) , con tes ted  or com peti t ive .  The major c r i te r ia  used  to 
distinguish between  an agreed, contested and competi tive offer is 
solely based  on the consideration offered, the  reac t ion  of the 
directors and on the num ber  of offerors involved.
As regards the consideration offered, if an offer is made wholly 
or par t  in cash as a principal consideration, the offer is te rm ed  a 
cash offer. If the consideration is made in securities, the offer is 
called an exchange of share for share offer. However, w h e rev e r  a 
competi t ive  offer is made, offerors often p re fe r  offering cash 
instead, w h e th e r  or not a l te rna t ives  are provided.  The second 
criteria refers,  in the main, to the reaction of the ta rge t  board  of 
directors. Competitive offers are almost always contested, in the 
sense tha t  e i ther  the target  company's  board of directors  resists  
any  r ival  offeror or seeks ano ther  th i rd  p a r ty  to ou tb id  the  
u n w an te d  offeror  (for example ,  the  f ierce s t rugg le  b e tw e e n  
Guinness and Argyll for the control of Distillers).46 Alternatively,  
the contest  may be caused by competitors themselves against each 
other while the target company's board of directors remains  neutra l  
and, at  the same time, convinces their  shareholders  to hold the ir  
shares (for example, the competi tion be tw een  the  the  tw o  Swiss 
companies, Nestle and Suchard for the control of the UK company, 
Row ntree47 in the U.K, and Primistere S.A and Z. Biderman for the 
control of Radar S.A holding in France48). In events  such as these
4 6 -  See infra, Ch.6, footnotes 108 to 109.
4 7 -  See infra n.23 and 132/Ch3.
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experienced shareholders  often re ta in  their  stock until the la test 
possible date before the offer expires. Certainly, the main reason 
for such a delay is a financial one, i.e, to induce competi tors  to 
revise their  price competitively. Finally, the third criteria relates to 
the num ber  of offerors involved. An offer for the control of a target  
company may be made by one offeror, it may also be made by 
several  b idders ail of which seek to gain the majority  of votes at 
the target  company's general meeting. At present,  the quanti ta t ive 
criteria is the major e lement to distinguish be tw een  a competi tive 
and a single offer. The forms of takeover  offers will be discussed 
below in turn.
(a)-  CONTESTED OFFERS
Contested offers often result  from the fact tha t  directors of the 
ta rge t  company, once they  have decided to resis t  an offer, see the 
picture in a different light. The prospect for success of an offer is 
less predictable and shareholders uncertainty is greater .  There are, 
how ever ,  severa l  m easures  the opposit ion may u n d e r t a k e  to 
discourage the offeror as well as to dissuade investors from making 
a hurr ied  decision and refrain from selling their  stock. In general, 
the re  are a n um ber  of aspects which may be considered  by  the 
ta rge t  company 's  directors and im plem ented  e i ther  prior  to the 
announcement of potential offers or during the immediate  period of 
the offer. Indeed, each measure,  w he the r  prophylactic or remedial,
4 8-  M.2 Biderman_et  Societe Valeur c. Socie te  Primisteres e t  Autres . 
Trib.de Com. de Paris , 28 Juillet 1986., Presidence de M.Grandjean, noted by  
Marchi J.P, (1986)  Gaz.Pal.(Jurisprudence) at p .14; Trib Com.De Paris, l re ch., 
28 Juil l . l986,  noted in (Receuil Dalloz, p.305); Cour D'Appel De Paris (3e Ch.B), 
18 Mars 1988,  President de Lemontey M„ noted in (1988)  Gaz.Pal., at p.6 
Jurisprudence .
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has its own implications bu t  both adversely  affect offers against 
which they  have been implemented.
The effects discussed above may be economic, financial,  
commercial, legal, social and psychological or emotional.  In some 
o ther  instances,  d irectors  may also invoke or t r igger  political 
aspects.  The whole range of such aspects th a t  d i rec to rs  may 
advance to their  shareholders is aimed to f rus t ra te  an offer and to 
p rese rve  the ir  company 's  independence .  Competitors (offerors), 
depending on their own financial resources, may also pu t  forward a 
num ber  of advantageous arguments  in the hope of inducing either 
the directors of the ta rge t  company to rev iew  their  decision, or 
directly to induce shareholders  to accept the proposal. They may 
promise, for example, not to cut jobs, to keep the m anagem ent  of 
the company (target), to p reserve  the initial h ea d q u a r te r s  of the 
ta rge t  and th a t  the target,  after acquisition, would  have  its own 
board of directors. They may also argue tha t  the re  should be no 
reduct ion  in the level of par t ic ipat ion  or f inancial  ea rn ing  of 
inves to rs .  But the se  p rom ises  r e m a in  w i th in  the  f r a m e  of 
uncertainties and probabilities.49 If there  are several  competitors, 
the only alternative for rivals is to raise their  price competi tively or 
to propose other attractive considerations.
(b)-  MUTUAL OR FRIENDLY OFFERS
In practice, not ail mergers are the resu lt  of contested offers. 
An offer may also be the resu l t  of an agreed deal, w h e re  both 
par t ies  involved prefer  amicably to negotiate the  proposal.  The 
re le v a n t  authori ty ,  in o rder  to p ro tec t  sh a reh o ld e rs  in te res ts ,  
imposes upon their  directors the pr im ary  responsibil ity of assessing
4 9 -  See infra, Section 3 /C h l  and Ch.6 resp ec t ive ly  because  both are 
closely related.
the transaction, shaping it, approving it, and finally presenting it to 
their  shareholders  for their  ultimate acceptance or rejection. The 
exercise by directors of their  position of represen ta t ion  and the use 
of their  vas t  knowledge about the impact which such a deal may 
rep re se n t ,  are c ircum scr ibed  by  the  f iduc ia ry  d u ty  owed to 
s h a re h o ld e r s .50 Legally, in the presence of such a situation, the 
at t i tude of both the U.K. and French regulations differ radically. 
Whilst the British regulator's involvement is minimal, the French is 
more important.  The French Commission des Operations de Bourse 
(C.O.B) requires  both parties involved to submit to it, prior to any 
official announcem ent ,  a common inform ation  d o cu m en t  (note 
commun) for sc ru t iny .51 They must also send, w i th in  the same 
day, the i r  offer d ra f t  to the  Conseil des Bourse de Vaieurs, 
specifying certa in  r eq u i rem en ts .52 The most im p o r tan t  aspect in 
respect of agreed offers is the consent of parties in offers and the 
the supervision of the relevant  authority. Both are vital.
( 3 ) -  C H A R A C T E R I S T I C S  OF T A K E O V E R  OFF ER S
Typically, takeover  offers begin w i th  an offeror,  usually  a 
company, acquiring a majori ty of voting rights control, b u t  not a 
100% ownership, in w h a t  is then the ta rge t  company. The kind of 
methods th rough  which such control is ob ta ined  are tak eo v e r  
offers, private negotiation, marke t  purchase or any combination of 
these. In most instances, acquisition of effective control or even a
50-  See Ch.5 'Directors Fiduciary Duty'
51 -  C.O.B. decision generale of 25th July 1978,  Rule B.2 (J.0.13th August, 
1978) as amended by the Arrete. Amended by the 1989 Regulation, see infra 
Ch.3
52-  Arrete of 7th August, 1978,  Art 178 et seq, relating to public offer 
regulation as amended by the 1989 Arrete of Sept.28th., see infra n.73
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significant in terest  in a company is merely a t ransi tory  step toward 
either majority of control or full ownership. Similarly, acquisition of 
majority control by a takeover offer is often followed with in  a short 
time by a compulsory acquisition and ultimately obtaining direct 
and full ownership. In other situations, if the acquirer  is a paren t  
company, the acquired company (target) may rem ain  a subsidiary 
of the acquiring company for an extended period. If this is the case, 
the p a ren t  company operates  the subsidiary  th rough  a board of 
directors composed of the paren t  company's nominees.  However, 
the interplay between a takeover offer and compulsory acquisition 
has been  made clear in Re National Bank L imited .33 P lowman J 
refused to place any limitation on the term "arrangement" . In tha t  
case the vital aspect of the scheme was the purchase by an outsider 
of all issued shares  of the company. The d is s en te n t  minori ty  
challenged tha t  it could only be effected through a takeover  offer 
by using Section 209 of the C.A. 1948 (now sch 12 of the
F.S.A. 1986). He pointed out tha t  section 206 and Section 20 involve 
quite different considerations and different approaches. By v ir tue  
of Section 206 an a r r an g em e n t  can only be sanctioned if the 
question of its fairness has f irs t  of all been submitted  to the court. 
If it does come to the court, then the bu rden  falls on the dissentent  
minority to prove the unfairness of the scheme.54 But, since the 
bu rden  of proof is placed on any applicant to prove otherwise, the 
ques t ion  is how convincing proof should  be? This r e m a in s  
questionable and an easy answer could not justifiable at  all. The 
same question arises in Re Hellenic and General T rus t  L im i ted . 
Templeman J states tha t  "the fact that an arrangement under Section 206
53- (1966)1 All ER 1006
54-  Compare with the rule laid down in Foss v  Harbolle (1 8 4 3 )  2 Hares 
rep. 461.
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produces a result which is the same as a takeover under Section 209 is not 
necessarily fatal." Thus, albeit fulfilling nearly  identical objectives, i.e, 
control, both transactions, w he the r  or not  one is ancil lary to the 
other, remain distinct.55
Takeover offers may also be distinguished from other forms of 
m a rk e t  purchase notably, pr ivate  deals and disposals as well  as 
leve raged  bids or r e v e r se  offers,  including pa r t ia l  offers.  In 
de te rm in ing  w h a t  characteris t ics  may make it dist inguishable,  
stress hereinafter  will be on some of its major characteristics. The 
most no teworthy  aspects of takeover  offers appear  to be tha t  first, 
general takeover  offers require tha t  a certain minimum num ber  of 
shares  should be offered. Such a quan t i ty  is usually  conditional 
upon the potential success of the in tended  offerors and clearly 
expressed in the re levant  offer document. Indeed, it is becoming a 
rule th a t  w hereve r  an offeror seeks to acquire more than  30% of 
shares carrying voting rights, he must make a general  offer to all 
shareholders  of the target company or at  least to all the holders of 
shares of a particular class or classes. Actually, this is a triggering 
level under  most re levan t  regulation, the purpose of which is to 
provide investors with  fu r the r  safeguards.  Correspondingly, if an 
offer is made conditional on acceptance being offered in respect  of a 
stated minimum limit of shares, the offeror often rese rves  the right 
to waive any conditions introduced subsequently. Likewise, an offer 
is generally  made irrevocable. This means th a t  once an offer is 
publicly announced, the offeror cannot re trac t  his com m itm ent  as to 
the continuity of his offer unless justifiable grounds are provided 
and the regulator  considers them  reasonable  and convincing for
55- (1976) 1 WLR 123 at 127
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such withdrawal.  By contrast, the position of shareholders  to whom 
the offer is addressed may v a ry  from one country to another. The 
French regulator permits  any shareholder to w i thdraw  his offer at 
any  time, including the last  day of the offer. But in Britain 
shareholders  of the ta rge t  company can only use the ir  rights to 
w i th d ra w  in par t icu lar  circumstances.  For example,  w h e re  the 
original offer is p rom ptly  followed by  a competi t ive  offer and 
provided tha t  the original offer is not declared unconditional as to 
acceptance.
Since the purpose of an offer is to acquire or facili ta te the 
eventual  acquisition of control (the level of which usually exceeds 
51%) of the ta rge t  company, only shares  which entit le , or may 
eventually  entitle, their  holders to voting rights at general meetings 
of the ta rge t  are relevant.  Finally, a takeover  offer which involves 
the  change of control of the  t a rg e t  com pany  (whether or not 
competitively launched) genera tes  various provisions of information 
disclosure. In consequence, misstatement,  f raudu len t  or deceptive 
action entails civil and criminal proceedings. If a cash offer is made, 
the price for shares  of the ta rge t  com pany is f r e q u e n t ly  made 
substantia l ly  higher than  the cu r ren t  m a rk e t  quota t ion  of such 
shares. In most takeovers  transactions the premium offered often 
exceeds 20% above the market  price. To emphasize, in France, one 
s tudy concluded tha t  premiums always v a ry  be tw een  20% to 40% 
before an offer is announced and up to 100% or more during the 
offer period.56
56-  See mainly, Loyrette J, Les Offres Publiaues D'Achat. supra n.10, at 
p.110 -114
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SECTION THREE: CONTROL AND MOTIVATION 
It is generally agreed tha t  takeovers  are becoming the  most 
f requen t  process involving the change of control from one company 
(target) to the successful offeror. But there  is an ambiguous area 
w here  both control and purchase of shares are involved. The sellers 
are not controlling persons and the controllers are no t  the  legal 
owners  of shares .57 This, perhaps ,  is the aspect th a t  gene ra tes  
more controversies  and is still at the  point of d ev e lo p m e n t .5 8 
Moreover any motivation to acquire control may be f ru s t ra ted  by 
the desire, for example, to rem ain  in control. Below it will be 
discussed, first, the vexed  aspect  of control and, second, the 
motivation to acquire control as well as to defeat offers.
5 7 - Ibid, at 260
5 8 -  For an extensive analysis, see mainly Champaud Cl, Les Methods de 
Regroupement  des Societes (19 6 7 )  Rev.Trim Dr.Com.. p. 1003: Laviec J.P., 
Protection et Promotion des Invest i ssem ents . (Press Universitaire de France, 
1985),  p . 17; Flores G. & Mestre J, La Reglementation  de l 'Autocontrole  
(Commentaire de la Loi No. 85 -7 0 5  du 22 Juillet 1985), (1985)  Rev.Soc. p.775; 
Coffy de Boidefere M.J., L'Autocontrole dans les Societes Commerciales et  la 
Loi du 12 Juillet 1985, (1987) Gaz Pal.. Doctrine, p.4; Wooldridge F, The French 
Law Implementing The Seventh E.E.C. Directive (1988)9 Co.Law. n.63: Bejot M., 
La Protection...des Actionnaires Externes Dans les Groups de Societes en  
France et en Allenmaene. p.61 (Bruxelles, Etablissement Emile Buylant, 1976); 
Wooldridge F., GrouD.s.._.of Companies. The Law and Practice in Britain. France 
and Germany supra n.36; Pickering M.A, Shareholders Voting Rights and 
Company Control (1965) L.O.Rev. p.248; Hornsey G., some Aspects of The Law 
Relating to Company Control (1950)13  M.L.Rev. p.470; Boyle A.J, The Sale of 
Controlling Shares: American Law and Jenkins Committee, ( 1 9 6 4 )1 3  T.C.L.O. 
p .185: Manne H.G., Some Theoretical Aspects of Shares Voting ( 1 9 6 4 )  64  
Col.L.Rev. p .1427; Hill A., The Sale of Controlling Shares (1957)70  Harv.L.Rev. 
p.986; Berle A.A, "Control" in Corporate Law (1 9 5 8 )  58 Col.L.Rev. p . 1212:  
Weinberg M.A & Blank M.V., Takeovers and Mergers. (4th ed.) Para 203  and 
914,  supra n.19; Farrar J.H, Ownership and Control of Listed Public  
Companies, Revising or Rejecting the Concept of Control, in Comnanv Law in 
Change. Current Legal Problems, at p.39, (London, Stevens and Sons, 1987)
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3.1- CONCEPT OF CONTROL
Basically, there appear three sorts of control; the control which 
is exercised during the com pany’s usual business life (prior to any 
acquisit ion), control w hich  is sought  to be acqu ired  w h e n  a 
company becomes vu lnerab le  to takeover  offers, and control by 
convention. Concerning the control of the subject of a takeover offer 
and control by convention, the distinction is great. As the form er  is 
pure ly  an acquisit ion of voting r igh ts ,59 the la t te r  is s imply a 
transfer ,  consolidation or concentration of voting rights in one or 
s e v e ra l  h an d s .  For ex a m p le  v o t in g  a g r e e m e n t s  b e t w e e n  
shareholders  and voting trusts.  This also applies to proxies and 
t ransfe r  of control in legal m erger .60 Hence the kind of control 
which is an essential element of a takeover  offer principally relates 
to an acquisition of votes. The question here is twofold. Could it be 
assumed tha t  the incentive for the acquisition of control is limited 
to an appo in tm en t  or dismissal of directors?. How w ide  is the 
la t i tude of the controllers and w h a t  is the desire or motivation 
behind an acquisition of control?
5 9 -  The term "voting power", "controlling interest",  "right over  
shares", and "voting control" or "controlling power" are hereinafter used in 
this thesis  interchangeably both to describe the control and to denote the 
characteristics of shares that give such control.
6 0 -  One should not  confuse  b e t w e e n  a transfer  of control  and 
acquisition of such control by a takeover offer. For further information,  see 
Paillusseau J., La Cession de Controle (1 986),I.C.P. I.Doctrine,3244; Pail lusseau  
J. and Contin R., La Cession de Controle d’une Societe, (1 9 6 9 )  T.C.P (ed, Cl), 
87052,  87053;  and (ed.G.I.), 2287; Cateron M., La Protection des Interets Des 
Actionnaires et  La Prise de Controle des Societes par les Groupes Concurrents, 
(1969)  Rev.Soc. p.143; Oppetit B., La Prise de Controle D'une Societe au Moyen  
D’une Cession D'Action, (19.70) T.C.P. ed.G I, 2361.
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A -  MEANING OF CONTROL
As is stands, the expression "control" is complex to define. In 
addition, there  are a wide range of techniques and devices w hereby  
control can be secured as discussed above. It is w or th  reiterating 
tha t  control may be obtained by purchase of shares  on or off the 
Stock Exchange in a matter  of days or over periods of time, it can 
also be secured  by contracts ,  by  a r r a n g e m e n ts  e n t e r e d  into 
b e tw e en  shareho lders  or by proxies and voting t r u s t s .61 Thus 
control  cannot  fa ir ly  be a t t r ib u te d  to, or de r ive  from, mere 
o w nersh ip  of a majori ty  of vo tes  in a gene ra l  meeting. For 
economists, control may mean planning the company's  long term 
strategy, allocating its resources, selecting products , m a rk e t  and 
technology in addi t ion to o ther  k ey  decisions.62 But for legal 
academic wri ters  control means various things, the tes t  of which is 
the  legit imacy of decisions.6 3 Hence, some argue th a t  control 
means "the capacity to choose directors. As a corollary, it carries capacity to 
influence the board of directors and possibly to dominate it".64 W hereas  
another w ri ter  pointed out tha t  control "denotes the relationship which 
exists when an individual or group of individuals, who are clearly identifiable in
6 1 - See Gower L.C.B., The.Principles of Modern Company Law, p. 441 -444  
(London Stevens and Sons 1957),  Ibid (edn 1969); Pickering, Shareholders  
Voting Rights and Company Control, supra n.58; Hornsey,  Some Aspects of 
The Law Relating to Company Control, supra.n.58
6 2 -  Herman E.S., Corporate .Control. Corporate Pow er  (Cambridge  
University Press, 1981) reviewed by Werner W. (1983) Col.L.Rev 238.
63 -  Berle A.A, concludes that attainment of a position of control "may 
not be secured by bribery  or by  fa lse  representa t ion  or by inducing  
directors of the corporation w h o s e  control  is sought  to res ign  for a 
consideration.  Properly it may not be secured by purchase of stock from 
previous controlling stockholders along with  a companion understanding or 
agreement that directors resignations will  be brought about. When  control 
has been secured, its exercise must be "responsible", supra n.58 at p.1224
64- Ibid, at p. 1212
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some respect or respects and who may themselves be incorporated, exercise 
powers of direction and dominion over the affairs of a company".65 Looking 
at self regulation, in the view of the Panel administering the Code in 
the U.K. control means a holding, or aggregate holdings, of shares 
ca rry ing  30% or more of the  voting r igh ts  of a com pany,  
i r respec t ive  of w h e th e r  the holding or holdings give de facto  
control.66
Referring to s ta tu to ry  definit ions,67 the  French legislation 
incorporated an even wider  definition of control. The French Code 
Commercial of 1966,. Article 355(1)  indicates th a t  a com pany 
should be deem ed to have control of another  com pany  w here  it 
directly or indirectly  holds a proport ion  of ano ther  com pany 's  
capital conferring on it the majori ty  of the vo tes  at  a genera l  
meeting of th a t  company; it holds the majority  of vo tes  in th a t  
company pursuan t  to an agreem ent en tered  into w ith  m em bers  of 
tha t  company; and w here  by its position of having de facto  control, 
it determines the decision-making process at a general  meeting of 
th a t  com pany .68 Although var ied  and to a cons iderable  degree 
homogeneous, both the theoretical and sta tutory  definitions, appear 
to locate the control in the hand of those having the power to elect
65-  Pickering M.A, supra n.58, at p.248
66-  Originally the triggering level  under the City Code was  40%. It was  
reduced to 30% in 1974. The Bank of England and the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI) urged the government to lower the threshold at which offers  
trigger the obligation to make a general  offer to all shareholders from 30% 
to 20%, The Times, February 27th, 1989, at p.2
6 7 -  The U.K Industry  Act 1975,  Part.II sect ion 12 d e f in es  the  
circumstances involving the change of control of a locally res ident  company  
to foreigners; For tax purposes, the British Finance Act, 1940,  Section 55(3),  
noted by Hornsey G., supra n.58 at p.471-473
6 8-  Compare the French definit ion re sp ec t ive ly  w i th  the U.K. Fair 
Trading Act 1973, as amended by the 1989 Companies Act, at Section 65; The 
E.C Joined Case 6 and 7 /7 3 ,  at para 32 (e), supra n.5.
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the board of directors and to determ ine  the fu tu re  policy of the 
company. Moreover, since the control of companies cannot only be 
said to be der ived  from mere ownership  of shares ,69 the above 
cited defin i t ions of control  r em a in  incomplete and  som ehow  
unsatisfactory. This means tha t  they appear  to leave many questions 
open for resolution.
As regards  the var iabil i ty  of the percentage of vo tes  which 
entit le the holder to control the policy of or to elect the  board of 
directors, nei ther  the statutes, including extra legal regulation, nor 
academic writers,  resolve the problem. Specifically, to determine at 
w h a t  point a subs tan t ia l  shareho lder  may control or occupy a 
position of de facto  control.70 To illustrate, in Britain, for instance, 
the Companies Act 1948 as well  as the Insuring Companies Act 
1974, Section 193 (1) (c) and Section 7 respectively regarded  one 
third or more of the voting control as giving control. The Monopoly 
and Mergers Act of 1965 considers  25% of voting control  as 
conferring the exercise of effective control.71 The 1989 Companies 
Bill advocated a much lower level of 15% as the tr iggering level at  
which obligations to make general offers arise 72 By contrast,  the 
E.E.C. Directives and the French legislature consider one th i rd  of 
voting rights as giving de Facto control73
69- For example,  there are various devices w h e reb y  a person,  w hether  
or not owning shares, may control a company and, thus be be able to elect  its 
board of directors, notably by proxies, voting trust, voting agreements,  or by  
other  contracts,  including inc idental  transfer  of control  such as b y  
in h e r i ta n c e .
7 0 -  Legal or de jure control is usually referred to 50% or more of votes  
at the company general meeting.
7 1 -  The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers laid down 30%.
7 2 -  Following the adoption of the C.A 1989,  such a recom mendat ion  
appears to be omitted
7 3 -  See the French Conseil de Bourse de Valeur Regulation of  1989,
41
No explanation can be given as to w h y  an effective control 
cannot be located in one uniform level. Perhaps the more im por tan t  
question is w hy  do almost all securities m arke t  regulators  a t tem pt  
to impose or fix such a minimum level and for w h a t  purpose?
Starting, for instance, from the characteristics pf shares. As a 
matter  of law, it is obvious tha t  shareholders  are ent ire ly  free to 
dispose of their  rights at any time they  wish to do so and to any 
buyer  they  choose. In one case Borland's Trustee v. Steel Brother 
and Co. Ltd.. Farwell I. indicated:
A share is the interest  of a shareholder in the company measured 
by a sum of money, for the purpose of liability in the first place, and
of interest  in the second A share is not a sum of money ...but is an
inte rest  measured by a sum of money and made up of various  
rights.74
However ,  as one may notice f rom  to day  c o m p u lso ry  
acqu is i t ion  pract ice ,  it  used  to be v e r y  d if f icu l t  to  force 
shareholders  to disinvest involuntarily, because, a t  one time, the 
court viewed share ownership as a form of ves ted  r ight th a t  could
Art.5.3.1, Ch.III, Arrete du 28 sept.1989,  (J.O.Sept.30th, p.12309);.Article 4, para 
2 of the E.E.C. proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company law  
relating to Takeovers and Other General Bids, requires that " To calculate the 
threshold...,  the fol lowing must be added to the vot ing rights held b y  the  
offeror: (a) voting rights held by persons acting in their own name but on 
behalf  of the offeror; (b) w h e r e  appropriate,  vo t ing  rights he ld  b y  
companies belonging with  the offerer to the same group of undertakings ...; 
(c) vot ing rights held by persons acting in concert w i th  the offerer; (d) 
where  appropriate, voting rights held by directors of the offerer company",  
COM (88) 823 final, supra n.14; It is worthy of note that in the U.K. the Panel 
has already adopted a level  of 30% after which a mandatory offer must be 
made. See Rule 9 of the Code.
7 4 -  (1901)1  Ch.279,  17 T.L.R.45; British and American Trustee  and 
Finance Corp. v. Couper (1894)  A.C 399, 10 T.L.R.415; Oakbank Oil Co v. Crum 
(1882)8 App Cas 65, 89 LT 537.
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not be taken  without consent. Since this att i tude created barriers,  it 
was replaced by the rule th a t  perm it ted  the majority  to acquire 
compulsorily the remaining shares  against a fair  and equi table  
c o n s i d e r a t i o n . 7 5 Correspondingly offerors, w h en  deciding to take 
over a ta rget  company, enjoy a wide range of freedom in the sense 
tha t  they  are not compelled to exercise the control being acquired 
for a specified purpose. In other words, control may be sought for 
various purposes which may or may not be in the best  in terests  of 
the shareholders of the target  company. As a corollary, the re levant  
regulation f requen t ly  compels the buyer, in particular  in cases of 
exchange  offers ,  to  make more in fo rm a t io n  d isc losu re  to 
sha reho lde rs  to w hom  the offer is addressed .  I t  follows th a t  
offerors cannot escape from their  proper obligations towards  their
7 5 -  Acquisitions of minority shareholdings in a company and litigations  
which often arise therefrom are a vexed  aspect. See, Weinberg and Blank, 
Takeovers And Mergers.- (4th ed), supra n.19, at Ch. 20, Paras 2 0 0 1 -2 0 0 5 ;  
Kolodney K., Protection of Minority Shareholders  After a Takeover  Bid, 
(1986)7  Co.Law. p.20; Weiss M.I, The Law of Takeovers And Mergers. A History 
Perspective,  (1 9 8 1 )5 6  N.Y.U.L.Rev.. 624; Corley R.N. Principles of Business  
L a w . (13th edn.),(Prentice Hall, 1986). Generally, methods w h e r e b y  a fair and 
reasonable value  of the assets under challenge could be determined are; the  
va lu e  market method, the assets  va lue  method, and the in v e s tm e n t  or 
earning value method. The first type of valuation may set up the value of the 
shares on the basis of the price for which a share is selling or could be sold 
to a will ing purchaser. But such a method is only relevant  in the ordinary  
circumstances of the Stock Market i.e., it is irrelevant in case of recession or 
market fluctuation. The second method conveys solely a basic fact  about the 
target company’s net assets valued as they stand. Each share is calculated on 
a pro-rata basis of the net value of assets in the aggregate. The third and last 
method is based on a prediction of the c o m p a n y ’s future prospects and 
income compared w i th  its previous  earning record.  Finally, to make a 
subsequent  acquisition in order to secure fuller ownership of the acquired  
company binding on 100% of the shareholders of the offeree company, the 
acquirer must at least  receive a 90% acceptance of its offer so that the  
remaining 10% of the minority shareholders could be obtained by invoking  
the compulsory acquisition procedure.
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own shareholders. Yet, almost always the law lays stress on both 
aspects. Mention should also be made of the fact th a t  those seeking 
control of a ta rget  company are more willing to pay a higher price 
on a per share basis than  they would be willing to pay if the shares 
are voteless. The na tu re  of the problem, therefore,  appears  to be 
compounded. On the one hand, it is not simply the purchase or sale 
of shares, bu t  it is a question of "voting power" and "premium".76 
On the other, is the need to protect shareholders,  be they  a majority 
or a minority, against abusive m arke t  practice. While the la t ter  is 
discussed in the subsequent  chapters,  in particular the fou r th  and 
fifth chapters, the former gave rise to growing concern about  the 
need  of some form of sharing p rem ium s.  For example ,  Berle 
considers tha t  control is a "corporation asset" and advocated tha t  
any premium for the purchase of voting rights should be paid to 
the "corporate treasury" .77 Other com m enta tors  argue th a t  since 
consideration was not paid for the shares bu t  for control, it does not 
follow th a t  the seller of a substantia l  block may appropr ia te  for 
h im self  any  p rem ium  th a t  the  offeror  is willing to  p ay  for 
control .78 Shareholders  should be given an "equal opportunity".
7 6 -  It is worth highlighting that sales at premium are lawful,  and the 
shareholders are under no specific duties in selling their controll ing block. 
Lord Russell of Killowen described a share thus " ...It is the in terest  of a 
person in the  company,  that in teres t  being com posed  of r ights  and 
obligations which are defined by the Company’s Act and by the memorandum  
and articles of association of the company. A sale of a share is a sale of the 
interests so defined, and the subject-matter of the sale is ef fectively ves ted  in 
the purchaser by the entry of his name in the register  of members",  
Commissioners of Inland Revenue v. Crossman k  Others. (1937)  A.C.26, at 66.
7 7 -  Discussed by Hill A., The Sale of Controlling Shares, supra n.58,  at 
p.987; Lowenstein L, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal For 
Legislation (1983)  83 Col.L.Rev. p. 249,, at p.249; Farrar J.H, Ownership and 
Control, supra n.58, at 39 et seq.
7 8 -  For an extensive  analysis, see Alfred Hill, the Sale of Controlling 
shares, at p 986 et seq, Supra n.58
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This would entitle the minority shareholders to sell their  shares on 
the same te rm s  as the controlling shareho lders .79 The opposite 
view suggests tha t  if both propositions were  to be in use, it would 
restra in  transfers  of control. On the one hand, if the prem ium  must 
be paid to the  "corporation treasury",  shareho lders  may not be 
willing to sell their  controlling block. On the other hand, if minority 
shareholders are given "equal opportunity",  b idders may buy  more 
shares  th an  necessary, i.e, "possibly causing the transaction to become 
unprofitable".80 Thus, it can be safely argued th a t  the proposition 
which advocates  equal  oppor tun i t ies  could be the  app rop r ia te  
outcome.81 Furthermore, it could be seen tha t  unequal distribution 
of a p rem ium  will p robably  h inder  sha reho lders  in te re s t s  and 
therefore distort  the main principle of protection th a t  the re levan t  
regulation aims to preserve. Therefore, this could be the answer to 
the above question w ith  respect  to the various a t tem p ts  to fix a 
certain level of shareholdings. This means tha t  beyond such points 
w he the r  30% or 1/3, the so called triggering level, shareholders  of 
the  ta rg e t  com pany  are given the  o p p o r tu n i ty  to sh a re  the 
premium for any change of control. But since experience exhibits
7 9 -  Lowenstein L, Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers: A Proposal  
For Legislation, at p.265, supra n.77; Lipton M. Takeover Bids in The Target's 
Board Room, (1979)35 Bus Law, at p.101 and (198 1)36 Bus Law, at p. 1017
8 0 -  Easterbrook F.R & Fischel D.R, Corporate Control Transact ions  
(1982)  Yale L.T. p.698,  at p.716-17; The Proper Role of a Target's Management  
in Responding to a Tender Offer (1981 )94 Harv.L.Rev. p.l 16 1
8 1- This is, perhaps, consistent w ith  the current trend of takeover  
offers regulations in almost all countries, principally,  UK and France and 
recently the E.E.C. proposal for a directive on takeovers.  Sharing a common  
concern, they  have formally bound any person interested in the control of a 
target company, once its holding exceeds the prescribed limit as discussed  
above, to make an offer to all shareholders at a higher price, including those  
who already accepted or transferred their shares, whether  or not the whole  
body of shareholders is willing to sell its controlling block.
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various instances in which a proportion of 15% or even  less may 
enable the holder to exercise control, it appears  tha t  fixing a higher 
level, say one third, cannot sufficiently afford more safeguards or 
equa l  oppor tun i t ies  b e tw e e n  sha reho lde rs  involved. Hence an 
a l ternative appears  to be tha t  a percentage of 20% could cover a 
much wider group of shareholders.
B-  TYPE OF CONTROL
Conceptually, there  are two discernible approaches to control. 
One is a common law theory  based on voting r ights control. The 
o ther  is a cont inen ta l  concept rela t ing to dom inan t  influence. 
Surpris ingly ,  it should be pointed th a t  most t a k e o v e r  offers  
regulations with in  the E.E.C. tend to adopt the fo rm er  theory  and 
evade the latter. Notwithstanding w hethe r  the control is secured by 
the purchase of shares or otherwise, in practice the re  exists two 
major types  of control, legal or de jure  control and effective or de  
facto  control.82 Briefly, on the one hand, Berle and Means classify 
"control" into five major categories: control through almost complete 
ownership; majority control; control through legal advice; minority 
control; and management control. The three former  categories were  
regarded  as legal, while the two remaining (minority  control and 
managem ent  control) w ere  deemed to be "factual" forms. On the 
other hand, Pickering describes the concept of control to include; 
proprie tary  control; control by constitutional means; inter  m em ber  
control a r rangem ents ;  inter  company control; and m an ag em en t  
contracts. Finally, Pickering pointed out:
82-  Berle and Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property , 
(revised ed 1968),  at ch 5, noted by Farrar J.H., Ownership And Control of 
Listed Public Companies, supra n.58, at p.39; Pickering M.A, Shareholders  
Voting, supra n.58
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...these different basic forms of control cannot always be sharply  
segregated and elem ents of various types, and either legal or d e  
f a c t o  or a combination of both, may exist together in any one 
company. They are means of control and not ends in them selves.83
As far as both descriptions are concerned, the most re levan t  
e lem en t  or type  of control with in  the competi t ive offer field is 
majority of control which, legally speaking, always refers  to 51% of 
unrestr ic ted voting rights. It is worth  reiterating tha t  the 51% level 
referred  to in this context is an extra-legal requ irem en t  for an offer 
to be declared successful. This is vital and almost all Stock Market 
regulations adhere  to the same principle tha t  an offer should be 
made conditional as to the  minimum level of acceptance .84 In 
other word, the offer lapses.
3 .2 -  MOTIVATION FOR TAKEOVERS
A- MOTIVATION TO ACQUIRE CONTROL
Thinking on the subject of motivation to acquire control as well 
as its likely implications has been  far  from unanimous. Desire to 
at ta in  control may arise from, legal, commercial,  economic and 
financial, (including social) considerations,  taking into account 
factors such as recession, inflation and currency f luctuations.83 In 
this respect, among the most common motives advanced  are: the
8 3-  Pickering M.A, supra n.58
8 4 -  Recently,  the French regulator requ ires  any o f feror  not  to 
introduce any clause as to the minimum level  of acceptance. See infra Ch.3
8 5 -  Research into motivations ,  in this context,  concerns  mergers  
b etw een  companies.  For reading see Paillusseau J Sc Contin R, La Cession de 
Control D'une Societe , supra n.60, Trochu M, Les Offres Publiques D'Achat , 
supra n.10; Weinberg M.A, Takeovers and Mergers (3rd edn) (London, Sweet  
Sc Maxwell,  1971), at p.307; Cooke T.E, supra n.41,  at p.26; Goldberg W.H, 
Mergers. Modes. Motives and Methods (Gower 1983); O.E.C.D, Mergers Policies 
and Recent Trends in Mergers (1984).
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desire to increase m arke t  power; a desire to diversify  to spread 
risks and to reduce dependence on a single product, i.e, looking for 
new brands which have a reputation worldwide; a desire to achieve 
sufficient size to obtain economies of scale or g rea te r  financial 
strength; a desire to reap the profits often associated with  a merger 
transaction or to obtain tax advantages; and the desire of managers 
to obtain greater prestige by acquiring more employees.
It is also im por tan t  to mention tha t  there  are var ious  other  
motivations namely, a desire to acquire an established company for 
an eventual  expansion of business ra ther  than  to build up through 
in ternal  effort. Accordingly, an acquirer may be motivated by  the 
desire  to obta in  business  in new  te rr i to r ies ,  he may also be 
substantia l ly  concerned w ith  the value of the ta rg e t  com pany 's  
assets  about  which he bel ieves th a t  he knows b e t t e r  th a n  the 
offeree's board their  real value and the manner w h e re b y  they  can 
be bet ter  or more profitably used. But the desire to acquire control 
may be frus tra ted  by a num ber  of factors including: the availability 
of finance and the legal, fiscal and m onetary  obstacles th a t  still 
exist. Of relevance, too, in this context, is merger  control which 
forms an in tegral pa r t  of competi tion policy w ith in  the European 
Community. One aspect in merger  control on w hich  th e re  does 
appear  to be some consensus is th a t  the d if fe ren t  categories of 
concentra t ions  (horizontal,  ve r t ica l  and conglom erate)  r e q u i r e  
somewhat different s tandards of t rea tm ent .  Case law w ith  respec t  
to merger control f requen t ly  approaches the de t r im en ta l  side of 
hor izonta l  m ergers  w i th  s t r ic tness  in a p ar t icu la r  m a rk e t  or 
m arke ts .  The major concern abou t  the  l ike ly  im pl ica t ion  of 
hor izon ta l  m erge rs  com pared  w i th  v e r t ic a l  or co n g lo m era te
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mergers comes from their ability to enhance and create a dominant 
position and thus to h inder  competition. Two major factors are 
r eco g n ised  as i m p o r t a n t  for  com pe t i t ion :  th e  d e g re e  of 
c o n c e n t r a t io n  and  b a r r i e r s  to e n t r y . 86 H o w ev er ,  w h i le  
c o m m e n ta to r s  ex p re s s  d o u b ts  as to  th e  a d v a n ta g e s  and 
d is ad v an ta g es  w hich  s tem from m ergers ,  th e i r  f ind ings  are 
inconclusive, merger control regulations have avoided reliance on 
any single fact as being determinant .87
B -  MOTIVATION TO FRUSTRATE OFFERS
The reaction of the directors of the ta rge t  company to offers, 
w he the r  competitive or not, may be one of these al ternatives: resist 
potential or actual competitors on the basis of inadequacy of terms; 
seek either a rescue which outbids the offerors or en ter  into merger 
negotiation with  another fr iendly company other than  the offerors 
pursuan t  to a merger plan; support  one offer against the other and 
reco m m en d  the ir  sh a re h o ld e rs  to accept it  su b se q u e n t ly ;  or 
pe r fo rm  th e i r  du t ies  and obligat ions in an im p a r t i a l  w ay .  
Eventually, as has been pointed out earl ier, w h e th e r  or not  the 
directors of the target company respond to an offer in a negative or 
a positive manner,  or stay neutra l ,  the key  decision to rem a in  
independen t  or to favour the change of control is f re q u en t ly  w ith  
the  in s t i tu t iona l  sha reho lde rs  as well  as those ho ld e rs  of a 
significant percentage of shares carrying unrestr ic ted voting rights.
86-  O.E.C.D, Mergers Policies, at p.9, supra n.85.
87- See The U.K Fair Trading Act 1973 as amended, supra n.68; The 
French Loi No.7 7 - 8 0 6  du 19 Juillet  1977  Relative au Controle de la 
Concentration Economique et  la Repression des Ententes Illicites et des Abus  
de Position Dominante as amended by Loi No.85-1408 du 30 .12 .1985 ,  Art.6 (O.J. 
31.12.85,  No. 155 13): The E.C Regulation on The Control of Concentration, supra 
n.3.
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As a matter of general practice within the takeover  offers field, it is 
im p o r tan t  to realize th a t  most Stock Exchange regula t ions  are 
in tended  to enhance self de te rm ina t ion  of shareho lders .  Hence 
shareho lders  self determinat ion ,  w h e th e r  or not to sell shares,  
assumes the availabil ity of adequate  information disclosure, the 
te s t  of which is the  mater ia l i ty  of inform ation  to the  decision 
making process. Therefore,  the directors are the  un ique  p a r ty  
which bear the burden  of satisfying the shareholders needs.88
Experience dem onstra tes  tha t  once offers are announced, the 
board of the ta rge t  company may, and often does, decide at an 
early  stage of the offer w h e th e r  to oppose bids, to su p p o r t  one 
offeror against the other,  rem ain  neu t ra l  and await  for a b e t te r  
deal, or act in an impartial  w ay  for the best  interests  of the ir  own 
shareholders .  Correspondingly, the board of directors ,  in the i r  
capacity as fiduciaries, are assumed to make their  position clear in 
any situation. Actually, directors seem to be really in a dilemma. If 
they  decide, for example, not to oppose offers which, in the ir  
assessment,  are undesirable to the interests  of their  shareholders ,  
they will be deemed to be in breach of their  duties, w h e th e r  or not 
shareholders  rely on their  judgements.  Furtherm ore ,  if directors 
determine to recommend an offer which is, in fact, not beneficial to 
shareholders to whom it has been recommended, or oppose an offer 
which, normally, should be recommended, they  will put  themselves  
in breach of their  duties. In this context, before setting ou t  any 
argum ents  w h e th e r  for or against directors '  at t i tudes,  th e re  are 
some im portan t  factors which should be taken  into account. These 
include w he the r  the transaction is fr iendly or unfriendly; w h e th e r  
there  are competing parties for the ta rge t  company; w h e th e r  the
88-  See Ch.4.
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t ransac t ion  involves  cash or securit ies ,  w h e th e r  the  b a n k e r  
r ep re se n ts  the buyer ,  the seller or both, w h e th e r  th e re  is a 
difference of opinions within the board of directors. There is also a 
general variat ion in the form of takeover.  First, w h e re  the offer is 
one consisting all or in part  of securities; second, w here  the offer is 
one of cash for all the target  company securities; and th ird  w here  
the offer is one of cash for a controlling block of the ta rge t  shares. 
Bearing these variations in mind, the reaction of shareholders  to 
d irec tors '  res is tance  of ten  d epends  on the  w o r th n e s s  of the  
consideration proposed and the outcome.
First, those  w ho sup p o r t  d i re c to rs ’ res is tance  a rgue  th a t  
shareholders  of the ta rge t  company, as an unorganized body of 
individuals  and institutions,  cannot bargain effectively. It is only 
th rough  the ir  directors  th a t  they  gain the  power to negotiate.  
Individually, shareholders  can only exercise the simple option of 
accepting or reject ing  an offer. As m e m b e rs  of a g roup  of 
individuals who are forced to make individual decisions in a context 
where  they do not know the decision others in the group will make, 
shareholders may be unable to make decisions tha t  will bes t  serve 
the ir  collective self in te re s t .89 This means tha t  a p e r s o n ’s self 
determination is to some extent dependen t  on others and in some 
aspects he does not have the capacity of acting on the basis of his 
own assessment.  Conversely, since shareholders  are unorganized, 
especially w here  there are no links be tw een  them, they  lack this 
power and the responsibili ty associated w ith  it th a t  can only be 
performed through their  representat ives .  Besides, the inabili ty of 
shareholders to make a collective decision may force them to ignore
89-  Herzel L., Schmidt J.R And Scott J.D, Why Corporate Directors Have a 
Right to Resist Tender Offers, (1980)3 Coro.L.Rev. at p.l 11 and 115.
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a host of in te res ts ,90 notably the in terests  of em ployees .91 As to 
the conflict of interests ,  it is argued tha t  the re  is no justifiable 
grounds of separating bad intentions from good in tentions w hen  
conflict of in te re s ts  are p re se n t .92 Others point out  th a t  it is 
reasonab le  for the  directors  of a ta rge t  com pany  to re jec t  a 
tak eo v er  offer if the ir  decision is justified on the  g round  of 
inadequate  price, adverse impact on constituencies and doubt as to 
the quality of the offeror's financial resources or securit ies in an 
exchange offer. Furthermore,  the d irec tors’ resis tance to an offer 
often works in favour of an d /o r  to shareholders  advan tages  by: 
forcing the initiator to raise the price; forcing the offeror to engage 
in a negotiated deal on more favourable  terms; a t tract ing  other  
offerors who will outbid the original initiator 93 To a lesser extent, 
some others ,  in sup p o r t  of the  above a rgum en t ,  a s s e r t  th a t  
directors, by resisting an offer, can be viewed as engaging in a type 
of implicit negotiation to obtain a be t te r  deal from the  init iator 
himself or from some other competitors. Second, the contra ry  view 
argues  th a t  any res is tance  by the  direc tors  or any  s t r a te g y  
designed to p reven t  takeover  offers reduces overall  w e lfa re  and 
shareholders  lose w h a tev e r  p rem ium  over the m ark e t  va lue  the 
offeror proposed would have offered but for the resis tance or the
90-  Ibid.
91-  The post implications of takeovers on em p loyees ’ jobs seems to have  
insuff ic ient ly  recognized.  Moreover,  the pattern of carreer e m p lo y m e n t  
within the field of takeovers appears to be altered in the sense  that there is 
no insurance for workers to remain in job after completion of the offer.
92 -  Lipton M., supra n.76; It is argued that where  a conflict of interest  
arises, it could be solved by appointing an independent committee .  Such an 
option has been criticised on the basis of its difficulties. That is to say how  
an honest  person with a linkage mechanism could be chosen.
93-  Ibid.
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prospec t  of resistance. In the  v iew  of those against  directors '  
resistance, ta rget  company directors have a significant in te res t  in 
p reserv ing  their  companies '  independence  and thus  preserv ing  
the ir  salaries and sta tus (their  es tablished position of prestige, 
power and fortune); the less effective they have been as managers, 
the  g re a te r  the ir  in te re s t  in p rev en t in g  a t a k e o v e r  o ffe r .94 
Easterbrook and Fischel advocate tha t  since resistance to takeovers  
decreases shareholders  gains, directors should be b anned  from 
using any defensive tactics to f rus t ra te  bona fide offers, including 
a t t e m p ts  to secure  a w h i te  k n ig h t .95 Still, a th i rd  group of 
commentators  argue tha t  directors of a target company faced with 
an offer should remain  neutral.  The decision w h e th e r  to block an 
offer, or to accept it, is a matter  to be left for each shareholder  to 
decide.9  ^ Others, additionally, indicate tha t  directors'  resis tance to 
a takeover offer has only a marginal impact on the outcome of the 
com pany control contests .97 Experience shows var ious  instances 
w h ere  directors can do nothing to rem a in  in d e p e n d e n t  once a 
com peti t ive  offer has been  made. "Realistically, the target choice is 
between ravishment by the hostile suitor or a hastily arranged shotgun wedding 
with the white knight."98 Either way, the change in control is most
94-  Penrose W., Some Judicial Aspects of Takeover Bids (1964)9  Tud.Rev. 
p 128; Weiss M.I, Tender Offers And Management Responsibil i ty (1 9 7 8 ) 2 3  
N.Y.L Sch.L.Rev. p.445,  at p.446; Steinbrink W.H, Management’s Response to 
The Takeovers  Attempt  (1 9 8 9 ) 2 8  Case Wes .Res .L.Rev . p.882; Klink F.J, 
Management's Role in Recomending For or Against an Offer (1 9 7 0 )  Bus Law. 
p.845.
95- Supra n.77.
9 6 -  This seems to be the present trend of almost all securities  market  
regulations.
9 7 -  Coffee J.C., Regulation of the Market for Corporate Control; a 
Critical Assessement of the Tender Offer’s Role in Corporate Control, (1 9 8 4 )8 4  
Col.L Rev. 1149, Shareholders Versus Managers: The Strain In The Corporate 
Web (1986)85 Mich.Law.Rev. o.l
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likely, if not automatically, to end with the dismissal of the target 's  
directors . In o ther  words ,  the ir  previous posit ion of pow er  is 
jeopardized. Other commentators  describe offerors as "profiteers", 
or "financiers" seeking only to satisfy the ir  needs  w i thou t  due 
regard  to the  in te res ts  of the shareholders  i n v o l v e d . "  Finally, 
mention should also be made of those who argue tha t  offers should 
be decided by shareholders in a general meeting. They state that, as 
a matter  of logic, the alternative would be to enhance the powers of 
the board of directors by giving it not merely the r ight to defend 
against  takeovers  offers bu t  the right to veto  th e m .100 This v iew 
would pe rhaps  tend  to bring legal m erger  and ta k eo v e r  offer 
decision making to a unified mechanism.
Whatever the substantive ground of the above cited comments,  
the French re levant  authorit ies exercise a pervasive influence on 
each deal. This means tha t  any transaction carried out w ithou t  the 
French authority 's  approval is a violation of the regulation, i.e, the 
French approach  seems more in f luenced by the  t e n d e n c y  of 
dirigisme and administrative decision. By v ir tue  of French Conseil 
de Bourse de Valeur's general regula t ions,101 a ta rge t  company 's  
directors are required  neither  to act nor to respond to any offer 
ei ther  positively or negatively on their  own init iative and desire, 
unless the re levant authorities have received a prior notification to 
th a t  e f fec t .102 Finally, one may w onder  about  the  inexplicable
98-  Ibid, Regulation of The Market, at p.1175.
9 9 -  Penrose W., Some Judicial Aspects, supra n.94
100-  Loweinstein L., Pruning Deadwood in Hostile Takeovers, at p.269,  
supra n.77.
101-  Regulation of 7th August, 1978 relating to public offers as amended.  
See infra n. l /Ch.3.
102- Rule 9 and 10 of the C.O.B. decision generale of 25 July, 1978,  
require the directors of an offeree company to submit, within a period of 4
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reasons as to w hy  in France directors cannot freely  and directly 
re spond  to offers as hap p en s  u nder  the  Brit ish sys tem .  One 
ques t ion  may be re le v an t  in the context is, does the  French 
regulator’s policy operate as a safeguard against defeat of the offer? 
The offeror’s main assurance against defeat is in making a be t te r  
offer which the ta rge t  company shareholders consider reasonable. 
It is equally  im p o r ta n t  to mention  th a t  offerors are not  also 
protected against any subsequent  competi tive offer. Against w h a t  
then  are offerors protected? The most obvious protection, which is 
reflected in both the French and British systems, is solely against  
any f raudu len t  or deceptive opposition. This, in fact, is an indirect 
protection for offers whilst it is primarily designed to promote and 
p reserve  the in te res ts  of the ta rge t  com pany’s shareholders .  As 
indicated earlier, the regula tor  may not protec t  init ial offerors 
against competitors. Furthermore, in France, such litigation has not 
been init iated so far. By w ay  of contrast, in Britain, such disputes 
are clearly illustrated in Lonrho ole v. Faved a n d  o t h e r s . 1Q3 In this 
case, the directors of Lonrho pic, challenged the sub seq u en t  rival 
offer made by Fayed for the control of the House of Fraser (House
of Fraser Holding Ltd.) on the grounds of interference w ith  Lonrho’s
/ '
right to bid for the House of Fraser. The learned judge said tha t  in 
Hadmoor Productions Ltd. v Hamilton Lord Diplock recognised the 
existence of the tor t  of in te rfe rence  w i th  a pla intiff 's  t r a d e  or 
business by unlawful means, but  in tha t  case protection was sought 
for "commercial expectations" and the facts w ere  v e r y  d if fe ren t  
from the present  case.104 Pill J. considered tha t  "the right of freedom to
days,  their opinion on the merit or risk of the proposal to the re levant  
authorities which will  decide there upon. Amended by the 1989 Regulation,  
infra n . l /Ch.3.
103- Financial Times, July 22nd 1988; noted in Editorial (1988) JJLL 339.
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bid is not a business asset in the sense advocated. The question is whether it is 
arguable that there is a legal right to bid which has been interfered with 
unlawfully". According to tha t  case it was a p p a re n t  th a t  the  sole 
purpose of Lonrho’s complaint was to f rus t ra te  the rival offeror 's 
chance  of b idd ing  and th u s  advanc ing  its ow n  in te r e s t .  
Consequently, because it was not substantive, the learned judge set 
the  com pla in t  aside. One may say th a t  the  l e a rn e d  judge 's  
observation appear as pr imary  guidelines upon which fu tu re  cases 
will be decided.1°5
A related question is w he the r  the board of directors has any 
r ight  to defend the company at all? How much la t i tude  ought 
directors have in the exercise of such opposition? In one case, in the 
U.K, the question was w hether  directors can validly issue shares, for 
instance, in order to defeat a takeover made by an asset strippers, a 
rival or an incompetent manager who would run  the com pany .106 
In Cavne v. Global Natural Resources Pic.. Magarry V-C stated:
I cannot see why tha t should not be a perfectly proper exercise of 
fiduciary powers by the directors of [the company]. The object is not 
to retain  control as such, but to prevent [the company] from being 
reduced to impotence and beggary, and the only means available to 
the directors for achieving this purpose is to retain control. This is 
quite different from directors seeking to retain control because they  
think they are better directors than their rival would be .*07
104- (1983)1 AC 191.
105 -  See also the Guinness and Argyll  l i t igation w hich  u l t im ate ly  
balanced in favour of the former upon the basis of convenience.  See Chapter 
6 in particular the footnotes 110 to 111.
106-  Compare with  the U.K. Monopoly and Mergers Commission f inding  
discussed infra n.l7/Ch.3
107-  (Ch.D, 12 August ,1982),(Unreported case), noted by Mayson S.W., 
French D. k  Rayan Chris, Mavson. French & Ravan on Company Law, at p.400,
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In another case, Buckley J indicated
My own view, is that the directors ought to be allowed to consider 
who is seeking control and why. If they believe there will be 
substantial damage to the company's interests if the company is 
taken over, then the exercise of their powers to those seeking a 
majority will not necessarily be categorized as improper. I think that 
directors are entitled to consider the reputation , experience or 
policies of any one seeking to takeover the company. If they decide 
on reasonable grounds, a takeover will cause substantial damage to 
the company's interests, they are entitled to use their powers to 
protect the company. That is the test that ought to be applied in this 
case.108
What is interesting in the light of the above discussion is tha t  
the directors' role has nowhere been f ramed or described in te rm s 
of limits. One may argue tha t  it is not for the court to de term ine  the 
scope of the directors role;109 nor to "act as kind of a supervisory board 
over decisions within the powers of managements honestly arrived at."110 But 
w h a t  seems serious is w h e re  d irec tors  benef i t  one group  of 
shareholders at the expense of others, raise profit for themselves  or 
mislead shareholders altogether to reta in  control. That is, perhaps, 
the  core of the  problem. This has  b ee n  made ciear  in the  
authorit ies. In Howard Smith Ltd v. Amool Petro leum  L td .. Lord 
Wilberforce stressed that:
...to define in advance exact limits beyond which directors must not
(edn .1988 /89)  (London, Blackstone Press Ltd). See also (1984)1 All ER 225.
1 0 8 -  Teck Corporation v. Millar. (1973 )33  D.L.R (3rd) 288 (B.C.S.C); see 
Chapter.6; see another v ie w  in Dawson International ole (1988)4  B.C.C 305,  at 
p.313
109- Richard Bradv Franks Ltd v. Price (1937)58  C.L.R 112, at p. 139, 11 
A.L.J 202, (1937)A.L.R 470
110- Howard Smith Ltd v. Amool Petroleum Ltd.(1974)AC 821,  ( 1974 )2  
W.L.R 689, (1974)1 All ER 1126, see infra Chapter 5 & 6
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pass is, in their lordships' view, impossible. This clearly cannot be 
done by enumeration, since the varie ty  of situations facing directors 
of different types of a company in different situations cannot be 
anticipated ...Negatively, to exclude from the area of activity cases 
w here the directors are acting sectionally, or partially: i.e, improperly 
favouring one section of the shareholders against others...for the 
court, if a particular exercise of it is challenged, to examine the 
substantial purpose for which it was exercised 111
Whilst this case, in order to assess directors ' actions, sets out 
the "substantial purpose" test, the following case focuses on the state 
of mind and motive. In Hindle v. lohn Cotton L td .. Viscount Finlay 
indicated:
Where the question is one of abuse of powers, the state of mind of 
those who acted, and the motive on which they  acted, are all 
important, and you may go into the question of w hat their intention 
was, collecting from the surrounding circumstances all the materials 
which genuinely throw light upon that question of the state of mind 
of the directors so as to show w hether they w ere honestly acting in 
discharge of their powers in the interests  of the company or w ere  
acting from some by-motive, possibly of personal advantage, or for 
any other reason 112
In a w or ld  w h e r e  co m p an ie s  h av e  a l r e a d y  a s s u m e d  
in te rn a t io n a l  d imensions ,  it seem s diff icult  to iso la te  good 
in ten t ions  from bad in tentions .  Neverthe less ,  the  p rob lem  of 
intention, especially d irec to rs ’ im proper  motivations is a much 
debated question. It must be stressed, for example, tha t  in Advance 
Bank of Australia  Ltd v. FAI Insurance  Austra lia  L td . Kirdy P. 
recognised such difficulties and indicated another  cr i te r ia  to be 
relied on as well. He indicates:
111- Ibid, atp.835
112- (1919) 56 S.L.R 625 (H.L), at p. 630-1
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Statements by the directors about their subjective intention, whilst 
relevant, are not conclusive of the bona fide of the directors of the 
purposes for which they acted as they did. In this sense, although 
the search is for the subjective intentions of the directors, it is a 
search which must be conducted objectively as the court decides 
w h e th er  to accept or discount the assertions which the directors 
make about their motives and purposes.U3
3 .3 -  VULNERABILITY
At some stage, controllers of a company may dispose of their  
controlling percentage of shares in whole or in part. The reasons for 
doing so vary. For instance, due to competitive pressure w here  such 
controllers could no longer sustain it, or for financial reasons either 
they become unable to raise the capital necessary for fu tu re  growth 
and expansion, or because of the greater  need to invest  e lsewhere  
in more read i ly  real izable  assets. So do th e se  fac tors  make 
companies potential  candidates for takeover?  Do the re  exist any 
o the r  characte r is t ics  to r e n d e r  any com pany  a cand ida te  for 
takeover?  In other words, w ha t  makes a company vu lne rab le  to 
acquirers?
There  are some examples  or s i tuations th a t  may m ake a 
company a potential candidate for takeover.  A company operating 
in an industry  w here  its products have been under heavy  dem and 
from national and foreigners buyers  ( im porte rs  and expor te rs )  
alike. A c o m p a n y ’s securit ies  are u n d e rv a lu e d  and po ten t ia l  
acquirers pretend or expect to put them to bet ter  use and to raise 
profits  as well. The com pany has sufficient plant,  eq u ipm en t ,  
mineral or other valuable rights, pa tents  or, licenses which  may 
enable a potential  offeror to en ter  a new  business  a ren a  or to 
compete worldwide. A company may also be vulnerable  to takeover
1 13- (1987 )  12 A.C.L.R 118, at p.136-7
59
because share ownership is so widely dispersed. A company's good 
or bad  m an ag em en t  may also be an a t t ra c t iv e  e l e m e n t  for 
acquirers.  A company could also be susceptible to takeover  if the 
political climate stands in an impartial  position towards foreigners. 
Moreover, a company with  a tax loss may be acquired because of 
the tax saving which will accrue to the acquiring company. In short, 
a company may be bought and sold because of the reputa t ion  of its 
products (brand names) and the value of its securities. As to brand 
names, it is almost invariably cheaper to buy the production and 
distribution facilities for a going product than to s ta r t  from nothing. 
Indeed, it is always possible to build up a com pany’s b rand  based 
on in te rna l  efforts  as Lever has exhibited in Britain w i th  the 
development of Whisk liquid detergent  and Mars w ith  its Trucker 
confec t ionary  bar. But the risks,  costs and t im e are a lways 
s ig n i f ic an t ly  h i g h e r . 114 In te rm s  of costs, r e c e n t  e s t im a te s  
dem ons tra te  th a t  cu r ren t  advert is ing and m ark e t  costs for the  
promotion of a new brand in the U.K are between £7m. and £10m. 
in the first yea r .1 *5
3 . 4 -  U N D E R  W H I C H  L A W  T H E  R E G U L A T I O N  OF T A K E O V E R S  
S H O U L D  BE C L A S S I F I E D
It is difficult to identify  or locate the law under  w hich  the 
regulation relating to takeovers  should be classified. There  are 
complex interactions between company law, banking acts and stock 
exchange regulations and also w ith  a nu m b er  of o ther  ancillary 
laws, notably taxation, commercial and industr ia l  law. Insurance,
114- Buying is Smarter than Building, The Financial Times, 27 th  April 
1988,  p.22; Loyrette J„ supra n.10, at p .147; Lee W.L and Carreau D, at p .15, 
supra n.26.
1 Ibid.
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labour and competition laws as well as criminal and civil law may 
incidently or occasionally come into play.
In his report,  Professor Pennington recognized the  possible 
difficulties for an even tua l  a t tem p t  to identify  the  b ran ch  of 
commercial law under  which takeover offers should be classified. 
He advanced pre-eminently  the branch of company law .116 Other 
studies exhibit  the separation between company law and the  law 
which tends to cover in the aggregate the securities market,  i.e., 
capital marke t  law.117 A fu r ther  group focussed on the na tu re  of 
the  con t rac t  e n te re d  into b e tw e e n  sellers  and b u y e r s  and 
advocated the mechanism of the private law of contrac ts .118 At 
the moment there is no clear agreement on the point.
3 .5 -  CONCLUSION
The preceding discussion was concerned w ith  the definit ional 
f ramework as well as the manner in which concentrations be tw een  
companies are economically and legally classified. The picture tha t  
emerged was tha t  each form of merger is not only distinct bu t  also 
dea lt  w i th  by d i f fe ren t  provisions. But the  in te rac t io n s  and 
compatibil i ty  be tw een  the re le v an t  regulations seem s obvious. 
Whilst merger control regulation is concerned with  the post effect 
of all types of concentrations, legal mergers and share mergers  are 
a means to such concentrations. Furthermore, both legal and share 
mergers are concerned with the transfer  and purchase of securities
116-  Pennington R.R, Report on Takeover Bids..., supra n. 21.
117- See mainly, Buxbawn R.M. and Hopt K.J, Legal Harmonisat ion of  
Business Enterprises. (Vol.4) (Walter De Gruyter. l988) Ch.3 , at p 167-226
118- Ridge Nominees Ltd v.I.R.C (1962)  Ch 376.  (1962)A11 ER 1 108, (1962)2  
W.L.R 3; Davies P.L, The Regulation of Takeovers  And Mergers . (London,  
Sweet  and Maxwell, 1976). See also Pennington R.R, Company L a w . Ch.27, 
p.824,  supra n. 17
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w h e r e a s  contro l  of co n cen tra t io n  is des igned  to p r e s e rv e  
competition and deter  any harmful effects which result  from share 
or legal merger.
Quite apart  from questions of legal mergers and merger control 
discussed above, it is nowhere expressed in te rm s tha t  a takeover  
offer has a specific definition. This is p resum ab ly  because the 
methods available for effecting such a transaction are varied,  for 
example, control of one company may be acquired by legal merger, 
a takeover  offer (w he ther  part ia l  or complete)  as well  as by  a 
r e v e r s e  t a k e o v e r  o f f e r .1 19 Control may also be acqu ired  or 
reinforced by compulsory offers or by leveraged  o f f e r s 120 or, 
te n d e r  offers and o ther  looting t ran sa c t io n s . !21 It can also be 
secured by proxy m ach ine ry122 and voting agreements  and other
1 1 9 -  Reverse  tak eover  offers ex ists  w h e r e  one or more private  
companies seek to acquire control of a public company whether  or not listed 
on the Stock Exchange.
120 -  The term 'leveraged b id ’ refers more to the  f inancing of the  
transaction than to the substance,  because the purchasers equity  inves tm ent  
is small,  e v e n  nominal,  compared w i th  the total  purchase price..  The 
financial resources,  in this context, consist  either of funds borrowed from a 
variety  of institutional lenders,  or of an agreement  by the sel lers to accept  
deferred payment.  In a leveraged bid, it is often bankers w h o  init iate the  
transaction and they  almost invariably depend on selected managements  to 
operate the acquired company. Yet bankers,  insurance and other passive  
investors invest  substantial  sums in these leveraged buyouts.  By the v e r y  
nature of the operation, it is special ly conceived and financed. Therefore it 
seems v e r y  l ikely to prevail once the single market is completed because  of 
the higher value  of the assets of the victim company and of ready  fund or 
resources to complete the transaction.
121 -  Looting transactions or "top up arrangements" are d ev ic es  
w h e r e b y  a person seeking to acquire control or substant ial  proportion of 
voting rights pays a premium to some investors  in order to obtain control  
and obliterate the remaining claim. Such means are not tolerated under the 
U.K. City Code. See Rule 16 of the City Code. See also (19 8 7 H.B.L.482.
122- Although they  seem to serve identical purposes, takeovers  and 
proxies are substantial ly different and distinct from each other.  Proxies
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t rad ing  a r rangem en ts .  The d ivers i ty  of methods,  for offerors,  
reflects a choice between alternatives which becomes more acute. It 
foilows th a t  any decision to make an offer becom es  criticai. 
However, the desire to acquire control may be f ru s t ra te d  by  a 
num ber  of factors, notably the desire to keep the ta rge t  company 
independent.
Company law in both the UK and France recognize th a t  the 
ul t imate decisions w ith  respect  to the affairs of companies  are 
in tended to be entirely  reserved  to the shareholders  in a general  
meeting through the use of their  power of election and removal.  A 
similar situation prevails  in the case law which tends  to w ard s  
recognition of the separat ion  of powers be tw een  the board  and 
shareholders .  On the basis of separat ion  of powers b e tw e e n  the 
board and shareholders, the shareholders are concerned themselves 
to decide on any key or significant change in the company's in ternal 
affairs such as the am endm en t  of its constitution, while the  board 
of directors through their  appointed m anagem ent  run  the  day  to 
day business. But it does not follow that  directors are depr ived  of 
the  r ight to make any business  decision. Correspondingly, the 
extent to which the directors are permit ted  to bind their  company 
to th ird  parties  is circumscribed w ith in  the scope of f iduc ia ry  
duties.123
In m odern  times, th inking  abou t  co h e ren t  p rov is ions  for
contests  are initiated by those who do not own controlling shares.  They are 
typically started by individuals, not by companies, because 'the substance of 
the argument is over w ho  shall have the privi lege of managing someone  
else's money  and, perhaps, the power to confiscate a portion of the profit 
stream', see Lowenstein L., Pruning Deadwood, in Hostile Takeovers,  supra  
n.77.
123- See Ch.5.
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investors '  protection was fu r th e r  im plem ented  in the  takeovers  
field. Both systems of regulation, once again, consider shareholders  
to be the ultimate party  determining the success or failure of offers 
by making rational decisions w hether  to retain their  stock or to sell 
it to the offeror presenting the most advantageous consideration. 
Certainly,  th is  can only be made w h e re  s h a r e h o ld e r s  are  
concurrently  supplied with  all material  facts about the offer, are 
given sufficient t ime to make a rational decision, w i th o u t  being 
p ressured  to make a hurried  decision or denied an oppor tun i ty  to 
decide on the merits or demerits  of the offer. This is the common 
concern of both the U.K and French regulators, and the discussion of 
the superv isory  bodies in the subsequen t  chapter  s tresses  such 
aspects.
Again, it appears from the discussion in this chapter  th a t  the 
increasing am ount  of takeovers  and legal mergers  has not  only 
triggered debate, but  also the legislatures' intention to introduce an 
appropr ia te  f ram ew ork  w ith in  which such activity  is conducted. 
Focus is on two major aspects: the protection of shareholders  and 
the transparency of the market. Both will be discussed in the fourth  
and fifth chapter  of this thesis respectively. It w or th  highlighting 
tha t  both the protection of shareholders  and the t r an sp a ra n cy  of 
the  m arke t  opera te  in favour  of a host of in te res ts  principally, 
employees,  creditors and consumers or the com m unity  at large. 
Related to this, re fo rm s at Community  level have  in e v i ta b ly  
contributed to the development of the national re levan t  laws and 
regulations in particular in areas not a lready covered by existing 
provisions.
64
C H A P T E R  T W O  
S U P E R V I S O R Y  I N S T I T U T I O N S  IN  FRANCE  
A N D  THE U N IT E D  KINGDOM
Both in France and the U.K securities m arke t  regulations lay 
down basic principles and rules which, whilst  in the U.K for the 
most pa r t  have never  been embodied in legal form, in France, the 
whole system is legally based. But if the re  are sufficient basic 
similarit ies to make a comparison possible, the re  are, equally,  
sufficient d ifferences to make such a com parison  in te res t ing .  
Differences are found in the origin and developm ent  of financial, 
economic or commercial activities which the governm en t  tends  to 
police within an appropriate and flexible legal f ramework.  Bearing 
this in mind, both countries  share the same objective, i.e, the 
protection of investors. This chapter  will, first, discuss the  French 
Bourse de Valeur; and second, the British regulatory organizations. 
For convenience and simplicity, a comparison will be summ arised  at 
the  end of this ch ap te r  along w i th  the  conclusion. Such a 
comparison between both the Commission des Operations de Bourse 
(hereinafter  called C.O.B.) and the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
will involve, both their  policies and powers w ith  respec t  to the 
regulation of takeover offers and the likely implications of the E.E.C 
proposal for a directive on takeovers and other bids. The discussion 
will  i l lus tra te  how far  the likely im p lem en ta t io n  of the  E.E.C 
Directive will affect not only the form of the British self regulating 
body but, also will restrict any extension of the powers of C.O.B.
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SECTION ONE: FRENCH PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
Since the 1988 reform of the French Bourse de Valeur, various 
newly  established  inst i tu tions came into existence, no tab ly  the 
Conseil des Bourse de Valeurs (C.B.V.), the  Societe de Bourse 
Frangaise (S.B.F), the  Societes de Bourse (S.B.) ano ther  form of 
inst i tu tion o ther  than  the S.B.F.; and l ’Association Frangaise des 
Societes des Bourse de Valeurs (A.F.S.B.V). It is w or thy  of note to 
mention tha t  the status of the C.O.B. remains unaffected. Since the 
regulation of public offers is shared be tw een  the C.B.V. and the 
C.O.B., it is interesting to provide f irs t  an outline about  the  legal 
background of such new ly  form ed inst i tutions,  and second to 
co n cen t ra te  on the  C.O.B. and th e  C.B.V. co n s t i tu t io n s  and 
jurisdictions.
1 . 1 -  L E G A L  B A C K G R O U N D  A N D  R E F O R M S
The f i rs t  step to reform took place in 1 9 6 6 .1 In France, 
stockbrokers (Agents de Change) are essentially partnerships.  They 
arrange deals and negotiate investors securities in the  Bourse de 
Valeur on their  own behalf .2 They receive from investors  agreed
1- Loi No. 66-1009  of 28th December, 1966 (D. 1967.30)
2 -  It is w orth  noting that there  w e r e  s e v e n  Bourse de Valeurs  
operating independently  and distinct from each other. These w ere  located in 
France's major cities namely,  Paris, Bordeaux, Lille, Lyon, Marseille,  Nante  
and Nancy. Following the 1966 reform, the above cited Bourse de Valeur  
became branches of the main Bourse de Valeur which is s ituated in Paris. 
Operating alongside the domestic Bourse de Valeur in Paris, the International 
Stock Market was  established in 1961, dominated by the foreign Stock Market  
institutions,  these are Brussells,  Luxembourg,  Vienna, Madrid, Amsterdam,  
London, Germany, Italy, New York, Tokyo, Toronto, Johannesburg and Paris.  
The major concern of the International Stock Market is the promotion of the 
Stock Market, to provide a market place w here  members  and m e m b e r s ’ 
organisations can conven ient ly  execute  transactions in listed securit ies ,  to
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fees  against  any  t ransac t ion  th e y  execu te .3 The law of 28 th  
December, 1966 gathered  all those Agents de Change under  the 
umbrella  of one national company, i.e, the Companie Generale des 
Agents de Change. This company was placed under  the regulation 
and the superv is ion  of the Chambre Syndicate des Agents de 
C h a n g e .4 Due to the  increasing use of public offers and the  
growing concern about the need for greater  investor protection, the 
C.O.B. was  fo rm ed  in 1967, specifically to control  the  sor t  of 
information made available to investors.5
The second reform, perhaps the most important,  is tha t  which 
took place in J a n u a r y  1 9 88 .6 The c o n s e q u e n c e s  of such 
re s t ruc tu r ing  were ,  first, subst i tu t ion  of one set  of dea lers  by 
another, i.e, the abolition of the sta tus of Agents de Change and 
the ir  activities and the creation of two societes; the Societe de 
Bourse (S.B)7 and the Societe de Bourse Frangaise (S.B.F).8 The
ensure that securities traded on the Stock Market have a certain degree of 
marketabil ity  which  investors  have come to expect.  Another matter of  
concern involves  the exchange of information b etw een  its membership  and, 
especial ly,  to the public investors. Finally, the International Stock Market's 
prime concern is to develop public offers, which have recently triggered the  
attention of governments and the financial community  at large.
3 -  Huyck P.M., The French Capital Market: Insti tutions and Issues  
(1968)16 Am.T.Comp.Law.. d.279
4- For further information on the Agent de Change see Receuil Dalloz, 
Agent de Change (Encyclopedie Dalloz, Societes,  1978);  Huyck P.M., The 
French Capital Market: Institutions and Issues, supra n.3
5-  Ordonnance No 6 7 -8 3 3  of 28.9.67,  (D.1967,  373) ,  amended by  Loi 
No.69-12 of Jan 1969, Loi No.70.1208 of 23.12.1970 (J O. of 24.12.70,  p.11891), Loi 
No 70 .1283  of 31.12.70 (J.O 31.Dec p .12275),  Loi No. 8 8 -70  of 22nd Jan.1988,  
relating to the Bourse de Valeur, (O.J. 23.1.88 p.l 11); Loi No 89 -531  du 2 Aout  
1989 relating to Security and Transparance of the Financial Market (relative  
a la Securite et a la Transparence du Marche Financier), (J.O. 4 Aout, p.9822 )
6-  Loi No.8 8 -70  of 22nd.Jan .l988,  supra n.5; Arrete of 2 2 n d .S e p t . l988,  
relating to duties of the market institutions (J.O. 25 Sept. 1988 p . l 2196).
7 -  Art.l ,  24 and 25 of the Loi 88-70 ,  supra n.5 ; Arrete of 4th Jan., 1989
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fo rm er  is placed under  the control of the la t te r .  The Second 
consequence was the subst i tu tion of the Chambre Syndicate des 
Agents de Change by the Conseil des Bourse de Valeurs ;9 The 
th i rd  consequence  was the  in t roduc t ion  of an au th o r iza t io n  
s y s tem .10 Accordingly, any Societe de Bourse must, so as to carry  
out its activities, obtain a prior authorization directly  from the 
C.B.V. To do so, the  Societe de Bourse must subm i t  the  d ra f t  
constitution to the C.B.V. which contains sufficient g uaran tees  in 
relation to the composition of its members  and the  am oun t  of its 
capital. Under the new regulatory system, the major dealer  for the 
Stock Exchange is the Societe de Bourse. It is interesting to mention 
that, unlike the British Stock Market, the French Bourse de Valeur 
has long been kept  in the hands of public institutions. That is to say, 
it was shared  be tw een  the C.B.V., the C.O.B. and the  Ministry  of 
Economy. Thus, it is a m atter  of law ,11 whils t  in Britain, control 
rem ains  in the hand of the self regulating bod ies .12 Therefore ,  
w hen  discussing m arke t  s truc ture  and regulation of the  var ious  
re levan t  institutions,  notably those which monitor and supervise
(O.J. 6th Jan., 1989, p.224).
8 Established by Loi No.89-531 of 2nd.August 1989,  supra n.5. By virtue  
of Art. 124 to 127 of the Loi 89 -531 ,  the S.B. and its membership are placed 
under the  direct  control of the S.B.F, w hich  su bs t i tu ted  the  form er  
"institution financiere specialise" that is, first, formed under the Loi No. 88 -  
70 of 22nd Jan.1988, supra n.5
9- The C.B.V is a public institution endowed with  legal personality,  Art 
5, Ch.2, Loi No.88-70,  supra n.5
10-  It, perhaps,  corresponds to the British authorizat ion s y s te m  
brought by  the F.S.A.1986.  See also Arrete of 22nd Sept .1988,  Duties of the 
Institutions, supra n.6.
11- Bronner R, Bourse de Valeurs, (1978),  supra n. lO/Chl
12- Traditionally, the creation of associations was  encouraged b y  the  
Bank of England largely  on a non statutory basis.  See Page A.C., Self-  
Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension (1986) 49 M.L.Rev. p . l 41.
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takeover  offers activities, the distinction b e tw e en  the  UK and 
French policies is obvious.
1.2- CONSEIL DES BOURSE DE VALEURS
A- ORGANISATION
The C.B.V. consists o f t e n  members designated by election from 
the Societes de Bourse, a represen ta t ive  of the Societes de Bourse 
itself,  e m p lo y ee s '  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s ,  r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  of l is ted  
companies, and a represen ta t ive  of the governm ent  (Commissaire 
du Gouvernment)  nom inated  by the Ministry  of Economy. The 
Conseii elects from amongst its members  a president.  Decisions in 
relation to matters  with in  its jurisdiction are ta k en  by  majority. 
However, appeals against  decisions of the Conseii are w ith in  the 
competence of either the administrative or civil courts. But, if such 
appeals or judical rev iew are granted, they  may not p rev en t  the 
decisions of the Conseii from taking e f f e c t . 13
B- JURISDICTION
The pr im ary  role of the C.B.V. is to ensure tha t  dealings in the 
re levan t  securities of a company, w he the r  on or off the Bourse de 
Valeur,  are  fa ir ly  p re sen ted ,  r e a s o n ab ly  execu ted  and  th a t  
s h a re h o ld e r s  invo lved  are not  misled or d e p r iv e d  of the  
opportunity  of participation in decision-making. In addition to its 
au tho r i ty  over  the  Bourse de Valeur ins t i tu t ions  and m a t te r s  
concerning admission, suspension  of quota t ions  and delis t ing 
securities from the official lists, the  Conseii enjoys v e r y  wide 
d iscretionary power with  respect  to the control of public offers 
transactions. One of the major procedural requ irem en ts  which the
13- Art 5, Ch 11, Loi No.88-70,  supra n.5
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C.B.V intends to enforce is th a t  which traces its origin from the 
principle of adm in is t ra t ive  direction. To il lustrate ,  any kind of 
public offer must be submitted  through a bank represen t ing  the 
offeror; an offer document subm itted  for approval  must  contain 
sufficient information. On receipt of this document,  the C.B.V., in 
addition to the suspension of quotation, informs concurrent ly  the 
Ministry of Economy and the C.O.B. If nei ther  the Ministry nor the 
C.O.B. opposes, the Council may approve such an offer. The C.B.V. 
decision of approval  is announced in the official bulle t in  of the 
Bourse de Valeur. However, whilst  the economic implications of an 
offer are a matter  for the discretion of the Ministry of Economy,14 
information disclosure is monopolized by the C.O.B. This means tha t  
trading in the re levan t  securities of the target  com pany may not 
s ta r t  w ithout  obtaining both the C.O.B.'s visa and filing w ith  the 
offer docum ent  a notif ication from the  r e le v a n t  a u th o r i ty  of 
concen tra t ion .  In the  U.K., by con tras t ,  the  P ane l  is g iven  
predominance to administer its self regulation w here  any question 
of takeover  offers arise. The British Stock Exchange involvement is 
limited to the extent tha t  a matter of listing of securities is sought.
In the immediate period of an offer, shareholders willing to sell 
or t ransfe r  (exchange) their  shares should authorize a dealer  of 
their  choice within a period which may not be less th an  tw en ty  
days (previously one month). Yet the shareholders concerned enjoy 
an absolute right of w i thd raw a l  at any time during the  whole 
period of the offer. Both the timing of offers and the shareholders  
rights of w ithdrawal raise major points of differences. Both will be
14- Loi No.77-806 of 19th July 1977 relating to Control of Concentration.  
A mended  b y  Loi No.8 5 - 1 4 0 8  of 30 .9 .85 relating to Ameliorat ion  de la 
Concentration (J.O 31.Dec. p. 15513)
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discussed later on. Finally, at the end of sale and purchase of shares 
operations, the Conseii centralises all shareholders '  orders,  w he the r  
relating to purchase and sale or those transferred  on the basis of an 
exchange of securit ies.  This task  is conferred  on a specialized 
dep a r tm en t  (Centralized Stock Clearing Department of the Bourse 
de Valeur). The Conseii ultimately announces publicly in the official 
journal the outcome of an offer, w he the r  or not the in tended offers 
were  successful.
1.3- COMMISSION DES OPERATIONS DE BOURSE
It is w orth  reiterating tha t  the Commission des Operations de 
Bourse (C.O.B.) was established in order to carry  out two separa te  
tasks.  The f i rs t  is to ensu re  against  the  p e r m a n e n t  r isks  of 
malpractice and the second is to provide a coherent f ram ew ork  of 
sta tutory protection for investors ' in terests .15
A- ORGANISATION
C.O.B. was created in 1967 for the purpose of im plem enting  
most of the objectives sought to be accomplished by the French 
G overnm ent  w i th in  the  securi t ies  m arke ts ,  i.e, p ro tec t ion  of 
investors. Prior to 1967, the date in which the C.O.B. was installed, 
there was a committee which had power to monitor and supervise
15- For further reading see, Guenot J., La Commission des Operations de 
Bourse,  Commentaire,  ( 1 9 6 8 )  Receuil Dalloz. Sirev.  p .139: Burgard J.J, La 
Commission des Operations de Bourse et  la Bourse (1 9 7 2 ) l.Finance:: Mahiu M., 
La Commiss ion des Operations de Bourse du Droit Francais ( 1 9 7 2 )  
Rev.Prat.Soc.  p.255; Guyon Y., Le Role de la Commission des Operations de 
Bourse Dans L'evolution Des Droit des Societes Commerciales ( 1 9 7 5 ) 2 8  
Rev.Trim.Dr.Com.. p.447); Leviec P., La Commission des Operations de Bourse et 
la Vie des Societes (1 9 7 7 )  T.C.P.. ed. C.I. 12350.;  Broult R.B, Problem of  
Enforcement and Co-operation in the  Multinational Securities: A French  
perspective (1987)9 U.Pa.L.Rev.. p.453
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the activities of the Bourse de Valeur, bu t  it did not use these 
powers effectively and efficiently .!6 In its p resen t  form, C.O.B. is 
composed of a president chosen by the Conseii des Ministres; four 
members  chosen by vir tue  of their  experience and knowledge, two 
of whom are required to be chosen from a financial profession, (all 
appointed by the Ministry of Economy); and finally a representat ive  
of the Government (Com miss air e du Gouvernement) w ho is ent i t led to 
reques t  a second reconsideration of the matter  laid before him, or 
any decision taken for that  purpose. Most of the employees of C.O.B. 
are nominated by the Pres ident  of the C.O.B. upon the  M inis try’s 
approval.
In order to carry out its function and duties, C.O.B. is organized 
into d ep a r tm en ts  each of which carries a specific function. The 
Departm ent of Stock Market activities is responsible  for m arke t  
inspection, investigations and surveil lance. The Accounting and 
Financial  D ep a r tm en ts  hav e  v e r y  w ide  p o w ers  to conduc t  
investigations concerning the financial records of a listed public 
com pany  on any  suspicious aspect. The In fo rm at ion  Division 
controls and reviews any announced s ta tem ent  directed to public 
inves to rs .  The Legal D ep a r tm en t  is concerned  m ain ly  w i th  
violations of law. The Department of Research and Development of 
the  Securi t ies  M arke t  is r e sp o n s ib le  for d e v e lo p m e n t  and 
promotion of the financial market.!7
16-  It was  established in 1942 by the Loi of 14th February,  1942.  See, 
Bronner, Bourse de Valeur, supra 10/Ch. 1; Bezard P, Les Offres Publiaues  
d ‘Achat, supra n.lO/Ch.l; Guyenot J„ La Commission des Operations de Bourse, 
Commentaire, supra n. 15. The Committee was  abolished in 1968 b y  Decret No. 
68-23  of 3rd January 1968; (J.O. of 12.1.68) (D.1968,79).
1 7 ” Broult  R.B, Problem of Enforcement and Co-operat ion in the  
Multinational Securities: A French Perspective,  supra n 15.
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B- JURISDICTION
It is quite clear tha t  C.O.B.'s sta tutory authority derives from its 
origin in the 1967 Ordonnance.18 C.O.B., in its capacity as the body 
having pr im ary  responsible for the protection of investors, enjoys 
v e ry  wide powers. It is entit led to impose regulations relating to 
m atte rs  w ithin  the scope of its jurisdiction, or add to, or delete  
from, the  existing ru les  w h e n e v e r  it deem s n e c e ss a ry .  Its 
jurisdiction covers any kind of information, w he the r  supplied by a 
public or private company. 19 Presumably, it also extends to cover 
organizat ions and p r iva te  associations which  h av e  a ce r ta in  
m in im um  degree  of contact  and com m unica t ion  w i th  public  
i n v e s t o r s . 20 In addit ion,  the  1989 Loi has  b r o a d e n e d  its 
au thor i ty .2 ! Take, for example, the issue of visa. Previously, quite 
ap a r t  f rom the question of merger  reference ,  the  C.B.V. could 
approve and publish an offer while the C.O.B. was considering the 
offeror information document.  The 1989 Loi and the su b se q u en t  
C.B.V. and C.O.B. regulations state tha t  an offer may remain  pending 
until the visa is granted, even if the offer document complies w ith  
the requirements  of the C.B.V. regulation.22
18- Ordonnance No 67-833 ,  Art.l ,  supra n.5; Decret of 1968; Loi No.8 4 -1 6  
of 11 Jan.1984; and Loi No.85-134 of 14thDec.l985  (J.O. 15 Dec. p.14598).
1 9 - Ibid
20-  Loi No.66 -537 ,  of 24th July, 1966 relating to Societes Commerciales  
(J.O.24 July, p.6402);  Arrete of 6th July 1988 relating to Adm iss ion  of  
Securities to Listing; The C.O.B. Regulation No.8 8 -0 4  relating to Information to 
be Published by Public Companies Making Subscription Offers, (J.O. 14th  
July, p 9158); see also the C.O.B.'s provisions made in substitution to Sch. No 5 
of the C.O.B. instruction relating to Note d'Information of 10th October 1970.
2 1 - Supra n.5
22-  Infra n.l /Ch.3.
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C -  P O W E R S  OF CONT ROL A N D  I N V E S T I G A T I O N .
C.O.B.'s d i s c re t io n a ry  pow er  in r e s p e c t  of d isc losure  of 
information is unlimited. Furthermore, C.O.B.’s power of decision is 
clothed in legal form. In s ituations involving an adm iss ion  of 
securities on to the French official marke t  or an offer to the  public 
for subscriptions, C.O.B.’s role appears to be determ inant .  It covers 
not only those public companies which belong to the m em bers  
states of European Community but also those undertakings of third 
states. This means tha t  if a company seeks to offer its securities to 
the public or to apply for an eventual  admission of its securities on 
the official market,  or even  deal on the  open m arke t ,  it must  
comply w ith  C.O.B.’s requ irem en ts  and instructions.  A docum ent  
"note d ’information" established in advance by the C.O.B. m ust  be 
completed and re tu rned  to it for a preliminary scrutiny.23 In this 
connection, it is w o r th  noting th a t  even  if an appl ica t ion  for 
admission of securities has complied w ith  the C.B.V. requ irem ents ,  
C.O.B. is still en t i t led  to exercise its r ights  of oppos i t ion .2 4 
Opposition may be made if C.O.B. considers tha t  such an application 
for admission will, if permitted, jeopardize the good performance of 
the  m arke t ,  be incom pat ib le  w i th  inv es to rs '  in te re s t s ,  or is 
inaccurate.23
C.O.B.'s powers of in tervention  in the affairs of companies in 
normal circumstances is less str ingent compared w ith  its f i rm ness  
in situations involving the change of control from one com pany to
23-  Ordonnance 67-833  of 1967, Art 3, supra n.5; Arrete of 6th July 1988  
relating to the C.B.V.,Regulation Generale (J.O. 14 July, p 9154)
24-  The C.O.B. Regulation No.88-03  relating to right of opposition,  Art 1, 
2 and 3 (J.O. 14 July 1988, p 9158);  Loi No 8 8 -70  of 22 January, 1988.  See, 
supra.n 5 and 20 respectively
25- Ibid
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the other by means of a takeover offer or through other al ternative 
techniques. For example, if misleading information or omitted facts, 
in an annual or quar te r ly  financial report,  are noticed during its 
circulation to shareholders  concerned, the C.O.B. may req u es t  the 
board of d irectors  of th a t  com pany  to rev iew  or correc t  any 
deficiency. If t h e  company concerned refuses to comply w i th  the 
C.O.B.'s decision, depend ing  on the  deg ree  of d is to r t io n  of 
information, the C.O.B. may or may not publish its findings. Where 
takeovers are concerned it is C.O.B.’s view that  accurate information 
enables shareholders  to whom an offer is addressed  to make an 
informed and rational decision as to acceptance, and also, because 
accurate information is essential to aver t  the occurrence of various 
sorts of abusive and o ther  insidious practices. Therefore ,  prior 
control over the information document and the deliverance of the 
visa have  long been  considered vital. Yet it still ques t ionab le  
w hether  that  policy of dirigisme and restraints  constitute a realistic 
d e te r ren t  to m arke t  abuses such as unfair  dealings, f raud  on the 
minority, or inequality of t rea tm ent  between shareholders.
In addition to its disclosure power in respect  of subscriptions, 
admission of securit ies and most im por tan t ly  public offers,  the
C.O.B. is also em pow ered  to superv ise  and inves t iga te  ins ider  
dealings and m a n i p u l a t i o n s . 26 T h e  need to protect investors  and 
the need for effective provisions to keep their  confidence in the 
m arke t  are the major reasons for the C.O.B.’s investigative power. 
Following the increasing use of public offers in France, as well  as
26-  Insider Trading was  made a criminal offense in France by  Loi of 20  
December 1970, as amended in 1983 by the Loi No.83-1 of 3rd Jan.1983 (J.O. 4 
Jan. 1983). The provision of this Act impliedly covers market manipulations.  
It is worthy highlighting that the C.O.B. is not entitled to prosecute violations  
of law, but it is entitled to bring the matter before the court instead.  See also 
chapter 5 in connection with  insider dealing and directors f iduciary duties.
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the t rend  away from the tradit ional  method of fusion, which is 
characterized by the length of its procedure,  to more sophisticated 
al ternatives  which enable an offeror to achieve swiftly its aim, a 
nu m b er  of malpractices have emerged, such as insider  dealings, 
s p e c u la t io n ,  r u m o u r s ,  m a n ip u la t io n s  and  i n a c c u r a c y  of 
in fo rm a t io n .27 It is w o r th y  of note tha t  sales and purchases  of 
shares w ith in  or outside the Bourse de Valeur are not f ree  from 
risks. Additionally, not all purchases or sales of share  operat ions 
tr igger  the  a t ten t ion  of the r e le v a n t  au th o r i ty  to in i t ia te  an 
investigation into share dealings. Abusive or suspicious conduct is 
the major justification to initiate an investigation to identify  and 
locate such risks. Once an investigation is te rm ina ted ,  the  C.O.B., 
being the f irs t  responsible public institution for the  protection of 
investors’ interests may either instruct those in violation of the law 
to refra in from doing so or to bring the matter before the Court for 
remedy.
Procedurally, the C.O.B. may start  investigating m atte rs  which 
come to its a t t e n t io n  on its own in i t ia t iv e  or u p o n  the  
recommendations of other competent authorities, i.e., the C.B.V. or 
the  Ministry  of Economy. The C.O.B. by m eans of a specific 
deliberation, mandates its qualified agents to conduct investigations 
and to obtain information it deems just if iable .28 Thus, w h e n  a 
matter  comes to C.O.B.’s attention through complaints, petit ions or
2 7 -  Loyrette J., Les Offres Publiaues d'Achat.. at p.202  et  seq, supra  
n.lO/Ch.l; Bezard P., Les Offers Publiaues d'Achat. supra n.10 in Ch.l; Trochu 
M.; supra nlO/Ch. l;  O.P.A. ou O.P.E., (1970)  13.Rev.Eco, de la Banoue Nale de- 
Paris. . Chronique Juridique, p.51.
28-  Art 5 of the 1967 Ordonnance as amended, see supra n.5. Loi No.88-
70 of 22nd Jan, 1988 inserted Art 5 A and B into the Ordonnance, (J.O. 23 Jan,
1988 p . l l l l ) .
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claims by  the  public, or f rom any o ther  source,29 the  C.O.B., 
depending on the degree of complexity and seriousness of the issue, 
at its f irs t  stage of inquiry, obtains information th rough  a simple 
request.  If it considers tha t  the wrongdoer needs only a corrective 
measure,  the C.O.B. may instruct him to refrain from carrying on his 
activities in violation of the regulation which would, if left, affect or 
have  adverse  consequences upon the investors  in te res ts .  If the 
misconduct or violation of the regula t ion  is com m it ted  by  an 
i n t e r m e d i a r y  such as a Societe de Bourse or an y  of its 
m e m b ersh ip ,3 0  the C.O.B. proceeds w ith  disc iplinary sanctions 
through the C.B.V. The sanctions imposed by the C.B.V. or the C.O.B. 
may be a warning,  rep r im and  (censure); t e m p o ra ry  or definite 
suspension  of pa r t  of, or all, the  activities and w i th d ra w a l  of 
agreement (recognition), in addition to fine up to 5,000,000 F.F.31
In cases w here  the C.O.B., in respect  of the m a t te r  before it, 
considers th a t  such suspicious behav iour  or malpractice needs  
f u r th e r  inqu i ry  and scru t iny  it may, by  means of p a r t icu la r  
resolution (deliberation) for each company, mandate  its qualified 
agents to carry  out investigations.32 By v ir tue  of a such decision, 
invest iga tors  are enti t led  to obtain  in form ation  useful  for  the 
purpose of the matter  under investigation, enter  into all premises, 
examine business records, minute books, and book-keeping. They
2 9- Local or foreign securities market regulators.
30" Loi No. 88-70,  Art 8 and 9., supra n.5.
3 1 - Ibid.
3 2 -  Ordonnance No.67.833,  Art 5 (A) and (B), inserted therein by  the  
Art 13 of the Loi No.88-70 of 22nd January, 1988, Supra n.5; The ability of the 
mandated person to investigate is granted to him by the C.O.B's President. It 
should be stressed that such decision to mandate agents has been  qualif ied as 
identical  to a judicial order. See Ducouloux-Favard, L’in format ion  et  la 
Recherche Des Infractions Boursieres in (1988)  Receuil Pallor. Sirev. Chron. 
XLLLL p.271
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are also ent i t led  to take  copies or extracts  the reo f  and make 
enquiries w h erev e r  this is deemed necessary. Consequently, any 
person who knowingly or recklessly furn ishes  false information, 
refuses  to supply  or deters  the investigation may be subject  to 
criminal and civil proceedings, or both, in addit ion to a f i n e . 33 
Finally, for the  pu rp o se  of co m p le ten ess  of ev id en ce ,  the  
investigators  are also enti t led  to sum m on any person, group of 
pe rsons  or any  o the r  in s t i tu t i o n s ’ r e p r e s e n ta t i v e s  invo lved  
expected to have or having information bearing on the  question 
under  inquiry, to come to a hearing to give test imony.34 Once the 
r e p o r t  is com pleted ,  C.O.B.'s p re s id e n t  decides on the  l ikely  
proceedings. If the breach is serious, C.O.B. brings it before the court 
for an u l t imate  rem edia l  order,  or an app rop r ia te  disc ip l inary  
measure.
To sum up, three significant issues should be pointed out: first,
C.O.B.'s decision to investigate is final and it is not subject to any 
appeal except on the ground of misunderstanding  of facts or bad 
faith, a m atter  which is most unlikely to happen;  second, C.O.B. 
during the currency of its investigations,  and its findings, is not 
subject  to the law of professional s e c r e c y . 35 in  o th e r  w ords ,  
ins t i tu t ions  which  are being inves t iga ted  may g en e ra l ly  no t  
exercise any professional privilege or claim im m uni ty  f rom  the 
requ irem en t  to disclose certain information which C.O.B. considers 
useful. Finally, C.O.B. may instigate or recommend prosecution for 
wrongdoing by any company operat ing under  its jurisdiction. It
33-  Art 10 of the 1967 Ordonnance as amended by Art 14 of the Loi No.
8 8 -7 0  of 22 Jan.1988,  supra n.5, and Loi of 24th  January 1984 (J.O. 25 th  
January, 1984).
3 4 - Loi No. 70-1208 ,  supra n.5.
3 5 - Loi No. 83.1 of 3rd January 1983, supra n.26.
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cannot prosecute violations itself. C.O.B., after  handing over  the 
wrongdoing, continues to co-operate in the prosecution of the case. 
In criminal cases, the Court is required to seek C.O.B.’s opinion when  
conducting a prosecution of alleged insider trading and securit ies 
market  manipulation.
In the UK, by  contrast , the power to invest iga te  is shared  
b e tw een  the governm en t  and self regulation. On the  one hand, 
although the powers ves ted on the S.I.B.36 or the D.T.I.37 are v e ry  
similar to those given to the C.O.B., the S.I.B. in the U.K may not 
investigate the affairs of an S.R.O. or a person certif ied by  R.P.B. 
unless the S.R.O has requested  the S.I.B. to do so or w here  it, in the 
extreme case, appears to the S.I.B tha t  those members  w ere  unable 
to invest iga te .  By contrast ,  p re sen t ly  under  the  French 1967 
Ordonnance, the re  exist no bar r ie rs  to p rev en t  the  C.O.B. from 
investigating the Bourse de Valeur institutions. In addit ion to the
D.T.I. and the S.I.B., w here  suspicious practice is noticed, the  Stock 
Market  may appoint an ad-hoc commission to investigate .  Stock 
Exchange attention is e i ther tr iggered by complaint, the com pany 
management,  the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, the  f inancial 
institutions and in particular by the intermediaries involved. Unlike 
the  ap p o in tm e n t  of an inspector  by the  C.O.B. in France, the  
designation of an ad-hoc committee  by the Stock Exchange in 
Britain is a private decision. However, in both countries the  v as t  
m a jo r i ty  of inves t iga t ions  are of ten  e i th e r  inconc lus ive  or 
d e m o n s t r a t e  no id en t i f iab le  in s id e r  t r ad in g .  F u r t h e r m o r e ,  
publication of findings tha t  are based on probabil ity or uncerta in ty
3 6 -S e c t io n  105 of the F.S.A, 1986, the S.I.B, is also entitled to delegate its 
power to an S.R.O's officer to carry out an investigation for vio lation of the  
regu la t ion
37-  Section 177 of the F.S.A.1986
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may not be made public because of the fear  of defamation actions. 
As a matter  of routine, both the Stock Exchange and the Panel look 
at all suspicious share price movements, collecting information from 
intermediaries and asking them for details about their  clients.
SECTION TWO: BRITISH INSTITUTIONS
It is well established tha t  the British regula tory  f ram ew ork  is 
s h a re d  b e t w e e n  the  g o v e r n m e n t  and th e  s e l f - r e g u la t in g  
associations.  But the  g o v e r n m e n t ’s policy of re so r t ing  to, or 
encouraging, self regulating associations, although it traces its origin 
in history, still faces criticism-38 This section p rovides  a short  
outline about the legal background as well as the major reasons 
leading to the U.K. financial sector reform. Next, the authorization 
system o r /and  recognition of intermediaries. Then, focus will be on 
the jurisdictions of the Stock Exchange as well as the  Panel  on 
takeovers  and mergers within the field of takeovers.  Finally, and 
p e rh ap s  the  most im p o r ta n t  point  to cons ider  is d raw ing  a 
comparison be tw een  the French Commission des Operations de 
Bourse and the Panel, on the one hand, and pointing out the major 
implications of the E.E.C. proposal on takeovers and other  bids upon 
both regulatory institutions on the other.
2 . 1 -  L E G A L  B A C K G R O U N D  A N D  RE FO R M
The City of London Stock Exchange reform of 1986 was  the 
r e s u l t  of an accum ula t ion  of ev en ts .  Dealing in se cu r i t ie s  
f raudu len t ly  and in an abusive manner  led to the enac tm en t  of a
38-  Gower L.C.B, Report on Investor Protection, (Cmnd 9125,  1984); Page 
A.C., Self-Regulation: The Constitutional Dimension, supra n.12,  at p. 141. See  
also infra n.l 11 & 112.
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f irst s ta tute  in 1958, the Prevention of Fraud (Investments)  Act.39 
Accordingly, in te rmediaries  tha t  w ere  not m em bers  of the Stock 
Exchange were  required to obtain a license from the then  Board of 
Trade and to adhere  to licensed dealer  rules laid down by the
D.T.I.40 However, the majority of pa r tne rsh ip s  involved in the 
securities indus t ry  are exempt from the need to obtain a license 
because of their  membership of the Stock Exchange or of one of the 
associations of dea lers  in securi t ies  recognised by  the  D.T.I., 
including groups of foreign houses.4 ! By the beginning of 1980 
such an approach proved inconsistent w i th  respec t  not only to 
fa irness  and equal i ty  of t r e a tm e n t  b e tw een  the  var ious  f irm s 
involved in the securities industry,  bu t  also was not sufficient or 
flexible to cope with market changes and to meet investors needs in 
par t icu lar  inst itutions,  which ten d ed  to look for oppor tun i t ies  
w or ldw ide .42 One notable deficiency concerning the protection of 
investors  was th a t  a nu m b er  of f irms operat ing in in v e s tm e n t  
management,  for instance, failed w ith  substantia l  losses of money 
such as Norton W a r b u r g 4 3 in February  1980 and Barlow Clows.44 
P ressure  for an even tua l  change of the Stock M arket  came also
3 9-  This Act, quite apart from imposing l imitations on the distribution  
of circulars and other inducements to invest , makes it an offense for anyone  
to carry on or deal in the relevant securities unless he either is l icensed or 
exempt from such a requirement.
40 -  Licensed Dealers.Rules,1960 (S.1.1960,  No.1216), recently  revised as 
the Licensed Dealers (Conduct of Business) Rules (S.I 1 9 8 3 /5 8 5 )
4 1 -  Jackson D, Change in the Stock Exchange and Regulation of the  
City. (1985) B.E.O.Bull. p.544
4 2 -  They w ere  attracted by the internationalisation of savings  f lows  
which  reflects in part specific policy measures such as the abolition of the 
Exchange Control Act in the U.K in 1979., see Jackson D., Change in the Stock 
Exchange and Regulation of the City, supra n.41
43- Ibid
4 4 - Observer, 5th June, 1988
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from a num ber  of other reasons. First, conflict be tw een  the Stock 
Exchange regulation and the Restrictive Practices Act which ended 
with the government 's  decision to exempt the Stock Exchange from 
the Restrictive Practices A c t , 45 subject to the abolition of fixed 
c o m m i s s i o n s . 46 Second, in termediaries  w ere  organized in te rm s of 
a strict separation of capacity between  brokers and jobbers which 
had preven ted  flexible methods of carrying on business activities. 
Such a distinction between brokers  and jobbers was rem oved  and 
replaced by the so-called "single capacity" trading. This means tha t  
an in term ediary ,  usually a company, becomes enti t led to perform 
its functions both as principal (buying and selling securities on its 
own account) and as agents for its client (receiving orders  to buy or 
sell securit ies  for its client 's  account against  c o m m i s s i o n s ) . 4 7  
Moreover, ow nersh ip  rules w ere  real  obstacles th a t  p rev en te d  
f i rm s  from acquir ing a ce r ta in  percen tage  of sha reh o ld in g s  
exceeding 29.9%. Therefore, in order  to perm it  m em ber  f irm s to 
organize themselves, in 1986 the Stock Exchange introduced its new 
membership  regulation to allow an outsider company to own up to 
100% ownership of a member firm (removing the previous ceiling 
of 29.9%.).48 It is equally  im por tan t  to mention the  desire  to
4 5 -  The Stock Exchange w a s  brought  w i th in  the scope  of the  
Restrictive Practices Act, by the Restrictive Trade Practices (Services) Order 
1976.  Due to the conflict, the O.F.T referred the Stock Exchange to the  
Restrictive Practices Court in 1979. See Jackson D., Change in the Stock 
Exchange and Regulation of the City, at p.546,  supra n.41.
46 -  The minimum fixed commission was  removed in 1984 and changed  
to negociable commission.  See Jackson D., Change in the Stock Exchange and 
Regulation of the City, at 547, supra n A l .
4 7 -  See, Sir Nicolas Goodison, All Change at the Stock Exchange (1987)  
L,S.QQ,Gaz., p. 17121; Freshfields, Securities Regulation in the U.K. (London, IFR 
Publishing Ltd. 1987); Lomax D.F., London Stock Market After the  Financial 
Services Act (London, Butterworths 1987).
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com pete  ef fec t ive ly  and eff ic iently  in para l le l  w i th  fore ign  
securities markets .  Thus, changes which took place in the  U.K, 
financial marke t  following the passage of the F.S.A in 1986 reflect 
in p a r t  the  above cited concerns along w i th  the  following 
reorganization of institutions.
Bearing in mind the abolition of the ownership rules as well as 
the previous distinction between  brokers  and jobbers, one of the 
major changes in the  Stock M arket  resu l ted  in a com binat ion  
be tw een  various m arke t  institutions and dissolution of others. For 
example,  the merger  which took place b e tw e en  the  old Stock 
Exchange and the International Securities Regulatory Organization 
(I.S.R.O.). This led to the creation of two distinct private companies; 
the In ternational  Stock Exchange of the U.K. and the Republic of 
I re land  Ltd, and the  Securities Association Company Limited 
(T.S.A). The former  as the recognized inves tm en t  exchange (R.I.E.) 
and the la t te r  as the self regulating organization (S.R.O.).49 The 
second thing was tha t  the Council for the Securities Industry ,  which 
was established in 1978, ceased to exist in October 1985.5° Here, 
concern of the governm ent white  paper, Financial Services in the 
United K i n g d o m , 51 which gave effect to Professor Gower's Report,
4 8 -  See Wedgewood A.J, A_Guide to the Financial Serv ices Act 1986.  
(London, F.T.P. Limited, 1986); Jackson D, Change in The Stock Exchange and 
Regulation of the City, supra n.41
4 9 -  The F.S.Act, 1986 defines an S.R.O as:... a body (w hether  a body  
corporate or an incorporate association) which regulates the carrying on of 
inves tm ent  business of any kind by enforcing rules which  are binding on  
persons carrying on business of that kind either because they  are members  
of that body or because they are otherwise subject to its control. Art 8 ( 1 ) .
50-  The C.S.I was set up on the initiative of the Bank of England, mainly  
as a supervisory  and co-ordinating body. It has published codes of conduct  
and Rules notably,  the rules governing substantial  acquisit ion of shares  
which are presently incorporated in the City Code.
5 1 -  White Paper, Financial Services in the U.K. (1985 )  Cmnd 9432 .  See
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was the creation of a s ta tu tory  regulatory  body able to supervise 
the regulation of inves tm ent  business in the U.K., i.e, the Security
and Investment Board (S.I.B.).52
The basic distinction between  the S.I.B. and S.R.O. or R.I.E., is 
t h a t  an S.R.O., including R.I.E., are b ased  on a co n t rac tu a l  
relationship with  its members  who alone it can regulate using the 
mechanism of administra t ive disciplinary measures  for breach of 
its in te rna l  code of practice.53 The S.I.B. carries out two types  of 
function. One is conferred on it by the Secretary  of State on the 
basis of delegation of powers and in accordance with  the provisions 
of the F.S.A. 1986. In this respect, the S.I.B is called the "designated 
agency". The other function derives from its n a tu re  as a pr ivate  
limited company which enacts its own rules, regulates the conduct 
of its m em b ers  and superv ises  the i r  per fo rm ance .  I t  is also 
empowered, by vir tue of its own regulation, to impose disciplinary 
m easures  for breach  of rules. Equally the major f e a tu re s  cited 
above apply to the Council of the Stock Exchange which, though 
remaining a self regulating body, has the backing of the law and 
any failure to comply with the regulation carries legal as well  as 
disciplinary sanctions, for example, withdrawal of recognition.
The th i rd  aspect  re la tes  to the f r a m e w o rk  w i th in  w hich  
intermediaries  are required to carry out their  activities. The F.S.A.
also notes in (198 5 )T.B.L. at p. 93 and 237
3 2 -  In the f irst instance,  the proposition gave  birth of tw o  bodies  
namely,  the S.I.B. and the Marketing and In vestm ent  Board latter called 
"M.I.B.O.C.". But, in order to avoid an overlapping or proliferation of powers,  
the S.I.B. and the M.I.B.O.C. merged into a new single board, i.e, S.I.B. For 
further reading see, Lomax D.F., London Stock Market After the  Financial  
Services Act, supra n.47; White Paper, Financial Services in the U.K. (1985) ,  
supra 5 1
53-  Page A.C., Self-Regulation: Constitutional Dimension, supra n. 12
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1986 introduced a system of r e c o g n i t i o n . 54 The F.S.A.1986 makes 
it a criminal offense for anyone to carry on inves tm ent  business in 
the U.K without prior authorization. Two questions may arise. First, 
should  it be a s su m ed  th a t  the  w hole  range  of f i rm s  and 
organizations are requ ired  to obtain such recognition w h e th e r  or 
not they  are locally res iden t  bodies, and second, which  body is 
entitled to grant such permission?
In the U.K., f irs t  of all, the F.S.A.1986 lays down a genera l  
p roh ib i t ion  on anyone  provid ing  f inanc ia l  se rv ices  w i th o u t  
obtaining a prior authorization. The Act also p rovides  var ious  
alternatives ei ther with respect to exemptions of a certain type of 
activity from the genera l  prohibit ion which is em bod ied  in its 
provisions or in relation to facilities through which an authorization 
can be obtained. As regards  the recognition r eq u i rem e n ts ,  any 
institution seeking to carry  on inves tm ent  business in the  U.K. is 
requ ired  to obtain an authorization from the S.I.B., except  for 
overseas  applicants which subm it  the ir  req u es t  direc t ly  to the 
Secretary  of State in whom the power of recognition is ves ted .  
However, a member  of an S.R.O. or an R.I.E. is not obliged to seek
S.I.B. authorization. Under the F.S.A.1986, both organizations R.I.E. 
and S.R.O. are entitled to authorize inves tm ent  businesses for the ir  
members,  regulate their conduct and supervise their  performance. 
They are also em powered ,  by v ir tue  of th e i r  own regulation, to 
impose disciplinary measures for breach of the ir  rules.  But this
5 4 - This can be seen from Art.3 of the F.S.A.1986. See also infra n.56.  
Article 3 of the F.S.A, 1986 stipulates that "no person shall carry on, or 
purport to carry on, in ves tm en t  in the United Kingdom unless he is an 
authorised person". Therefore, in order to carry out any sort of activities  
with in  the  securities market, institutions have to have  or seek  a prior 
authorization, unless granted otherwise.  Compare with  the French Loi No.88-  
70 Relating to the Bourse de Valeur, supra n.5.
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does not p revent  the S.I.B. from exercising its delegated power. The
5.1.B. to some extent may make rules which are directly applicable 
to all authorized persons, including their  membership .  Hence, the
5.1.B.'s regulation concerning financial resources rules, cancellation 
rules, rules regarding the legal detention  of c l ien ts ’ m oney and 
compensation fund rules are directly applicable to all authorized 
persons.55
Authoriza t ion ,  w h e th e r  in France, or U.K, seems to ensu re  a 
basic means of control and contact. What matters  for the regulator 
is to ensure  an adequate  and efficient protection to investors. For 
example, permission to carry  out any kind of inves tm en t  business 
needs some degree of qualifications and conditions to be fulfilled. 
An applicant must satisfy the re levant  au thori ty  th a t  it is able to 
police and regulate the admission as well as the conduct of its own 
members,  and tha t  its in ternal rules provide s tandards of adequacy 
and compliance. The standards of adequacy and compliance formula 
takes  account of va r ious  factors  notably ,  the  n a t u r e  of the  
investm ent business, the kind of investor likely to deal w ith  them, 
the effectiveness of the organization of a r rangem ents  for enforcing 
compliance and the effect of any other sort of control to which its 
members are subject.56
As to the ways of authorization, in addition to the category of 
persons exem pted  by the F.S.A. provis ions57 the re  are severa l
5 5 -  See, Lomnicka E.Z. & Powell  J.L., Encyclopedia of Financial Law  
(vol .2) (London, Sweet  and Maxwell  1987);  Coopers and Lybrand,  T h e
E in an c ia l .  Services— Act 1986.  A Guide to The Act, and The I ssu es  for
M a n a s e m e n t  (London, Kegan Page Ltd, 1988);  Freshfie lds ,  S e c u r i t i e s  
Regulations in the U.K. supra n.46; Lomax D.F, supra n.47; Wedgew ood A J., 
supra n.48.
56- Ibid
5 7 -  Section 36 to 46 of the Act exempt the fol lowing bodies: Bank of
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ways through which authorization to carry on inves tm en t  business 
can be obtained. First, an authorization can be granted  directly by 
the  S.I.B.58 Second, by seeking m e m b ersh ip  of one of the ir  
exempted bodies principally, the S.R.O., R.I.E., R.C.H. or the R.P.B.59 
Third, an authorization may also be obtained through an insurance 
c o m p a n y ; 60 f r ie n d ly  societies;6 ! o p e ra to rs  and t r u s t e e s  of 
recognised schemes; and overseas R.I.E. or R.C.H. authorized in an
E.E.C. m em ber  state which have received a certificate to ca rry  on 
investment business in the U.K.62
However, the S.I.B. and/or,  the Secretary of State, in respect of 
overseas organizations, reserves  the right to revoke authorization 
for breach of rules or non-compliance w ith  the national legislation 
or in te rn a t io n a l  o b l i g a t i o n s . 63 The S.I.B. may also in te rv en e ,  
w h e r e v e r  deem ed  n ecessa ry  e i th e r  to r e s t r i c t  the  k ind  of 
inves tm ent  business regulated by the authorized persons, impose 
disciplinary measures, or w ithdraw  recognition from th em .64 It is 
worth  reiterating tha t  the S.I.B.'s authority  which is t rans fe r red  to 
it as a designated agency by the Secretary of State does not convert  
it into a s ta tu tory  body. But it remains uncertain w here  and w h en  
the S.I.B could be deemed to be acting upon its own rules  o ther  
than  those transferred  to it by the Secretary of State. In te rm s  of a
England, R.I.E., R.C.H. and R.P.B. in respect  of anything done in their  
capacity as such which  constitute in ves tm ent  business;  overseas  R.I.E. and 
R.C.H. (subject to prior notif ication and certificate); Lloyds  and l i sted  
institutions;...etc.
58-  Sect. 25-30  (Delegation) order 1987 (S.1.1987/942) .
59-  Sect 7, 8 and 9 of the Act.
60 -Insurance Company Act 1982; Sect 129 of the F.S.A.1986.
61 - Sect. 24 of the F.S.A. 1986 et seq
62-Sect.40 et seq of the F.S.A.1986.
63- F.S.A.1986, Sect.79-84 inserted therein by the Companies Act.1989
64-  Freshfields, Securities Regulation in the U.K. Supra n.47
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con tras t  b e tw e e n  the U.K. des ignated  agency and the  French 
re levan t  authorit ies  (C.O.B., C.B.V. or even  the Societe de Bourse 
Frangaise), the S.I.B., regardless of the delegation of powers, is a 
p r iva te  l imited company. It is f inanced by  fees  im posed  on 
investment businesses and S.R.Os. No public funds are involved. The 
French relevant authorities for their part, are established by statute 
which also determines the scope of their  powers and their  budget  is 
governmental.
2 . 2 -  TH E  STOCK E X C H A N G E  C O U N C I L 6 5
The Stock Exchange of the United Kingdom and the Republic of 
Ireland came into existence following the merger and division of 
the U.K. domestic Stock Exchange and the In ternational  Securities 
Regulatory Organization.66 The other body which was the result  of 
the same combination is the Securities Association (T.S.A) which is 
also a p r iva te  body .67 At p resen t ,  the  s ta tus ,  im m u n i ty  and 
functions of the competent authority  is devolved to the Council of 
the Stock Exchange which continues to be responsib le  for the 
admission of securit ies  as well  as making ru les  on lis ting in 
accordance with the sta tutory provisions.68
The Securities Association's (T.S.A.), activities cover inves tm en t  
businesses in domestic and in te rna tiona l  securit ies dealt  on the 
London Stock Exchange, options, gilt edged securit ies, f inancial
65-  See, Art.142(6) of the F.S.A, 1986. For further reading see mainly,
P en n in g ton  R.R., S.tngR Exchange,  t h e  New  R e q u i r e m e n ts  (London,
Butterworths, 1985).
6 6 -  The International Stock Exchange of the U.K. and the  Republic of 
Ireland Limited Company, so-called "R.I.E"
67-  See, supra n .4 1, 47 k  55
6 8 -  Gower L.C.B, Report on Investor  Protection,  Part 1, supra n.38;  
Lomax D.F., supra n.47.
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fu tu re s ,  and corpora te  f inance, in te rn a t io n a l  bonds  including 
Eurobonds, inves tm ent  management and advice. In addition to its 
legal responsibilities, the T.S.A., by v ir tue  of the Act, is enti t led to 
authorize inves tm en t  businesses for its members ,  regu la te  the ir  
conduct and supervise  the ir  activities. It is also em pow ered ,  by 
vir tue  of its own regulation, to impose disciplinary measures either 
for a b reach  of its rules or violation of o ther  bodies r e le v a n t  
rules.69
The Council is entit led to make its own rules, p romulgate  or 
dele te  from them  as it sees fit. Besides, it imposes  its own 
disciplinary sanctions such as warning, repr im and,  suspension or 
imposition of conditions upon the listing of securities w ithout  which 
they  cannot be t raded  on the Exchange and in the ex t rem e case, 
w i th d ra w a l  of m em bersh ip .  The Stock Exchange exerc ises  the  
power delegated to it by the Act,70 but  in so far  as it imposes 
additional requ irem en ts  under its own rules or in exercise of its 
genera l  power,71 it does not act as a public au thor i ty  exercising 
powers conferred  by law. Ambiguity  and unce r ta in ty ,  in this 
respect, as in relation to the S.I.B., arise as to w h en  the Council is 
acting upon its delegated authority and those of its own resources.
6 9 -  The R.I.E., in terms of numbers  exercising their activit ies  in the  
city of London Stock Market are, The International Stock Exchange of the  
United k ingdom and the Republic of Ireland ; the  A ssoc ia t ion  of  
International Bond Dealers (A.I.B.D.) w ith  its head office in Zurich. The 
A.I.B.D. is in v o lv e d  in secon d ary  market  in v e s tm e n t ;  the  London  
International Financial Future Exchange Limited and the London Commodity  
Exchange, in addition to many other International Organisation such as the  
London Metal  Exchange, the International Petroleum Exchange and the  
London Meat Exchange as w ell  as the Baltic International Freight Future  
Exchange (B.I.F.F.E.X.). See further, Lomax D.F, supra n.47, at p.78 et  sea
7 0 -  Part IV of the F.S.A 1986 which repealed Part III of the Companies  
Act 1985 (Com. Order, No.3, 1986).
7 1 -  Sect 142 Para 9 of the F.S.A.1986
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Unlike the French C.B.V.,72 the U.K Stock Exchange Council is 
not a s ta tu tory  body. It is a private company with limited liability. 
One consideration which may also be re levant in this context is tha t  
while the French reform brought a simple and harmonious system, 
the UK has been characterized by the diversity  of its self regulatory 
institutions. In te rm s of jurisdiction, both the U.K Stock Exchange 
com peten t  au thori ty  and French inst i tution (C.B.V.) enjoy almost 
co r resp o n d in g  powers .  The Brit ish F.S.A 1986 e n a b le s  the  
competent authority  to refuse any listing application if it considers 
that, by reason of any matters relating to the issuer, the admission 
of the securities would be detr imental  to the interests  of investors; 
or in the case of securities already officially listed in another  state, 
if the issuer has failed to comply with  any obligations to which he is 
subject by v i r tu e  of th a t  l i s t i n g  73 Both situations can only be 
challenged or be the subject of judicial review if the decision is 
clearly inconsistent with  the law or based on an obvious and clear 
misunderstanding of the re levant  facts.74 In order to carry  out its 
functions,  the Council is en t i t led  to delegate its pow ers  to a 
committee or subcommittee, officer or servant  of the authority.
As far as the regulation of takeover  offers is concerned, while 
the French C.B.V. plays the principal role, the presence of the British 
Stock Exchange Council appears decisive only to the ex ten t  th a t  a 
listing of a new securities is sought for the implementat ion  of such 
offers. Yet, in the U.K, the rules and requirements  affecting issues of
7 2 -  The French C.B.V. was  the result  of a conversion of the  Chambre  
Syndicale des Agents de Change (C.S.A.C) into a n ew  statutory body present ly  
known the C.B.V. See Loi No.88-70,  supra n.5.
7 3 - Sect. 144(3)(a) of the F.S.A 1986
7 4 -  Hahlo H.R St Farrar J.H, Hahlo's Cases and Materials on Company  
Law (3rd edn) (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1987) p.576-602 .
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secur i t ie s7  ^ are coining to be mostly regulated by s t a t u t e I f  a 
listing of securities is sought, Section 144(2) provides that:
without prejudice to the generality of the power of the com petent 
au thority  to make listing rules .... requ ire  as a condition of the 
admissions of any securities of the official listing: (a) the submission 
to, and approval by, the au thority  of a docum ent (in this Act 
referred  to as "listing particulars") in such form and containing such 
information as may be specified in the rules; and (b) the publication 
of that document, or, in such cases as maybe specified by the rules, 
the publication of a document other than listing particulars".
7 5 -  Under the F.S.A.1986,  “in v e s tm e n t” which  is the eq u iv a le n t  of  
"securities" means: shares and stock in the share capital of a company,  
debentures,  including debentures  stock, loan stock, bonds,  certif icates of 
deposit  and other instruments  creating or acknowledging in d eb tedn esss ,  
excluding cheques,  bill of exchange,  banknote,  bank s tatements ,  savings  
accounts,  insurance policies, leases or otherwise:  g o v e n m e n t  and public  
securities (loan stock, bonds): instruments  entit ling to share or securit ies  
(warrant  or other in s tru m en ts  enti t l ing the holder  to su bscr ibe  for  
in ves tm en ts ) ;  cert if icates represent ing  securi t ies  or other  in s tru m en ts  
which  confer property right in respect  of any in vesm en t ,  any right to 
acquire, dispose of, underwrite or convert  an investment ,  a contract and 
right (other than option) to acquire any such an investment  o therwise than  
by subscription: units in a collective inves tment  scheme, including shares in 
or securities  of an open ended inves tm ent  company; options to acquire or 
dispose of an investment,  currency,  gold or silver; future rights under a 
contract of the sale of a commodity  or property of any other description  
under which delivery is to be made at a future date and at a price agreed  
upon w h e n  the contract is made; long-term insurance contracts in terms of 
business; rights and interests  in investments .  Sch.l ,  Part 1, Sect. l  to 11, of 
the Act. See also Sect 142, para 7.
7 6 -  Prior to 1984,  listing of securit ies-regulation w as  self  regulating  
backed by the law. From January 1985,  the rules governing fu l ly  l isted  
securities have  been  changed, as part of the E.E.C harmonisat ion  policy.  
Three directives,  adopted by the council b e tw een  1979 and 1982,  required  
member states to enact legislation concerning securit ies  in all respects .  
These directives are: the "Admission Directive" O.J L’7 9 /2 7 9 . ;  the "Listing 
Particulars Directive" O.J. L 80 /3 9 0 ;  and the "Interim report Directive O.J. L 
8 2 / 1 2 1 .  See Pennington R.R, Stock Exchange, the New R eq uirem ents , at p.2 
and 23, supra n.65.
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The Act also lays down a guideline to determ ine  w h a t  sort of 
information is requ ired  to be contained in the document.77 This 
refers  to the na tu re  of the  issuer of securit ies and the  kind of 
investments  involved, to the nature  of the person likely to consider 
their  acquisition, to any information available to investors and their  
professional a d v i s e r s 78 Notwithstanding changes of purposes, the 
competent authority often requires the following information to be 
included in the listing par t icu lars :79 in form ation  re la t ing to a 
persons responsible for par t icu lars80 and the auditing account;81 
information concerning securities to which the listing particulars  
r e l a t e s ;82 inform ation  regarding the i s s u e r8  ^ and its capital;84 
in fo rm a t io n  concern ing  the  i s sue rs  ac t iv i t ie s ;8  ^ asse ts  and 
liabilities, financial posit ion and profits and losses; the  recen t  
d e v e lo p m e n t  and p rospec ts  of the  issuer;  and  f ina l ly  the  
in f o rm a t io n  co n cern in g  a d m in i s t r a t i o n ,  m a n a g e m e n t  and
7 7 -  Detail of the Act's guidelines are contained in the Stock Exchange 
(Listing) Regulations 1984 (S.1.8 4 /7 1 6 ) ,  discussed by Pennington,  supra n.65,
7 8 -  Sect. 146(7) and Sect. 147 (Supplementary Listing Particulars)
7 9 -  If the securities to which the listing particulars relate are n e w ly  
presented by  the issuer,  as Professor Pennington pointed out, the l ist ing  
particulars fulfi l  the function of a prospectus in inducing in ves tors  to 
subscribe, but if the securities are already listed or have been  allotted to a 
holder who is seeking to dispose o f  them, the listing particulars are simply  
designed to induce other interested investors to purchase them from their  
existing holder. See, supra n.65
80-  Sect. 152 (1) to (9) of the Act identif ies  persons responsib le  for 
particulars.
81-  Listing Regulation (S.1.1 9 8 4 /7 1 6 ) ,  Sch.A Ch.l and Sch.B. Ch.2, supra
n.77
82-  Ch. 2, Sch 1 and 2 of the Listing Regulation, supra n.77
83-  The meaning of "issuer" is provided by Section 142(7) of the F.S.A. 
1986.
84-  Ch.3 of the Listing Regulation, supra n.77
85-  Ch. 4 of the Listing Regulation, supra n.77
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supervision.86
2.3-  PANEL ON TAKEOVERS AND MERGERS
A- ESTABLISHMENT
As early  as 1939, the Governor of the Bank of England formed 
a body know n as the "City Working Party" for the  purpose  of 
considering and setting up a f ram ew ork  w ith in  which takeovers  
should be conducted .87 In 1968 this body was replaced by the 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers. The Panel was placed under  the 
supervision of a newly established body in 1978, i.e., the Council for 
the Securities Indus try  (C.S.I.). After the passage of the Financial 
Services Act 1986, the Panel assumed its full powers and sta tus.88
The City Code, which is administered by the Panel, is ne i ther  a 
source of law nor a statute,  it is purely a measure of self discipline 
r e p r e s e n t in g  the  collective opin ion  of those  p ro fe s s io n a l ly  
concerned in the field of takeovers  and mergers  on a range  of 
business s tandards .89 In order to be swiftly adapted to changes in 
c i rcumstances as well  as to p re se rv e  its vi ta l  ethical  suasion 
character, the Code is drafted in comparatively philosophical te rm s 
so as to make it difficult for its req u irem en ts  to be avoided .90 ' 
Moreover it was thought impractical to devise the  code ru les  in 
such detail as to cover all the various circumstances which arise in
8 6 -  Ch.5 to 7 of the Listing Regulation, supra n.77.
87 -  See Weinberg M.A, Takeovers  and Mergers . (4th edn.),  at Ch.12, 
para 1202, footnote 1, supra n. l9 /Ch. l
88 -  For an extensive analysis see Johnston A., The Citv Takeovers Code 
(Oxford University Press, 1980).
89-  Ibid.
90 -  Panel answers to questions contained in the inquiry  of  the D.T.I, 
July 1974, noted by Weinberg, Takeovers & Mergers, (4th edn), at para 1229-  
30, supra n . l9 /C h. l .
takeovers  and mergers si tuations and, accordingly, persons who 
engage in such activities should be aware of the spirit  of the Code 
as well as the le t ter .91 It is interesting to mention tha t  a parallel 
philosophy is reflected in both the French Code of Conduct which 
has been  introduced by the C.O.B. in 1970 and the E.E.C. Code of 
Conduct of 1977.
The Panel was, at the time of its foundation, faced w ith  two 
problems. One was w ith  a de term inat ion  of w h a t  its p roper  role 
should be. Should it in tervene on its own initiative in the course of 
a takeover  offer, w herever  a breach of the City Code is noticed? Or 
should it confine itself to inquiry after the event  had taken  place? 
The former policy was chosen.92 The second problem was w he the r  
it could implement a system of voluntary  self discipline or should it 
submit to regulation by law enforced by officials appointed by the 
government.  The City Working Par ty  preferred  for a n u m b e r  of 
reasons vo lun tary  self discipline based on a Code and administered 
by its own sponsors.93
The Panel consists of three main organs, the Panel Membership, 
the Panel Executive, and the Panel Appeal Committee.94 The Panel 
Membership consists of a chairman, two depu ty  chairmen, a non 
represen ta t ive  member nominated by the Governor of the Bank of 
England and a rep re se n ta t iv e  of the  following b o d i e s , 95 all of 
which  are com mitted  to suppor t  its activities - the  Securit ies
91-  See the City Code, introduction to general principles.
92-  See supra n. 88 &. 90.
93 -  See Page A.C., Self-Regulation and Codes of Practice, ( 1 9 8 0 )  T.B.L. 
p.24, at p.26 and 103.
94-  City Code, introduction p.A2; The Panel report of 31st  March 1987.
9 5 -  Representative usually, but not necessari ly  a chairman. However ,  
in respect of the membership some are represented  by a v ice  chairman,  
others by their president whereas  other are represented  b y  a nominated  
person. See the Panel report 1987.
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Association, the Stock Exchange, the Unit Association, The National 
Association of Pension Funds, The Association of Inves tm en t  Trust 
Companies, The Association of British Insurers ,  The Confederation 
of British Industry ,  the British Merchant Banking and Securities 
Houses Association (with separate  rep resen ta t ion  of its corporate 
Finance Committee),  the In v e s tm e n t  M an ag em en t  Regulatory  
Organization, the Financial In termediaries ,  Managers and Brokers 
Regulatory Association, the Committee of London and Scottish 
Bankers, and the Insti tute of Chartered Accountants in England and 
Wales.
The P a n e l  Execut ive ,  w h ic h  is r e s p o n s i b l e  fo r  the  
adm inis tra t ion  of the Code, is composed of a Director General, a 
Deputy Director General, Secretaries including joint Secretaries, 
Deputy Secretary and ten assistant Secretaries. If it is alleged tha t  
the Panel has abused its power (acting outside its jurisdiction) in 
rela tion to any refusal  of recognition or if the Panel ceases to 
recognise a person who is deemed to be entit led to obtain such a 
right, there is a right of appeal to the Appeal Committee. An appeal 
may also lie with  leave of the Panel bu t  no application for leave to 
appeal may be made to the Panel Committee itself.96
The Appeal  Committee consists  of a Chairman, w ho  will 
normally have held high judicial office, and two m em bers  of the 
Panel, who were  not involved in the decision under  appeal. One of 
these members,  so far as it is possible, will be a rep resen ta t ive  of 
the body to which the party  concerned is affiliated. In all litigated 
cases, notice of appeal must be given within two business days of 
the  decision in question.  The Panel  will n o rm a l ly  su sp en d
96-  The Panel usually refuses to grant leave to appeal against a finding  
of fact or against a decision concerning the interpretation of its Code.
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publication in full of its findings during this time. If the re  is an 
appeal to the Appeal Committee, publication of findings as well as 
the initial decision are fu r th e r  suspended  until af te r  the final 
decision of tha t  Committee. However, the Appeal Committee will 
rely substantially on the evidence already t rea ted  by the Panel as 
the f irs t  Court of Appeal, unless the Appeal Committee considers 
these may be material  new evidence which could not reasonably  
have been presented  to the Panel. In such a case, the Committee 
may either hear  such evidence or rem it  the m atter  once again to 
the Panel for reconsideration. But, if the appeal is dismissed, the 
Panel  f indings are publ ished  su bsequen t ly .  It is w o r th w h i le  
mentioning that, following the passage of the F.S.A. 1986, especially 
after the Guinness affair,97 the governm ent was p rom pted  by the 
desire to enhance the Panel’s position with respect to breaches of 
the City Code.98 Consequently, the City Code on Takeovers  and 
Mergers is officially supported by the whole range of the securities 
marke t  organizations notably, the S.I.B., the D.T.I. and the S.R.O. as 
well as the R.P.B. and R.C.H. The S.I.B., for instance, requ ire  a cold 
shouldering of those unwilling to comply with the City Code or co­
operate with  the Panel when  it is conducting an investigation. The 
Panel is also enti t led to receive res tr ic ted  information  ob ta ined  
through the use of s ta tu tory  powers.99 Of utmost importance,  the 
Court of Appeal,  in dealing w ith  the  decisions of the  Panel, 
recognised that  they are treated as valid and binding until they  are 
set aside by the Courts and so application for review should not be
97_ Financial Times, 3rd August 1988,  p. 14; Regina v  Panel on Takeovers  
and Mergers ex Parte Guinness PLC. (1988)  2 F.T.L.R, p.50 (C.A)
98- Statement of the Panel's Chairman of 23rd Sept. 1987,  at p.3 in the  
Panel report of 31st March, 1987.
99- Ibid.
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used as a tactic in the course of an offer. Therefore,  the possibility 
of an application for judicial review will not hinder or res tra in  the 
working of the Panel and its Executive.100
B- JURISDICTION
The City Code applies principally to those who are actively 
involved in Stock Market operations in so far as they  seek to obtain 
or reinforce the ir  posit ion of control in ta rg e t  co m p an ie s .101 
However, the  Code does not only apply to persons involved in 
takeover  transactions as such, its scope of application extends to 
include all professional advisers. In te rm s of companies,  the City 
Code applies to ail listed and unlisted public companies, including 
some private companies in particular in respect of reverse  takeover  
offers and those incorporated and res iden t  in Eire, the Channel 
Islands and the Isle of Man if their  shares are listed or dealt  in on 
the International  Stock Exchange.102 However, while the identi ty  
and na tu re  of the offerors and their  place of incorporat ion  are 
irrelevant,  the whole focus is centered on target companies tha t  are 
incorporated in the U K. and having their  head office and place of 
central management here .10^
Fundamental ly ,  al though the P an e l ’s overal l  objective is to 
ensure tha t  all shareholders are trea ted with fairness and equali ty  
and are enabled to make an informed decision on the merits  or 
demerits  of the offer, its central tenet,  in practice, is to provide 
fur ther  safeguards for the inexperienced and small shareholders. In
100-  Alexander R QC, Umpire or Policeman? Self Regulation or Statutory  
Enforcement? (1987 )The Private investors, p.49.
101- See the City Code, introductory section.
102- Ibid.
103- Ibid.
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other words, experienced, specifically professional, investors are in 
general "well able to look after their interests".1°4 Furthermore, the 
Code is not concerned w ith  the merits  of a bid. That is for the 
shareholder.  Nor is it concerned with  the financial or commercial 
advantages or disadvantages of a takeover offer. These are matters 
for the company and its shareholders.  !°5 The Code is not concerned 
w i th  those issues such as com peti t ion  policy, w hich  are the 
responsibili ty of the government.  As regards the Panel 's function, 
most works concerning the adm inis tra t ion  of the  Code are dealt  
w ith  by the Executive in a quite informal manner.  That is to say 
th a t  the  Executive, th rough  its consultat ive process, has in fact 
dem onstra ted  its effectiveness and ability to cope w ith  si tuations 
even  if they  are not covered by the le t ter  of the  Code and has 
solved problems while they  still live r a th e r  th a n  awaiting and 
taking remedial action subsequently .106
The Panel Executive, in addition to its day to day work  relating 
to the regulation and the supervis ion of re levan t  dealing, is also 
entit led to conduct investigations into the alleged affairs e i ther  on 
its own initiative or upon a complaint by other concerned parties  
such as insider trading or other serious violations of the Code. In 
addit ion, the  Executive is r eq u i red  to co -opera te  w i th  o th e r  
regulatory authorit ies ,!07 whether  in respect of mutual exchange of 
i n f o r m a t i o n ! 08 or concerning the conduct of in v es t ig a t io n .109
104- Supra n.100
1 0 5 - Supra 101
106- Supra 100
107-  Bodies w ith  which  the Panel  co-operation is required are; The  
Department of Trade and Industry (D.T.I.) the Stock Exchange, the  S.I.B., the  
Recognised Professional Bodies, the Recognised Clearing Houses (R.C.H.), the  
S.R.O.s and the R.I.E. and the Bank of England, See the City Code, at section A.3.
108- Under the Companies Act 1985 and the F.S.A. 1986,  and the Banking
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Additionally, in order to ensure a high business standard  within the 
m arke t ,  the  Panel  may take  d isc ip l inary  m e asu re s  to curb 
violations of its Code. It may also repo r t  the offender 's  abusive 
conduct to the re levan t  organization or au thor i ty  w i th  which the 
offender  is affiliated. In consequence, such an au th o r i ty  may 
impose or take a disciplinary action against those subject to its 
jurisdiction who do not appear  likely to comply w ith  the Code’s 
s tan d a rd  of business  conduc t .110 In ex trem e cases, the Panel 's 
ult imate sanction, with  the cooperation of the In ternat ional  Stock 
Exchange, is the  w i th d raw a l  of the  facilities of the  securit ies  
market.
Finally, the above discussion shows that, a l though the  Panel 
decision is not legally enforceable and has never  been  far  from a 
num ber  of criticisms, it is generally tolerated or accepted, w h e th e r  
expressly  or impliedly by the financial com m unity  involved in 
takeovers  and mergers activities.111 Presumably,  this means tha t  
the P ane l’s power derives, in the main, from ‘the  co-operat ion, 
assistance and unders tanding  of its sponsors. Moreover, w h e n  it
Act 1987,  the Panel  is becoming entitled to obtain and receive regulatory  
information the disclosure of which is restricted by statute, see the City Code 
on Takeovers and Mergers, 1988, section A.3.
109-  The relevant authorities are required to co-operate and facil iatate 
the Panel investigation proceedings,  w h e n e ver  undertaken.  See, Rule 12 of 
the S.I.B rulebook. It is worth highlighting that the Panel on takeovers  has 
not been  integrated into the the framework because,  as it chairman pointed  
out, the F.S.A 1986 reform was intended to regulate the relationship b e tw een  
in termediaries  and investors,  w hereas  the Panel  is concerned w i th  the  
protection of shareholders in certain specif ic situations,  notably  takeovers  
and mergers. See supra n.100
110- The City Code’s introduction
1 1 1 -  See Page A.C., Self-Regulation and Code of Practice supra n.93;  
Ferguson R.B, The Legal Status of Non-Statutory Codes of Practice, (1 9 8 6 RB.L. 
p. 12; Bradley C., Harmonisation of Takeover and Merger Regulations w ith in  
the E.E.C, (1986)7 Co.Law. p. 131 -32
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c o m e s  to  c h a l l e n g in g  t h e  P a n e l 's  d e c i s io n  b e f o r e  t h e  c o u r t ,  P r o f e s s o r  
G o w e r  p o i n t e d  o u t  t h a t  "the court in any litigation that may ensue will trea t 
the Code and the ruling thereon as prescribing fair and reasonable s tandards of 
co n d u c t" .1 12 To p u t  i t  m o r e  s i m p l y ,  t h e  P a n e l  h a s  g a i n e d  ju d i c i a l  
r e c o g n i t i o n  as  w e l l . 113
S E C T I O N  T H R E E :  C O N C L U S I O N  A N D  THE I M P L I C A T I O N  OF TH E
E.E.C P R O P O S A L  FOR FOR A  D I R E C T I V E  ON T A K E O V E R S
Although both British and French takeover  regula t ions  are 
basically in tended  for the protection of investors  in te res ts ,  in 
par t icu la r  those of the  ta rg e t  com pany 's  sh a reh o ld e r s ,  the i r  
regulatory systems differ radically. In Britain, generally  speaking, 
self regulation prevails ,114 while in France the whole issue is a legal
112-  Gower L.C.B, Review of Investor Protection: Part 1, para 9.13.  supra 
n.38. See also supra n.51
113- Gething v. Kilner (1972)1 All ER 1166 at 1170, (1972)1 W.L.R.337. In 
Re St. Piran Ltd.. Dillon J states "The words 'just and equitable'  are w ide  
general  words to be construed generally and taken at their face value.  The 
provision of the City Code [on takeovers  and mergers] , set  out a code of 
conduct which has been laid down by responsible and exper ienced persons  
in the City as being fair and reasonable conduct in relation to companies  
which  like St.Piran have obtained the benef it  of a public quotation on the  
Stock Exchange. If the directors of a public quoted company or the principal  
shareholders  in such a company choose to f lout that code of  fair and 
reasonable  conduct and to ignore w ithout  good reason the  con s eq u en t  
direction of the City Takeover Panel, and minority shareholders are injured  
by the withdrawal of the Stock Exchange quotation for the company's shares,  
then it seems to me that it could be v e r y  wel l  be just and equitable in the 
natural sense of those words that the company should be wound up" Re St. 
Piran Ltd. (1981)3 All ER 270 at 277, (1981)1 W.L.R.1300.
1 1 4 -  Readers  are referred  to Page  A.C., Self  R egula t ion ,  The  
Constitutional Dimension, supra n.12; (1985)  Cmnd 9432,  supra n.51; (1 9 8 0 )  
Cmnd 7937; Gower L.C.B., Review of Investor Protection, supra n.38; Walker D., 
Regulation in Financial Market (198 3 )2 3  Bank.Eng.Ouart.fiuII.. p.499; Hurst  
T.R, Self Regulation Versus Legal Regulation (1984)5  Co. Law., p. 161; Ferguson
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one. The regulation w ith  respect to societes com m erciales for all 
practical purposes, is contained  in the  1966 Loi des Societes 
Com m erciales, and  a d m in is t ra t iv e  re g u la t io n s  p ro m u lg a te d  
the reunder.115
In the ord inary  course of business, under both regulations, any 
significant change in the company's in ternal affairs, for instance the 
am endm ent of its articles of association, increase or decrease of its 
share  capital, including any election or rem oval of d irectors , is 
en tire ly  reserved to the shareholders ultimate decision in a general 
meeting, w hilst the board of directors, th rough  th e ir  appoin ted  
m anagers and officers, run  the day to day business. This does not 
mean tha t directors are deprived of the right to make any business 
decision. Correspondingly, the ex ten t to which the d irec tors  are 
perm itted  to bind their com pany to th ird  parties is circum scribed 
w ith in  the scope of f iduciary  d u tie s .116 Such a philosophy w ith  
re sp e c t  to in v e s to r  p ro tec tion  w as f u r th e r  en h a n ce d  in the 
ta k e o v e rs  field. Both the  UK and French reg u la to rs  consider 
shareholders, principally those of the  ta rg e t com pany, to be the 
ultim ate party  determ ining the success or failure of offers. Such a 
rational decision can only be made if shareholders are adequate ly  
informed. This is the main theme. It is w orth  highlighting th a t  such 
a view is not exclusive to Britain or France, it reflects all securities
R.B., The Legal Status of N on-statutory Codes of Practices supra n .l 11; P eeters  
J., R e-regulation of the Financial Services Industry in the UK, (1 9 8 8 )1 0  U.Pa.
! ! 5 -  Loi No.6 6 -5 3 7  of 24 July 1966 relating to Societes Commerciales, as 
am ended; Loi No 8 9 -5 3  1 of 2nd. A ugust 1989 relating to S ecu rity  and 
T ransparency  of the F inancial M arket (re la tiv e  a la • secu r ite  e t la 
transparence du Marche Financier) (J.O. 4th Aout, 1989, p.9822), supra n.5 &
20.
116- Infra, Ch.5 'Directors Fiduciary Duties'.
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m arkets regulations worldwide.
In te rm s  of legal p rocedu re , one of the  m ost s tr ik in g  
differences b e tw een  UK and French takeover  offers regu la tions 
re la tes  to the  r ig id ity  of the provisions and the  d ivergence of 
policies. In Britain, w ith  the overw helm ing  belief in th e  free  
m arket, the regulator in tends to leave parties in offers to contact 
each o ther (save question of notification) w ithou t in te rfe rence  to 
the  ex ten t th a t  sh a reh o ld e rs  involved  are fa ir ly  and eq ua lly  
trea ted . By contrast, in France, in addition  to th e ir  continuous 
involvem ent in takeover offers operations, the C.B.V. and the C.O.B. 
p reven t any in te rvention  in the market, once the in tended  offer is 
no tif ied  to them , un less  it is fo rm a lly  an n o u n c ed  to th e  
shareholders  involved. Moreover, once a notification is made, the 
C.B.V. im m ed ia te ly  suspends dealings in the  ta rg e t  co m p a n y ’s 
re le v a n t  s h a re s .117 Besides, as regards  the  reg u la r i ty  of offer 
docum ents or inaccuracy of in fo rm ation  contained  in the n o te  
d 'inform ation.118 the re levant law in France confers a w ide range of 
powers and discretion on both the C.B.V. and the C.O.B., e i ther  to 
refuse  any application or to req u ire  fu r th e r  in fo rm ation  to be 
supplied to it w h erev er  this is deem ed necessary. Such p rocedural 
res tra in ts  are not be found in the UK. W hat is obvious in the U.K., is 
th a t  the Panel has developed a consu lta tive  sys tem  w h e re b y
117- Suspension of quotations w as considered in the UK to d istort the  
free market, see Beevor A, Practioner's Guide _to the Citv Code on T akeovers  
and Mergers (Surrey,W.M.C.Ltd.,1 989)
118- Under the French regulation an offeror is required to subm it tw o  
d istin ct docum ents. One for the C.B.V. for contro l of reg u la r ity  and  
com pliance. The other must be subm itted to the C.O.B. containing inform ation  
disclosure to be made public. Additionally, a draft docum ent containing term s  
and conditions w ith  respect to the offer is sent to the target com pany's board 
of directors for an ultim ate acceptance or refusal.
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uncerta in ty  is rem oved. Furtherm ore, minor violations of the City 
Code may be solved while they are still live. However, if an offer is 
refused, the decision of the re levan t au thority  in both  countries is 
final. In France, the decision of the C.O.B. or the C.B.V., can only be 
challenged before the adm inistrative court because of a flaw in the 
law or m isunderstanding of fact. Parallel to this attitude, the Panel's 
decision can only be attacked through judicial rev iew .119
Disclosure, which is both "informative" and "device",120 is of 
profound im portance in both the French and British regulations. 
Basically, it is "informative" in the sense tha t it provides investors 
w ith  in form ation  so th a t  they  may reach an in fo rm ed  decision 
about the issues under consideration w ithout resorting to lawsuits. 
Indeed, its significance is d ep en d en t largely on the  s ta n d a rd  of 
accuracy  and ava ilab ili ty  of up da ted  and non com plica ted  
information, the test of which is materiality. It is a "device" w here  
it is d irec ted  to d e te r  or curb m ark e t abuses such as in s ider  
dealing.121
By w ay of fu rth e r  contrast, while the power of C.O.B. extends to 
cover the whole range of investm en t decisions, w h e th e r  th rough  
takeovers, m ergers or prospectuses and o ther re la ted  events , the 
Panel's jurisdiction covers only m atters of takeovers  and m ergers. 
P rospectuses and others investm en t decisions are m a tte rs  for the  
Company Act 1985 and the F.S.A.1986.
To put it into perspective, C.O.B. has two roles to play. One is 
co ncerned  w ith  in fo rm a tio n  d isc losure  to in v e s to r s  of th e
119- R.v. Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, ex parte Datafin pic. (1 9 8 7 )2  
W.L.R.699, (1987)1  All ER 564, (1 987)B.C.L.C. 104, (1987)Q.B. 8 1 5 , noted  in  
(1987)JJLL. 142; (1988) JikL.329
120- Hahlo, H. R.& Farrar, J. H., Hahlo's Cases and M aterials on Company 
LaSL (3rd. ed), p .179, supra n.74.
121- Infra, Ch.5.
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company's o rd inary  life. The other is specific to takeover offers and 
other a lte rna tive  techniques of share purchases or transfe r .  The 
powers of the British self regula tory  body (Panel) are specifically 
limited to inform ation disclosure in connection w ith  takeovers  and 
mergers. That is to say, information disclosure which is requ ired  by 
the  law of p rospectuses and o ther paralle l m ethods of raising 
capital of the com pany fall outside its jurisdiction. Mention should 
also be made of its investigative powers. The investigative process 
may not be identical in principle. In short the power to investigate 
which, in France is wholly centred w ithin C.O.B.'s. jurisdiction, in the 
U.K. is shared betw een  the governm ent and self regulation. On the 
one hand, although the power vested  on the S.I.B.122 or the D.T.I.128 
are v ery  similar to those given to the C.O.B., the S.I.B. in the U.K may 
not investigate the affairs of an S.R.O. or a person certified by R.P.B. 
unless the S.R.O. has requested  the S.I.B. to do so or w here  it, in the 
extrem e case, appears to the S.I.B. th a t  those m em bers w ere  unable 
to investigate . By contrast, under the French Ordonnance, th e re  
exist no barriers  to p reven t C.O.B. from investigating the Bourse de 
Valeur institutions. In addition to the D.T.I. and the  S.I.B., w h ere  
suspicious practice is noticed, the Stock M arket may appoin t an ad 
hoc commission to investigate. The Stock Exchange's a t ten tio n  is 
e ither triggered by complaint, the company m anagem ent, the Panel 
on T akeovers  and M ergers, the f inancia l in s t i tu tio n s  and, in 
particular, by the in term ediaries involved. A decision to appoint an 
inspector to investigate by the C.O.B. in France, is w holly clothed in
122- Sect. 105 of the F.S.A.1986. The S.I.B, is also entitled  to delegate its
power to an S.R.O's officer to carry out an investigation  for v io la tion  of the  
reg u la tion .
1 2 3 - Sect. 177 of the F.S.A, 1986
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legal form. The appoin tm ent of an ad-hoc com m ittee by the Stock 
Exchange in Britain is a totally private decision which does not have 
the force of law. However, it is w orth  repea ting  tha t, in both  
countries  the  v a s t  m ajority  of investiga tions are  o ften  e i th e r  
inconclusive or d e m o n s tra te  no iden tif iab le  in s id e r  trad in g . 
Furtherm ore, publication of findings tha t are based on probability  
or u n ce rta in ty  may not be made public because of the  fea r  of 
defamation actions.
Recently, at the Com m unity level, a new  p roposa l for a 
directive on takeovers and other bids has been subm itted  to the 
European Council for approval. The aim sought to be im plem ented  
by  the p roposal is twofold. One the  p roposal is d irec ted  to 
harm onise  the existing regulations of the  E.E.C. m em ber s ta tes  
w ith in  the field. This implies th a t  rules w ith  respect to takeover  
offers should be at least clothed w ith a certain degree of legal form. 
The o ther is to enhance fu r th e r  the in te rests  of investo rs  and to 
curb m arket abuses which could not effectively be reduced w ithout 
legal action.
Concerning the re lev an t bodies, it is subm itted  th a t  ru les  to 
pro tec t the  in te re s ts  of those affected by ta k eo v e r  offers are 
unlikely  to be effective unless th ey  are policed by  an  official 
regu la to ry  b o d y .124 Further, although the designation of such a 
supervisory body is left to the discretion of the m em ber sta tes , the 
Commission stresses tha t the body likely to be designated  m ust 
have  su ffic ien t pow er to m onitor e ffec tive ly  and e ff ic ien tly  
takeover offers activities. Furtherm ore , article 6 of the  proposal 
p rov ides severa l options th a t  "the authorities thus designated may 
delegate all or part of their powers to other authorities or to associations or
1 2 4 - COM (88) 823 final, at para 11, supra n .l4 /C h .l.
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private bodies". In addition, as a means of control and inform ation 
disclosure, the Commission needs to be k ep t in fo rm ed  of such 
designations an d /o r  of any delegation of power and th a t m em ber 
s ta tes should specify all the division of functions th a t  may be 
made. 125 The likely implication of such a proposal on the U.K self 
regu la ting  associations no tab ly , the  Panel on T akeovers  and 
Mergers, is th a t  such a body should be in tegrated  into a legal form. 
If its sta tus is in tended  to be preserved , it may e ither be placed 
under the supervision of a new body clothed w ith  legal power other 
th an  the  S.I.B. or be placed under  the  d irect u m b re lla  of the 
Secretary  of State. It is w orthy  of note to m ention th a t  the 1989 
Companies Bill recom m ended  an in tegra tion  of the  Panel into  a 
reg u la to ry  f r a m e w o r k . 1 2 6  As regards C.O.B., since it a lready  has 
such legal power, it may not be affected by the  E.C proposal 
compared w ith the British Panel on the City Code.127
The last point re la tes to the organization of the m arket. In 
Britain, the F.S.A 1986 confers v e ry  wide powers on the Secretary  
of S tate  to e s tab lish  a re g u la to ry  f ra m e w o rk  w ith in  w h ich  
in v e s tm e n t  b u s in e sse s  are  conduc ted . Most of his pow ers , 
now adays , are  in the  process of t r a n s fe r  (d e lega tion )  to a 
designated agency set up for the purpose i.e., the  Securities and 
In v es tm en t Board (S.I.B.). The S.I.B., w hich is a p r iva te  lim ited  
company is at the centre of the regulatory  structure. In France, the 
re levan t law directly em pow ers C.O.B. and the C.B.V. including the
125- Article 6, para 1, of the proposal, supra n .14 /C h .1
126- What the Companies Bill 1989 suggested, w ith  respect to the status 
of the Panel, w as not adopted in the Companies Act, 1989. P resum ably  the  
integration  of the Panel into a legal fram ew ork rem ains pending until the  
E.C. proposal for a Directive on takeovers is finalised.
1 27 - Further com parison and im plications w ill be in d ica ted  b elow  
w herever it seem s necessary.
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S.B.F, to police the m arket. Indeed, they  depend  largely  on the 
M inistry of Economy as far as the h ie rarchy  is concerned, b u t in 
relation to the supervision and regulation of the Bourse de Valeur 
they  enjoy great discretion and freedom. A them e which is common 
to both  the French re le v an t la w 128 and the British F.S.A. 1986 
concerns the power of recognition. Both legislators requ ire  anyone 
conducting  in v e s tm e n t  b u s in e ss  to be au th o r iz e d  p ersons . 
Consequently, the conduct of in ves tm en t business w ith o u t prior 
au th o riza tio n  is a c rim inal o f fe n se .129 This au th o riza tio n  is 
p resum ed to be granted  if a person is a m em ber of a recognised 
organization, for instance, an S.R.O. in the U.K or Societes de Bourse 
in France. Like the French C.B.V., or the C.O.B., in Britain, the S.I.B., 
in the proper perform ance of its role, is em pow ered  to call for 
inform ation from any authorized in v es tm en t business, an S.R.O., 
R.P.B., R.I.E. or R.C.H. as may reasonably be required  for the exercise 
of its functions and powers. The S.I.B. is em powered, in appropria te  
cases, to revoke or suspend any authorizations or in te rv en e  to the 
ex ten t th a t the protection of investors is required . Its power also 
extends to prohibit certain  k inds of harm fu l transactions carried  
out or intended to be carried out contrary  to the established rules. 
The S.I.B. may also impose restrictions on dealings, if investors are 
seriously and prejudicially affected. The ultimate rem edy  the S.I.B. 
may take is to apply for compensation schem es.1^ 0
Referring to the E.E.C. proposal on takeovers and o ther bids, it 
seems fairly certain tha t the E.C linkage mechanism in the field is at
128- Loi N o.66-537 relating to Societes Commerciales as am ended; Loi No. 
88-70  of 22nd Jan., 1988 and Loi No. 89 -531 , supra.n.5
129- Art.3 of the F.S.A,1986.
1 30 - See A she T.M, The R egulation  of Financial S erv ices , (1 9 8 7 )  
L.Soc.Gaz.. p .1392
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its p rem atu re  stage. Numerous a lternatives have been  offered by 
the Commission to deal w ith  the organization re le v an t  to police 
takeovers. Among the suggestions put forw ard is, f irs t of all, there  
m ust be a supervisory  body clothed w ith  legal powers, responsible 
for the im plem enta tion  of takeovers  regulations. Second, on the  
basis of existing structures, the choice of the appropria te  body to 
whom a delegation of power from the s ta tu to ry  body is left to the 
m em ber state concerned. This means the proposal for a Directive 
leaves it, once a public au thority  is set up, to m em ber sta tes  to 
designate any o ther appropria te  body to perform  such functions 
w hether  a public or private or a nationally or regionally organized 
b o d y .131 Third, since the in tended takeover offer Directive should 
be complied w ith  throughout the Community, a contact com m ittee 
is proposed under the  auspices of the  Commission. The contact 
com m ittee consists of rep resen ta tiv es  of the m em ber s ta tes  and 
r e p r e s e n ta t iv e s  of th e  C o m m iss io n .132 The c h a irm an  is a 
r e p re se n ta t iv e  of the Com mission.133 The contact com m ittee 's  
p relim inary  and major functions are (a) to facilitate the  uniform  
application of the Directive th rough  regular consultations on, in 
particular, practical problems arising in its im plem entation; (b) to 
ensure concerted action upon the policies followed by the m em ber 
s ta tes  in o rder  to obta in  reciprocal t r e a tm e n t  for Com m unity  
nationals and companies as regards the acquisition of securities of a
131- Art.6 of the E.E.C. proposal, supra 14/C hl
1 3 2 - C om m ission R ecom m endation  of 25 July 197 7  con cern in g  a 
European Code of Conduct relating to Transaction in Transferable Securities  
(O.J. L.2 1 2 /3 7  of 20.8.77); Article 21, para 2 of the proposal, supra n. 14 /C h l.
133- Som ehow  such proposition seem s to be m odelled on the previous  
French Commission Technique de Surveillance du Marche w hich  ex isted  in  
1 9 7 8 . T his in s t itu t io n  w a s fo rm ed  am o n g st th e  C.O.B. and th e  
C.S. A.C.'s. m em ber ship.
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com pany by means of a takeover bid; c) to advise the Commission, 
if necessary , on additions or am en d m en ts  to the  Directive. 13 4 
Finally, the establishm ent of transitional bodies responsible for the 
im plem entation  of the regulation of takeover bids fo rm ed by the 
Commission, both in order to make possible some degree of control 
over the  na tional au thorities , will have, once finalized , w ide 
implications, not all of which will be discussed here. The major 
implication concerns questions of jurisdiction. The es tab lishm ent of 
such a body will inevitably shift some of the powers from national 
supervisory  bodies to the Communities in the field. In o ther words, 
the  national superv iso ry  bodies au thorities  will cover national 
ta k eo v e rs  w h ils t  c ro ss-b o rd e r  ta k e o v e rs  come w ith in  th e  E.C 
re levant supervisory body.
134- Article 21, para 1.
109
CHAPTER THREE 
CONDUCT OF COMPETITIVE OFFERS
SECTION ONE: PROVISIONS GOVERNING COMPETITIVE OFFERS.
Under the French regulations, the technique of acquiring 
control of a company by making a competitive offer to acquire the 
desired level of shares at a fixed price in case of Offre Publique
d'Achat (O.P.A) or, upon exchange of securities in case of Offre
Publique d'Echange (O.P.E), is subjected to a standard procedure 
called "Normale".1 The standard procedure applies to public offers 
involving an amount of shares representing at least 33.1/3% of the 
target company's relevant share capital. Such a percentage may be 
increased without incurring any obligation with respect to the 
making of a general offer if the transaction carried out comes 
within the scope of certain exemptions.2 First, if the transaction 
results from either a disposal of securities free of charge, for 
example by inheritance, or as a result of legal mergers between 
companies. Second, the threshold beyond the prescribed level
should not exceed 3% and the acquirer confirms that such a 
percentage would be reduced within 18 months of the acquisition 
(reclasser les titres ou les droits de vote acquis en excedent dans un 
delai de dix-huit mois). Third, the excess results from reduction of 
the equity share capital of the target company or of the voting
1- See both the C.B.Y's Regulation, Arrete of 28 Sept. 1989 (J.O.30 Sept, 
p. 12301). Previously, Art. 193 of the C.B.V general regulation (arrete of 7th 
Aug. 1978); "Normale" procedure has for the first time been introduced and 
confirmed by the Ministry o f Economy in 1970.; the C.O.B’s Regulation
No.89.03 and 89.02 (J.O.30 Sept.1989, p.12307 and 12309 respectively).
2- Ibid, Art. 5.3.6, at Ch.Ill, of the C.B.V Regulation of 1989. Previously, 
Art. 180.
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rights control.3 This equally applies in U.K. but, it is carried out 
under distinct forms and requirements.
Competitive offers made in accordance with the standard 
procedure, in France, have to comply with some conditions laid 
down by both the C.B.V. and the C.O.B.'s regulations.4 However, if 
a competitive offer is concurrently made with the original offer, 
there seems no particular condition which should be observed by 
the rival offeror except with respect to the proposed consideration 
and timing.5 Most of the conditions arise in connection with a 
subsequent competitive offer. The first condition is concerned with 
the appropriate time within which a competitive offer should be 
made. Art. 5.2.16 of the C.B.V. regulation of 1989, stipulates 10 
days before the expiry of the original offer timetable. The second 
condition relates to the amount of consideration contained in the 
offer document. If the rival offer is made in cash, the price must be 
made at least 2% above the initial offer price.6 The third condition 
is concerned with shareholders' acceptance. Under the C.B.V. 
regulation, a shareholder's acceptance (ordre de vente) ceases to be 
binding once a competitive offer is announced unless he decides to 
maintain it.7 The fourth condition relates to the liberty of choice 
of the parties to an offer. According to the French rules, if an offer 
is promptly followed by a competitive one, the initiator is given the 
right of choice whether to withdraw completely his offer from the 
competition scene, to maintain his initial propositions or to outbid
3- Ibid, Art.5.3.6.
4- Supra n .l.
5- Art.5.2.26. Any amelioration is required to be significant. In order 
to determine how far the consideration offered is significant, it lies within 
the C.B.V's discretion. See Art.5.2.28 of the C.B.V. Regulation, supra n .l.
6- Ibid
7- Art.5.2.17 and 5.2.18 of the C.B.V Regulation, supra n .l
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the rival offeror. However, the C.B.V informs the investors about 
the original offeror’s ultimate decision.8
As regards notification of offers, the differences between the 
U.K and French Regulations appear to be that under the British City 
Code, an offer document must, in the first instance, be notified to 
the offeree's board of directors or to its advisers.9 This also 
applies to competitive offers whether made contemporaneously or 
more or less subsequently. In France, as already discussed in the 
previous chapter, any offer must first be notified both to the C.B.V. 
and C.O.B. If the offer which is addressed to the authority is 
approved, the intermediary, usually a bank, sends it to the offeree 
board of directors for consideration. The board of the target 
company is also required to follow a corresponding procedure 
before circulating their views about the offer to their shareholders. 
Another distinction which seems relevant in the context relates to 
the provisions applicable to competitive offers. In the U.K, the rules 
contained in the City Code have a tacit application to competitive 
offers. The French regulations, by contrast, contain specific 
provisions which directly and expressly apply to competitive 
o ffe rs .10 This equally applies to the E.E.C. proposed directive on 
takeovers and other bids.
8- Ibid. By contrast, under the British City Code, if  an offer is followed 
by another competing offer for the control o f the target company, the 
original offeror is not allowed to withdraw his offer only in exceptional 
circumstances where the Panel considers justifiable for such a withdrawal.
9- City Code, Rule 1.
10- Express provisions can also be found in the E.C proposal for a 
Directive on Takepvers and other Bids, see Art.20, supra n .l4 /C hl.
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SECTION TWO: CONDITION OF MAKING OFFERS
British law makes no explicit condition, nor does it provide 
specified clauses, for competitors to comply with except those 
concerning competition and the public interest or matter of 
legitimate national concern .!1 This is presumably because the
regulation of takeover offers is totally left to be dealt with by the
City Code rules and the Stock Exchange relevant provisions. Thus, it 
is quite obvious that any condition should be distinguished from 
self regulation in the field. The first set of provisions is contained in 
the City Code general principles which seek to ensure the highest 
business standard during the course of a takeover offer and, 
therefore, to provide a fair treatment and equal opportunity for all 
shareholders. The shareholders to whom the offer is addressed 
should be given sufficient time, advice and information to enable 
them to make an informed and rational decision. The information 
regarding an offer must be prepared with the highest standard of 
care and accuracy. However, these principles are, in the main, a 
codification of good standards of commercial behavior and they 
should have an obvious and universal application even to those 
matters which are not explicitly covered by the Code.12
The second set of provisions relates to the period of time 
within which a subsequent competitive offer should be announced. 
Under the City Code, as long as the initial offer is not declared 
unconditional as to acceptance, any competitor is entitled to make
11- Neither the Panel nor the Stock Exchange are concerned with the 
broad question of competition and the wider issues of the public interest. 
Those are matters of govenment concern. Nor is the Code concerned with the 
financial or commercial advantages or disadvantages of offers. These are left
to the company and its shareholders. See the City Code introduction.
12- City Code, at introduction para 3.
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an offer for the control of the target company at not less than the 
highest price proposed by the initial offeror. By contrast, according 
to French regulations, any competitor is subjected to some 
conditions. These are: a competitive offer should be made before
the expiry of the initial offer's ordinary timetable (save wherever 
granted otherwise). If the consideration for the offer is made in 
cash, it must be at a higher price not less than 2% above the price 
originally offered by the other offeror.13 Both the C.B.V and C.O.B. 
regulations require any offeror to delete any pre-condition as to 
acceptance. Instead he is allowed to limit his acquisition, together
with shares already held, to an amount equivalent to 2/3 of voting 
rights control in the target company. In the U.K., under the City 
Code rules, if an offeror fails to attain a percentage of voting control 
above 50% in the target company, his offer lapses accordingly.
The third set of conditions is chiefly concerned with the 
renewal of offers and restrictions imposed thereupon. As a general 
rule, where an offer has been announced or posted, but has not 
become or declared wholly unconditional and has been withdrawn 
or has lapsed, bidders cannot renew their offers within 12 months 
of it lapsing or withdrawal.14 The exception from that rule often 
rests with the relevant authority's discretion. An example will, 
perhaps, explain these rules. Hoylake, a United States company,
made an offer for the control of B.A.T (British company). As a 
procedural requirement, the offeror must have a final clearance
from the United States authorities. Because of administrative delay, 
Hoylake was worried that its offer might fail because it would not
13- C.B.V's Regulation, supra n .l.
14- This is reflected in both countries' regulations; See, for instance, 
City Code, Rule 35.
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have obtained on time the required approval from the United 
States insurance regulators before the offer would have lapsed 
under the British City Code's normal timetable. The Panel, so as to 
maintain an orderly framework within which a takeover offer is 
conducted and to preserve not only the interests of parties to an 
offer but also its flexibility and adaptation to change in 
circumstance, said "The regulatory proceedings (in the U.S.) are most unlikely 
to be concluded within the timetable prescribed by the Code. This will have the 
effect that shareholders will not have a real opportunity to consider an offer on 
its merits".15 Since takeovers are increasingly  becoming 
international in nature, the Panel's decision is, indeed, vital. It is, 
thus, obvious that the Panel should consider the implications of its 
strict and burdensome timetable for offers involving foreign 
competitors or offerors generally. Consequently the Panel indicates 
that situations of the kind illustrated by Hoylake for the control of 
B.A.T, where the interaction of the Code and foreign regulatory 
processes fall to be considered, are likely to occur. In consequence, 
potential offerors are required to satisfy the host country’s 
requ irem en t.16
The fourth set of conditions are purely economic, political, or 
financial as the case under consideration may be.17 Regarding the 
political issue, both the U.K and the French relevant laws confer on
15- The Independent, 16th September, 1989, p.21.
16- "BAT to Appeal Against the Panel", The Panel statement, noted by 
Clare Dobie, City Editor, The Independent, Sept. 16th 1989, at p.21
17- Take for instance the Kuwaiti's case which has been considered as a 
matter of "legitimate national concern", see House of Lords, Mergers Control, 
session 1988/89 (H.L.31), (H.M.S.O. 1988), at p.8; Consider also rival offers 
made by Standard Chartered Bank and Hong Kong and Shanghai Bank for the 
control o f the Royal Bank of Scotland, an Edinburgh based financial 
institution , noted by D.M. Raybould, Controlling Mergers Through  
Competition Law, (1983) Co Law 56, at 61
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the person responsible (Secretary of State in U.K or the Ministry of 
Economy in France) a wide range of powers to take into account 
various criteria other than those relating to competition. In Britain, 
for instance, during the investigation into Kuwait's shareholdings in 
B.P. (British Petroleum), the M.M.C. concluded that the government 
of Kuwait's 21.6 % threshold in B.P. could be harmful to the public 
interest. The M.M.C. findings were centred on the broader issue of 
what is called "legitimate national concern" which include a possible 
divergence of the national and international interests of the British 
Government and Kuwait's interests. That is, the passing of the 
British company to O.P.E.C. control.
As regards financial conditions, the most typical illustration of 
such a condition is that of the competitive offer involving the 
control of the Royal Bank of Scotland by Shanghai and Hong Kong 
and the Standard Chartered Bank. The target company controlled 
almost 50% of the Scottish banking sector and an English retail 
banking subsidiary, Williams and Glyns. As for the competitors, the 
Hong Kong and Shanghai are both bank giants in the world by Stock 
Market value, but 33% measured in assets,18 with shipping and 
airline interests, and a subsequent expansion through the 
acquisition of a U.S. major bank. The Standard Chartered Bank is a 
London based international bank with interests in South Africa, the 
Middle East and Far East and recently California. Hence the M.M.C. 
concluded that the implementation of such an offer could harm the 
public interest. It was said that the London based international 
bank would harmfully affect "career prospects, initiative and business in 
Scotland which would be damaging to the public interests of the U.K. as a whole". 
Concerning the other overseas rival (Hong Kong & Shanghai), the
18- Ibid
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M.M.C. stated that it would not only affect Scotland, but also "that 
transfer of ultimate control of a significant part of the clearing bank systems 
outside the United Kingdom would have the adverse effect of opening up 
possibilities of divergence of interests which would not otherwise arise." Apart 
from the issue of competition and the public interest, Part II of the 
British Industry Act contains provisions which enable the Secretary 
of State to exercise certain powers in the event of a change of 
control of a manufacturing company to a foreigner which appear to 
him to be of a special importance to the U.K. or of any substantial 
part of it.19
With reference to the "economic conditions" the different 
approaches adopted by those countries which do have a system of 
merger control were briefly outlined as follows:
The merger control provisions themselves display a great deal of 
variety from country to country. The main differences arise as regards 
the criteria for defining or examining mergers (size and market share
threshold), the standard by which a merger is considered desirable or 
undesirable (a straightforward competition test or wider public interest 
criteria of which competition is but one, though important, element 
among others such as trade, employment, environment, regional policy) 
and as regards procedure (judicial or adm inistrative or some 
combination of the two, prior or post notification, procedure for advance 
clearance or approval of certain mergers). At the risk of over
simplification, it is possible to divide the countries into those which rely 
entirely or predominantly on a competitive test (Canada, Germany,
19- S .13 of the British Industry Act,1975 if it appears to the Secretary of
State that there is serious and immediate probability o f a change o f control of
an important manufacturing company, and it appears to him that change of
control would be detrimental to the interests o f the United Kingdom or any 
substantial part o f it, he may by order prohibit that change o f control or
make a vesting order. A vesting order is made by the Secretary of State with
the approval of the Treasury, and directs the vesting o f share capital or
assets employed in the company in himself or nominees.
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Japan and the United States) and those which take a broader position 
requiring a case by case assessment of a variety of factors before 
determining whether a merger is acceptable or not (France, Ireland, 
New Zealand, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the E.E.C.). Australia has 
a mixed system comprising a prohibition of mergers leading to a 
strengthening of market dominance but a procedure for advance 
notification by the trade practices commission subject to a wide public 
benefit test.20
In France, the prime test is whether the merger will distort 
competition and, if so, whether its economic and social advantages 
outweigh its adverse effects on competitors. Apart from this, the 
question which arises is whether or not there exist other conditions 
to be observed. Under British relevant law, excepting competition 
or public interest tests, there would appear no provisions to 
prevent the implementation of merger between companies or to 
impose conditions thereupon.21 Recently, such a position has 
expressly been reaffirmed by the Secretary for Trade and Industry 
who responded to those commentators who voiced concern on 
mergers control, in particular the questions of open regime; 
vulnerability of companies; reciprocity and the protection of 
national manpower. These questions arose directly from the 
competitive offer for the control of Rowntree, the British food 
manufacturer, made by the two Swiss rivals, Nestle and Suchard 
Jacob, as well as from the D.T.I decision of merger clearance for 
Nestle to proceed with its offer. In his statement, as regards the 
open system, the Secretary of State said "Britain has taken a lead in 
ensuring that it had an open regime and that artificial barriers were not set 
up".22 Concerning British companies1 vulnerability, he pointed out
20- O.E.C.D Report on International Mergers and Competition Policy in 
1988, p .17.
21- See, DTI, Blue Paper on Mergers policy, (H.M.S.O, 1988)
118
that "nothing in U.K. law prevented a company, with the consent of its 
shareholders, making itself b i d - p r o o f . " 2 3  He also claimed that a number 
of companies in Britain had made themselves "bid-proof" through 
the amendment of their articles of association and shares structure, 
notably, the Great Universal Stores Company; P&O; Savoy Hotel and 
Trusthouse Forte.24
As regards reciprocity, the Secretary of State stressed that 
"There are no powers under Swiss law for the Swiss authority to block 
takeovers of industrial or commercial companies. There are no barriers to British 
firms taking over Swiss firms" Thus it would be unlikely for the U.K. to 
transmit a signal that it is protectionist on artificial grounds. Finally, 
it is quite interesting to note that, there is one consideration that 
may be relevant here is that with respect to foreign takeovers of 
U.K. companies, as was highlighted by the D.T.I blue paper on 
merger policies, 1988, the government’s general policy towards 
inward investment by overseas companies in the U.K. economy is to 
welcome it.25
In France, the regulation with respect to foreign takeovers of 
French companies imposes various conditions. Such provisions vary 
depending whether or not the acquirer originates from an E.E.C. 
member state or from a non-E.E.C. candidate, and on the amount of 
shareholdings sought to be obtained. As it presently stands, the
22- Ibid.
23- The Times, May 26th, 1988; The Financial Times, 26th May, 1988.
24- But as far as listed public companies are concerned, the Stock 
Exchange is reluctant to grant or accept any restriction on listed shares 
because, if  granted, this may distort the principle o f free marketability of 
secu r ities .
25- Supra n.20; See also Earl P. and Fisher G, International. Mergers 
And A cquisition, supra. n.41/Ch.l. The threshold of 20% has been reduced to 
10%. See Loi 89-531, supra n.5/Ch.2.
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French legislation laid down a 10% threshold (previously 20%) as a 
triggering level which, no matter how the percentage of shares is 
acquired, activates a more rigorous control.26 if  an acquisition 
involves a 10% or less of the equity share capital of a French 
company, prior permission from the Central Bank must be 
o b ta in e d .27 But if the acquisition threshold exceeds 10% of the 
target company's share capital, more stringent conditions are 
imposed. Under the French Exchange of Control Act of 1966,28 any 
person, usually a company, which seeks to acquire a substantial 
proportion of shares in the relevant share capital of a French target 
company must lodge with the Treasury Department an application 
for purchase along with a statement confirming that at least 80% of 
the equity share capital is owned by E.E.C. residents. Parties 
involved in such a transaction have to observe certain procedural 
requirements. The Ministry of Economy enjoys great discretion to 
approve, disapprove or remain indifferent. In addition, the Ministry 
may consult other relevant ministries as to the likely detrimental 
effects the transaction in question may entail. If a takeover offer 
involves foreign companies for the control of a French target 
company, and that is deemed to be of an important nature, the 
Ministry may impose further conditions on the proposed takeovers 
to be fulfilled. However, takeovers in France which boost or 
generate employment and produce other technological benefits in 
the field are allowed to proceed.29
26- Vacher-Desvernais A.and Monod J., Foreign Takeovers in France, 
(1985) Intl.Bus.Law, p.328
27- Banque de France, Note No 75 of September 20th, 1977. Noted by 
Vacher-Desvernais A.& Monod J., Foreign Takeovers in France, Supra n.26
28- Loi No.66-1008 of December 28th, 1966. By virtue o f the Loi No.89- 
531 of 2nd August 1989, supra n.5 & 128/Ch.2. Such a threshold is reduced to 
10%.
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In addition, the French legislature provides a system for prior 
clearance. This means that purchase of securities in French target 
companies by any foreign company is subjected to the provisions of 
prior notification and clearance. Normally, where the Ministry of 
Economy does not respond within a one month period from the date 
the application is received, tacit permission is deemed to be granted 
and the purchase could be carried out. If that authority, within the 
prescribed period, requests additional information, another month 
will start as soon as the information under request is supplied.3 0 
However it should be acknowledged that in exercising prior control 
over the direct investment operation, the rules in both countries 
(U.K. and France) are not radically different as regards the supply 
of information. The following information must be provided: 
namely, information on investors (acquirers) notably the name and 
country of their residence; the name of the target company; the 
address of its registered office; list of shareholders and directors; 
amount of share capital, its activities; details of the shares sought to
be purchased; copy of the most recent financial report; a list of
subsidiary and affiliated companies either abroad or in the country 
of the target company. The authority in either country will 
normally expect a particular interest to accrue in the country in 
which the investment is sought.31 In addition, the application 
should contain or include data concerning the funds to be provided 
for financing the purchase, modality of payment for shares, price
29- For further reading see, Vacher-Desvernais A.& Monod J., Foreign 
Takeovers in France, supra n.27.
30- Vacher-Desvernais A.& Monod J., Foreign Takeovers in France, at
p.329, supra n.26.
31- See, for example in the U.K, D.T.I Blue Paper on Mergers Policy, 
supra n.21
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per share, warranties and reasons for, and synergy to be derived 
from the investment. The later is considered in the light of present 
legal, commercial, economic, social and industrial policy.3 2 
Likewise, where the investment is carried out by way of public 
offer, various other conditions and provisions of compliance are 
imposed by C.B.V. and C.O.B. such as the conditions of receivability 
and visa.33
SECTION THREE: ANNOUNCEMENT OF OFFERS
Parties to a competitive offer cannot always control the 
negotiation process and its associated problems. Once the possibility 
of an approach becomes divulged, a period of uncertainty sets in for 
shareholders, employees, creditors of companies involved and their 
respective com petitors.34 It is in circumstances such as this that 
persons with privileged access to confidential information, other 
than those seeking control, begin making profits at the expense of 
unknowledgeable persons.35 It is also particularly interesting to
32- For further reading see, Vacher-Desvernais A. and Monod J., 
Foreign Takeovers in France, Supra n.26; Weinberg M.A and Blank M.V, 
Takeovers And Mergers. (4th edn.),paras 1558-1575, supra n .l9 /C hl
33- See French Institutions at Ch.2.
34 - It is worthwhile mentioning that in France announcements o f  
offers are entirely monopolized by both the C.B.V and C.O.B. In the U.K, by 
contrast, announcements of offers are left in the hand o f parties to the 
offers themselves. Therefore, this section will discuss the U.K City Code 
requirements relating to an announcement of offers. However, the French 
requirement in the context will be noted wherever necessary.
35- Attorney General’s reference (No 1 1988) H.L, April 13th, 1989. In 
the light o f this case the appellant was informed by a merchant bank 
connected with a company that a take over bid for the company had been 
agreed and that the information was confidential. The appellant promptly 
bought 6000 shares in the company and made a profits of £3000. For further 
reading see The Independent, April 14th, 1989, at p. 14 "Dealing on Unsolicited 
Tip-Off Broke Trading Law"
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note that rumours and speculative buying shares may well start 
before news about a potential offer is announced. In theory it 
seems clear that such negative aspects may be referred either to 
the offeror's inadequacy of security; to the press; market 
expectation, or to the leak of confidential "price sensitive
information"36 during the period of an offer.37 But it is difficult to 
locate their real source in practice.38 Evidently , rumours,
Ati n r  axmn m o r l r a f  m  n t i i n n l o t i  n n  p  Aiil/1 p o u c a  tl At Atl 1 \7o p ^ v / u x a n v i i  u i  v/ v v ^ n  n i a i  i v v  i  m a i i i j ^ u i u i i v / A i  w v / u x v *  v u u j v  u v i >
disruptions internally within the target company but also 
externally within the stock markets. During the period of a 
takeover offer some other phenomena may also come into play
such as the phenomenon of "acting in concert"39 and "associates"40 
as well as the practice of "warehousing" and "nominees".41 It is
36- It is quite clear that genuinely "price sensitive" information is 
disseminated throughout the takeover offer period. Yet there is an important 
distinction between information that causes a movement o f the share price 
at the time of potential offeror and that which is the result o f market 
expectation or analysis o f fact. Briefly, price sensitive information is 
commonly and largely used but, it has never been defined. Nevertheless, see 
the Joint Statement by The Stock Exchange and the Panel on Takeovers and 
mergers, (April 24th, 1977),- noted by Weinberg & Blank, Takeovers And 
M ergers, paras 27226 to 27236 (1979), supra n. 19/Ch. 1.
37- The City Code defines the period o f an offer as "The period starting 
from the time when an announcement is made o f a proposed offer or possible 
offer until the first closing date or, if this is later, the date when such offer 
becomes or is declared unconditional as to acceptance or lapses"
38- See Panel's annual report, 31st Marsh, 1988, p.7
39- Rule 9 and the definition section of the City Code. However, under 
the City Code whilst 'acting in concert' has particular relevance to 
mandatory offers, the aspect of 'associate' is dealt with by the provision o f  
the Code within the context of disclosure of dealings. Compare with the 
French relevant provisions of the Loi N o.66-537, Art 356.1.3 inserted by the 
Loi No.89.531, Art. 18., supra n.5/Ch.2
40- Ibid. See also Rule 8 of the Code
41- See infra. Ch.6
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obvious that each of these problems may form part of the whole 
operation which involves the change of control. Offerors frequently 
make their offers sequentially with several purchases coming close 
together to the formal offer, for instance by making a "dawn 
raid",42 or using other techniques to induce directors or substantial 
shareholders to accept their offers prior to making a formal offer 
like the device of "prior commitments" known in Britain as a "shut­
out offer".43
Evidently, regulators are becoming increasingly aware of the 
implications of the above cited malpractices and also of their 
unsettling effects whether on shareholders' interests or on the stock 
market. However, each legal system may view the matter 
differently depending on its seriousness and of the practice 
involved. Two different approach are, nowadays, in existence. While 
in France, prominence is given to a d m in is t ra t iv e  dirigisme. in 
Britain, the prevailing tendency is the "free market interplay" in 
the belief that the market is the best available place for 
determining the value of the company’s relevant securities.44 T h e  
Panel, which is the body closely involved in the regulation of 
takeover offers in Britain, is chiefly concerned with three major 
areas. First, the accelerated announcement of offers and the best 
quality of information which should not confuse or mislead 
shareholders to whom the offer is intended. Such information, in 
view of the regulators,45 must be fairly presented, accurately 
prepared and reflect the purpose to which it relates. Second, to
42- Ibid.
43- See Johnston A., The Citv Takeovers Code, at p.77 and 99, supra 
n .88 /C h .2
44- See for Britain, House of Commons, Paper 298 of 1969 para 82.
45- See, The F.S.A.1986, Sect.146 paras 3.
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prevent the creation of a false market before and during the period 
of the offer. Third to ensure the principle of equal treatment 
between shareholders involved. Under the City Code, two kinds of 
announcements are required. One is a premature announcement. 
The other is a formal announcement.
3.1- PREMATURE ANNOUNCEMENT
A- ANNOUNCEMENT OF POSSIBLE OFFERS
The chief aim of the Panel throughout the offer period is to 
maintain an orderly and fair conduct for takeover offers, to 
preserve the interests of the shareholders involved, and to enhance 
further their confidence in the market. The first step is to draw the 
attention of those involved in takeover offers to the seriousness of 
the operation. They then are often requested to seek legal or 
financial advice. Besides, as a preventive measure against 
unexpected infringements of the Code, the Panel always stresses 
the need for consultation at an early stage on any point of difficulty 
regarding the formulation of an intended offer, whether or not this 
relates to the interpretation of the Code.46 It should also be noted 
that prior consultation is paramount, not only because it enables 
offerors to avoid breaching the regulation but also, as a primary 
advantage, it enables the Panel's executive to anticipate and correct 
possible infringements of the Code before being committed rather 
than imposing on the offender any remedial disciplinary 
measures.47
46- The Panel on many occasions reaffirmed that "interpretation of the 
Code in relation to particular takeovers should not be published without 
prior consultation with the Panel"; See, The Panel Statement on the 
Deemerger Corporation plc/Extel Group pic. April 23rd, 1986, noted by Morse 
G., (1986) J.B.L.406 at 407.
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Potential offers which are not immediately made public often 
entail rumours and speculations, including manipulation and insider 
d e a l i n g .48 These aspects are generally due to the offeror's 
inadequacy of security prior to making an offer but, as a matter of 
securities market practice, the issue is wider than one of
inadequacy of security. One might argue that those undesirable 
developments may be because of a company’s vulnerability or 
because of the stock market's perceptive analysis of facts. 
Therefore, if a potential offer involves an unusual movement4^, 
particularly where any potential offeror is being named by the
circulating rumours, the relevant regulator requires that the offeror 
should either deny publicly his intention to make an offer50 or 
proceed with a prompt announcement to that effect.5 1 The 
relevant regulation empowers the target company, the subject of
speculation, to request the Stock Exchange for a temporary
suspension of dealing in its shares. The offerors (whether potential 
or actual) are prevented, by virtue of the City Code rules, from 
detering the target company from such a request.52 However, the 
Panel, to maintain the proper performance of the market and to
stop the spread of those associated unwelcome events, does not
require that potential offerors disclose their names or the outcome 
of their negotiations, but rather a general statement that talks are
47- Panel's annual report, 31 March 1988. For criticism with respect to 
the Panel's unpublicized daily work, See, Johnston A., The Citv Takeover Code. 
p.42„ supra 88/Ch.2
48- See Ch.5, Directors Fiduciary Duties and Insider Dealings.
49- The City Code, Note on Rule 2.2 provides that "A movement of 
approximately 10% should be regarded as untoward".
50- Panel statement on Argyll Group pic for the control o f Distillers
Group pic, Sept 10th,1985, noted by Morse G. (1985>J.B.L. 233.
51- Rule 2.3.
52- The City Code requirements.
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taking place will suffice to fulfill the objective. Rule 2.4 provides 
that:
. . .  until a firm intention to make an offer has been notified a brief 
announcement that talks are taking place (there is no requirement 
to name the potential offeror in such an announcement) or that a 
potential offeror is considering making an offer will normally satisfy 
the obligation under the rule.
The main point underlying this rule is designed primarily to 
prevent and stop the spread of rumours as well as speculation 
including side deals at profits (inside deals). It is argued that the 
City Code rules concerning an early announcement sometimes give 
rise to difficulties for both the offerors and the offeree's board of 
directors, especially when they are in the process of negotiation. 
The offerors may regard a pre-announcement as detrimental to 
their approach while they are still requesting further information. 
Their reasons may vary, for instance, they do not wish to trigger 
other competitors or be referred to the Monopoly and Mergers 
Commission at an early stage.53 For the board of the offeree 
company, a prematurely announced offer, especially in certain 
doubtful circumstances relating to the process of negotiation, is 
regarded as operating against their shareholders best interests in 
particular where the process comes to an abortive end.54 On the 
other hand, the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers, in the course of
53- Offerors som etim es do deliberately make a prelim inary  
announcement for tactical reasons. See Johnston.A., The Citv Takeovers Code. 
p. 219, supra n.88/Ch.2; In such situations the attitude o f the Panel is clear 
that, once a preliminary announcement is made, no offer can be withdrawn 
without a prior authorisation. See, The City Code Rule 2.7
54- Weinberg M.A and Blank M.V., Weinberg on T a k e o v e r s  and 
M ergers, paras 1309 (4th edn), supra, n. 19/ch. 1
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dealing with the problems of rumours, speculative buying shares 
and many other associated negative aspects, identifies some events 
which, wherever they are present, should be announced 
immediately. Accordingly, two sets of rules are provided by the 
Panel. The first set of rules focuses on the problems expected to 
arise prior to making an approach; and the second set of rules deal
with such problems as arise during the currency of an offer.
B-ANNOUNCEM ENT DURING A NEGOTIATION.
According to the City Code, announcements during a negotiation 
may take place: first, when a firm intention to make an offer is 
notified to the board of the offeree company, whether directly by 
the potential offeror or from a serious source; second, immediately 
upon an acquisition of shares which gives rise to an obligation to 
make an offer under Rule 9; third, when, following an approach to 
the offeree company, the offeree company is the subject of rumour 
and speculation or there is an untoward movement in its share 
price ;55 or fourth, when negotiations or discussions are about to be 
extended to include more than a very restricted number of 
interested people.56
The underlying purpose of an early announcement lies with the
idea of balance of convenience between the interests involved and
the expected detrimental effect as a result of delay. The Panel,
55- Under the City Code an announcement may also take place where 
"before an approach has been made, the offeree company is the subject of 
rumour and speculation or there is an untoward movement in its share price 
and there are reasonable grounds for concluding that it is the potential 
offeror's actions (whether through inadequate security, purchasing o f  
offeree company shares or otherwise) which have lead to the situation". Rule 
2. 2(d) .
56- See the City Code, Rule 2.2.
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therefore, insists that the balance of advantage resides in making 
an immediate statement which operates as an effective deterrent to 
such undesirable events.
C- RESPONSIBILITY FOR ANNOUNCEMENT OF OFFERS
(1 )-OFFEROR'S RESPONSIBILITY
Rule 2.3 stipulates that:
Before the board of the offeree company is approached, the 
responsibility for making an announcement can lie only with the 
offeror. The offeror should, therefore, keep a close watch on the 
offeree company's share price for any signs of untoward movement.
If the offerors are not intending to make an immediate 
announcement, the Panel requires to be consulted forthwith. 
Indeed, such a requirement may on occasion be very beneficial to 
shareholders to whom offers are intended. If there is no affirmation 
from the potential offeror, the Panel requires him to deny his 
intention. Consequently, the obvious implication following denial of 
an intention to make an offer may be that the City Code rules may 
deprive potential offerors who for one reason or other, are not 
willing to proceed with their offers at the time of rumours and 
speculation, of the opportunity to make another offer for the same 
company for a reasonable period (three months or more).57
(2 )-OFFEREE'S RESPONSIBILITY.
According to the Code, there are two possible events which, 
wherever present, require an announcement as quickly as possible.
57- For Argyll Group pic, as a result of denial of intention, the agreed 
period was three to four months. See (1986)LBJL. p.233; The City Code Rule 35 
relating to restrictions following offers.
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Firstly, where there are rumours, speculations or untoward 
movements in the target’s relevant securities; and secondly, when 
discussions about an offer are expected to be extended to include 
quite a wide number of persons. In both situations the prime 
responsibility to announce is no longer with the offeror but it lies 
with the offeree’s board and its advisers alone. Rule 2.3 provides 
that ’’Following an approach to the board of the offeree which may or may not 
lead to an offer, the primary responsibility for making an announcement will 
normally rest with the board of the offeree company”. If there is an 
untoward movement, the target company is, by virtue of the 
relevant regulation, entitled to request the Stock Exchange to grant 
a temporary suspension. The offeror in this respect is prevented
from deterring the offeree company action by either requesting the 
Stock Exchange for a suspension of dealing in its securities or from 
making a prompt announcement.58
One may conclude that practice illustrates that a considerable 
amount of speculations and rumours concerning a possible offer
may occur. The Panel's attitude has always been to require that,
whenever there is such a speculation or rumours, parties involved
and their respective advisers should consider w hether an 
appropriate announcement is required under Rule 2.2 of the City
Code. However, the implication of the City Code with respect to 
potential or actual offerors are almost the same. A potential offeror 
who is not proposing to make an offer, for one reason or another, is 
required to issue a public statement denying his intention. As a
consequence, this denial of intention will inevitably restrict him
from making an offer for the same company for at least three
58- Rule 2.3 paras 2 and 3.
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months or more.59 Such restrictions equally apply to withdrawal of 
an offer without a good reason which the Panel considers 
justifiable. As regards suspension of dealings in the target
undertaking's securities, unlike the French system, the British 
regulators prefer to keep the market unhampered. The main point
is that the Panel empowers the target company to request the Stock
Exchange suspension whenever it thinks fit but it never intervenes 
on its own initiative to do so. On the other hand the Stock Exchange 
appears reluctant (in respect of listed public companies) to grant a 
suspension of dealings in the target com pany's securities.
Furthermore, even if it is permitted, the Stock Exchange will not 
generally grant a suspension for more than 48 h o u r s . I n  France, 
once an offer is submitted for approval, suspension of quotations is 
automatically taken by the relevant authority. This, in view of the 
French regulator, is considered vital.
3.2- FORMAL ANNOUNCEMENT OF OFFERS
A- ANNOUNCEMENT OF A FIRM INTENTION TO MAKE AN OFFER
The City Code, general principle 3 provides:
"An offeror should only announce an offer after the most careful 
and responsible consideration. Such an announcement should be 
made only when the offeror has every reason to believe that it can 
and will continue to be able to implement the offer: responsibility in 
this connection also rests on the financial adviser to the offeror"
The basic nature of this provision is typically financial. But to 
some extent it is more general and it has a very wide range of 
implications. The question of how to form a firm intention to make
59- Rule 35.1; 35.2; and in particular Note (a) on Rule 35.
60- Note 1 on Rule 2.3 of the Code.
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an offer is a more complex. Briefly speaking, offerors considering 
making offers always begin identifying the target company, 
studying the legal framework of the country in which the 
vulnerable company operates, in particular, the restrictions and tax 
im p l ic a t io n s .61 National offerors are often familiar with such 
implications. Once a firm intention is formed, the offeror must also 
raise sufficient funds to implement its offer.62 In this connection it 
is worthy of note that the resDonsibilitv for financial confirmation
•S JL *
that the offeror is able financially to implement his offer in full lies 
also with the financial adviser of the offeror. Hence the financial 
information which is required to be disclosed in the offer document, 
including listing particulars, will not suffice. The vital point is that 
an offer document must contain a confirmation of a banker to that 
effect.
B - CONTENT OF AN ANNOUNCEMENT
Rule 2.5 of the Code lays down that when a firm intention to 
make an offer is announced, the announcement must contain:
(i) the terms of the offer; (ii) the identity of the offeror; (iii) details of 
any existing holding in the offeree company. These include (a) which 
the offeror owns or over which it has control, (b) which is owned or
61- For further reading see mainly, Begg P.F.C, C orporate Acquisition  
And Mergers, at Ch. 12, (London, Graham & Trotman Ltd., 1985); Weinberg and 
Blank, Takeovers and Mergers. Part 4, Chl6, Paras 1601-1962, supra n .l9/C hl; 
Earl & Fisher, International Takeovers and Mergers. Ch.7-8, supra n.41/Ch.l; 
Bird P.A, Accounting For Acquisition And Mergers, (19851J.B.L 232
62- There are various methods through which an offeror may raise the 
necessary fund. These are: public offer; offer for sale; placing; and 
capitalization. Since such methods are outwith the scope o f this thesis, 
readers are referred to the following writers: Pennington R.R, Company Law. 
(3rd. edn), Ch.8, p.203; (4th edn), Ch.6 p.137, supra n .l7/C h.l, Gower L.C.B, T he  
Principles of Modem Company law. (1969), Ch.6, p. 102, supra n.36 & 61/Chl
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controlled by any person acting in concert with the offeror, (c) in 
respect of which the offeror has received an irrevocable 
commitment to accept the offer, (d) in respect of which the offeror 
holds an option to purchase, (e) in respect of which any person 
acting in concert with the offeror holds an option to purchase; (iv) all 
condition to which the offer or the posting of it is subject; and (v) 
details of any arrangement including indemnity or option 
arrangements, and any agreement or understanding, formal or 
informal, of whatever nature, relating to relevant securities which 
may be an inducement to deal or refrain from dealing.63
Such details as should be contained in an announcement are by 
no means definite. Under the City Code there are various other 
obligations to be fulfilled namely, the obligation to post an offer 
document within the prescribed period; the obligation to disclose 
shareholdings; and the obligation to behave in an orderly manner in 
compliance with the relevant regulations.
SECTION FOUR: OFFER DOCUMENT AND CIRCULAR
4.1- OFFER DOCUMENTS
A- PREPARATION OF AN OFFER DOCUMENT
It is quite obvious that as far as an offer document is 
concerned, its preparation is the subject of various provisions, 
principally those of the F.S.A.1986, the City Code and the Stock 
Exchange. However, greater importance attaches to the problem of 
accuracy and fair presentation of information. Another crucial issue 
relates to the time as well as the relevance of information contained 
in documents.64 The British City Code states that:
63- Under the French C.O.B Regulation, once a visa is granted, 
corresponding information is made available by the C.O.B to the shareholders 
of the target company. See C.O.B Regulation of 1989, supra n .l.
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. . .  any document or advertisement addressed to shareholders
containing information or advice from an offeror or the board of the 
offeree company or their respective advisers must, as is the case with 
a prospectus, be prepared with the highest standards of care and 
accuracy".65
Rule 23.1 of the Code which is an amplification of general 
principle 5, indicates that such information must be adequately and
fairly presented to shareholders involved. However, concepts which 
are difficult to define are "highest standard of care" and "fairness"
of presentation of information. Moreover, the interpretation of such 
a words will ultimately be for the Panel on the City Code.
Concerning the amount of care to be taken during the 
preparation of an offer document, reference should be made first, 
to the statement of Lindly M.R. stated that "...the amount of care to be 
taken is difficult to define, but it is plain that directors are not liable for all the 
mistakes they may make, although if they had taken more care they might be 
avoided them...".66
The Panel states:
 in a normal circumstance, assuming good faith on the part of
those involved, the Panel would simply require any deficiency to be 
made good, it would not lightly deprive shareholders of the 
opportunity to consider a bid on its merits if further information can
64- An offer document must include a statement in respect o f  the 
persons responsible for information contained in the document and also 
indicate where such a document is available for inspection. Corresponding 
requirements can be found in the C.B.V. and C.O.B. Regulations, supra n .l
65- General principle 5 o f the Code. The ambit o f the City Code 
Principles is, however, much wider. This may equally be noticed by 
reference to the French or the E.E.C Code of Conduct of 25th July 1977. (O.J 
No.L 212/37 of 20.8.77). But, perhaps, the surprising aspect appears to be that 
no Code of Conducts explained how question of care should be assessed.
66- Lagunas Nitrate Co. v. Laeonas Svdicate (1899)2 Ch.392 at 435, 15 
T.L.R 436.
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be given.67
But if an offer is made and offerors use diagrammes, charts and 
graphs or any other data, in the view of the Panel, they must be 
presented without distortion, the test of which is the materiality of 
fa c t.68 If misuse of charts and diagrams is noticed the Panel may 
recommend corrections to be published within 48 hours.69 In 
addition, the Panel urges parties to offers to take particular care to 
ensure fa ir p resen ta tio n .70 A similar concern was on the 
formulation of profits and dividends forecasts and assets valuation. 
In its statement, the Panel reaffirmed that the Code does not 
require profits forecasts to be correct provided they were prepared 
with due care.71
In referring back to the phrase "as is the case with a prospectus"72 
referred to in the Code, the leading case is the judgement of 
Kindersley V.C.73 in terms which Page Wood V.C., in another case
67- See Morse G., (1988^ J.B.L. 323.
68- See further Kolodny K., Protection of Minority Shareholders After 
Takeover Bid, The U.K. and Ontario Compared, (1986)7 C o .L a w . p.23, in 
particular footenote 60. The test adopted for materiality o f facts in the 
circular is as follows : "an omitted fact is material if  there is substantial 
likelihood that a reasonable shareholders would consider it important in 
deciding how to vote"
69- The Panel statement on John Finlan, a property and construction 
development group's offer for the control of Lincroft Kilgour; Lester D.J, 
Misleading Takeover Circulars (1985) 6 C o.Law .. p.98.
70- Ibid.
71- Panel statement of February 12th, 1985 o f Racal Electronic pic's 
offer for Chubb and Son pic, noted by Abrams C. (1985)6 C o.L aw .. p.232.
72- Unlike a prospectus, an offer document has nowhere been defined. 
S.744 of the U.K Companies.Act 1985 defines a prospectus as "any document 
notice, circular, advertisement, or other invitation, offering to the public for 
subscription or purchase any share in or debentures o f a company". For 
more details see, Pennington R.R, Company Law. (4th Edition), p .2 19-255 , 
supra n. 17/Ch. 1.
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described as a "golden legacy".74 At present this is known as the 
"golden rule". The principle laid down by Kindersley V.C. is mainly 
directed to those responsible for the issue of prospectuses inviting 
persons to subscribe for, purchase shares in or debentures of a 
company, or for other purposes determined by the prospectus so 
issued. Kindersley V.C, indicated:
Those who issue a prospectus, holding out to the public the great 
advantages which will accrue to persons who will take shares in a 
proposed undertaking, and inviting them to take shares on the faith 
of the representations therein contained, are bound to state 
everything with strict and scrupulous accuracy, and not only to 
abstain from stating as fact that which is not so, but to omit no one 
fact within their knowledge the existence of which might in any 
degree affect the nature, or extent, or quality, of the privileges and 
advantages which the prospectus holds out as inducements to take 
shares.75
The court has been particularly strict in insisting that a 
prospectus must not contain information which is untrue or 
misleading or contains interpretations other than those officially 
given by the relevant authority which an investor may consider 
tru e .76 The other common feature of all document is the problem 
of using ambiguous languages and statements.77 In order to close
73- New Brunswick. Co. v. M uggeridge (1860) 1 Dr. & SM 363, 383.
74- Henderson v. Lacon (1867) L R 5 Eq. 249 at 262. See Gower L.C.B, The 
Principles of Modem Companies Law, p.325-6, supra n.36 and 61/Ch.l.
75- Supra n.73
76- This principle has received approval and support o f various 
subsequent judicial decisions over the years, for a brief discussion, Powell 
J.L, Issues and Offers of Companies Securities: The New Regimes (London, 
Sweet & Maxwell, 1988), p.72 ; Pennington R.R., Company Law. (1979), p.219, 
Supra n .l7 /C h l
77- A number of resolutions were set aside by the court because of a 
"Tricky" circulars. See Kaye v. Crovdon Tramways Co. (1898)1.Ch.358; T iessen  
v. Henderson (1899)1 Ch.861; B aillie v. Oriental Tel Co. (191511 Ch.503, Noted
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the gap, the City Code states that the language used in a document 
or advertisement should clearly and concisely reflect the positions 
being described.78 Moreover, sources for any fact which is material 
to an argument must be clearly stated, including any detail to 
enable the significance of the fact to be assessed.79
B - CONTENT OF AN OFFER DOCUMENT
Both in the U.K and France an offer document must contain 
provisions specifying certain minimum standards of information.80 
Once an offeror has expressed his intention to make an offer, the 
offer document must contain, first and foremost, the following basic 
inform ation81:
(1) DISCLOSURE OF OFFERORS INTENTION
Both countries' requirements, in this context, are common. 
Under the U.K City Code, for instance, Rule 24 stresses that an 
offeror seeking to acquire control of another company is required to 
reveal his intention regarding the target company's continuation of
by Gower L.C.B., The principles of Modem Company Law, part 5 p. 443, supra 
n.36 and 61/ Chi.
78 - City Code, Rule. 23.2 of the Code. See also supra n.79.
79- City Code, Rule. 23.2 not 2(a).
80- In practice, an offer document is almost always sent by a marchant 
bank acting on behalf of the offerors concerned or by an intermediary who 
is authorised person. Presumably, the reason underlying such policy lies in 
the fact that the governing body o f the bank are better aware o f the 
implication of the regulation in force.
81- It is important to emphasize the Panel Appeal Committee's view that 
"..information given at the time of a bid cannot be wholly divorced from pre­
bid information which the shareholders have been given or ought to have 
been given", Statement of the Appeal Committee o f the Panel on Leasco 
/Pergamon Press takeover offer, noted by Weinberg M.A, Takeovers and 
M ergers. (4th edn), para 1134, supra n .l9/C h.l
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business and also to state any substantial changes sought to be 
undertaken including any redeployment of the fixed assets of the 
target. The offeror is also required to set out and plainly justify the 
long-term commercial strategy of the proposed offer and to give 
com mitment on the continued employment and the offeree 
subsidiaries. In France, in addition to the disclosure of identity and 
characteristics relating to the initiator, an offeror must disclose his 
intention in respect of the industrial, financial and social policy for 
the future 12 months. The offeror is also required to disclose the 
significance of his offer.82
(2 ) DISCLOSURE OF FINANCIAL INFORMATION.
According to Rule 24.2 of the City Code, an offer document 
should contain at least the following major information regarding 
the offeror, the offeree and, whether the consideration is securities 
or cash. These are:
(1) For the last 5 financial years for which the information has been 
published, turnover, net profit or loss before and after taxation, the 
charge or tax, extraordinary items, minority interest, the amount 
absorbed by dividends and earnings and dividends per shares; (2) a 
statement of the assets and liabilities shown in the last published 
audited accounts; (3) all known material changes in the financial or 
trading position of the company subsequent to the last published 
audited accounts or a statement that there are no known material 
changes; (4) details relating to items referred to in (1) above in 
respect of any interim statement or preliminary announcement 
made since the last published audited accounts; (5) inflation adjusted 
information if any of the above has been published in that form; (6) 
significant accounting policies together with any points from the
82- Art.7 para 2 and 4 .of C.O.B Regulation provides that "....Ses 
intentions pour les 12 mois & venir relatives & la politique industrielle,
financiere et sociale des societes concemees ; La teneur de son offre." C.O.B
Regulation No.89-03, supra n .l.
138
notes to the accounts which are of major relevance to an 
appreciation of the figures; and (7) where the offeror is a company, 
the names of its directors.
Where the offer involves the issue of unlisted securities Rule 
24.10 requires an estimate of the value of such securities by an
appropriate adviser which must be contained in the offer document 
and in any subsequent alternative addressed by the offeror. The 
offer should also reveal whether or not the offeror intends to resort 
to compulsory acquisition powers conferred on it by virtue of the 
Companies Act, 1985.83 Finally, in case of a securities exchange 
offer, the offer document must indicate the amount of shares of the 
offeror which the offeror has redeemed or purchased during the
previous 12 months ending with the latest practicable date prior to 
the posting of the offer document and the details of any such 
redemption and purchases, including dates and prices.84 In France, 
corresponding requirements with respect to disclosure of financial 
information can be found in both the C.B.V and C.O.B. Regulations.
(3) DISCLOSURE OF SHARE OWNERSHIP
As originally introduced, both countries' relevant provisions 
would require disclosure of certain prelim inary inform ation 
pertaining to share ownership before a person acquires control, 
whether by cash or on an exchange of securities basis. The
underlying reason for this requirement seems twofold. First, to
identify the acquirers as well as their position of control or 
influence over the target company. Second, it is unlikely to leave
83- Companies Act 1985, Sect. 428 as repealed by the F.S.A.1986; Rule 
24.9 o f the City Code. Compare with the C.B.V and C.O.B requirements 
contained in the 1989 Regulations, supra n .l.
84- Rule 37.4 (b) of the Code.
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shareholders involved unaware of any prior knowledge about the 
potential change of control of their company. Thus, both the U.K and 
France require an offer document to reveal information relevant 
principally to shareholdings of the offeror in the offeree company; 
the shareholdings in the offeror and in the offeree company; the 
shareholdings in the offeror and in the offeree company which any 
persons acting in concert with the offeror own or control; details 
regarding any arrangement or agreement.85 When an arrangement 
exists with any offeror, with the offeree company or with an 
associate of any offeror or of the offeree company in relation to 
relevant securities, details of such arrangements are required to be 
immediately disclosed, whether or not any dealing takes place86 In  
view of both the U.K and France regulators, if a person is party to 
an arrangement with an offeror or an associate of that offeror not 
only will this render such a person associate of that offeror but it is 
also likely to mean that such person is acting in concert with 
him .87
85- See the U.K City Code, note 6(b) on Rules 8.1 (dealings by parties 
and by associates for themselves or for discretionary clients); Rule 8.2 
(dealings by associates for non-discretionary clients); and Rule 8.3 (dealings 
by 1% shareholders). Compare with Art.7 of the French C.O.B Regulation 1989 
No.89-03, supra n .l
86- Ibid. For the purpose of the U.K. City Code, an arrangement includes 
any arrangement or understanding, formal or informal, o f whatever nature 
relating to relevant securities which may be an inducement to deal or 
refrain from dealing.
87- See also Note 3 on Rule 9.1 (directors of company presumed to be 
acting in concert) and Rule 25.3 (shareholdings and dealings); See the 
French C.O.B. Regulation N o.89-03 , Art. 7 and 4. See also Loi No 89-531 
relating to Security and Transparency o f the Financial Market, supra 
n .5 /C h .2.
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4 .2 -  TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF AN OFFER
A- TERMS OF AN OFFER
An offer document often states that the target undertaking's 
shares will be acquired free from all charges and encumbrances 
and together with all rights attached to them, including the right to 
receive benefits such as dividends, or any other distribution of 
income. Concerning the acceptance period, the offer, whether 
revised or not, shall not be capable of being extended nor of being 
kept open after the final day on which it is due to expire88 unless 
it has previously become unconditional. However, the offerors may, 
and sometimes do, reserve the right, provided that permission is 
granted, to extend the offer to a later date deemed necessary.8 9 
Offer documents usually contain terms and conditions relating to 
the type of shares allocated to shareholders and rights 
thereupon .90 However, wherever an exchange of securities offer is 
involved, further obligations are triggered, for example, the 
obligation to comply with the Stock Exchange Listing particulars.
B- CONDITIONS OF AN OFFER
Takeover offers are always made by means of an offer 
document, identical copies of which are sent to all shareholders 
concerned. But the policy of the relevant regulators towards the 
communication of such copies differs radically between U.K and
88- An offer is not allowed to exceed the 60th day after the day the 
offer was initially posted. Rule 30.1 & 31.6 of the City Code.
89- Ibid
90- In general, considerations which practically used to finance an 
offer, are; stock unit and cash, stock unit and convertible preference shares; 
cash plus convertible preference shares; all securities or all cash; ordinary 
shares and loan stock and the like.
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France. According to the U.K City Code, copies of all documents 
bearing on an offer must be lodged with the Panel at the time of 
their issue. In France, no issue or communication of documents is 
permitted to be made without prior approval by the authority of 
the Bourse de Valeurs (both the C.B.V. & C.O.B.). Furthermore, the 
City Code seems to adhere to the policy that an offer document 
should always and invariably be made conditional upon obtaining 
the minimum level of the percentage of shares stipulated therein, 
which is 50% or more of the voting rights control in the target 
co m p an y .9! In other words, the offer lapses if such a condition is 
not fulfilled. Alternatively the offeror involved is under no 
obligation to buy any excess. In France, the C.B.V. and C.O.B. 
regulations impose parallel conditions. Concerning the level of 
control, Article 5.2.2 of C.B.V. Regulation requires an offeror to 
acquire (together with shares already held in the target company) 
an amount of voting control equivalent to 2/3 (65%) of the target 
company’s share capital.92
C- MERGER REFERENCE
Offerors seeking to acquire control of a target company are 
required to make it clear that the offer in question is conditional 
upon obtaining a mergers control clearance.93 Additionally, a
91- Rule 10 of the City Code provides that "it must be a condition of any 
offer for voting share capital which, if accepted in full, would result in the 
offeror holding shares carrying over 50% of the voting right of the offeree 
company that the offer will not become or be declared unconditional as to 
acceptance unless the offeror has acquired or agreed to acquire (either 
pursuant to the offer or otherwise) shares carrying over 50% of the voting 
rights attributable to (a) the equity share capital alone; and (b) the equity 
share capital and the non-equity share capital combined". No corresponding 
condition is provided in France.
92- See Art.5.2.2 of the C.B.V Regulation 1989.
93- In France, an authorisation from the competition authority is
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statement must also be included in the document in respect of 
whether or not such an offer is expected to be referred for 
investigation by the Monopoly and Mergers Commission. But, this 
does not mean that the offeror will escape from any obligation if its 
offer lapses as a result of a reference. Note 1 on Rule 9.4 provides 
that:
. . . i f  an offer lapses on reference to the M.M.C, the obligation under 
the Code will not be affected as in relation to acceptance which will 
cease to be bound. Accordingly, if a subsequent clearance is given, 
the offer must be reinstated on the same terms and at not less than 
the same price as soon as practicable. If the offer is prohibited, 
offerors cannot be allowed to proceed.94
In F rance, the re levan t au thorities stress tha t the 
announcement of an offer does not mean an approval with respect 
to control of concentration is granted. Consequently, the initiator of 
an offer is required to notify the Ministry of Economy (direction 
generale de la concurrence et de la consomation).95
D - RESERVATION OF THE RIGHT TO WAIVE ANY CONDITION
Offerors may, and often do, reserve the right to set aside any 
statement, waive any condition and discharge any responsibilities 
as deemed appropriate. Save with the consent of the Panel, the 
offer will lapse unless all conditions have been fulfilled within 21 
days after the date on which the offer becomes unconditional. 
Accordingly, if the conditions specified in the offer document have 
not been fully implemented, the offeror reserves the right to 
discharge without prejudice, of any acceptance. Settlement of the
required to be obtained beforehand. See C.B.V Regulation, 1989, Art. 5.2.10
94- See Rule 9 of the City Code.
95- C.B.V's Regulation, 1989, Art.5.2.10.
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consideration to which any target undertaking shareholder is 
entitled to under the offer will be implemented in full in 
accordance with the terms set out in the document. It is worthwhile 
mentioning that in France, where an offer is declared unsuccessful, 
a corresponding requirement relating to discharge of acceptance 
can be found in both the C.B.V. and C.O.B. regulations. If the 
conditions specified in the offer document have been fully 
implemented and there is an excess of acceptances, the offeror 
reserves the right either to accept the whole excess or to proceed 
with a reduction on a pro rata basis.96
4.3- KIND OF CONSIDERATION OF AN OFFER
In both the U.K and France the form of consideration offered in 
conjunction with an offer may be in cash, securities, or a 
combination of securities and cash.97 The relative distinction 
between these three sort of considerations depends largely on 
various factors notably, taxation. For example, an exchange offer is 
always effected tax-free whereas a cash offer is generally taxed. 
Such forms of consideration will be discussed in turn.
A- CASH OFFER
Experience demonstrates that foreign offerors seeking to 
acquire a locally resident company often proceed with cash offers 
rather than offering an exchange of securities. This is because of 
legal, fiscal and monetary obstacles that still exist in many 
countries. Payment of a cash offer, depending on an arrangement, 
may also be deffered to a future time. This is called "deferred cash
96- Ibid.
97- See, for example, Art.5.2.3 of C.B.V. Regulation, 1989
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offer”. If a deferred cash offer is proposed and subsequently 
accepted by the target shareholders, such a device is viewed as 
borrowing the acquisition funds from the target company rather 
than from the bank.98 One of the major implications of deferred 
cash offers is that, once shareholders of the target company receive 
cash at the deferred date and upon the agreed price at the date the 
contract is concluded, they cease to have any voting rights or 
interests either in the target company or in the acquiring 
c o m p a n y ."  Second, the stamp duty becomes relevant once the full 
amount is received by the seller. This means that any sale of shares 
in a company for cash is an event which is potentially taxable and 
that tax liability in such a situation is generally deferred until the 
shareholder concerned receives his full amount in cash. 100 Hence, 
stamp duty is triggered whenever a shareholder obtains the 
deferred cash payments for his shares. Alternatively, if he agrees to 
accept new shares of the acquiring company in return for his 
holdings already transferred, he will normally be treated for tax 
purposes as a shareholder in the acquiring company and, therefore, 
will benefit from the available exemption. Finally, if potential 
offerors decide to offer cash for the shares of the target company, 
the obvious implication may be that directors, although their 
decision may suffice, are also required to obtain the approval of 
their shareholders in respect of raising the finance necessary for 
the implementation of the intended takeover in the company's 
general meeting.
98- Peter & Fisher, International Takeovers & Mergers, at p.38, supra 
n .4 1 /c h .1
99- Ibid
100- Ibid
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B- EXCHANGE OF SECURITIES* OFFER
Unlike the cash offer, a securities exchange offer is often 
assimilated economically and commercially to legal m ergers.101 
Exchange offers give rise to problems of shareholders choice 
between alternatives. This is where some shareholders prefer cash 
instead. In this connection banks often intervene to provide a 
se ttlem en t.102 But the question is if an offer document contains an 
option of a cash alternative, should the offeror be obliged to acquire 
shares at the same price as in relation to the terms of the offer or 
should it consider a cash alternative as a distinct and separate 
document from the offer document and purchase shares on the 
terms negotiated with the bank involved or to buy shares offered 
at the indicated price as in relation to the offer document. First of 
all, questions of qualification arise.
As regards qualification of the bank offer, Britman J. stated:
it appears to me that the cash alternative can properly be described 
as a ’put option1 exercisable against a third party, and that such 'put 
option' is a term which forms part of a scheme ...involving the 
transfer of shares...in a company to another company. Indeed it 
forms a most essential part of the scheme, because it is manifested 
from the offer document...103
Others argue that it quite clear that the underwritten cash offer 
is a separate offer made by the offerors' bank, to the shareholders 
in the offeree company. Weinberg pointed out that:
Unless this is clear and the two offers are separate offers, then there
101- See chapter one of this thesis, Definitional Framework o f mergers 
and takeover offers.
102- See, Begg P.F.C, Corporate Acquisition And Mergers., supra n.61.
103- Re Carlton Holdings Limited - Worster v. Priam Investment Limited
(1971)2 All ER 1082 at 108, (1971)1 W.L.R.918..
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is a danger that the underwritter cash offer will be treated as part of 
the main offer so that when the offeror comes to exercise its righ ts.Jt 
will have to make a comparable cash offer from its own resources to 
the offeree shareholders not withstanding that the underwritten
arrangements are at an end.104
What matters for the shareholder, in fact, is to be treated fairly 
and at not less favourable terms in relation to those who preferred 
the exchange or cash alternative. Questions of distinction appear to
have a little relevance. Thus, concerning the price consideration
expressed in the underwriting document, it applies, subject to the 
type or characteristics of shares held, to all shareholders concerned 
on an equal footing.105 Appendix 1(5) of the Code, in respect of
underwriting and placing, provides that:
...in cases involving the underwriting or placing of offeree company 
securities, the Panel must be given details of all the proposed 
underwriters or placees, including any relevant information to 
establish whether or not there is a group acting in concert, and the 
maximum percentage which they could come to hold as a result of 
implementation of the proposals.
Rule 33.2 of the Code, grants the offeror the choice not to be 
bound to keep that alternative open in accordance with the main 
offer requirements. This rule states:
...where the value of a cash underwritten alternative provided by 
third parties is at the time of announcement, more than half the 
maximum value of the offer, an offeror will not be obliged to keep 
that alternative open in accordance with Rules 31.4 or 33.1 if it has 
given notice to shareholders in writing that it reserves the right to 
close it on a stated date, being not less that 14 days after the date on
104- Weinberg M.A. and Blank M.V., Weinberg and Blank on Takeovers 
And Mergers.(4th edn), Para. 1393, footnote 3, supra n.l9/C hl
105- Ibid, at paras. 1394-5,
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which a written notice is posted, or to extend it on that stated date.
However, the most striking feature of this rule is that it seeks 
to establish a balance between the interests of shareholders and 
those of the underwriters. Furthermore, to keep an orderly market, 
Rule 33.2 urges the issuers of underwritten cash alternatives not to 
announce any notice between the time when a competing offer has 
been announced and the end of the resulting competitive situation.
4.4- OFFEREE COMPANY’S CIRCULAR
A - ISSUE OF A CIRCULAR
Once discussion between parties to the offer is terminated, the 
offeree directors issue a circular explaining their attitude to the 
proposal. For the shareholders, of course, there can be no doubt that 
both the offer document and circular are compiled and read 
together. If there is opposition, the directors who decided to resist 
an unwanted offer will doubtless produce and communicate their 
opposition through the means provided and the battle of circulars 
begins as a result. It is in such a situation that uncertainty about 
the proposed offer becomes manifest. It should be noted, however, 
that while in U.K, it would seem a circular requires no 
authentication, in France the authentication by the relevant 
supervisory bodies is vital and cannot be avoided.
Assuming the approval is granted, the offeree directors like the 
offeror, whether by virtue of the City Code provisions or the C.B.V 
regulation, are required to circulate their views about an offer in a 
prescribed form, the so called "circular", to their own shareholders. 
It is interesting to reiterate that, in the U.K. a circular issued by the
target company directors recommending either acceptance or 
rejection of the offer is totally governed by the City Code. Apart 
from this, the question which may arise is whether the target 
company’s directors have a power to refuse to accept an offer 
document if it is misleading, incomplete or worthless compared 
with the value of their company's securities. Actually, if an offer
document is deemed to be misleading, the only role of the directors 
concerned is to report such anomalies to the competent authority 
for decision.106 In the view of the regulators such anomalies should 
not be used as a ground for frustrating bona fide offers.107 
Consequently, if an offer document contains false statements,
various civil and criminal proceedings may be taken against the
persons responsible for it, principally the offeror. By the same 
token, if an offer document contains incomplete information or 
contains information other than that required to be provided, the 
question then is a matter of compliance which is the responsibility 
of the supervisory body to bring the action against the defaulter.
As regards civil and criminal liabilities, the U.K. F.S.A 1986
contains various provisions which deal principally with any person 
making false, misleading or deceptive statements, promises or
forecasts. Such provisions are applicable if the circular is made
dishonestly to defraud or deny the shareholders involved an 
opportunity to decide correctly on the merit of offers. This, indeed, 
may lead to civil or criminal proceeding depending on their actual 
or perceived effects.108
106- In France, both an offer document and circular are subjected to 
prior examination by the relevant authority. See for example, Art.5.2.5 to 
5.2.7. of the C.B.V. Regulation.
107- In the U.K., the Panel requires that any anomaly be corrected and 
published within 48 hours.
108- See infra, Chapter 4 "Protection o f Shareholders"
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B- CONTENT OF A CIRCULAR
In addition to the requirements with respect to disclosure of 
share ownership,109 by virtue of Rule 25.4 (a) and (b) and Rule 25.5 
respectively, an offeree directors' circular must contain all relevant 
inform ation as to directors service contracts entered into or 
amended within 6 months of the date of document or where such 
contracts have more than 12 months to run. Directors, in advising 
their shareholders on the merits or demerits of an offer, must also 
disclose any arrangement in relation to dealing in securities by or 
on their behalf of whatever kind. Finally, the offeree board's 
circular must indicate the amount of relevant securities of the 
offeree company which the offeree company has redeemed or 
purchased during the period commencing 12 months prior to the 
offer period and ending with the latest possible date prior to the 
posting of the offeror document. Such a circular must set out all 
relevant details of any such redemption and purchases, including 
dates and prices.110
4.5- COMMUNICATION AND DISPLAY OF DOCUMENTS
In fact, the U.K. involvement in the conduct of takeovers is 
radically different from the French one. While in France, an offer 
document is required to be sent, in the first instance, to the C.B.V., a 
copy of which is addressed to C.O.B. to exercise its prior control on 
the content, in Britain the offeror is entitled to communicate 
directly with the target company. Under the City Code, once a firm 
intention is publicly made, the offeror is obliged to send its offer 
document to the target company's board within a period of 28 days
109- Rule 25.3 of the City Code.
110- Rule 37.3 of the City Code
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starting from the date the intention to make an offer is announced. 
It may also be notified to the target company’s advisers. If the offer 
is made by an agent, the principal's identity must be disclosed. 
Provided that the board of the target company is satisfied that the 
offeror is, or will be, able to implement the offer in full, the 
d irectors of the offeree company are obliged to publish 
immediately a circular containing their advice and views on the 
merits or demerits of the proposals. But if an approach is made 
which may or may not lead to an offer, a premature announcement 
must be made by both the offeror and the offeree company.
Both countries regulations require that copies of the following 
documents must be made available for inspection at the place 
indicated in the offer document. Such copies should remain open for 
consultation throughout the period of the offer. These are: (1) The 
memorandum and articles of association of both the offeror and the 
offeree company; (2) Their published accounts for the preceding 
financial years, usually 5 years, prior to making the offer or be 
in v o lv e d ;111 (3) Directors service contract entered into with the 
previous years otherw ise than in the ordinary course of 
business;112 (4) Statements of the financial advisers (confirmation) 
as well as those of the valuer of securities;113 (5) The offer 
document; (b) The listing particulars approved by the Stock 
Exchange authority relating to the offeror;114 (6) Any document
111- See respectively, the U.K Companies (Table A To F) Regulations 
1985 ((S.I. No.805/1985) and the French Loi No.66-531 of 1966 as amended.
112- The City Code requirements as amended and C.O.B Regulation No.89- 
03 of 1989, supra n .l.
113- Ibid.
114- The Stock Exchange requirements. Sec also Part IV of the F.S.A 1986. 
relating to listing provisions.
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evidencing an irrevocable commitment to accept an offer;115 (7) 
Written consent of accountants, lawyers or financial advisers in 
respect of the offer or any other document whether or not made at 
the time the offer is formally announced.116 (8) Where profits and 
dividends forecasts including assets valuation are announced, a 
report of the auditors or consultant accountant and the financial 
advisers scheduled with letters of consent as well as evaluating 
certificate must be joined and made available for consultation.117 
Finally, a copy or copies of each document on display must, on 
request, be made available by offeror or the offeree company to 
each other as well as to any rivals in accordance with the City Code 
requ irem en ts.118
SECTION FIVE- EFFECT OF SUBSEQUENT RIVAL OFFERS
5.1- LEGAL EFFECTS
A- WITHDRAWAL OF OFFERS
As a matter of general law in France and self regulatory 
practice in the U.K., once an offer is publicly announced, it becomes 
irrevocable. To illustrate, in the U.K. Rule 2.5 of the City Code 
requires that "the announcement of a firm intention to make an offer should 
be made only when an offeror has every reason to believe that it can and will 
continue to be able to implement the offer". In consequence, Rule 2.7 
stipulates that:
when there has been an announcement of a firm intention to make 
an offer, the offeror must, except with the consent of the Panel,
proceed with the offer unless the posting of the offer is subject to the
115- C.O.B. and C.B.V requirements, supra n .l.
116- C.O.B and the City Code requirements.
117- The City Code, Rule 24 et seq.
118- See Rule 19.4 and 19.6
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prior fulfillment of a specific condition and that condition has not 
been met".
As a protective measure against any breach of the relevant 
regulation, the offeror may sometimes include in its offer document 
provisions which enable it to escape from prejudicial obligations 
such as the withdrawal of its offer if a subsequent competitive offer 
is announced. This clause has been clarified and permitted by the 
City Code. Note 2 on Rule 2.7 provides that "An announced offeror need 
not proceed with its offer if a competitor has already posted a higher offer...". In 
France, if an offer is followed by a competitive offer, the initiator, 
by virtue of the C.B.V Regulation, is allowed either to proceed with 
his offer or to withdraw. In which case, the relevant authority bring 
to the attention of the shareholders concerned the initiator’s final 
decision.
B - WITHDRAWAL OF ACCEPTANCE
There are various instances where shareholders' prior 
acceptance of an offer ceases to be binding. Notably, the offer lapses 
on a reference to the M.M.C., the withdrawal of a no extension 
statement, where the offer is unsuccessful as to acceptance, and if
the initial offer is followed by a higher offer. In any of these cases
the offer document must make it clear that, wherever any of the
above cited circumstances arise both the shareholders and the 
offeror will thereafter cease to be bound by prior acceptance.! 19 
Apart from these exceptional factors cited above, normally, if a
119- Rule 12 of the Code; Rule 13 Note 2, as regards the invoking
conditions, provides that "An offeror should not invoke any condition so as to 
cause the offer to lapse unless the circumstances which give use to the right 
to invoke the condition are of material significance to the offeror in the 
context o f the offer...".
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shareholder has already accepted the initial offer, he is legally
bound to transfer his shares for the consideration stated therein.
This is because the acceptance of an offer produces a binding 
contract between the seller and the buyer, and not merely create 
the possibility of such a contract coming into existence in the
fu tu re .120
C - WITHDRAWAL OF DIRECTORS’ STATEMENTS
Usually any offeror is categorically bound by the issue of any 
statement as to the duration of his offer.121 It is equally important 
to mention that, technically, the issue of such a kind of statement 
may induce shareholders to whom the offer is intended, to make a
pressured decision with respect to the sale of their holding.
According to the City Code requirements, if an offeror has already 
issued a statement in respect of the duration of his offer and at the 
time of making the statement has not reserved the right to set it 
aside he is not allowed to introduce changes thereafter. The 
corresponding implications of the issue of the statements are: first, 
the offeror will be deprived of the right to extend his offer beyond
the stated date in the statement; second, he cannot revise his offer
even if his offer has not yet reached the amount of acceptance
stated in the offer document. However, in most instances, offerors
prefer reserving the right to withdraw a no extension statement
because it solely operates to their advantage. Thus, if a competitive 
situation arises after a no extension statement has been made, the
issuer, as Note 2 on Rule 31.5 provides, can choose not to be bound
120- Ridge Nominees Limited v I.R.C supra n. 118/Ch. 1; Pennington R.R, 
Compnv Law, p.804 (1979), supra n.l7/C hl
121- Rule. 31.5 of the City Code.
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by it and is to be free to extend, revise or withdraw his offer 
provided that first, notice to this effect is given as soon as possible 
(and in any event within 4 business days after the day of the 
announcement of the competing offer) and shareholders are 
informed in writing at the earliest opportunity; and second, any 
offeree shareholders who accepted the offer after the date of the no 
extension statement are given a right of withdrawal for a period of 
8 days following the date on which the notice is posted. In France, 
there exist no corresponding provisions in the context as those 
contained in the City Code.
D -P R IO R  COMMITMENTS TO ACCEPT AN OFFER
In the U.K, an offer is always conditional on the offeror 
receiving acceptance which, together with shares already owned, 
results in the offeror holding shares carrying more than 50% of the 
voting rights. In a competitive offer situation the question is 
whether prior commitments to accept an offer (the initiator’s offer) 
remain valid? Admitting that where two or more companies make 
at the same time their offers competitively for the control of the 
target company, the shareholders to whom such offers are 
addressed, so as to preserve their liberty of choice, may defer 
accepting any offer till the latest possible time before the offers 
close. In consequence, if a shareholder accepts an offer as soon as it 
is made he cannot withdraw his acceptance.!22 But the matter, in 
question, is concerned with prior engagements which an offeror 
may collect to support his offer. In both countries prior 
commitments to accept an offer have long triggered the relevant 
authorities attention. In the U.K., the Board of Trade drew attention
122- Pennington R R , Company Law. (1979), p.804, supra n .l7/C h.l
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to a practice whereby directors, pursuant to an agreement or 
understanding with the offeror to accept a bid, bind themselves not 
to recommend any subsequent competitive offer.I23 Since such a 
practice is deemed to be detrim ental to the in terests of 
shareholders, the Department of Trade requires parties involved in 
an agreement to provide the terms of any "provisional agreement", 
by which the target company's directors bind themselves to accept 
the offer.124 The City Code requires that "References to irrevocable 
commitments to accept an offer must make it clear if there are circumstances in 
which they cease to be binding, for example, if a higher offer is made".12  ^ In 
France, a distinction should be drawn between acceptance of an 
offer where shareholders of the target company order their 
intermediaries to sell their shares to the preferred offeror and 
irrevocable commitment to accept offers. With respect to the 
acceptance of an offer, it does not generally gives rise to any 
d if f ic u lt ie s .126 As for prior commitments to accept an offer, the 
French relevant authorities consider them valid provided that such 
engagements are officially notified to C.O.B. in advance.127 However, 
during the period of an offer, no agreement which may distort the 
performance of the Bourse, is allowed to be concluded.12**
123- Jenkins Committee Minute 1577, noted by Weinberg, Takeovers and
M ergers, paras 1129, supra. n.l9/C hl
124- Ibid
125- City Code, Rule 24.3 Note 5.
126- Acceptance of an offer can be withdrawn at any time during the
period of the offer under consideration. See Art. 5.2.12 o f the C .B.V’s
Regulation 1989, supra n .l
127 . See, M.Z Biderman and others v. Primistere and others, supra
n .4 8 /C h .1.
128- See, C.O.B Regulation No.89-03, Art.4, supra n.l
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E - EFFECT OF HOLDING STATEMENTS
Rule 20 of the City Code stipulates that "parties to an offer must 
take care not to issue statements which, while not factually inaccurate, may 
mislead shareholders and the market and may create uncertainty". The scope 
of this rule is wide ranging. It extends to catch those potential 
offerors who, for tactical reasons, may issue statements setting out 
that they are considering making a competitive offer while the 
initial offeror is in the immediate period of its offer. Since such 
ambiguous statements are deemed to be undesirable for both the 
offeror and the offeree shareholders, the Panel requires that it is 
intolerable and unacceptable for such statem ents to remain 
ambiguous for more than a limited time, particularly in the later 
stages of the offer period.129 In addition, the maker of this kind of a 
statement does not escape from the obligation to make a prompt 
announcement or denial of his intention. Failure to do so will
inevitably entail serious consequences such as a delay of at least 3 
months before making another offer for the target company.130
5.2- FINANCIAL EFFECTS
Although the financial implications of competitive offers on 
each other fall outside the scope of this study, a brief outline would 
appear necessary. Regardless of whether or not the subsequent
competitor has been invited to participate by the target company’s 
directors, there are various financial elements that competitors will 
prepare on the basis of what is already proposed by the initial
offeror. In general, the potential competitor will consider the 
present value and future earning prospects of the target company,
129- Note 1 on Rule 20
130- Rule 35 of the Code.
157
and the nature and the amount of consideration proposed by the
initial offer. Indeed, in this respect, frequently the offeror's 
financial adviser, usually a bank, accountant and auditors will assist 
him in his process of analysis. Equally, the offeror will seek to
borrow or raise the necessary funds to implement his offer in full. 
The offeror may also consider the amount of outstanding securities 
of the target sought to be acquired compared with the original 
offeror's proposal. In addition to the implication on the market for 
the shares of the target once its offer is announced. Another
consideration which is also vital relates to tax implications of any
proposed transaction. Inevitably each element considered by the 
potential offeror will have great financial effects on the actual 
offeror. Naturally, most offerors, nowadays, raise sufficient funds to 
the extent that will enable them to implement their objective, i.e, 
gaining control. The problem of extra funds emerges where the 
initial offeror may not consider the likely effect of potential 
competitors. Besides, no-one can deny the burden of cost involved 
and time consumed for the initial offeror to reconsider his position 
in the light of the new situation. Take, for instance, Rowntree's case. 
The amount of the £2.3 billion Nestle final offer was, in fact, 
dictated not by Nestle nor even by Rowntree,1^1 but by the dawn 
raid from Jacobs Suchard which induced and reactivated Nestle. 
Comparing both competitors, Suchard and Nestle, the former was 
far from matching the financial power and preparation of the latter 
rival. These were: turnover 6.1 (35.29 bn); net profits 265 m (1.8 
bn); operating profits 471 (3.7 bn); cash flow 394 m (3.0 bn); net
131- Nestl6 was, over one year, looking for a mutual deal, a method of 
achieving expansion and growth objectives. Until Suchard acted, Nestle had 
bought no Rowntree shares because it hoped to implement its friendly deal. 
See further The Times, April 27th 1988, p.25 & 27.
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profit per share 530 (537); shareholders funds 1.1 bn (12.7 bn); 
sales 3.5 bn (2.8 bn) staff 16,000 (163,000).132 It is worthy of note 
that the offer price, during the immediate period of the competitive 
offer, had reached 90% higher than that preceding the dawn raid 
and 52 % above its pre-October peak of 585 pence. 133 This, perhaps, 
may illustrate the financial implications of competitive offers on 
each other as well as the Stock Market reaction. Legally, however, 
the British regulator does not impose any financial conditions to be 
observed by a subsequent rival only in so far as those provisions 
concern the necessary funds to implement the intended offer in full 
and the condition that an offer must be made at not less favourable 
terms compared with the initial offer price. By contrast, in France, 
the relevant regulator requires that a competitive offer must
exceed at least 2% of the original offer price at the time the
competitive offer is made.
5.3- EFFECT OF A MERGERS REFERENCE
Like many takeover problems, the typical instance that has
triggered attention has been when two offers are made more or less 
successively for the control of a target company, one of which
merits reference for investigation whereas the other rival does 
n o t . 13/1 During the review of the previous procedure of merger
control in the U.K, the government's major concern was to find an 
effective and flexible means to handle such problems wherever
they might ar ise .135 Accordingly, various a l ternatives  or
propositions have been advocated. One alternative to deal with the
132- Ibid.
133- Ibid
134- See D.T.I., Mergers Policy, Annex F, p.40, supra n.21.
135- Ibid.
problem, it is submitted, is that it would be for the government to 
abandon the current practice of ensuring, either by obtaining 
undertakings or by making orders, that the proposed mergers 
should not be allowed to go ahead while the investigation is in 
progress and to adopt measures of demerger in the event of an 
adverse finding by the Commission instead.136 The other alternative 
for dealing with the problem is to impose a restraint on share 
dealing of the target company so long as one offer is under 
in v e s t ig a t io n .137 Both propositions face criticism by those who 
prefer that all offers should be blocked until final clearance. One 
argument lays stress on the problem of the unfairness to the 
referred offeror, whose opportunity to implement his takeover 
transaction, if cleared by the M.M.C thereafter, is diminished or 
removed if a rival offer is successful in the meantime.138 In 
addition, blocking one rival but not both will distort the good 
performance of the market for the control of the target company. 
Likewise, even in the absence of rivals, the fact that an offeror is 
referred to the M.M.C. would, in addition to delay, enable the target 
company extra time to organize its defenses successfully and, thus, 
allow it to defeat a bona fide offeror or at least to induce him to 
withdraw his interests.139 It is worthy of note that under the City 
Code, even if an offer lapses on reference, the obligation to make an 
offer may not come to an end. That is to say, the offeror still has to 
proceed with his offer unless prohibited by the competition rules.
The government's position was made clear in the Companies 
Bill 1989. Clause 100 of the Bill, sub-section 14 (A) states:
136-Ibid, at p 40, para 3.
137- Ibid at para 5.
138- Ibid.
139- Ibid.
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...where a merger reference is made under this section, it shall be 
unlawful, except with the consent of the Secretary of State under 
subsection (4C) of this section (a) for any person carrying on any
enterprise to which the reference relates on having control of any
such enterprise or any subsidiary of his, or (b) for any person
associated with him or for any subsidiary of such a person, directly
or indirectly to acquire, at any time during the period mentioned in 
subsection (4b) of this section, an interest in shares in a company if 
any enterprise to which the reference relates is carried on by or 
under the control of that company.
The Bill describes the circumstances in which a person acquires 
an interest in shares other than where such a person acquires an 
interest in pursuance of an obligation assumed before the 
announcement of a merger reference. These are:
...where (a) he enters into a contract to acquire the shares (whether 
or not for cash) (b) not being the registered holder, he acquires a 
right to exercise, or to control the exercise of, any right conferred by 
the holding of the shares, or (c) he acquires a right to call for delivery 
of the shares to himself or to his order or to acquire an interest in the 
shares or assuming an obligation to acquire such an interest. 140
Yet, following the passage of the Companies Act 1989 none of 
the proposed solutions are adopted. As far as the French relevant 
regulations is concerned, the problem being outlined has neither 
been conceived nor implemented. This equally applies to the E.E.C. 
merger control code, presumably, because of the requirement of a 
mandatory prior notification.
5.4- PROCEDURAL EFFECTS
In the U.K., the City Code provides detailed rules governing the 
timetable within which an offer, whether or not competitive, should
140- Ss.(4f to k) of the U.K. Companies Bill 1989.
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be finalized and implemented in full. The exemption, with respect 
to the timing of the offer eg, extension beyond the maximum 
timetable limit, is normally granted to the extent that, and only in 
exceptional circumstances, the Panel considers justifiable. Under the 
City Code, an offer document is required to be posted to 
shareholders concerned within a period of 28 days starting from 
the date the announcement of a firm intention to make an offer is 
publicly made. While the relevant period of an offer begins from 
the date the firm intention is announced, a more vital date is the 
day of posting the offer document. Once the document is posted, 
offerors have 60 days to fulfill their obligations. The offeror, after 
posting his proposal, has a period of 21 days to keep his offer open 
as to acceptance. He is also entitled to revise his offer within the 
prescribed timetable as many times as he wishes.
The question that normally should really be asked at the 
beginning is what effect a subsequent rival offer might have upon 
the initial offer timetable? It is true that any effect a rival offer 
may produce, in the context, is often dependent largely on the 
initial offeror's choice. Like the French regulation, the British City 
Code gives the initial offeror the opportunity of choosing either to 
accept the subsequent rival offer's new timetable and, thus, to 
reconsider its position accordingly, or to keep its original timetable. 
The former situation, in the case of a contested offer, would appear 
to give the target company another chance and sufficient time to 
organize its defenses. But with respect to the later situation, the 
question is how far the target company directors could discharge 
their previous obligations and restrictions? This remains unclear.
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5.5- POSTERIOR EFFECT ON A TARGET COMPANY
One may wonder whether an expressed intention about the 
future of the target company binds the offeror or not. Experience 
has shown various instances where an offeror, after obtaining the 
majority of control in a general meeting of the acquired company, 
proceeds with early retirement or other proceedings so that the 
number of employees by one way or other is reduced to the desired 
level. There are other major effects: change in the business plan 
and operating policy of the acquired company such as purchasing, 
advertisement and pricing policy; change in the management; full 
integration of the target company or retention of its place as a 
subsidiary of the group; changes in the < composition of assets and 
liabilities; dismissal of employment for technical or commercial 
reorganization; and finally, changes in capitalization and dividends 
policy of the acquired company.
CONCLUSION
In its present form, a competitive offer is always made in cash. 
Cash offers are entirely free from any government interference, 
particularly in Britain. This is apparently because of the belief that 
shareholders who sell their shares will no longer have a continuous 
interest in the acquired company (save wherever necessary when 
an offer involves an element of exchange of securities). But this 
does not mean that the competitive offer is left unregulated. 
Whether or not an offer involves a cash consideration, the most 
important provisions are those which maintain the interest of 
shareholders without unduly impeding legitimate offers. As far as 
information disclosure is concerned, such provisions are intended to 
ensure that neither offerors nor the directors of the target company
mislead shareholders or deny them the opportunity of making an 
informed and rational decision. Therefore, a certain minimum 
standard of information disclosure is required to be concurrently 
made and fairly presented not only in the offer document but also 
throughout the period of the takeover offer. The major test of such
information is accuracy and materiality. An aspect of takeover
offers that most regulations stress is the shareholders right of 
withdrawal. But it is differently regulated. In Britain, for instance, 
shareholders of the target company are permitted to use their 
rights of withdrawal in specific circumstances. In France, by 
contrast, such a right may be used at any time during the offer 
period. It is also particularly vital to mention that the United 
Kingdom rules, with respect to the revised offer conditions, are not 
radically different from French legislation. Both regulations, for the 
purpose of ensuring equal opportunities, provide that if an offer 
(whether initial or competitive) is subjected to any revision during 
the offer period, the offerors concerned are obliged to pay the 
increased consideration even to shareholders who had already
offered their shares. Additionally, in both states, the existing 
regulations contain provisions designed specifically to monitor the 
conduct of parties involved in takeover offers. Occasionally, the 
regulators do interfere in an offer so as to prohibit or restrict 
certain dealings which may seriously and prejudicially hamper
investors interests, i.e., insider dealing, manipulations and other 
unruly market practices such as speculation and rumours.
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CHAPTER FOUR 
PROTECTION OF SHAREHOLDERS
The protection of shareholders is a vexed problem. The purpose 
of the  p r e s e n t  discussion is a d d re s sed  to the  p ro tec t ion  of 
shareholders  once trading in their  securit ies start .  Knowing th a t  
sha reho lders  (insti tutional and ord inary)  are in an unbalanced  
position of protection vis a vis each other, the f irs t  question in this 
chap ter  is to w hom such protec t ion  is d irec ted?  This leads to 
consider first, w h a t  category of shareholders  is b e t te r  served  or 
p ro tec ted  and those  w hich  need  f u r th e r  p ro tec t io n s?  Since 
information disclosure and publicity are deem ed to be the most 
important  factors for the protection of shareholders,  the question is 
w h e th e r  reliance is on the am ount of information publicly made 
available or on its materiality. Should there  be any link be tw een  
periodic information disclosure made in the o rd in a ry  course of 
business and those requ ired  to be made available in a part icular  
situation such as a takeover offer. Another concern which may arise 
in the context is w he the r  or not information disclosure contributes 
both to the development of the transparency of the m arke t  and the 
protec tion of shareholders .  Finally, w h a t  k ind of r em e d ie s  are 
available.
In discussing information disclosure, concern will, first, be on 
the purpose  of disclosure;  second, on d irec to rs  disc losure of 
interests; and third, on disclosure of share dealings. Then, the focus 
will be on the methods w h e reb y  information is released. Finally, 
this chapter  will discuss the kind of rem edies  available to curb 
abusive practice within the market.
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S E C T I O N  ONE: I N F O R M A T I O N  D I S C L O S U R E
1 . 1 -  P U R P O S E  OF D I S C L O S U R E
A significant f ea tu re  under ly ing  com pany  law is th a t  of 
disclosure and publicity. This fundam enta l  aspect, legally speaking, 
operates against the theory of secrecy or confidentiality which may 
break investors ' confidence within the market  and produce distrust  
in directors. In other words, disclosure, in its essence,  seems an 
effective safeguard for the interests involved. This means tha t  the 
rules have not only prescribed the contents of disclosure, bu t  have 
also imposed civil and criminal sanctions to curb insidious m arke t  
practice. For companies generally, it is a sta tu tory  requ irem en t  tha t  
certain  information should be made available to the public for 
inspection on a periodical bas is .1 However,  not all information is 
required  to be made available. There is still a certa in  am oun t  of 
confidential  in form ation  which, if disclosed, could h a m p e r  the 
whole company interests.
I t  is obvious th a t  inves to rs  are  p la in ly  e n t i t l e d  to be 
adequate ly  and fully informed and employees and creditors to be 
safeguarded but the relevant question is to w h a t  extent  information 
disclosure should go? One study points out tha t  disclosure consists 
of v a r io u s  e x t e n t s .2 These inc lude the  e x te n t  of r e q u i r e d  
disclosure, w h e th e r  in s ta tu tes  regulating securit ies issues or in 
diverse other re levant provisions such as self regulations; the type
1- The Companies Act 1985 as amended, Sch.4; Morse G., C o m p a n ies  
Consolidation Legislation. 1 9 8 7 . p.465 (London, Sw eet and Maxwell, 1987); 
Sealy L.S. Cases And Materials on Company Law, p.431 (London, Butterworths, 
1985).
2- Warner Grove, and Baillie, The Concept of Disclosure and Its Cost 
and Benefits, in Hahlo H.R and Farrar J.H , Hahlo's Cases And Materials on 
Company Law. (3rd edn.) p . l7 9 -4 0 7 r supra n.74/Ch ?
166
of investors concerned and the na tu re  of securities the subject of 
dealings; the d issem ination  of the disclosed in fo rm at ion  in a 
digestible form to those persons; the timing of the disclosure; and 
the  k ind  of r e m e d ie s  ava i lab le  w h e th e r  civil, c r im ina l  or 
disciplinary measures .3 The true nature  of the purpose which the 
disclosure req u i rem e n t  intends to ensure  is the protection of (a) 
investors  ( individuals and institutions),  be th e y  a majori ty  or 
minority  against the abusive acts of those w ho a rede jure or de 
facto in control; (b) employees be they shareholders or not; and (c) 
creditors of the target  company. This, finally, implies protection of 
investors ,  c redi tors  or employees,  cannot be seen  as en t i re ly  
isolated issues. It should be seen as a whole if the confidence of all 
these groups is to be maintained.
1 . 2 -  D I S C L O S U R E  OF I N T E R E S T S  I N  S H A R E S
By v ir tue  of sections 198-209 of the U.K. Companies Act 1985 
(herein  after C.A.1985), most kinds of in te res ts  in the r e le v an t  
share capital of the company, w he the r  beneficial in terests,  control 
of voting rights or disposal of such interests, must be notified to the 
company within two days (previously five days) following the day 
on which  the  obligation to make notif ication a r i s e s 4 by any 
person, or person acting in concert, holding 3% (form erly  5%) or 
more of the voting rights control.3 The re levan t  provisions of the 
C.A.1985, extend to cover any interests ,  e i ther  arising from the 
acquisit ion or disposal of in te res ts  or which w ere  the re su l t  of 
reduction in the percentage of notifiable in te res ts  subsequen t ly
3- Ibid.
4- Section 202 (1) and (4), 206 (8) of the Companies Act 1989 (herein  
after C.A.)
5 - Section 134 k  199 (2) of the C.A. 1989
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made by s ta tutory  regulation, even if the holder did not acquire or 
d ispose of any  in te re s t s .6 M oreover,  in te r e s t s  w h ich  w e re  
at tr ibuted to a person by vir tue of another person's in terests  other 
than  those of concert parties are also governed by the provisions of 
the C.A.1985.7 In order to keep a certain degree of t ransparency,  
the C.A.1985 em pow ers  the ta rge t  com pany to inqu ire  into the 
ho lders '  in te res ts .  However, it is possible to assum e th a t  the 
con t ro l le rs8 of the company could be unwilling to ca rry  out such 
an in q u i ry  on the i r  own init ia t ive,  p re s u m a b ly  because  the 
d isc losure  of sha reho ld ings  will  affect  th e i r  pos i t ion  if so 
revea led .9 Alternatively, Section 214 of the C.A.1985, entit les the 
holder of 10% of the voting power, w he the r  aggregated or not, to 
compel the  company to exercise its power conferred on it by the 
relevant s ta tu te .10
6- See the C A.1985 as amended by the C.A.1989.
7 -  See Section 202 (3) & Section 134 of the Companies Act 1985 as 
amended.
8 -  See the definition of the term "controller" in Section 105 of the  
Banking Act 1987; Section 207 (5) of the F.S.A.1986.
9 -  Arguably, the basic distinction b etw een  disclosure of an in terest  in 
shares and disclosure of share dealing lies in the fact that the form er is 
required to be made to the company's board of directors and subjected to the 
approval of shareholders in a general meeting, if it is deem ed  necessary ,  
w hereas the latter needs to be made publicly available to the w h o le  body of 
shareholders. Disclosure of holding and dealings by  directors h a v e  b een  
deem ed as necessary  to prevent the abuse of inside inform ation w h ereas  
disclosure by other shareholders has been regarded to be required only  to 
protect directors ( and m em bers and e m p lo y ee s)  against h av in g  their  
com pany taken over w ithout their know ledge . See the Jenkins Report, 
Cmnd.1749 (1962), noted by Gower L.C.B, The Principles of Modern Company 
L as:, p.389, supra n.36 & 61/Ch.l.
1 0 - For further reading into the provision of the C.A,1989, see Ernst 
and Young, Guide To The Companies Act 1989 ( London, Kogan Page Ltd. 1989); 
Morse G. and others, The Company Act 1989, Text and Commentary (London, 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1990).
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Another  consideration which may also be r e le v a n t  in th is  , 
context is tha t  a company, in the performance of its inquiry  power, 
is entitled to petition the court on the matter  under  inqu iry .11 But, 
the question is how long may the inquiry  take? Apparently ,  the 
C.A.1985 had left the period of such notice to be determined by the 
company itself. The Stock Exchange regulation provides th a t  non 
responding shareholders to whom the notice is issued must have 28 
days warning  notice before being deprived of the right to v o te .12 
Some of the problems are demonstrated in two recent  competi tive 
situations in 1986. One was the control of the British Aerospace 
company " Westland pic". The other was Guinness for the control of 
Distillers pic. Both led the regulator to review the effectiveness the 
re levant  regulation. The control of Westland was swiftly passed to 
the American consortium at the target com pany’s general  meeting 
th rough  the help of Swiss nom inee  accounts holding 20% of 
Westland voting r igh ts .13 Such a threshold was only en te red  into 
the company register a week before the meeting.14 As a result, the 
Stock Exchange felt  obliged to t ighten its rules on disclosure in 
par t icu la r  as to the  iden t i ty  of sh a re h o ld e r s  h id ing  b eh ind  
nominees accounts.13
At present,  the Stock Exchange permits  listed companies  to 
in troduce into the ir  articles of association provisions to impose 
sanctions against the use of nameless accounts to avoid disclosure.
11- See the F.S.A. 1986, Sch.17; In so lven cy  Act 1986, Sch.6; The 
Independent, 21st Feb.1989, p.22.
12- Noted by the Economist, Remove The Mask of N om inees Accounts, 
vol.310, p . l 6 (Jan.21st.1989). .
13- See House of Lords Commons Paper 176; Trade and In du stry  
Committee Report on Westland Case, Session 1 9 8 6 /8 7  (H.M.S.0.1987).
1 4 - Ibid.
15- The Independent, supra n. 11.
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Any person who does not disclose its identity within  fourteen  days 
(prev iously  tw e n ty  eight  days) will be d is e n f ran c h ise d ,16 in 
addition, to various restrictions on the transfer  of shares under  the 
provisions of the C.A.1985.17 However, while the fou r teen  days 
applies to shareholdings of 0,25% or more of a company, the 28 
days notice applies for less than 0,25% threshold .18
Concerning statutes, following Westland pic and Guinness pic 
affairs, the re  has been  a growing concern about  the need  for a 
coherent s ta tu to ry  requ irem en t  tha t  the s tandard  of information 
disclosure should be im proved .  Such w as  the  subjec t  of the  
relatively recent House of Lords debate on the likely am endm en t  to 
the C.A.1985. It has been suggested tha t  the company be allowed to 
impose sanctions on the non-responden t  shareholders  af ter  only 
seven  days. P re su m ab ly  such a reco m m en d a t io n  is des igned 
p r im ar i ly  to im p lem en t  the E.E.C direc t ives  on disclosure of 
significant sh a reh o ld e rs19 under which the time limit allowed for 
notification by shareholders  of significant dealings in shares  is 
seven ca lendar  days .20 The House of Lords was opposed by the 
Stock Exchange which considers that  seven days is not adequate  for 
shareholders  to be sufficiently informed and safeguarded .  The 
chairman of the Stock Exchange argued tha t  a "notice period of less than 
fourteen days would give inadequate protection for investors legitimate 
interests".21 Only a few of these proposals have been incorporated 
in the C.A. 1989. These include reducing the disclosed threshold  to
16- Ibid
17- See Part XV of the C.A.1985 relating to the court orders in respect of 
restrictions on shares. See also'Section 454
18- The Independent, supra n. 11; The Economist, supra n.12.
1 9 -COM 85/791 of 1985.
20- H.L.218, p .12, 16th report, session 1985 /86 ,  (July, 8th, 1986).
2 1 - The Independent, supra n .l 1
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3% and the timing for a notification of in terests  in shares from 5 
days to 2 days. This, indeed, is a welcome effort  for both  the 
adequate safeguards of investors interests and the t ransparency  of 
the securities market.
1 . 3 - DISCLOSURE OF THRESHOLD
In determining w hether  or not a person may be able to control, 
or to influence the  decision-making in the com pany 's  genera l  
meeting, various levels of control have been  in troduced .22 What 
matters  to investors is to know the controllers of the ir  company 
and to be entirely aware of w ha t  influence a shareholder may have 
on it. For the regulator  w h a t  m atte rs  is to provide an o rder ly  
f ram ew o rk  w ith in  which dealings in shares  are effected.  This 
im plies  the  ex is tence  of a d e t e r r e n t  p rov is ion  to p r e v e n t  
uncontrollable shareholdings from taking place. It is w or thy  of note 
th a t  while some levels  are notifiable, o thers  p roduce  f u r th e r  
implications notably, the obligation to make a genera l  offer to all 
shareholders .  It is equally  im por tan t  to mention th a t  d i f fe ren t  
levels of shareholdings confer varying rights namely, the  right to 
pass a special or ordinary resolution, appoint nominees in the board 
of the company, or to petition the court to investigate the affairs of 
a company w herever  an abuse or f raudulent  action is noticed.
1.4- NOTIFIABLE SHAREHOLDINGS.
Under o rd ina ry  circumstances,  an acquis it ive co m p an y  is 
perfectly entitled to build up a stake in another company through 
m a rk e t  purchases .  But once its pe rcen tage  exceeds  5%, the
2 2 -  See COMC85) 79 Final, supra n . l6 /C h l ;  Begg P.F.C, Cor nor a te  
Acquisition And Mergers, p.24- 26. supra n.61/Ch.3
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purchaser  must notify it to the re levant  authori ty  and the ta rge t  
company within a period of 5 days in Britain, and within 15 days in 
France. Under both French and UK laws any person (na tura l  or 
legal) must disclose any fraction of voting control tha t  it may have 
held in another company. In France, notifications of shareholdings 
are required to be made to the relevant authority  to whom belongs 
the duty  to inform public investors on any change.23 Moreover,  in 
extreme cases, the re levan t  public institutions,  part icu lar ly  C.O.B. 
has the legal power to compel those companies to disclose their  
holdings.24 In Britain, the initiative is left to the company whose 
shares are at issue itself. The 1989 Companies Bill recom m ended  
tha t  companies whose shares are in question should be empowered, 
w h e re v e r  full disclosure is not made, to declare th a t  the  shares 
being held shall be subject to restriction under the Companies Act, 
Par t  XV with in  a period of 7 days notice. Another a l te rna t ive  is 
given to the holders of 10% or more to initiate an investigation.25 
Unlike the UK, the 10% threshold  in France g en e ra te s  f u r th e r  
restr ictions. French law, in addition to information disclosure of 
ownership, imposes a prohibition on any shareholder from entering
2 3 -  Art 356 of the Loi^No. 6 6 -5 3 7  of 1966 as amended by the Loi No 84-  
148 Art 8, March 1st 1984; Loi No. 85.11 of Jan 3rd, 1985 Art 11 subsequently  
replaced by the Loi No 85 705 of July 12th 1985 Art 5. Then modified b y  the 
1987 Loi No 87 416 Art 57 (June 17th 1987); and recently by  the Loi No.89-531  
of 2nd August 1989 relating to Transparency and Security of the Bourse de 
Valeur, supra n.5/Ch.2.
2 4 -  See Ordonnance 6 7 -8 3 3 ,  Loi No.88-70; and Loi N o .8 9 -5 3 1 , supra  
n.5/Ch.2.
2 5 -  Section 442 (3)-3  (c) & Section 62 of the C.A. 1989, confers w ide  
discretion on the Secretary of State to appoint inspectors provided an 
application is made by members of the company sought to be investigated  
holding not less than 10% of the issued shares and the applicant m ay give  
secu r ity  not exceed in g  £ 5 0 0 0  for the p aym en t of the costs  of the  
in vest iga tion .
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into reciprocal shareholdings. Such a prohibition does not extend to 
cover other forms of shareholders agreements such as circular and 
pyramiding shareholdings.26
As far as takeover  offers are concerned, the C.B.V. and C.O.B. 
reg u la t io n s  con ta in  prov is ions  s t ip u la t in g  t h a t  du r in g  the  
immediate period of takeover  offers any person, once the holding 
am oun ts  to 0,50% m ust  notify  such holding to the  r e le v a n t  
au th o r i ty .27 By contrast,  the British City Code on Takeovers and 
Mergers s tates tha t  once the total purchase of the voting r ights 
amounts to 1% or more but less than 14.99%, the holder must notify 
tha t  percentage on a daily basis. Recently, in Britain, the 1989 
Companies Bill, clause 91 suggested  ce r ta in  r e s t r ic t io n s  on 
acquisitions. According to clause 91 of the Bill, any person shall not 
be allowed to increase his holding concurrently from 5% or more to 
10% w ithou t  these  lapsing period of 10 days separa t ing  each 
purchase  operat ion .28 This restric tion applies also to purchase of 
shares amounting to more than 10% but less than  15%.29 However, 
no corresponding restrictions exist under  the French law of 1966 
and regulation promulgated thereunder .
As indicated earlier, whilst  some levels are notifiable, o thers  
produce fu r th e r  implications notably, the obligation to make a 
general offer to all shareholders. An obligation to make an offer to 
ail shareholders  may arise once an acquisit ion of shares  in the
26-See Art 358 and 359 of the Loi No.66 .537 of 1966 as amended by the 
Loi No.89-53  1, Art.18, supra n.23.
2 7 -  Article 22 of C.O.B ’s Regulation No.8 9 -0 3  of 1989, supra n .l /C h 3 ,  
abolished the following decisions and regulations: the Decision Generale 
dated 27 Feb. 1973, Decision Generale of 2 5 / 7 / 7 8  , Regulation No.86-01 of 1986  
and No.88-01 of 1988.
2 8 -  Such a recom m endation has not b een  incorporated into the C.A
1989
29- Ibid
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ta rge t  company exceeds certain specified percentages determined 
by the re levant regulation. In France, the re levant  regulation set up 
a 1/3% (previously 15%) threshold as the minimum level beyond 
which any person (purchaser)  is obliged to make a general offer to 
all shareholders  in the ta rge t  company. In the U.K, if any share 
purchase amounts to 30% the obligation to make a general  offer is 
t r iggered .30 The 1989 Companies Bill in tended to reduce the 30% 
under  rule  9 of the City Code to 15%, so tha t  any excess in the 
shareholdings automatically obliges the holder to make a general 
offer for the remaining shares of the ta rge t  com pany ins tead .31 
Such a level, if adopted, would afford shareholders more protection, 
i.e, the opportunity of sharing the control premium.32
Finally, one may note the potential implication of the 1/3% 
threshold  which is introduced by the E.E.C proposed directive as 
well as by the French C.B.V. regulations.  This, indeed. carries the 
ability to frustra te  several decisions (merger, increase and decrease 
of capital, variation of rights attached to shares....) which, pursuan t  
to the 1966 Loi provisions can only be effected by an extraordinary  
general meeting representing a 2 /3  majority of shareholders.  Under 
most company Laws a 50% threshold is the most significant level 
upon which an undertaking may be deemed ei ther as an affiliated 
company or a controller in tha t  c o m p a n y . 33 in  takeover  situations,
3 0 -  Rule 11.1 of the City Code states that w herever such percentage is 
attained, a cash offer or a combination of any other alternative must be made 
at not less than the highest price paid by the offeror or any person acting in 
concert w ith  it during the previous 12 months before the ob ligation  is 
invoked. However, such a requirement is not concerned w ith  the question of 
m andatory  o ffers  under rule 9 of the City Code. T hey are d is t in ct  
requ irem en ts .
31 -  Such a recommendation has not been incorporated in the C.A.1989.
32 -  See Section 1.3 in Ch.l of this thesis.
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in particular under the British City Code, a 50% acceptance condition 
is a crucial point as well. Additionally, most potentia l  offerors 
regard  a set of 51% sharehold ings  in a t a rg e t  com pany  as a 
minimum level to be secured. Whilst in France there are no specific 
requirements,  the British City Code makes an offer conditional upon 
obtaining such a level. If the condition being s t ipu la ted  is not 
fulfi lled the  offer lapses and cannot be renew ed  for the  same 
company within a period of 12 months. Finally, w ha t  appears  from 
the above discussion may be that,  first, w h a t  p re tended  to be a 
purchase and sale of shares was in substance a purchase of control. 
Second, as regards  the var iabil i ty  of percentage of votes which 
entit le the holder to control the policy of or to elect the board of 
directors ,  it seems ne i the r  the  s ta tu tes ,  including ex t ra  legal 
regulation, nor academic writers  resolve the problem, in particular 
w ha t  percentage of shares may give de facto  c o n t r o l . 3 4  Moreover,  
the re  appears  to be no universa l  s tandard  req u i rem e n ts  in the  
context at all.
1 . 5 -  D I S C L O S U R E  OF S H A R E  D E A L I N G .
It  should be acknowledged th a t  the  Panel 's  jur isdic tion is 
limited to the extent  tha t  a question of takeover  offers a r i s e s . 35
3 3 -  Art 355 of the French Loi of 1966 states that if a com pany holds a 
proportion of voting rights in another company b etw een  10 and 50%, the  
com pany holding such a proportion is deem ed as a participating company. 
Conversely, if the percentage exceeds 50% of shareholdings in a company, 
the target com pany is regarded as d ep end en t on the holder of such a 
percentage of the voting rights.
34 -  Legal or d e  j u r e  control is usually referred to 50 percent or more 
of votes  at the company general meeting.
35 -  For a historical v iew  about the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers see, 
Johnston A., Ihe_  Citv Code on Takeovers and M ergers, supra n.88/Ch.2.;  
Prentice D.D., Takeovers And The System of Self Regulation (1 9 8 1 )  Oxford  
Journal of Legal Studies. 406 .
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This appears  from the Panel s ta tem ent  dated 27 th  August, 1969 
which indicated:
It m ust be made clear th a t  the Panel possesses no genera l 
supervisory powers to ensure tha t directors of the public companies 
make full disclosure to their shareholders of all re levan t matters.
This is indeed a most important duty of directors and tha t it should 
have been continuously discharged becomes a m atter of especial 
importance as soon as any question arises of an offer for shares. It is 
for this reason that under its constitution the city Panel's in terest in 
the matter of disclosure is attracted w henever a question arises of a 
prospective offer, as well as during the course of negotiations about 
an offer or in the aftermath of an offer which has been made.36
The role of the Stock Exchange and its cooperation w ith  the 
Panel on Takeovers and Mergers is vital. In addition to its principal 
activities relating to listing and delisting securities on and from the 
official list, the  Stock Exchange plays a p a ram o u n t  role w ith in  
information disclosure of share ownership.  The Stock Exchange 
classifies acquisit ions of in te res ts  and disposal into four  main 
categories. Each transaction, depending on the threshold  involved, 
requires  certain minimum standards  of information disclosure as 
well  as publicity. Category 1, 2 and 3 requ ire  almost  identical 
in fo rm at ion .37 Category 4, which involves the in te res ts  of one or 
more directors or substantial shareholders or their  associates is the 
subject of stricter provisions which are slightly dissimilar than  tha t
36- Noted by Johnston A, The Citv Takeover Code, p.61, supra n. 88/Ch2.
3 7 -  Stock Exchange (Listing) Regulation 1984  (1 9 8 4  No.7 1 6 ) .  For 
further reading see mainly Weinberg and Blank, Takeovers and M ergers. 
Appendices, Paras 3 0 5 0 -3 0 6 5 ,  (1979) ,  supra n. 19 /C hl; Gower L.C.B , T he  
Principles of Modern Company Law . Ch IV, p.291 , supra n36  & 6 1 /C h l;  
Pennington R.R, Company L aw . (3rd.edn.), Part IV. p.6 2 5 - 6 3 7  (London, 
Butterworths, 1973), .The Stock Exchange (L is t in g ) The New R equirem ents  
supra n.65/Ch.2. See also supra n.76 and 77/Ch2.
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imposed on the above cited three categories.38
Class one t ransac t ions  exist  w h e re  the  secur i t ie s  e i th e r  
acquired or disposed of amount to 15% or more. The Stock Exchange 
re levant  d epa r tm en t  may, in certain exceptional circumstances or 
conditions, allow a higher percentage not exceeding 25%. However, 
if the  th resho ld  e i the r  acquired  or d isposed of exceeds the  
prescribed level of 25% or falls below 15%, the re levan t  authority  
t rea ts  each transaction in a different manner.  Transactions which 
exceed 25% are classified under major class 1 transactions, whereas  
those acquisitions or disposals falling below 15% are classified into 
class 2 transaction. Class 2 transactions occur w here  the threshold, 
w h e th e r  acquired or disposed of, is equal to or exceeds 5% bu t  is 
less than  15%. A class 3 transaction requires  ne i ther  publicity nor 
the  ap p ro v a l  of sh a reh o ld e rs  in a genera l  meeting.  Such a 
transaction is one w here  the am ount of acquisit ions or disposals 
does not exceed the 5% threshold.39
Class 4 transactions are substantially different from the above 
cited classes. This would be explained by the fact th a t  the  f irs t  
th ree  classes are calculated on the basis of the am ount  of assets  
ei ther acquired or disposed of, bu t  class 4 transactions are mainly 
ascerta ined by reference to the interests  of one or more directors, 
su b s tan t ia l  sha reho lders  of the com pany  or th e i r  r e sp e c t iv e  
associates in the transaction.40
3 8 -  Ibid. Weinberg and Blank, Takeovers and M ergers . A ppendices ,  
Paras 3 0 5 0 -  3 0 6 5 , (1 9 7 9 ) ,  supra n . l9 /C h l ;  Pennington  R.R., The Stock  
Exchange (L isting) The New Requirements p .127, supra n.65/Ch.2
3 9 -  Stock Exchange A dm ission to Listing, Section 6, Ch.l, Noted by  
Weinberg & Blank, supra n .l9 /C h .l;  Pennington R.R, supra n.65/Ch.2
4 0 -  The Stock Exchange, Admission of Securities to Listing, Section 6, 
Ch.l, noted by Pennington R.R., supra n .65/C h.2; W einberg & Blank, supra  
n .l9 /C h . l .
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A class 4 transaction exists if it satisfies one of these criteria:
(a) An acquisition or disposal of assets by the company or any of its 
subsidiaries from or to a director or substantial shareholder or an 
associate of e ither of them; (b) A transaction under w hich the 
company or any of its branches is about to or has taken  an in terest 
in another company w here  any in te res t  or pa r t  of it has been 
attributed or is to be acquired by a director of a listed company or 
an associate of such a director; (c) A transaction one of whose 
principal purposes or consequences is the granting of credit or the 
making of a loan by the listed company or any of its subsidiaries to a 
director or substantial shareholder or to an associate to a such a 
director or substan tia l shareholder; (d) A takeover by  a listed 
company or any of its branches the acceptance of which could result 
in a significant acquisition from a director or substantial shareholder 
of the listed company or from an associate of such a director or 
substantial shareholder; (e) The acceptance by a listed company or 
any of its subsidiaries of a takeover offer which would result in a 
significant disposal to a director or substantial shareholder of the 
listed company or to their respective associate.41
Additionally, the Stock Exchange regula t ion  p rovides  four  
common criteria to determine w he the r  an acquisition or disposal 
qualifies as a class one, two, or class th ree  transaction. First, the 
value of the assets to be acquired or disposed of compared w ith  the 
whole assets  of the subject company prior to such transaction.  
Second, the net  profits at tr ibutable to the assets to be acquired or 
disposed of based on the most recent audited annual accounts or on 
a subsequen t  unaudited account (if there  is a significant mater ial  
difference) compared with those of the ta rge t  company similarily 
ascerta ined.  To de te rm ine  the ne t  profit, all charges m ust  be 
deducted  in anticipation other  than  taxation and ex t rao rd in a ry  
i tems. Third, w h e re  appropr ia te ,  the aggrega te  va lue  of the
4 1 -  Ibid, Stock Exchange, Admission to Listing, Section 6, Ch.l, Para 6.1,
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consideration to be given or received com pared  w i th  the  to ta l  
assets of the offeree company. Fourth, the re levant  share capital to 
be issued or issued as a consideration compared w ith  the issued 
equity  share capital of the ta rge t  company promptly  prior to the 
acquisition.42
Concerning information disclosure, w ith  respect  to the above 
cited classes, the Stock Exchange requires  companies involved to 
supply material information to the holder of securities so as to be 
able to construct an informed judgement on the offer. Yet, according 
to the Stock Exchange regulation, information to be supplied in 
conjunction w ith  transactions 1, 2, and 3 should be made in a 
docum ent o ther  than  the listing particulars.  Six copies of such 
docum en ts  m us t  be sen t  to the  Stock Exchange com pan ies '  
announcement office for publication as soon as practicable.43 Each 
copy must contain at least the following minimum s tan d a rd  of 
information:
(a) particulars of the assets acquired or disposed of; (b) a description 
of the nature  of business activities of the ta rget company whose 
assets are acquired or disposed of; (c) w here  appropria te ,  the  
aggregate value of the consideration and its components and any 
deferred payment; (d) the value of the assets disposed or acquired;
(e) the  benefit  expected to occur to the com pany from  the  
transaction; (f) details of any service contracts , the in ten d ed  
application of the proceeds of sale.44
Besides, the company concerned is also requ ired  to keep  its
42- Ibid at Para 3.1 and 3.3. Compare with the City Code Note on Rule 21.
4 3 -  See Pennington R.R., The Stock Exchange (L i s t i n g ) The N ew  
R eq uirem en ts , supra n.65/Ch.2.
44 -  Section 6, Ch.l, Para 4.2 of the Stock Exchange Admission to Listing 
R egulation .
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own shareholders daily informed as regards, inter alia:
...the nam es of persons holding, or will a fter the  purchase or
disposals be individually interested in 5% or more of the company's
issued share capital as well as the am ount of the ir  in te rests : 
particu lars  of the consideration proposed and any varia tion  in 
directors status; their interests in transactions entered into w hether 
completed or remaining to be fulfilled at any time during or since 
the company’s last financial year; each director’s beneficial or other 
in terests  in shares or debentures  of the acquiring com pany and 
other companies in the same group.43
By vir tue  of the Stock Exchange regulation, if an acquisition is a 
major class one tha t  exceeds a 25% threshold, parties involved in a 
t ransaction  must add fu r th e r  re levan t  information  notably, the 
amount of the minority interests in its subsidiary and the approval 
of the  t ransac t ion  by passing an o rd in a ry  reso lu t ion  at the
sh a re h o ld e r s  gene ra l  meeting. In f u r th e r a n c e  to the  above
information, any transaction  or ag reem en t  en te red  into by the 
company should be made conditional upon obtaining the approval 
of sha reho lders  in a genera l  meeting. Consequently ,  w h e re  a 
transaction is qualified as class 4 in which directors, substan tia l  
shareholders or their  respective associates are deemed to have an 
interest,  the Stock Exchange may not allow them to partic ipate or 
cast their  vote in such a meeting. In consequence, persons coming 
under  such a restriction are required  to affirm their  position by 
issuing a s ta tement expressing clearly tha t  they may not vote at the 
meeting called for. It is worthwhile mentioning tha t  an independen t  
valuation  of the assets disposed of or acquired will be requ ired  
fo r th w i th .  The v a lu a t io n  s ta te m en t ,  w h ich  is m ade  by  an 
in d e p en d en t  expe r t  and sent along w ith  the docum en t  to the
45- Ibid, at Para 3.5.
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sha reho lders ,  should cert ify  and express ly  confirm th a t  the 
t ransac t ion  e n te red  into is fair  and reasonab le .  Finally, this 
transaction  may not have effect unless va l ida ted  by  the Stock 
Exchange.46 Thus, the information disclosure, with  respect to those 
specific transactions, the approval  of shareho lders  in a genera l  
meeting, the valuation s ta tem en t  of an ind e p en d en t  expert , and, 
most im p o r tan t ly  the Stock Exchange prior  control  over  the 
transaction are all designed primarily to provide fu r the r  safeguards 
to the in terests  of shareholders  involved and to ensure  a certain 
level of share dealing's t ransparency .47 Both points would appear  
to trigger the securities market regulators main concern in almost 
any country.48
Questions which may arise in the above context are, first, how 
far does the Stock Exchange regulation extend to monitor takeover  
offers; and second, w h e th e r  the question of "voting control"49 is 
t re a ted  in a detailed manner .  As fa r  as the  f i rs t  ques t ion  is 
concerned one may argue tha t  the Stock Exchange considers the 
issue of takeovers as incidental to its principal activities, because it 
(the Stock Exchange) is mainly concerned w ith  the  listing and 
delisting of securities on and from the official lists in addition to its 
role in and regulation of other auxiliary markets such as companies 
operating on the unlisted securities markets. But this does not mean 
tha t  the takeover  fields are left totally unregula ted .  Indeed  the 
Stock Exchange, along with the cooperation of other institutions,  i.e, 
the  Securit ies and In v es tm en t  Board (S.I.B.) and the  Panel  on
46- Ibid, at Para.6.
47 -  See Pennington, supra n.37.
4 8 -  Compare w ith  French Regulation Admission of Securities to Listing 
1989, supra n.20/Ch.2.
49- See, supra n.59/Chl
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Takeovers and Mergers, plays a crucial role not only in respect of 
in fo rm ation  disclosure bu t  also w i th  r e sp e c t  to m any  o the r  
associated problems namely, insider dealings, nominees, acting in 
concert, and most seriously marke t  manipulations. Concerning the 
second question, the Stock Exchange would appear not to be dealing 
w ith  the matter  of voting control in a detailed manner  but  ra the r  
generally. Presumably, as far as the protection of investors within 
the field of takeover  offers of compatibility be tw een  its regulation 
and the Pane l’s rules and general principles as being correlative. 
Moreover,  it seems in the opinion of the Stock Exchange tha t  the 
administration of takeovers is probably far be t ter  left to the City 
Code which incorporates more provisions in the field as the  two 
regulations are v e ry  much related. Hence in any offer, w h e th e r  
competi t ive  or not, buying and selling shares  carry ing  voting 
control is not, of course, w ithou t  consequences. It  may have  an 
unsett ling effect in the m arke t  and be sometimes d e t r im en ta l  to 
shareholders interests  if not adequate ly  supervised. Therefore, in 
order  to ensure  m arke t  t r anspa rency  th rough  a wide spread  of 
information and, most importantly ,  the protection of in v e s to r s ’ 
in te res ts ,  rule  8 of the City Code contains the  most de ta i led  
provisions re levant  to disclosure of share dealing during the offer 
period.
Prima facie, as indicated above, one should determine the kind 
of information the shareholders involved need for making the right 
decision as to acceptance. A somewhat similar question arises in 
respect of cash offers. Should the parties to takeover  offers bear  
similar obligations as in relation to exchange offers and, therefore,  
provide identical  information to sha reho lders?  The com m only
accepted opinion amongst those involved in the financial marke t  is 
tha t  in a cash offer there is no need to provide full information to 
shareholders involved because they no longer, after receiving cash 
against their shares, have a continuing in terest  in both the acquirer 
and the ta rg e t  com pany .30 But it seems tha t  the  issue is more 
complex and may need more o ther  justif iable grounds.  Yet, it 
remains debatable. Take for instance, the matter  of deferred  cash 
offer, does this consideration with respect to information disclosure, 
need identical t rea tm en t  as in relation to an immediate payment,  or 
be subsumed under  the category of exchange offer?.
A d e fe r red  cash offer, by definit ion, is no more th a n  a 
sophisticated version of exchange offer.31 A cash deferred  offer 
has, in fact, some common fea tu re s  w i th  an exchange offer. 
According to the te rm s and conditions of a cash deferred  offer, a 
shareholder who accepts such a form of consideration will receive a 
full cash paym en t  to be effected at a fu tu re  date and at  a price 
agreed upon w hen  the offer agreem ent  is concluded. Hence, both 
offers, the exchange offer and the deferred cash offer, involve an 
exchange of securit ies during the re le v a n t  period of an offer. 
Furthermore, for tax purposes, an exchange offer is carried out tax 
free.  As for de fe r red  cash, the taxation au th o r i ty  appl ies  the  
principle th a t  a sale of shares  in cash is an e v e n t  w h ich  is 
potentially taxable.32 But in exceptional circumstances such as this, 
the taxation law will not apply till the acceptor receives his full 
cash paym en t .  Concerning the in te res ts ,  w h e th e r  p u r s u a n t  to 
exchange offer or de fe r red  cash offer, both  sh a reh o ld e rs  will
50-  Peter and Fischer, International Takeovers and A cquisitions, p.38, 
supra n 41/C h.l.
5 1 - Ibid.
52- Ibid.
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benefit  from the in terests  at tached to their  shares.  However,  the 
in te res ts  of those who agreed to receive cash p a y m e n t  after  a 
period of time will inevitably cease to be paid immediately  after a 
full payment of their  t ransferred  holdings.
Without going much further,  one may assert that, w ith  respect 
to the re levance of information disclosure in the context, each 
transaction should be t rea ted  on its merits. This, of course, may 
lead to the consideration tha t  one may not analogize the situation of 
those receiving cash in hand  following the  t r a n s f e r  of the i r  
sha reho ld ings  and those  w ho  agreed  to rece ive  th e i r  fu l l  
consideration (money against their  shares) over a period of time. 
The latter group of shareholders appears to be more vu lnerab le  to 
risk than in the case of share for share basis.
Practically, information about a potential change in control can 
be essential  in any intended proposal to an informed decision. The 
change of control from one company to another brings w ith  it the 
possibility of different operating results and different in v es tm en t  
decisions. The shareholders to whom the offer is in tended  may not 
at any moment rightly predict, in the face of a ta inted intention, the 
possible de t r im enta l  or beneficial effect following the change of 
control until the relevant facts are available to that  investor.33
It could be argued that  shareholders accepting a deferred  cash 
offer are protected under  the provisions of their  contract  b u t  it 
does not make sense or follow tha t  those groups of sha reho lders  
should not be covered by the disclosure requirements .  Surprisingly, 
the p resen t  a t t i tude of both the Panel and the Stock Exchange, 
concerning information disclosure, make it expressly  clear th a t
5 3 -  In order to reduce the likely  detrim ental effect on shareholders  
interests, most securities market regulations intensified their requirem ents.
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there is no obligation to disclose dealings of securities of an offeror 
offering solely cash.54 Such a policy has been amplified by the City 
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, rule 8 of which provides tha t  the 
disclosure is only req u i red  in the case of securit ies  exchange 
offer.55 Importantly ,  there  appears no convincing evidence as to 
w h y  not to assimilate them with  those of an exchange offer and to 
be, therefore,  t rea ted  on an equal footing. Finally, for the  aim of 
safeguarding fu r the r  the interests  of inexperienced investors and 
enhancing their  confidence, it may be advocated tha t  shareholders  
involved in a de fe r red  cash offer should be g ran ted  similar 
protection as in relation to shareholders involved in an exchange 
offer.
Under the City Code, there exists two types of disclosure. One is 
public. This means tha t  any share purchase is promptly  notified in 
writing or by telex to the Stock Exchange, the Panel itself and the 
press no later than 12 noon on the business day following the date 
of the  deal.56 The o ther  needs  no publication, the  so-called 
"private". This type of information disclosure may exclusively be 
made to the Panel alone if an exempt fund manager is deem ed to 
be involved with either party  to an offer.57 It may also be made to 
the Stock Exchange and the Panel respective ly .58 In essence, the 
la ter  type of disclosure appears  to ensure  two crucial points; to 
diminish the lack of t ran sp a ren cy  notably,  an accumulation  of
5 4 -  The Panel on Takeovers and Mergers and the Stock Exchange joint 
statement, June 1987.
5 5 -  See the definition of securities exchange offer under the City Code, 
definition section.
56- Note (a) on Rule 8 of the City Code.
57- Note (b) on Rule 8 of the Code.
58- Ibid.
185
substantia l  undisclosed voting control; and to p rev en t  w h a t  could 
have been  harm fu l  to the in te res ts  of sha reho lders  if it is so 
disclosed. To pu t  it into perspective ,  in spite of the  g rea te r  
interaction between public and the private disclosure, it seems, tha t  
p r iv a te  disclosure is more im p o r ta n t  for  the  au th o r i t ie s  in 
reg u la t in g  th e  conduc t  of in t e rm e d ia r i e s ,  t h u s  p ro tec t in g  
shareholders and ensuring transparency within the market.
The Panel ,  w h ich  is ch ief ly  re sp o n s ib le  for  th e  good 
performance of takeovers,  consistently emphasizes the  need  for 
p rom pt and detailed disclosure of dealings how ever  effected by 
parties to takeover  offers, associates or by those w ith  a significant 
shareholdings.59 The underlying objective is the promotion of two 
paramount principles. First, tha t  all shareholders should, along with 
continuous advice, have sufficient information and adequate  time to 
make an informed decision on the merits or demerits  of the offer; 
and second tha t  parties to takeover offers are w arned  in advance to 
use ev e ry  endeavor  to p reven t  the creation of a false market .  
S tr ingently  the  Panel, p rom ptly  af ter  dealings in the  r e le v an t  
shares of the offeror or the offeree company, imposes an obligation 
on parties to takeover  offers to notify in writing or by telex the 
Stock Exchange, the Panel and the press no later than  12 noon on 
the  business  day following the  date of the  t ransac t ion .60 This 
equally applies in France However, considering the necessity  of an 
accelerated disclosure, in the U.K. the Stock Exchange and the Panel 
impose a varying degree of strictness. The Stock Exchange regards  a 
transaction which has taken place on the latest  time of the business 
day as an early bargain for the next day whereas  the Panel t rea ts
59- Panel Annual Report, 1987 at p.7; and the 1988 report at p.5.
6 0 -  City Code, Rule 8 and notes Compare w ith  the requ irem ent of the 
French C.O.B. Regulation No.89. 01 of 1989, supra n.l/Ch.3
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such a transaction as occurring on the fo rm er  day and requ ires  
d isc losure  im m e d ia te ly  before  noon on the nex t  day .61 For  
example, in the view of the Stock Exchange authority, if dealing has 
occurred at the la test time, suppose of 25th, it is considered as an 
early  deal occurred on the 26th and thus the disclosure is required  
to be notified on the 27th. But the Panel, in this respect,  obliges 
parties involved to disclose their  deal on 26th  before noon instead. 
A m at te r  which  appears  unusua l  b e tw een  the  two set  of self 
regulations that  may create an area of controversies.
Principally,  the Panel specifies th ree  categories of persons 
deemed to enter  into dealings in the re levant  shares of the offeree 
or of the offeror company at any time, ei ther  w h e n  th e y  have 
reason  to believe a bona fide offer is im m inen t  or during the 
immedia te  period of the offer. For the purpose of disclosure, the 
following group of persons will inevitably bear a strict obligation in 
respect  of disclosure of their  dealings. These are (a) dealing by 
par t ies  or by associates, for them se lves  or for the account of 
d iscre tionary inves tm en t  clients; (b) dealing by part ies  or by  by 
associates for non-d isc re t ionary  clients; and (c) dealing by  1% 
shareholdings (previously was 5%).62 Exempt fund managers  and 
exem pt  m ark e t  makers  may also be included w ith in  the  above 
ca tegory .63 Yet, no matter  for whom the deal is made or about  to
6 1 -  See Notes on Rule 8 of the City Code. Rule 7.3 states that "disclosure 
after 3.30 p.m. on a business day will be deemed to be disclosed on the next  
business day". This means that if the purchase is not disclosed b y  3.30 p.m. 
the offeror concerned w ill have to w ait one more day before starting its  
purchase operation. Consequently, any delay  in relation  to in form ation  
disclosure relevant to share dealing may operate at the disadvantage of the  
offeror aim to gain a swift control over the target company.
62- See Rule 8.1, 8.2 and 8.3 of the City Code respectively.
63- Rule 7.2 of the Code.
187
be carried out, the City Code re levant  rules require  a daily public 
disclosure, except w h e re  exem pt  fund  m anagers  and m a rk e t  
makers are permit ted to disclose in a private manner.
As a procedural matter, public disclosure should be notified to 
the  Stock Exchange d irec t ly  by  the  par t ie s  invo lved  in the  
t ransac t ion  or th rough  an agent acting on the ir  behalf .  Where 
appropr ia te ,  the content  of notif ication bearing on the  deal is 
published in the companies news service of the Stock Exchange and 
copies of such announcement are communicated to the Panel.64
Unlike public disclosure, private disclosure may only be made 
to the Panel w h erev e r  an exempt fund manager, if deem ed to be 
connected with e i ther  par ty  to an offer (associate), deals for the 
account of a discretionary client during the currency of an offer.63 
Rule 8.2 states that:
except with  the consent of the Panel, dealing in the r e lev an t  
securit ies during an offer period by an offeror or the offeree 
company, and by any  associates,  for the  account of non-  
discretiOnary investment clients (other than an offeror, the offeree 
company and any associated) must be privately disclosed.
Private disclosure should also be made in writing or by  telex to 
the Stock Exchange Company announcement office. Identical copies 
are forw arded  to the Panel. Unlike the public disclosure,  pr ivate  
disclosure is not published.66
A re la ted  issue is the v a r i e ty  of m eans w h e r e b y  such 
information is made available to the public, specifically, to the 
group of shareholders involved. It is becoming obvious in takeover
64- Note (a) & (b) on Rule 8.
65- Ibid.
66 -  Ibid.
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situations and o ther  a l te rna te  sale and purchase  of securit ies  
techniques tha t  enormous amount of advert isem ents ,67 formal and 
in form al com m unicat ions  a lways take  place, e i th e r  befo re  a 
potential takeover offer is announced or during the re levan t  period 
of offers.68 Such contact may be made th rough  ad v e r t i s e m e n t  
campaigns ,  in fo rm al  invita t ions,  visi ts ,  meetings,  as w e l l  as 
organized  te lephone  campaigns.  Par t ies  concerned  m ay  also 
approach the press, television and radio in terv iews.  Since such 
manoeuvres are likely to induce investors, this chapter  will discuss 
first, how far  release of information is allowed and the  likely 
implications in case of failure to comply w ith  the r eq u i r em e n ts  
re levant  to takeover offers. Second will the kind of information be 
provided which a shareholder  may need for making a ra t iona l  
decision as to acceptance. The question sought to be discussed 
below is, first, w h e th e r  the kind of information re q u i red  to be 
disclosed could se rve  bo th  profess iona l  as w el l  as o rd in a ry
67 The F.S.A. 1986, Section 57.2 defines the term ’A d v e r t isem en t’ to 
include "any advertisem ent inviting persons to enter or offer to enter into  
an in v e s tm e n t  agreem ent or to exercise  any rights con ferred  b y  an 
investm ent to acquire, dispose of, underwrite or convert an in v es tm en t  or 
containing information calculated to lead directly to person doing so." While 
this definition may appear to be drafted in general term s, Section 207 .2  
brings more details as to w hat an advertisem ent is. By virtue of Section 207  
(2) of the F.S.A. 1986, an advertisem ent means" every  form of advertisem ent, 
w hether  in publication, by the display of notices, signs, labels, or show  
cards, by means of circular, catalogues, price list or other documents, by  an 
exhibition of pictures or photographic or cinematographic film s, b y  w a y  of 
sound broadcasting or television, by the distribution of recordings, or in any  
other manner; and reference to the issue of an a d v er t isem en t  shall be 
construed accordingly." This description is broader than might be expected.  
Besides, the use of some loose terms such as 'in any other m anner’.
6 8 -  Under both  the U.K and French r e le v a n t  ta k e o v e r  o ffer  
regulations, the offer period starts once an approach to a target com pany is 
made till the expiry of the intended offer. See, for exam ple, the C.B.V.’s 
Regulation 1989 Art.5.2.1 para 3., supra n.l/Ch.3
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shareholders;  second, how intensive and material the information 
so disclosed should be.
S E C T I O N  T W O :  R E L E A S E  OF I N F O R M A T I O N  ( M E T H O D S )
2.1- LEGAL REQUIREMENT
According to Section 57 of the  F.S.A, 1986 any re lease  of 
information must be made by an authorized person.69 However, if 
a person, other than  those authorized, seeks to issue an inves tm ent  
advertisement,  he is entitled to do so provided the contents  of such 
an advert isem en t  have been approved by an authorized body.70 
Failure to comply entails serious civil and criminal liabilities.7 1 In 
this respect, it could be asked w hy  should an authorized person be 
exem pted  under  the Act? P resum ably  the exemption  of certa in  
persons from the general prohibition contained is due to the fact 
that, on the one hand, such bodies are subject to certain s tandards  
of compliance dictated by the legislature and im plem ented  by  the 
superv isory  body, principally the S.I.B. On the o ther  hand, such 
standards of adequacy and compliance cannot be found or expected 
to be found in an ord inary  person an d /o r  if such adver t isem en ts  
are left in the hands of any person other than those authorized.72
69- See, supra, Ch.2 in connection with "Authorization Requirements".
7 0 -  F.S.A. 1986, Ch. III. See also Section 57.1 .of the F.S.A. 1986. By 
contrast, under the French re lev a n t  regu lation  any kind of is su e  of 
advertisem ent bearing on public offers is not allowed unless approved b y  the  
C.O.B.
7 1 -  Section 57.5 and 57.3 resp ective ly  of the F.S.A. 1986. H ow ever,  
Section 58 contains various exemptions from the general prohibition of the  
Act in the field; see also Section 35 to 44 and Article 9 of the F.S.A. 1986  
(Investm ent Advertisement) (Exemption) order, 1988. The exem ption extends  
also to cover matter covered by Section 154 of the Act.
7 2 -  See Ashe M. and Counssell L., The New A dvertising In v estm e n t  
regime (1989 )  Law.Soc.Gaz.. p.23; Circus P., The Financial Services Act 1986,
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This also could explain the  in te rac t ion  b e tw e e n  s ta n d a rd s  of 
compliance and the protection of investors. This, of course, leads to 
consideration of another point. Documents pertaining to purchase or 
sale of securities on or off the Stock Exchange may, as sometimes 
happens with respect to the issue of Listing Particulars, be issued in 
draft. Here questions of qualification and legal implication relating 
to the issue of such drafts  arise. How far will these  draf ts  bind 
persons to whom they  are addressed?
Prima facie , under  the F.S.A. 1986, an unau tho r ized  person  
issuing or causing to be issued an adve r t isem en t  which  has not 
been approved by an authorized person such as the Stock Exchange, 
will not be en t i t led  to enforce any u n d e rw r i t in g  ag reem en t ,  
including those which have been entered  into after the issue of any 
invalid advert isement.  In consequence, any invitee can recover any 
money or p roper ty  t ransfe r red  to the issuer as a result . Yet, the 
option w hether  or not to cancel such a deal remains the r ight of the 
target person.73 Concern has also been expressed in relation to the 
wide interpretation of the term "cause to be issued". It has been  asked 
w hethe r  a prepara tory  act such as the accumulation of information 
and its analysis  could constitute an in v es tm en t  ad v e r t i sem en t .  
Further  v e ry  difficult and per t inen t  questions w ere  asked about 
w hether  knowledge is essential for a person to cause the issue of an 
adver t isem ent .74 The S.I.B, in its capacity as designated agency for 
the implementat ion of the Financial Services Act provisions, states 
tha t  " if a business or a professional investor (who is not protected by the
The Advertising Aspects (1 9 8 8 )  B.I.I.B.&F.Law.. p.438; Chance C., Financial 
Regulation, Transitional Provision (1988) B.T.I B.& F l a w ., p.538
7 3 -  F.S.A. 1986, Section 57.(5) To (10).
7 4 -  See Ashe and Counssell, p.24, supra n.72.
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advertisement safeguards in the rules) passes on an advertisement he has 
received by way of business, this will be an issuing of that advertisement."^ 
This has, indeed, somehow closed the gap. In case law, the concern 
indicated above has, to some extent, been mitigated. In one case, it 
was pointed out th a t  "there must be some form of positive mandate or 
authority given for there to be causation".76 As reg a rd s  ques t ion  of 
knowledge or the skill involved, the court pointed out an obvious 
legal fact. The court stated tha t  "knowledge or prior authorization is not an 
ingredient in the offense of causing a prohibited act since the act is itself 
forbidden."77 In another case, the court stressed tha t  "a person cannot 
consent an act to be done unless he has knowledge of the fact."78 It  is 
equally  im p o r tan t  to mention ano ther  re la t ive ly  new  practice 
with in  the financial m arke t  w h e reb y  investors may be induced. 
This techn ique  is called "Cold-Calling" or "Unsolicited Call."7 9 
Interestingly, the Act seems not to prohibit unsolicited calls as such 
bu t  it r enders  any agreement,  once challenged, capable of being 
voidab le  at  the  option of the  cailee.80 M oreover ,  the  F.S.A
7 5 -  Practice note to the S.I.B's Rule Book, para 7.01, noted by Ashe and 
Counssell, supra n.72, at p.23
7 6 -  Mcleod v. Buchanan (1940)2 All ER 179 (H.L)
7 7 -  Sapp v. Lang (1970)1 QB 518, noted by Ashe and Counssell, supra
n.72.
7 8 -  Lovelace v. Directors of Public Prosecution (1954)1 W.L.R 1468
7 9 -  Section 56 of the F.S.A. 1986 defines "Cold Calling" as a "personal 
v is it  or oral com m unication made w ithout express  communication." This 
means that the provision of this section does not apply to w ritten  documents. 
But doubt remains as to how such oral aspects could be proved in case of 
violation. Corresponding problems could not be e ff ic ien tly  and e ffec t iv e ly  
encountered pertaining to insider trading w h ere  unpublished inform ation  
passes orally on tips to outsiders. See infra, at Ch.5 "insider trading and 
fiduciary duty".
8 0 -  Section 56 of the F.S.A. 1986; w ith  resp ect to exem ption , the  
Financial Serv ices  (U nsolicited Calls) Regulation, 1987  p rov id es  v a r io u s  
instances where the intended agreement could be deemed valid.
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(Cancellation) Rules, 1988 as (Amended) provides the victim w ith  a 
‘Cooling Off’ period within which the callee or invitee may exercise 
his option as to w ithdrawal of acceptance.81
Finally w ha t  appears from the above discussion is tha t  w h a t  is 
a matter  for the legislature is, on the one hand, to cover as much as 
possible of practice within the financial m arke t  tha t  is expected to 
h inder investors confidence. On the other hand, it is more im portan t  
for the authority  to ensure tha t  such practice is conducted w i th  a 
reasonable business standards.  In this connection, it is interesting 
to note th a t  the Financial Services Act r e q u i r e m e n ts  are not  
specifically in tended for the regulation of adver t isem en t  made in 
conjunction w ith  takeover  offers. They are more genera l  so as to 
cover the whole range of inves tm en t  advert isem en ts  w h e th e r  or 
no t  th e re  are ta k eo v e rs .  T herefore ,  it could be s o m e w h a t  
misleading if any other self regulations requ irem en ts  r e levan t  to 
takeovers were  to be set aside notably, the City Code.
2 . 2 - E X T R A  L E G A L  R E Q U I R E M E N T S
It is w orth  reiterating general principle 5 of the City Code. It 
p rov ides  th a t  any  a d v e r t i s e m e n t  ad d re s sed  to sh a re h o ld e r s  
containing information or advice must be prepared w ith  the highest 
s t a n d a rd s  of care  and accuracy .82 How effect ive  is such a 
requ irem ent?  What is the at t i tude of the Panel adminis ter ing the 
Code in the context? Regardless of the possible ex e m p t io n  of 
a d v e r t i s e m e n t ,83 it is im por tan t  to stress the implication of the
81- For further details, see supra n.72.
82- See also 3(b) on Rule 19.1 to 4 of the City Code.
8 3 -  Under the City Code categories of exem pted advertisem ent are: (1) 
product of corporate image ad vertisem en ts  not bearing on an offer  or 
p o ten t ia l  o ffer . (2) a d v e r t is e m e n ts  co n fin ed  to n on  c o n tr o v e r s ia l  
information about an offer for instance, reminders as to closing t im es of the
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City Code note 3(b). Note 3.(b) indicates  th a t  "the making of a. 
misleading statement is a serious matter. Once a misleading statement has been 
made, no subsequent correction can truly restore the status quo and redress the 
damage caused". In such circumstances,  the Panel, in order  to reduce 
the likely effect, has indicated that  if, during the period of an offer, 
it becomes ev iden t  tha t  a s ta tem en t  or adv e r t i sem en t  so issued, 
was incorrect, or could possibly mislead or put  sha reho lders  to 
w hom  the s ta tem en t  was directed in a confusing s ta te  as the 
worthiness of an offer, the least the Panel may do is to require  an 
im m e d ia te  co r rec t ion .84 It is w o r th y  of note th a t  th rough  the  
consu l ta t ive  sys tem  a v a s t  majori ty  of e r ro rs  and, pe rhaps ,  
misleading s ta tem ents  w ere  corrected before reaching investors.  
This is consistent with the Panel's chairman's s ta tement.  In 1988 he 
stated tha t  "the Panel system is designed to resolve an issue while it is live, 
and before irreversible action is taken, so that the takeover may go ahead on the 
right basis."85 The real question is how the Panel polices the release 
of in fo rm at ion  th ro u g h  the  media  nam ely ,  te lev is ion ,  rad io
offer or the v a lu e  of con s id era tions  (3) a d v e r t is e m e n ts  com p ris in g  
preliminary or interim results and their accompanying statem ents, provided  
the latter is not used for argument or in ven tive  concerning an offer. (4) 
a d v er t isem e n ts  w h ich  g ive  inform ation, th e  publication  of w h ich  b y  
advertisem ent is required or specially permitted by the stock exchange. (5) 
advertisem ent which communicate information relevant to holders of bearer  
securities, (6) advertisem ent bearing on tender offer under the SARs, those  
w hich  relating to court schemes; and ultimately. (7) those ad vertisem ents  
which are published with the specific prior consent of the Panel. The Panel’s 
consent, for example, might be granted if it w ere  necessary  to communicate  
w ith  shareholders during a postal strike, or w here material n ew  information  
or significant n ew  opinions do appear at the m eeting w h ich  m ust be  
circulated to shareholders to keep them inform ed consequently . See Note 
1(b) and 3 on Rule 19.
8 4 -  Note 3(e) on Rule 19 of the Code.; Alexander R„ A Year in The Life of 
The Panel, Observer, June 5th 1988,.p.57,
85- Ibid.
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interviews the press as well as meetings.
As regards the press, Note 2(a) and (b) on Rule 19 of the Code 
makes it clear tha t  the prime responsibil ity w ith  respect  to press 
release is on the advisers.86 The adviser should ensure  at  an early 
stage of an offer th a t  part ies  involved are w a rn e d  abou t  the 
possible implications of the City Code in relation of w h a t  they  may 
orally express w hen  approaching journalists. In consequence any 
person in te rv iewed is inevitably responsible for any incorrect or 
mis lead ing  s t a t e m e n t s 87 As a p reven t ive  measure ,  the  Panel 
states:
. ..quotations in documents, circulars, or press adver t i sem en ts  of 
press comments should not be quoted unless the board is prepared,  
where  appropria te,  to corroborate or substant ia te  them and the 
directors responsibility statement is included.88 .
Concerning television and radio interviews, the Panel stresses 
particular areas on which comment should be avoided, for example, 
fu tu re  profits and prospects, asset values and potential revision of 
offers.89 Furthermore, the Panel also requires tha t  anything which 
amounts to a confrontation between  rep resen ta t ives  of an offeror 
and the offeree company or between competing offerors should be 
avo ided .90 Where radio or television in terviews are granted,  the 
parties involved in offers should take particular care not to release 
f resh  material  in television or radio in terv iews or discussions.91
86- Note 2(a) and 7 on Rule 19. of the Code
8 7-  Supra n.83. See also City Code, general principles
88- The City Code.Rules
8 9 -  Note 2(a) on Rule 19; Note 5 on Rule 19; Panel annual report of 
March 31st 1988, at p.8 and 9.
90- Supra n.84 k  86
9 1 - Ibid
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Additionally, parties involved would be wise to make it a condition 
tha t  the sequence of the in terview should not be b roken  by the 
interposition of comments or observations by others not made in 
the  course of the  in te rv iew  and th a t  t r a n s c r ip t  should  be 
p ro v id e d .92 If any fresh  information is made public as resu l t  of 
such  an in te rv ie w ,  s h a r e h o ld e r s  m u s t  be k e p t  in fo rm e d  
accordingly.9^
Concerns about the increasing use of te lephone campaigns has 
also been expressed. According to rule 19.5, te lephone campaigns 
through which shareholders  are contacted are not to lera ted  to be 
conducted by persons other than the staff of the financial adviser.
Thus, the available safeguard for the investors in te res t  so far  
highlighted, quite apar t  from the Panel 's lack of legal power, is 
designed primarily  to fulfill two basic aims. First, to ensu re  th a t  
t ransac t ions  are fa ir ly  conducted; and second, to p rov ide  an 
effective relief w here  any kind of f raud  or m is rep resen ta t ion  is 
noticed. Besides, the protection in tended to be provided covers a 
host of interests  namely, the in te res t  of em ployees ,and  to a large 
extent creditors. In short the Panel's atti tude is wisely committed to 
a policy of equal opportunit ies  for all shareho lders  no t  only to 
receive the premium following the change of control bu t  also to 
have sufficient information and advice on time prior  to getting 
involved. Furthermore,  the Panel wishes to keep the  m ark e t  free, 
open and unham pered  unless there  are v e ry  significant facts or 
convincing proof to the contrary .94 This trend, however,  has been  
maintained over the years  and is still at the h e a r t  of U.K Stock
92- Ibid
9 3- Supra n.83
9 4 - Bid Machinery in Need of Overhaul, The Independent, October 26th,
1988.
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M arket  r e g u l a t i o n . 9  ^ But this does not mean tha t  the a t t i tude of 
the  legislature and the self regula tion (Panel) w i th  respec t  to 
breach  of the regulation are alike. While the Panel imposes the 
disciplinary sanction at its disposal, the legislature provides civil 
and criminal penalties. Corresponding atti tudes are reflected in the 
French regulation tha t  a breach of the regulation is a violation of 
the law. Following the discussion of directors responsibility, will the 
re levant criminal and civil sanctions will be discussed.96
S E C T I O N  THREE:  D I R E C T O R S  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y
3 . 1 -  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  FOR THE I S S U E  OF S T A T E M E N T S
According to both the U.K City Code and French legal regulation, 
directors of the target  company are obliged to circulate their  views 
on the merits or demerits of offers, including any al ternative forms 
of consideration offered, either at the same time the offer document 
is communicated to shareholders,  or at any su b seq u en t  re levan t  
t im e .97 But, perhaps, the distinctive aspect appears  to be th a t  in 
the U.K, unlike an offer document,  a circular made by  the ta rge t  
company's directors does not requ ire  e i ther  prior permiss ion  or 
dispatch through an authorized network. But it does not follow tha t  
inclusion of any  misleading or u n t ru e  facts are perm iss ib le .  
Directors who circulate false or incomplete  s t a te m e n ts  might 
obviously find themselves  liable for one or o ther  of the genera l
9 5 -  Most securities market regulations basically re ly  on inform ation  
disclosure and publicity.
9 6 -  It is w orthwhile mentioning that of additional rem edies, in the U.K 
there are the extra legal sanctions imposed by the self regulating bodies to 
secure compliance w ith  their regulation and to p reserve  d iscip line over  
their members.
97 -  See Chapter 2 of this thesis,
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offenses reformulated in the F.S.A.1986. Correspondingly, in France 
there have long been statutory offenses designed to deal w ith  fraud 
w hethe r  or not pertaining to misrepresentation. Those who put out 
f rau d u len t  s ta tem en ts  are generally  punished under  the  French 
Criminal Code.
In the view of the Panel, "once a misleading statement has been made, 
no subsequent correction can truly restore the situation and redress the damage 
caused.98 Indeed,  this at t i tude, in addition to its wide range of 
implications,  t r iggered the re levance of o ther  principles of law 
notably, the common law of fiduciary duties and misrepresentation. 
Yet the common test upon which directors may be deemed guilty of 
an offense is reaff irm ed in the au thor i ty  tha t  directors may be 
liable for gross negligence but not for a mere error of judgement or 
misunderstanding of facts.99
In its s ta tem ent  on Baker and Gibson Group pic for the control 
of Dee Corporation pic., the  Panel  indica ted  th a t  dur ing  the 
exchange of press-release and circulars, parties involved should be 
aware that:
. . . tendent ious  or ex t ravagan t  s ta t em en ts  should be avoided.  
Argument should be clear and not confuse shareholders .  The 
purpose of the exchange between parties to a bid is to analyse and 
clarify the impact and implications of the information given. If there 
are competing views, provided information is available for analysis, 
it is for the shareholders to decide which of the arguments  they  
prefer.100
9 8 -  Rule 23.2 of the Code; Note (v ii)(b) on Rule 19 .1-4  of the Code 
pertaining to directors duties and obligation toward both the o fferee and the  
offeror's shareholders
9 9 -  See l u r q u a n d  v  M artha11 (1969) 4 Ch App. 376; Re National Bank of 
Wales Limited (1899)2  Ch. 629; Lindly M.R.'s statement in Lagunas Nitrate Co 
v. Lasonas Syndicate (1899)2 Ch. 392 at 43^.. 1 S T L 436
1 0 0 - Noted by Morse G (1988) JJLL 323
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In both countries the re levant  regula tor’s underlying policy in 
the context seems to enforce shareholders self determination which 
should remain dominant over all. Furthermore, the Panel and C.O.B. 
w en t  fa r ther  and stressed that, in order to ensure  the accuracy of 
information supplied as well as to avoid any confusion, the source 
for any fact which is mater ial  to an a rgum en t  m ust  be clearly 
stated, including any detail to enable the significance of theJfact to 
be assessed. In the U.K. if offerors use diagrams, charts, graphs or 
otherwise, the Panel requires tha t  they  must be presen ted  without  
d i s t o r t i o n . 101 The language used in a do cu m en t  or, w h e re  
appropr ia te ,  in a su b se q u en t  s ta tem en t ,  should prec ise ly  and 
concisely reflect the position being described.102 Additionally, any 
advice given by directors must not be contrary  to their  s ta tem ents  
which are a lready  circulated to shareholders ,  which  while  not 
factually inaccurate, may mislead shareholders and the m arke t  and 
may create a false impression among the financial com m unity .103 
Again, it is interesting to note tha t  whilst  in the U.K directors are at  
l iberty to issue any s ta tem ent  without  the Panel’s in terference, in 
France, nothing is permit ted  to be made available to shareholders  
without C.O.B’s approval. That to say, issue of s ta tements  otherwise 
than those approved by the C.O.B is unlawful.
101 - Note 2(a) on Rule 23.2 of the Code
102- In Re Smith v. Faw cett Ltd. Green MR indicated that "...since 
shareholders have a prima facie right to transfer to w h o m so ev e r  th ey  
please, this right is not to be cut down by uncertain language or doubtful 
implications". (1942)Ch.304 at 306, discussed by Gower L.C.B., The Principles  
of Company Law. Ch.8. p.392.r supra r> 36 k 61/Ch 1
103- City Code, Rule 20, compare with C.O.B. Regulation 1989, Art.3 and 6, 
supra n.1/Ch.3.
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3 . 2 -  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  OF T H E  C O L L E C T I V E  B O A R D  OF D I R E C TO R S
Directors who were  not involved either in the p repara t ion  of a 
document or in the negotiation process may seek to avoid any 
potential liabilities which could arise therefrom. In the view of both 
the  U.K and French regula tors ,  w h e th e r  express  or tacit, it is 
essential to involve any directors, including officers, w h e th e r  or not 
they contributed to or cooperated in the inclusion or issue of untrue 
s ta tem ents  or concealed facts. Therefore, the regulators  reactions 
w e re  to make the full  board  of d i rec to rs  in d iv id u a l ly  and 
collectively liable for any  prejudicial  action co n s e q u e n t ly .104 
Eventually, this means tha t  directors of the offeror and the offeree 
companies are placed under  responsibil it ies to ensure ,  as far  as 
th ey  are reasonab ly  able to do so, th a t  the regu la t ion  is not 
viola ted. Practically and technically, f inancial adv ise rs  in this 
respect  are regarded as having a special responsibili ty  to ensure  
tha t  all directors are aware of their  responsibilities under  under  the 
relevant regulation.105
3 . 3 -  R E S P O N S I B I L I T Y  FOR M I S R E P R E S E N T A T I O N
As has already been pointed out, the fundam enta l  purpose of 
the regulator is to ensure  to all shareholders  involved an equal  
opportunity  not only to participate in any offer but also to evaluate 
the merits of any competing offers. Besides, part ies  involved in
104-  Whilst the preparation of offers docum ents or negotiations of 
offers may be delegated to a com m ittee  or an inner cabinet, the  Panel  
requires the board as a whole to ensure that a proper arrangement exists to 
enable it to supervise any powers so delegated. Panel statem ent of July 30th  
1987 as noted by Morse G. (1987) J.B.L. 480; See also the Panel annual report, 
March 31st, 1987, at p.8. Such a statem ent has been incorporated in the Code 
at Appendix 3.of 1988 as amended.
105- See the City Code requirem ents. See also directors duty  to seek  
advice, discussed in Ch.5
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offers are requ ired  to take care tha t  s ta tem en ts  are not  made to 
mislead shareholders or to create false impressions on the market. 
If a false s ta tem ent  is issued, and the directors knew it to be false 
while acting w ith in  the scope of the ir  au thori ty ,  the  action of 
misrepresenta tion lies against all directors. In Hedlev Bvrne it.was 
held tha t  if a misrepresentation is noticed there  will be liability for 
negligent m is-s ta tem ent  so long as a "duty is owed by the maker to the 
recipient of the statement".106
As regards  the offeree company 's  circular, Professor Gower 
pointed out:
...if there is a misrepresentation in the takeover circular, there may 
be an action for damages (either in deceit, under the 
Misrepresentation Act, or, conceivably, under Hedlev Bvrne and Co.
Lid., v. Heller and Partners Ltd), recession, or an action for breach of 
contract, and the same principles apply.107
In the absence of au thori ty  and a clear provision governing 
directors '  m is rep resen ta t ion  in takeovers ,  Gower's approach  to 
apply the principle pertaining to prospectuses to a takeover  circular 
is probably correct.108
106- Hsdlex^yrne and Co. Ltd. v. Heller and Partners Ltd.( 1964) AC 465; 
See also D errv  v. P eek  (1 8 8 9 )1 4  app cas 337. Both noted by Gower, T h e  
Princinles-of Modern Company Law, p.316, supra n.36 &, 61/Ch.
1 0 7 - Ibid at p.330.
108- In U.K, proceedings may be invoked by Section 47, Ch. V, Part I of 
the F.S.A. 1986 relating to regulations of conduct business; Section 173 -178 ,  in 
respect of insider dealings; and Section 200 to 202, Part X of the Act as regards 
fa lse  and m isleading sta tem ents,  prosecutions and o ffen ses  b y  bod ies  
corporate, partnership and unincorporated associates.
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S E C T I O N  F O U R :  C R I M I N A L  A N D  C I V I L  R E M E D I E S
In re fer r ing  to civil and criminal rem edies ,  the  f i r s t  and 
foremost question is w ha t  kind of punishm ent an offender (person 
who releases untrue or misleading information) may have in case of 
non compliance or deliberate  breach of the re levant  rules. First of 
all the Financial Services Act 1986 makes it a criminal offense for 
anyone to engage in an " inves tm en t  business" unless  it is an 
au thor ized  p e r so n .109 As far as " inves tm ent  adve r t isem en t"  is 
concerned, it is plain tha t  the rules of all S.R.O, R.P.B and R.I.E, 
including R.C.H contain certain common core rules based upon the 
adequacy test  corresponding to those of the S.I.B. rules to the effect 
th a t  investors should not be misled. Thus in order  to avoid any 
adverse  consequences, great  care must be taken  to en su re  th a t  
issue of investment advert isements do not contravene the rules. At 
this point, The Securities Association's (T.S.A) conduct of business 
rules provide tha t  any institution or agency must take reasonable  
care to ensure tha t  any regulated publication it un d e r tak es  must 
comply with  the business s tandard  rules. In doing so, the  issuer  
concerned is under  no higher duty  than to take reasonable ca re .110 
This may mean tha t  if a s ta tement is false or untrue and the person 
to whom the inves tm ent  adver t isem en t  is made suffered loss, he 
will not be entit led to recover damages if such issuer could prove 
tha t  the adver t isem ent  is prepared  with  reasonable and due care. 
The question which may arise is how reasonable care should be. It  
is, therefore, absolutely vital not only to provide guidelines on the 
subject, bu t  also to t ighten the gap, part icu lar ly  w ith in  such a
1 0 9 - F.S.A. 1986, S3 .
110- Discussed by Ashe and Counsell, at p. 24 , supra n.72
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sensitive area of business.
Surprisingly, an action performed in contravention of the S.I.B. 
or of the re le v an t  S.R.O’s rules may not lead au tomatica l ly  to 
prosecution as is the case in France w h ere  breach  of the  C.O.B 
regulation, for instance, is a contravention  of the law itself. But 
breach of the self regulation rules could give rise to disciplinary 
sanctions such as suspens ion  or w i th d ra w a l  of au thor iza t ion  
depending  on the  seriousness  of the  breach. There  are  o the r  
sanctions which include injunctions to stop fu r th e r  breaches ,  a 
public s ta tem en t  tha t  the re levant  rules w ere  not observed  or a 
resti tution order in favour of those suffering or may have suffered 
damage as a result  of a particular investment.  Mention should also 
be made of civil remedies under section 62 of the F.S.A. 1986 which 
provides tha t  if any loss results  from the breach of the rules in 
force, the person affected is entitled to bring an action for damages 
accordingly. However, Section 62 gives rise to a growing concern. 
Whilst it was  in troduced to cover a wide range of in v e s tm e n t  
business,  the recen t  Companies Act 1989 l imited its scope of 
application.
Concerning criminal consequences, section 47 of the Act makes 
it clear tha t  any person who
(a) makes a statement, promise or forecasts which he knows to be 
misleading, false or deceptive or dishonestly conceals any material  
fact; (b) recklessly makes (dishonestly or otherwise) a s tatement ,  
promise or forecast which is misleading, false or deceptive, is guilty 
of an offense if he makes the statement,  promise or forecas t  or 
conceals the facts for the purpose of inducing, or is reckless as to 
whether  it may induce, another person (whether or not the person 
to whom the statement, promise or forecast is made from whom the 
facts are concealed) to enter or offer to enter into, or to refrain from 
entering or offering to enter into, an investment agreement or to
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exercise, or re fra in  from exercising, any rights conferred by an 
investment.
According to this section, an omission which conceals material 
facts will constitute an offense if it wrongfully  induces another  
person to enter  into an investment agreement. Furthermore, it is an 
offense to engage in any device, practice, act or course of conduct 
w ith  an in tention to defraud, mislead or deceive o ther  persons 
involved or by v i r tu e  of which  th e y  become involved.  Most 
seriously, it is also an offense to advert ise  or d is tr ibute  circulars 
pertaining to investm ent unless the issuer is a recognised person. 
However the Act specifically provides some measure of defenses 
for any convicted person in deception, f raud or o therwise to prove 
tha t  his conduct would not be expected to create, at the time of the 
issue, any false or misleading impression. In this respect,  Section 
57.4 of the Act provides:
A person who in the o rd ina ry  course of bus iness  o the r  th a n  
investment business issues an advert isement  to the order of another 
person shall not be guilty of an offense under this section if he proves 
that  he believed on reasonable grounds that the person to whose order 
the adver t isement  was issued was an authorized person, tha t  the 
contents of the advertisement were approved by an authorized person 
or that  the advertisement was permitted by or under section 58.
Three defens ive  m easures  appea r  f rom  the provis ions of 
section 57.4. First, a person may not be deemed to be guilty if he 
can confirm with  evidence tha t  the person to whose o rd e r  the 
adver t isem en t  was issued was an authorized person; second, the 
contents  of the adver t isem en t  w ere  approved  by an au thorized  
person; and third, the adver t isem ent  was perm it ted  by or under
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section 58 of the Act. Finally, should noted th a t  ev e n  if such 
defenses are provided, one may not in te rp re t  them  otherwise.  To 
be understood, one should take account of the wide implications of 
tha t  section. This means tha t  the in terpretation of the section must 
not be understood by a simple reference to its literal meaning or on 
the  basis  of m isu n d ers tan d in g  of the su r ro u n d in g  facts  and 
circumstances.111
S E C T I O N  F I V E :  S H A R E H O L D E R S '  A C C E P T A N C E  A N D  T H E I R  
R I G H T  TO W I T H D R A W
5.1- SHAREHOLDERS ACCEPTANCE
Under the general law of contract, every  person is expected to 
have capacity to enter  into a binding contract. There are, however,  
cer ta in  vu ln e rab le  categories of persons whose s ta tus ,  age or 
condition re n d e r  them  e i the r  wholly  or p a r t ly  unqual i f ied  to 
contract, for example, mentally disordered persons or infants . Yet 
such incapacity usually does not arise within the context of buying 
and selling securit ies on the Stock Market.  This is especially  so 
because such a transaction  is genera lly  carried out th ro u g h  an 
in te rm edia ry  chosen by each par ty  to a contract .112 This equally 
applies to takeover offers.
In general, with respect to takeover practice, if a shareholder  
has already accepted the initial offer, he is legally bound to transfer  
his sharehold ings for the consideration indicated in the  offer 
document. Furthermore, since the offer document always contains a 
conditional clause, any shareholder 's early acceptance will not bind 
the o f f e r o r . 1 But it does not follow that  the offeree's shareholders
111 - See, H v. Lawrence (1982) A.C 510, per Lord Diplock, at 526.
112- City Code, Appendix 4 "Receiving Agents" Code of Practice.
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are totally deprived of the opportunity  to accept other subsequen t  
and more advantageous offers w h en ev e r  they  present.  In some 
circumstances, previous acceptance ceases to be b ind ing .114 It is 
im por tan t  to mention th a t  nothing in law or in self regula t ion  
obliges shareholders  to accept the proposal. Even if some or the 
majori ty of shareholders  t ransfer  their  securities to the offeror, it 
still most likely tha t  others will refra in from selling their  stock in 
the ta rge t  company after completion of the offer. This is so both 
because the offer document indicates the num ber  of shares sought 
to be purchased ,  and because  of the  d iv e rg e n t  in te r e s t s  of 
investors.
Nevertheless,  assuming tha t  acceptance conditions (50%), by 
one w ay  or another, are attained, the more specific question which 
causes some concern lies in the effect of unregistered t ransfe rs  as 
be tw een  offerors and sellers in deciding the success or fai lure of 
offers. In considering such a question, it is essential to keep in mind 
the na tu re  of the transaction. It is, first, a t rans fe r  of personal  
r ights  from one person to ano ther  (the offeror). If the  offer 
succeeds, the  logical consequence will be a subs t i tu t ion  of the 
prev ious  set  of controllers  of the  ta rg e t  com pany  by  a new  
controllers chosen by the successful offeror. What m atte r  for the 
offeror for the success of his offer, is the transfer  of such r ights 
w he the r  or not registered. What matters  for the regula tor  is th a t
113- As a protective measure, offerors often expressly  indicate in their 
offer documents that the offeror will buy the offeree's shareholders shares  
conditional on acceptance of the offer by the holders of (x) percentage of 
shares depending on the proportion of shares already ow ned by it in the  
target company.
114- Under the U.K City Code, for example, an acceptance ceases to be 
binding once a reference to the M.M.C is announced.
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such right must legally be transferred.  That is to say, they  must be 
registered and it is only the legal t ransfer  of rights which must be 
counted to determine the success or failure of an offer. This point 
seems to raise concern .115 The re levan t  question is w h a t  is the 
position if there are registered and blank (unregistered)  t ransfers  
of rights to an offeror during the latest time of the offer and such 
t ransfers  are challenged by another  competi tor?. Gould the  f irs t  
rece iver  of such r ights  be declared successful? In de te rm in ing  
which transfer  is valid for an offer to succeed, in case law it was 
held th a t  any  t r an s fe r  cannot be d eem ed  val id  unless  it is 
r e g i s t e r e d .116 As to priorities, w here  the re  is a conflict b e tw een  
offerors, valid transfers prevail.117
In the U.K, problems which may often arise in connection w ith  
takeover  offers relate to which shares are re levant  in determining 
the minimum acceptance conditions. Rule 10 of the City Code states 
tha t  any short selling will not be included in determining w h e th e r
115- Problems arise w here  the shareholders have b een  tem pted  by  
fraud in order to hand over blank transfers of rights so that the buyer may  
frustrate or discourage any rival to enter on to the com petition scene. This 
equally  applies to the practice of short selling w h ere  in tended  sa les or 
acceptance of the o fferee  company's shares carrying unrestr icted  voting  
rights are made even  though the se l ler /b u y er  has not y e t  exchanged the  
shares/consideration  involved. Such a transaction may, of course, lead to a 
risk of double counting w hich might take place at the end of an offer. An 
offer could be declared unconditional even  though the 50% of voting rights  
is not fulfilled. For further reading with respect to the latter form of sale see, 
(1988) J.B.L 164, 165 and 323; the C.B.I proposed that short selling should be 
banned during a takeover. The Independent, Feb.24, 1989, p.25. See further  
Morse G , (1986) JJLL. 317.
1 16- (1949 )  Ch.78, (1952 )  Ch. 499 C.A. See also Frv Re Chase National 
Executors and Trustee Corp. v. Frv (1946) Ch.312.
H 7 -  Shropshire Union Rlav v. R (1875) L.R.7 (H.L), 499, 1 15 L.J Ch 225,  
175 L.T 392, 62 T.L.R 414, (1946)2 All ER 206; Guv v. Water Tow Bros & Lavton 
Lid. (1909) 2 T.L.R 515; Societe Generate de Paris v. Walker (1885) 1 1 App Cas 20 
(H.L), at p. 28
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the acceptance condition is fulfilled under  the Code. One might then  
ask which acceptance under the City Code can be counted toward 
fulfilling such an obligation. For the purpose of curbing abuses as 
well as inequali ty  of t rea tm en t  be tw een  shareholders,  two major 
procedural requ irem ents  under the City Code need to be observed. 
First, both acceptance and purchase of shares must be valid so as to 
declare an offer successful; and second, val id  acceptance and 
purchase should be made before the offer expires.
As to valid acceptance and purchase, under  the City Code,118 
t r an s fe r  of r ights which may be counted tow ards  fulfilling an 
acceptance condition must satisfy the following requirements:
(1) acceptance must be from a registered holder or his personal 
representatives;  endorsed on behalf of the Stock Exchange to the 
effect tha t  documents of title have been delivered to the Stock 
Exchange and that  shareholders who accepted the offer are entit led 
to become a registered holder. (2) certified by the offeree company’s 
registrar or the Stock Exchange; (3) they are received by the offeror's 
receiving agent; and (4) the acceptance form must comply with  the 
following standard (a) where  the form consti tutes a transfer ,  if it 
meets the criteria for the registration of transfers and (b) w here  the 
fo rm does not consti tu te  a t rans fe r  if it consti tu tes  a valid  
appointment of some person as at torney to execute a transfe r on 
behalf  of the acceptor provided an app rop r ia te  ev idence  or 
representation certified by the authority is produced.1 19
Concerning share purchase, note 5 on rule 10 of the  Code 
provides tha t  any purchase of shares by an offeror or its nominees, 
including any purchase made by any person acting in concert w ith  
the offeror or its nominees, may only be permit ted  to be calculated 
in determ ining  the level of acceptance set out in the  offeror 's
1 1 8 - The City Code, Note 4 on Rule 10,
119- The City Code requirements are not clothed in legal form.
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relevant  document towards fulfilling an acceptance condition if it is 
performed in accordance with  these criteria:
(1) The shares are registered in the offeree company's register of 
members in the name of the offeror or its nominee or in the name of 
the person acting in concert with the offeror or its nominees; (2) a 
t ransfe r of the shares in favour of the offeror or its nominees  
executed by or on behalf of the registered holder in conformity with 
the above cited requirement of valid acceptance is delivered on or 
before the last time for acceptance and has effectively been received 
by the  receiver;  (3) ta l isman stock notes issued by  the Stock 
Exchange in the name of the offeror or its nominee are delivered by 
or on behalf of the offeror before or on the last time the offer closes 
and the receiver has recorded them in the appropriate document.
As regards timing, Note 6 on Rule 10 states tha t  in determining 
w hethe r  an acceptance condition has been fulfilled before the final 
closing date, only the following acceptance and purchases  may be 
counted. These are:
acceptance which meet the requirement of Note 4 on Rule 10 and 
which in addition either a) are accompanied by share certificates; b) 
are certified by the Stock Exchange and are from a registered holder 
or his representative; c) are evidenced by a certified transfer; and d) 
are certified by the Stock Exchange and the relevant certification is 
dated prior to the last day of dealing on the Stock Exchange before 
the expiry of the offer.
It  ap p ears  f rom  the above r e q u i r e m e n t s  th a t  th e y  are  
fundamental ly  designed to prevent  parties in offers or any  offeror 
to include shares otherwise acquired so as to gain swift control of 
the target company. In this respect, the Panel states:
it is essential when determining the result of an offer under the Code 
that  appropriate measures are adopted so that  all parties to the offer
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may be confident tha t  the result  of the offer is arrived at by an 
objective procedure which, as far as possible, el iminates areas of 
doubt.120
5.2- SHAREHOLDERS’ RIGHT TO WITHDRAW 
There is no doubt under  both U.K. and French regulations tha t  
shareholders who accepted the original offer may w i th d raw  their  
acceptance if a more favou rab le  offer is announced .  But the 
distinctive aspect be tween  French and U.K regulations seems to be 
tha t  while under French regulation, quite apart  from any conclusion 
of p r io r  a g re e m e n t s  and p ro v id ed  th a t  th e y  a re  no tif ied ,  
shareholders are allowed to w i thdraw  their  acceptance at any time 
during the relevant period of the offer, under  the British extra legal 
regulation, shareholders are permit ted  to use such a r ight only in 
special circumstance, for example, w h e re  a competi t ive offer is 
subsequently  announced.
CONCLUSION
Dealing in the c o m p an y ’s r e le v a n t  securit ies  on the  Stock 
Exchange is to a considerable  ex ten t  confusing in practice,  a 
confusion tha t  results from the fact tha t  first, the Stock Exchange by 
its na tu re  is speculative and, second, because of the increasingly 
permissible use of nominees accounts which reveal  nothing about 
the true  owner of the substantial shareholdings. Fur therm ore ,  an 
inefficient or inadequate  information disclosure in the  field may 
also contribute to the creation of confusion and uncer ta in ty  which 
both seems to distort not only the protection of shareholders  bu t  
also the transparency of the market as a whole. The question which
1 2 0 - The City Code, Appendix 4, supra n.l 12.
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may arise f irs t  in this connection is w h e th e r  the actual system of 
disclosure, along with the re levant  au thori t ies’ com m itm ent  to the 
prevail ing theo ry  of the  "free market"  a n d /o r  "adm in is t ra t ive  
dir ig isme' could resolve the lack of t r a n s p a re n c y  and  be an 
effective de te r ren t  to the creation of a false m arke t  and therefore, 
ensu re  a p roper  conduct of takeover  offers. It  seems from the 
above d iscussion  t h a t  a l though  in fo rm a t io n  d isc losure  may 
contribute to bet ter  t ransparency of the market and reduce abuses, 
it r em ain  unce r ta in  w h e th e r  all k inds of m a rk e t  pract ice are 
covered.
Concerning periodical information disclosure, for companies  
generally, w h e th e r  public or p r iva te  companies, l is ted on the 
Stock Exchange or not, it is a s ta tu tory  req u irem en t  th a t  certain  
sensit ive information, mostly of a f inancial na tu re ,  should be 
made availab le  for inspection  on a periodic bas is  nam ely ,  
accounting reports ,  balance sheets, profit and loss as w ell  as 
directors' and auditors'  reports. It is also param ount  tha t  full and 
accura te  in form ation  abou t  the  o w nersh ip  of com pan ie s  is 
available to enable shareholders  to know with  w hom  th e y  are 
dealing and to identify who is controlling their  company. Besides, 
in the  v iew  of the  regu la to rs ,  w h e th e r  in F rance  or U.K, 
acquisitions of interests  or disposals should be t r a n s p a re n t  and 
dealing in in form ation  should be w ide ly  sp read  to p ro tec t  
investors  and to enhance their  confidence with in  the  securit ies 
m arke t .  Finally, the rem ain ing  ques t ion  is w h e t h e r  or no t  
disclosure information contained in an offer document alone fulfill 
the  goal of protec t ion  ( investors  in te re s t )  t h a t  a lm os t  an y  
regu la to r  seeks to achieve. The answ er  to th is  q u es t io n  is
negative .  This is because in fo rm ation  contained in an offer 
document which is dispatched to shareholders ,  at  the t ime the 
offeror's firm intention to make an offer is officially and publicly 
communicated, is not an absolute standard of disclosure. It is t rue  
tha t  an offer document contains some useful information which 
enables  persons  to w hom  the offer is ad d re s sed  to form  a: 
p re l im inary  opinion about  offerors and the ir  s t ruc tu red  offers 
notably,  the identif ication of each offeror,  in tentions  and the  
amount of shares sought to be acquired as well as the percentage 
of shareholdings  a l ready  owned in each o ther.  But an offer 
do cu m en t  alone may r e m a in  fa r  less e f f ic ien t  to sa t is fy  
shareholders needs and to ensure marke t  transparency .  Besides, 
the Stock Exchange requires  tha t  a listing particulars,  which  is 
mostly of a financial nature, be sent to shareholders in conjunction 
with  the offer document.  The latter (listing document) is also the 
subject of growing concern and debate on the w ay  of improving 
the quality of information which should close the gap be tw een  the 
information provided during the company's usual business and 
tha t  offered in takeovers documents where  companies seek their  
shareholders  support.  Another question is w h e th e r  compliance 
with  the offer document including a listing particulars fulfills the 
offerors' obligations in respect of information disclosure. Certainly, 
it is not, because parties to takeover offers have continuous duties 
and responsibilities to perform and discharge which end w ith  the 
expiry of the offer.
In order  to set up an adequate  disclosure system, a rev iew  
would appear  desirable with  respect  to two crucial points: the 
t r a n s p a re n c y  of dealings in sha res  c a r ry  vo t ing  r ig h t  of 
whatsoever  kind and the protection of the interests involved. The
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Panel's underlying concern within  the disclosure field is the idea 
that  shareholders should be trea ted fairly and kep t  fully informed 
and to ensu re  order ly  conduct during takeovers  including the 
p re v e n t io n  of a false m arke t .  I n te re s t in g ly ,  the  r e l e v a n t  
au thor i t ie s  of most securit ies  m ark e ts  ad h e re  to the  same 
principle tha t  dealings in the shares carrying voting control is an 
even t  which should be as t ran sp a ren t  as possible. In Britain, the 
Panel, w i th  the collaboration of the  Stock Exchange and the 
Securities Inves tm ent  Board, in the face of a growing n u m b er  of 
domestic and cross-border  takeovers  involving the control of 
Brit ish  com panies ,  te n d s  to e n s u re  g r e a t e r  s t a n d a r d s  of 
transparency  of share ownership. This tendency may also be seen 
in the light of the recent French Loi 89-531 of 1989. However, the 
British regulation along with  France, in respect  of inform ation  
disclosure, is highly developed compared with  many o ther  E.E.C 
m em ber  states. But as far  as the U.K provisions r e le v a n t  to 
takeovers  are concerned they  would be much effective if such 
provisions were  embodied in legal form. Indeed, this is consistent 
with  the proposal of the E.E.C for the regulation of takeovers.  The 
European Commission is in process of laying down and finalizing 
rules dealing with takeover offers of cross-border na tu re  leaving, 
possibly, domestic  tak eo v e rs  to the  d iscre t ion  of the  local 
government.
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CHAPTER FIVE 
DIRECTORS’ FIDUCIARY DUTIES
The preceding chapter  dealt with  shareholders  protection. The 
major focus was on inform ation  disclosure, the  var ious  means 
w h e reb y  information is released to the public, in part icular  the 
group  of sh a re h o ld e r s  involved.  Remedies w ere  also br ie f ly  
discussed. As indicated, an aspect tha t  has received more attention 
and often stressed by the re levant  regulator concerns information 
disclosure. Indeed, it was not only the available informative device 
w hereby  shareholders can be able to form an informed judgem ent  
about an offer and to make a self determined decision, bu t  also it 
appears  to be an additional means w h e re b y  the likely adverse  
effect of any potential or actual abusive practice is reduced. Again, 
it was also stated in the previous chapter  tha t  directors w ere  the 
p r im ary  body who may give guidance as to w orth iness  of offers. 
They are also in a position, by vir tue  of their  vas t  knowledge, skill 
and exper ience ,  to a rouse  s h a r e h o ld e r s ’ u n ce r ta in t i e s .  It is, 
therefore ,  of profound im portance to discuss how far  directors 
lati tude ought to be. The following chapter  discusses w h a t  duties 
are owed by directors  in the per fo rm ance  of the i r  pa r t icu la r  
functions pertaining to takeovers in which the potential change of 
control f rom their  company to another  is at issue. The genera l  
principle upon which such duties are based can be found in both 
countries  the  U.K. and France. Directors, once the ir  jobs start ,  
w h e th e r  by contracts,  elections or by any other  agreem ent ,  are 
required  to show the utmost good faith, care and skill toward  the 
company in respect of their  dealings (performance of functions).
However,  w h i ls t  rel iance in this ch a p te r  will be on the  U.K 
li terature,  a t tent ion will be draw n to French reference w h e rev e r  
necessary.
The concept of f iduciary duties is a vexed and controversial  
aspect of com pany law. For example, directors  are v iew ed  as 
t r u s t e e s . 1 It is also argued tha t  directors in the perform ance of 
their  function are agents.2 This thesis is not concerned w ith  such 
aspects. Controversies which arise as to whom such duties are owed 
will be outlined later in this chapter.  It suffices to stress tha t  these 
duties, except in so far as they  depend on s ta tu to ry  provisions 
expressly limited to directors, apply equally to officers and shadow 
d irec to rs  acting in a m anager ia l  capacity .  Today, th is  is of 
param ount  practical importance. Finally, while the purpose of this 
thesis is specific, one should, prima facie , distinguish b e tw een  the 
directors’ role in the course of the com pany’s ordinary  activity and 
their  role where  change of control is imminent.  The role of directors 
in both  si tuations is covered by  the common law pr inciple  of 
fiduciary duties. Since the role of directors, in the performance of 
the i r  functions,  is f ram ed  w ith in  the  scope of the  f id u c ia ry  
principle, the underlying questions to s ta r t  w ith  are: first, w h a t
1- Romer G cast doubts as to w hether directors are trustees. He said; "It 
has som etim es been said that directors are trustees. If this means no more 
than that directors in the performance of their duties stand in a fiduciary  
relationship to the com pany the s ta tem en t is true enough. But if  the  
statem ent is meant to be an indication by w a y  of analogy of w h a t  those  
duties are, it appears to me to be wholly  misleading." Re Citv F.auitable Fire 
Insurance Co..( 1925) Ch.407, at p.426. For further reading see mainly, Sealy  
L.S, Fiduciary Relationship (1 9 6 2 )  C.L.T.69: (1 9 6 3 )  C.L.T.l 19. Directors as 
Trustee, (1 9 6 7 )  (LLJ.83; Pennington R.R, Company Law .. (4th  edn), Ch.16, 
p.532, supra n . l7 /C h l;  Hahlo H.R and Tribilcock M.J, Hahlo's Casebook on  
Company Law (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 1977) p.426 et seq.
2- By Gower L.C.B, The Principles of Modern Company Law. (1 9 6 9 )  
Ch.23, p .515, supra n.36 Sc 6 1/Chl
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does it mean for a director to be a fiduciary in a particular situation 
such as a competitive offer? Another analogous question lies in the 
amount of information disclosure shareholders  must have in order 
to make an informed and rational decision with respect to the sale 
of the i r  shares .  The la t te r  ques t ion  should also be re ad  in 
conjunction with  the previous chapter  "Shareholders Protection". 
Thus, so far, various tests  have evolved in the court, namely, the 
"best interests" formula; the "fairness test" and the "reasonableness 
c r i t e r i a " .3 In the light of the above discussion, the  discussion 
below will focus on first, to whom directors are fiduciaries; second, 
d irec to rs ’ duties to act in the best  in te res t  of shareholders;  and 
their  duties to consider em ployees’ and credi tors’ interests .  Stress 
will be on the directors duties of care and diligence. Concerning 
duties of care, discussion Will be restr ic ted to issues involving the 
p repara t ion  of profit and forecast. This discussion will consider 
w h e th e r  or not advisers, including accountants  and auditors ,  are 
under corresponding duties. As regards the du ty  of diligence, the 
issue of conflict of interests  will be discussed. Consideration will be 
given to w he the r  or not directors are under a duty  to seek advice, 
particularly legal advice. Another practical point concerns directors ' 
duties and insider dealing. This is left to be discussed to the last.
S E C T I O N  ONE: TO W H O M  DIR EC T O R S A R E A  F I D U C I A R Y
Regardless of whether  or not a takeover offer is involved, it is 
commonly agreed tha t  the directors '  role is always p e r fo rm e d
3- See, Mills, v. Mills (1938) 60 C.L.R 150, 11 A.L.J 527; Teck Corporation 
v. M illa r , supra n. 109/Ch. 1. For further consultation  in resp ect  of the  
meaning of "best interest" see, Davies P.( 198 8 )J.B.L 65.
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within the common law principle of fiduciary duties. In theory  the 
scope of the fiduciary duties and the measure of their  discharge has 
always been described in the light two discernible obligations; the 
duties of honesty and good faith; and the duty  of care and skill. The 
re la ted  criteria  by which the courts  waive the r e q u i r e m e n ts  of 
directors ' obligations and responsibil it ies is often re fe r re d  to the 
above  ci ted te s t s  of "best  in te re s ts " ,  " fa i rness  te s t"  and  
"reasonableness test".4 Correspondingly, the logical consequences for an 
aggrava ting  b reach  of the  r e le v a n t  regula t ions  may be civil, 
criminal or administrative in addition to the cost of the proceedings. 
The vital quest ion  is to whom directors  are f iduciar ies?  Several 
judgements have advocated different opinions. Some have said tha t  
directors '  f iduciary duties w ere  considered to be owed to to the 
"company as a whole", the meaning of which was re fe r red  to the 
co m p an y 's  g e n e ra l  b o d y .5 It follows th a t  the co m pany  as a 
distinct legal entity has had little relevance. Others considered tha t  
d irectors  owe f iduciary  duties  to the "existing sha reho lde rs" .6 
Although im plem enting  almost identical objectives, the  fo rm e r  
would appear more general compared with  the latter which is more 
specific because, if narrowly  in te rp re ted ,  may exclude a host  of 
o ther in terests  notably, the in terests  of employees and creditors. 
Still another  judgement,  albeit th a t  it rem ains  exceptional,  was 
advanced tha t  directors owe a fiduciary duty  to the shareholders
4 - See Teck‘ Corporation v. Millar supra n . l 0 9 /C h . l ,  noted b y  Hahlo H.R 
k  Trebilcock M.J , Hahlo's Casebook on Comoanv L a v  , at p. 4 5 0 -4 5 4 ,  supra  
n. 1.
5-  Evershed MR said that “ the phrase the 'company as a whole '  does  
not ... mean the company as a commercial entity, distinct from corporators.
It means the corporators as a general body. Greenhaleh v. Ardene Cinema  
Ltd.and Others (195 1) Ch 286: (19^0)2 All ER 1120.
6-  H&£Pn In te rn a t io n a l  L td . v. Lord G rade . ( 1 9 8 3 )  B.C.L.C 2 4 4
(C.A);.Sealy L.S, Cases And Materials in Company Law, p.247,  supra n l /C h .4
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individually.7
S E C T I O N  T W O :  D U T Y  TO A C T  I N  T H E  B E S T  I N T E R E S T S  OF
S H A R E H O L D E R S
The leading case, in the context of competitive offers, is Heron 
International Limited v. Lord Grade. It was held:
...where directors have decided that is in the interests of a company 
that the company should be taken over, and where there  are two or 
more bidders, the only duty of the directors..., is to obtain the best 
price..., where the directors must only decide between rival bidders, 
the in te res t  of the company must be the in te rest of the cu rren t  
shareholders.8
The question arises in relation to the in te rp re ta t io n  of the 
express ion  "shareholders" .  Should the  ow ner  of u n reg is te r ed  
sharehold ings  be covered  by the scope of th a t  te rm inology?.  
Another  analogous question re la tes  to the  re levance  of o the r  
involved interests  namely, the interests  of employees and creditors. 
Those classes of in terests,  if the te rm "shareholders" is narrow ly  
in te rpre ted ,  appear  most likely to be excluded from the scope of 
this judgement. Naturally, one may argue tha t  if such a judgem ent  
is w ide ly  in te rp re ted  it could therefore ,  ex tend  to cover bo th  
employees'  and creditors ' interests. This is so because a distinction 
between shareholders and employees or be tween shareholders  and 
c red i to rs  w i th in  the  same co m p an y  m ay s o m e t im e s  r i ses  
difficult ies .9 Finally, should the directors be obliged to consider
7 -  JBfim v a l v. W r i g h t .  1192012 Ch 421,  18 T.L.R 697; A l l e n  v. H v a t t  
(1914)30  T.L.R (P.O.
8- Supra n.6. See also Hoffman J. in Re a Company No.0 0 8 6 9 9 ,  The
Times. Ian 18th. 1986: (19 8 6 HB.T, 77.
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the long-term interests of their  shareholders w here  the change of 
control is imminent? In Heron it was held tha t  the target  company's 
directors, in choosing the more beneficial offer, should balance the 
shareholders shor t- term interests against their  long-term interests. 
Surely, the la tter  will largely be dependent  upon, or lying with, the 
successful competi tor.10
As regards the interests of directors and of their  shareholders, 
the question which may arise in tha t  connection is w h e th e r  it is 
possible for the directors of the target company to act solely in the 
bes t  in terests  of their  existing shareholders? Should they  consider 
at least  concurrently their  own interests?  Where the directors are 
shareholders  in the company of which they  are d irec to rs ,11 th e  
interaction of interests  has plainly been made clear by Latham CJ 
who indicated:
...It must, however, be recognised tha t a general rule, though not 
invariab ly  ... directors have an in te re s t  as shareholders  in the 
com pany of which they  are directors. Most sets of artic les of 
association actually require  the directors to have such an in te res t  
and it is generally desired by shareholders tha t directors should
have a substantial interest in the c o m p a n y  Very many actions of
directors, who are, shareholders, perhaps all of them, have a direct 
or indirect relation to their own in terests . It would be ignoring 
realities and creating impossibilities in the adm in is tra tion  of a 
company to require that directors should not advert to or consider in 
any way the effect of a particular decision upon their own in terests  
as shareholders.12
9- In the light of the n ew  in v e s tm e n t  deve lopm ent ,  if the  term  
shareholders is w id e ly  interpreted,  it may extend to cover  not only  
investors, including directors, employees  or creditors, but also consumers.
10- Supra n.6
11- As a condition, most company laws oblige the directors to a hold 
certain percentage of shares in the company in which they  are employed .
12- Supra n.4
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Certainly, no one would deny, nowadays,  the existing in terplay 
of in terests  be tw een  shareholders  and directors. This is appa ren t  
since the  p rom otion  of sh a re h o ld e r s '  in te re s t s  will, indeed ,  
positively reflect and greatly improve the directors'  interests.  But, 
if the directors in the ir  capacity as fiduciaries,  no m a t te r  how, 
benefi t  at the expenses of shareholders, it would automatically be 
f ram ed in term of abuse and more seriously, a breach of fiduciary 
duties and, therefore, be open to derivative actions.
As long as the re le v a n t  law ent i t les  the  d irec tors  to the 
oppor tun i ty  of having shares in the company th ey  manage, th is  
gives them  a position of power and control. Consequently, most 
com pany law and stock m arke t  regulations have p rogress ive ly  
changed their  provisions in order  to protect shareholders,  and by 
the  same m easure  t igh ten  the gap th a t  has  exis ted  b e tw e e n  
shareholders  and directors in the field of interaction of in terests,  
therefore,  constraining the directors to act in an impart ia l  manner  
in particular when  a competitive offer is at issue.
In France, d irectors  of the com pany  u n d e r  the  offer  are 
becoming increasingly restricted to respond directly to any offeror’s 
a t t e m p ts .  A l te rn a t iv e ly  th e y  are  obliged to p r e s e n t  th e i r  
arguments,  w he the r  in favour or against offerors, to the C.O.B. By 
contrast,  in the U.K. the presence of the regula tor ,  as long as 
investors interests  are not impeded and the m arke t  is running  in 
good performance, could not be noticed. It is w orthy  of note tha t  in 
the U.S.A, directors of the target company, w hen  change of control 
is imminent ,  are regarded as auctioneers charged w ith  obtaining 
the  b es t  price for the  sh a re h o ld e r s  to w hom  th e  offe r  is 
a d d r e s s e d . 13 According to tha t  tendency a duty  to be an auctioneer
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arises only if it is apparen t  tha t  the change of control is inevitable 
which is not the case w here  the directors of the ta rge t  company 
have determined to remain independent .14
S E C T I O N  THREE: D U T Y  TO C O N S I D E R  TH E  E M P L O Y E E S ’ A N D  
C R E D I T O R S ’ I N T E R E S T S
There is always an element of employees'  interests  in takeover  
offers operat ions which involve an imm edia te  change of control 
from one company to another. For the shareholders ,  w h e re v e r  a 
competitive offer is made, it is becoming standard tha t  the directors 
are obliged to balance the shareholders shor t- term  interests  against 
their  long term  interests.  The question then  is simply tha t  how far 
the scope of tha t  approach may cover the employees'  in terests?  By 
v ir tue  of section 309 (1) of the Companies Act 1985, the  ta rge t  
company's directors are obliged to have due regard to the in terests  
of their  employees in a similar m anner  as the in te re s ts  of the 
com pany 's  m e m b e r . ^  Assuming th a t  the  scope of this section 
extends to cover the in te res ts  of employees in a tak eo v e r  offer 
situation, two duties arise. First, the duty to inform and, second, the 
duty to consult. The target com pany’s duty  to consult is owed to the 
recognised trade  union w hereas  the du ty  to inform is placed on 
both the offeror and the offeree company. Remedies exist through a 
complaint to an industrial tr ibunal initiated by the recognised trade
13- Herzel L & Shepro R.W., Ups And Down of U.S Takeovers  Defence,  
(1988) 9 Co.Law. p.85 at 88
1 4 - See, supra, at Ch.6
15-  The problem arises w h e th e r  that sect ion covers  s i tuat ions  
invo lv ing  takeover  offers or it is on ly  enacted to protect  e m p lo y e e s  
interests  w here  there is. a transfer of undertakings as the E.C directive  
provides. Yet the matter remain open to questions.
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union .16 By contrast, in France, directors are obliged to inform as 
well as to consult the Syndicat des Travailleurs.
As a matter  of fact, the directors of the ta rge t  company often 
do cons ider  e m p lo y e e s ’ in te re s t s  in a s im ila r  w a y  as the  
shareholders  in te res ts .17 Perhaps the sole difference lies w ith  the 
consequences  on em ployees '  in te res ts ,  if the  t a rg e t  d i rec to rs  
cons idered  them  on a shor t  te rm  basis  while, norm ally ,  such 
interests  should be considered on a long te rm  basis. Of course, for 
the shareholders ,  w h e re  a cash offer is involved and accepted 
thereafter ,  there  may not remain  any fu r the r  link or in te res t  with 
the acquiring or the acquired company since their  aim is achieved. 
But, if tha t  approach suits shareholders  who will not  have  any 
fu r ther  continuous link with the company after it has passed out of 
control, it would inevitably have an adverse effect on employees '  
fu ture  jobs. In consequence, in addition to the equality of t rea tm en t  
b e tw e e n  sh a re h o ld e r s  and em ployees ,  the  leg is la tor  should, 
normally, seek another  w ay  of providing fu r th e r  protec tion for 
employees'  long term interests.
In the light of experience, takeover offers may affect not only 
shareholders  and employees, bu t  may extend to affect a host  of 
o ther  in te re s t s ,18 such as the in te res ts  of c red i to rs .19 Hence, in
16- (1989 )  31 Managerial Law, p .12. In France consultation w i th  the  
Syndicat des Travailleurs is compulsory.
17- Pennington considers the e m p loyee s  in terests  as an im perfect  
obligation. Company Law. (5th edn.) p. 660  (London, B u t terw orth s . l985).  
For other arguments, see Boyle A.J, Bovle and Bird's Company Law. (Jordans 
and Sons Ltd, 1985), p.593 et seq; Litster v. Forth Drv Dock Co Ltd (1989)1  All 
ER 1134.  This case, nevertheless,  covers unfair dismissal  of em p lo y e e s  
resulting from a transfer of undertakings.  Although it is directed  to 
insolvency situations Litster may also extends cover takeovers and mergers  
operations.
18- The interests  of consumers and at large the national concern may  
also be affected.
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considering w hether  or not the interests  of creditors should at least  
be taken  into account w here  a competi tive offer is imminent ,  the 
following case would appear  as an appropria te  guideline for the 
directors of the target company in respect of which interests  should 
be balanced or advanced subsequently. Berger J. said:
...A classical theory that once unchallengeable must yield to the fact 
of modern life. In fact, of course, it has. If to day the directors of a 
company were to consider the interests of its employees no one 
would argue that in doing so they were not acting bona fide in the 
interests of the company itself. Similarily, if the directors were to 
consider the consequences on the community of any policy that the 
company intended to pursue, and were deflected in the 
commitment to that policy as a result, it could not be said that they 
had not considered bona fide the interests of the shareholders.
I appreciate that it would be a breach of their duties for directors 
to disregard entirely the interests of a company's shareholders in 
order to confer benefit on its employees. But if they observe a 
decent respect for other interests lying beyond those of the 
company's shareholders in the strict since, then it will not, in my 
view, leave directors open to challenge that they have failed in their 
fiduciary duty to the company.20
Such a s ta tem en t  has left no doubt  as to the  inclusion of 
credi tors '  in te re s ts  and by the  same token  closed the  gap of 
in te rp re ta t ion  tha t  might be given o therw ise .21 Accordingly, it
19- Whilst it is commonly accepted that creditors' interests  are only  
relevant where  the company is insolvent, Lord Diplock has advocated that " 
the best  in terests  of the company are not exc lu s ive ly  those  of the  
shareholders but may include those of the creditors" Lonrho Ltd v. Shell  
Petrolum Co.Ltd. (1980) 1 W.L.R 624 at 634
20-  Teck Corporation v. Millar, supra n.1 0 9 / f h . l
2 1 -  It has been  argued that w h e n  the political cl imate permits  it, 
directors will  need to balance the interests  of various classes of members ,  
the creditors and the employees. See further Morse, C o m p a n y  C o n s o l i d a t i o n  
Legislation 1987 , at general notes on section 309 to the Act in p. 2 7 2 , .supra
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would be consistent to subordinate the in terests  of creditors w ith  
those of em ployees  and sha reho lders  as it is the  case under  
s ta tu to ry  mergers, so that, in so far as possible, similar decisions 
will carry similar effects. Nevertheless, where  certain obligations, in 
particular  situations such as takeover  offers, are not s ta tu to r i ly  
st ipulated, it does not mean tha t  they  are left unframed.  Indeed 
they  are inevitably  caught by the self regulation requ irem en ts .  
Thus, since it is still open to question w he the r  creditors '  in terests  
are covered or not, the City Code on Takeovers and Mergers obliges 
parties to an offer to pay due regard to creditors ' and em ployees’ 
in te res ts  w h en  formulating or giving advice to the ir  respect ive  
shareholders.  Regardless of w h e th e r  or not the offer is accepted, 
u nder  the  provisions of the City Code, the board of the ta rge t  
com pany is requ ired  to give its v iews regard ing  the  o f fe ro r ’s 
intentions in respect of the offeree company and its e m p l o y e e s . ^2 
This is a v i ta l  r e q u i r e m e n t  which may be adop ted  by  fu tu re  
legislation.
S E C T I O N  FOUR: DIRECTO RS'  D U T I E S  OF C A R E  A N D  D I L I G E N C E
Whilst duties of care and skill arise in connection w i th  the 
p rep a ra t io n  of documents ,  circulars and profits and  d iv idend  
forecasts, the duty of diligence and honesty come into play in cases 
involving conflict of interests .  This section will consider first, the 
directors' duty  of care and skill23 and second, the duty  of diligence 
and honesty in connection with directors' conflicts of interests .
n . l /C h .4
22- City Code, Rule 25 as amended.
23-  Duties of care and skill are described in details in the classic case  
by Romer J in Re Citv Equitable Fire Insurance Co Ltd. supra n. l
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4 . 1 -  D I R E C T O R S *  D U T Y  OF C A R E  A N D  T H E  I S S U E  OF P R O F I T S  
F O R E C A S T S  2 4
In essence, directors’ duties of care arise w herever  they  seek to 
communicate w ith  shareholders  to whom the offer is addressed .  
Such duties usually come into existence during the p repara t ion  of 
the offer document, circular, issue of subsequen t  s ta tem ents ,  or 
w ith in  the context of an announcem ent  of profits and div idends 
forecasts .  Similarily, the duty  of care arises w h erev e r  a subsequen t  
rev is ion  of an offer or an in t roduc t ion  of an a l te rn a t iv e  is 
undertaken. In this connection, save w herever  permitted, it may be 
t h a t  any  m is - s ta te m e n t ,  omission, w h e th e r  d e l ib e r a t e ly  or 
carelessly made, in conjunction with  an offer and communicated to 
shareho lders  concerned subsequently ,  may give rise to serious 
penalties.  They may be criminal, civil, or adm in is t ra t ive  as the 
degree of the  b reach  may be. Accordingly, directors ,  in the i r  
capacity as fiduciaries, are, by v ir tue of the re levant  provisions and 
the common law principle, obliged to act with  due care in relation 
to the affairs of the target company under the offer. Nonetheless, in 
order to discharge them from tha t  obligation, Brightman j. pointed 
out tha t  "Where a takeover offer has been made, the directors of the offeree 
company are under a duty to their own shareholders which includes a duty to 
be honest and not to mislead". Likewise, the Panel on Takeovers  and 
Mergers considered offerors' obligations towards the shareholders  
of the offeree company and their  obligations tow ards  the ir  own 
shareholders,  to a greater  or lesser extent, alike.25 This means tha t  
the offeror is required to consider not only matters which affect its
24-  Refer to the duty of care required for the preparation of document  
and circular discussed supra in Ch.3.
25 - GglhinR v. Kilner (1972)1 W.L.R 337 at 341 & 342, (1972)1 All ER 1166
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own sha reho lders  in terests ,  bu t  also those m a t te rs  which  may 
affect the rights of shareholders of the target company.
In referring to the preparat ion  of documents,26 the City Code 
provides a general guideline tha t  parties to an offer should prepare  
their  respective documents with  the highest  s tandards  of care and 
accuracy. In order to enable the shareholders to make an informed 
and ra t iona l  decision, the City Code obliges d irec tors  to make 
available, in the offer documents, all re levant  information and facts. 
That kind of information, in v iew  of the Panel, should be fair, 
concurrently announced and reflect the purpose being described in 
the issue. However, the Panel, on many occasions, has expressed  
concern at  the quality of a num ber  of misleading circulars which 
w ere  deemed to be inaccurately p repared  and, thus, misleading. 
The inaccurate information referred to was the incorporation in the 
circular of unsatisfactory graphs and diagrames. Accordingly, the 
Panel, in addition to the  issue of guidelines, has recom m ended  the 
type of remedies  tha t  it will take.27 For instance, concerning the 
use of diagrames and graphs or any other  appropr ia te  means to 
describe the matter under consideration, the Panel states tha t  there  
is a du ty  on directors to take particular  care in this re spec t  to 
ensu re  accuracy and fair  p re se n ta t io n .28 In consequence,  the 
Panel, in its capacity  as superv isor ,  may in s t i tu te  sanctions  
w h e re v e r  a breach  of the re levan t  rules is com m itted  namely,  
p r iva te  rep r im an d ,  public censure ,  w arn ing  or rep o r t in g  the  
offender 's  conduct to the D.T.I., the S.R.O. or the S.I.B. as the case
2 6 -  The term document is used in this context to denote an offer  
document and circulars.
27 -  See (1985)  6 Go .Law : Johnston A, The Citv Takeovers Code..at p.56,  
supra n.88/Ch.2
28- Ibid
may be.
Returning to the  p repara t ion  and the issue of profits  and 
d iv idends forecas ts  and assets  valuation,  conscious of ce r ta in  
responsibilit ies imposed upon them by the common law principle, 
sta tutes and self regulations, the directors are requ ired  to prepare  
profits forecasts w ith  due care. Technically, of course, a l though 
profits forecasts  by the ir  v e r y  n a tu re  are optional,  t h e y  are 
regulated by the Panel City Code.29 However the sta tutes deal w ith  
civil and criminal aspects (problems)  arising from  profits  and 
dividend forecasts.30 Whilst the City Code does not have  the  force 
of law, Section 47 of the Financial Services Act 1986, makes it a 
criminal offense for anyone to make "a statement, promise, or forecast 
which he knows to be misleading, false or deceptive”31 In the case law, it 
appears  tha t  directors may not be liable for a mere judgem ent  or 
misunderstanding of facts.32
As a m atter  of defensive tactics or inducement,  the  issue of 
profits forecasts often provides shareholders with  the oppor tun i ty  
of comparing between the real value of their  securities, under  the 
offer, and the  offeror 's  proposed price .33 It is genera l ly  used 
w here  the offer is on a share for share basis to d em ons tra te  th a t  
the grea ter  value of the shares sought to be exchanged is much 
g rea te r  th a n  the offeror is placing upon  them . Such tactical  
assumptions and advanced arguments  against or in favour  of the 
offer may arouse shareholders uncertainty. Worse, it is uncerta in
29-  The City Code, Rules 28 and 29.
30-  See in connection with the release of information in Ch.4
31-  See directors responsibili ty in Ch.4
32-  I.UEquand v. Mar s hal ( 1 869)LR 4 Ch. app 376; Re National Bank of  
Wales Ltd. (1899)2 Ch. 629
33-  Under certain circumstances, profits forecasts may not be material.  
For instance, where  the offer is whol ly made in cash. See supra n.35
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w hethe r  such predictions could help an o rd inary  shareholder .  If 
profits  forecasts  are issued by offerors,  th ey  d em o n s t ra te  and 
em phasise  fu r th e r  the prospects  and financial s t r en g th  of the 
offeror concerned. Consequently, sha reho lders  may, in ce r ta in  
circumstances ,  be induced  to make a h u r r ie d  decision as to 
acceptance. The worse  si tuation is w h e re  profit  fo recas ts  are 
concurrently issued by parties to offers to support  a rgum ents  in a 
d is to r ted  and misleading way. Therefore ,  once the  d i rec to rs  
consider making a profit forecast, in the view of the  Panel, the 
p r im ary  responsibil i ty  rests  w ith  the respect ive  advisers .  As a 
p reventat ive  measure, the Panel requires  the adviser to any  par ty  
to an offer to w arn  his clients of the care needed in making any 
forecasts or assumptions during the re levan t  period of an offe r34. 
Furthermore,  advisers are placed under  a strict du ty  to examine 
and report  on the forecasts. It is w orthy  of note tha t  the Panel drew 
attention to some obvious implications which res t  on the issue of 
profits  forecas ts  th a t  are made prior  to an offer.  The Panel  
considers such matters as re levant  even if they  are not specifically 
referred  to in the document because of their  perceived effects. This 
means that, if the profit forecasts w ere  made shortly  before the 
announcement of an offer, it is most likely to be taken  as a basis by 
the financial com munity  and, therefore,  will become v ita l  to be 
considered by the shareholders in making their rational decision. It 
is, therefore, important  tha t  any forecasts should be suppor ted  by 
as much objective information as possible to enable shareholders  to 
form their  judgement as to the reasonableness and reliability of the 
forecasts.35 Rule 28 of the Code states that:
3 4 - The City Code, Rule 28. 2 (c)
35-  The Panel considers that where  offers are wholly  made in cash, the
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There are obvious hazards attached to the forecasting of profits: this 
should in no way detract from the necessity of maintaining the 
highest standard of accuracy and fair presentation in all 
communication to shareholders in takeovers. A profit forecast must 
be compiled with scrupulous care and objectivity by the directors, 
whose sole responsibility it is; the financial advisers must satisfy 
themselves that the forecasts have been prepared in this manner by 
directors.
From this rule, and also from w h a t  has been said above, it is 
clear tha t  both parties to an offer and their  respective advisers are 
firmly and collectively responsible for any defect in the preparat ion  
and issue of forecasts.
Concerning the du ty  of the f inancial adviser  w h e re  he has 
reason to doubt the accuracy or incompleteness of information, the 
Panel, in its repor t  for 1976, states tha t  "When a financial adviser finds 
himself in such a difficult position and is faced with a situation where he thinks 
the Panel is being denied or misled, the Panel considers that his over riding duty 
is to the Panel".36 Additionally ,  the  C.B.I, in its ca p ac i ty  as 
membership  of the Panel, has confirmed tha t  the financial adviser  
should not be expected to shield a client who was endeavouring  to 
mislead the Panel.
Finally it appears tha t  the Panel imposes a corresponding duty  
on auditors ,  accountants  and v a lue rs  involved. Concerning the 
accountant's position, Rule 28.2 (c) para 2 of the City Code states  
tha t  whilst  an accountant has no duty  and responsibil i ty  for any 
assumption, he will as a resul t  of his rev iew  be in a posit ion to
issue of profits forecasts may have little relevance,  but th ey  are h ighly  
significant w here  offers involve an exchange of securities.
36 -  Panel report, July 1976,  noted by Johnston A., The Citv Takeovers  
£osl£„ at p .106, supra n.88/Ch2.
37-  Ibid
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advise the company on w ha t  assumption  should be listed in the 
document or circular and the manner  in which it should be set out. 
He is also, by v ir tue  of his influence, entit led not to allow any fact 
to be published which appears  to be unrealis tic, or one to be 
om it ted  w h ich  ap p ea rs  more re lev an t ,  w i th o u t  com m ent ing  
appropriately in his reports. As regards auditors, it is interesting to 
lay stress on the s ta tem ent of Lopes LJ who indicated:
It is the duty of an auditor to bring to bear on the work he has to 
perform that skill, care and caution which a reasonably competent, 
careful, and cautious auditor would use. What is reasonable skill, 
care and caution must depend on the particular circumstances of 
each case. .He is entitled to assume that they are honest, and rely 
upon their representation, provided he takes reasonable care. If 
there is anything calculated to excite suspicion he should probe it to 
the bottom; but in the absence of anything of that kind he is only 
bound to be reasonable, cautious and careful.38
Although the above s ta tem ent was said with respect  to certain 
special circumstances of the company, i.e w here  it is insolvent or 
about to be insolvent and the role of auditors therein, it appears  to 
have a universal  application. Therefore, it could be ex tended  to 
cover the auditors ' role and duty  in situations involving takeover  
offers, notably  the issue of profits  forecasts.  As rega rds  assets  
valuation ,39 the City Code, Rule 29.1 requires  tha t  "When a valuation 
of assets is given in connection with an offer, it should be supported by the 
opinion of a named independent valuer who has no connection with other 
parties to the transaction".40 Accordingly, a v a lu e r  m u s t  be a
38-  Re Kingston Cotton Mill Co (no.2), (1896 )  2 Ch. 279.  See also &£  
Thomas Gerrard fe Sons Ltd. (1968)  Ch. 455,  (1967)2  All ER 525,  (1967)3  W.L.R 
84.
3 9 -  See supra n.75/Ch.l  relating to the various methods of valuation.
4 0 -  This rule is perhaps designed to prevent  any possible confl ict  of  
interests .
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recognised person or inst itution and should have post qualification, 
experience and have knowledge of valuing the assets.41 Thus, the 
opinion of the valuer on the value of assets must be included in the 
re levant  document. Besides, such a document must incorporate the 
valuer 's  f irm s ta tem ent  indicating tha t  his consent has been given 
and not w i thd raw n  to the publication of his valuation certificate.42 
One question, al though it is perhaps  the last in the  context, may 
arise as to how far  the above categories of persons  (auditor ,  
accountant, and valuer)  should stand in a f iduciary position. The 
possible answer can be found in the s ta tu te s43 and case law.44 It 
has been shown in the authorit ies  tha t  the duties of the above 
group are to ascertain and state the accuracy of f inancial issues, 
accounting policies or valuation of assets brought to them. They are 
not bound to do more than exercise reasonable care and skill in 
making inquiries and investigations.43
4.2- DIRECTORS' DUTY OF DILIGENCE AND CONFLICT 
OF INTERESTS
Taking into account the economic, financial, commercial,  and 
social interrelationship and structure of companies, it can be argued 
tha t  it is difficult to determine w ha t  interests  a director may have 
and to avoid si tuation w here  a conflict of in te re s ts  is p re se n t
4 1 -  For further consultation,  see the requirements  of the  City Code, 
Rule 29: I.E.B Fasteners Ltd v. Marks. Bloom & Co (1981)1 All ER 289; (1983)2  
All ER 583,  (1982)1 C.M.L.R 289
42- See the CA 1985, Section 103
4 3 -  See, for instance,  the CA 1985,  Section 237  relating to auditors'  
f iduciary duties and powers.
44 -  See Re London and General Bank (no 2) (1895)  2 Ch 673  (CA) per 
Lindly LJ.
4 5 - Ibid
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accordingly.46 In the case-law, Roskill J. indicates tha t  "It is an over 
riding principle of equity that a man must not be allowed to put himself in a 
position in which his fiduciary and his interest conflict".47 Therefore  the 
principle which directors are bound to observe in the performance 
of the ir  role is tha t  directors in their  capacity as fiduciaries are 
required  not to allow themselves to be in a position w here  the re  is 
a potential or actual conflict between their  private interests and the 
interests  of those whom they  are bound to protect.48 Article 94 of 
the Companies Act, table A, 1985 imposes an interdict on a director 
of a company from voting or casting his vote at any meeting of the 
directors or of a committee of directors on any resolution pertaining 
to m atte rs  in which he, or a person connected w ith  him, has a 
material in te res t  or duty  which conflicts or may conflicts w i th  the 
i n t e r e s t  of the  co m p a n y .49 The te rm  "possibly conflict" a s  
expressed by Lord Cranworth in A b e rd ee n  Railway Co.v. Blaikie 
Bros. g a v e  rise to a num ber  of interpretations.  One case refers  to
4 6 -  See Herzel L. & Othrs, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to 
Resist Tender Offers, supra n 89/Chl;  Lipton M., Takeover Bids inThe Target  
Board Room, supra n.79/Chl
47-  Industrial Development Consultant Ltd v. Coolev (1972) 2 All ER 162,  
(1 9 7 2 )  1 W.L.R 443; Regal (Hastings) Ltd. v. Gul l iver  (1 9 6 7 )2  AC 134;  
Aberdeen Railway Co.v.Blaikie Bros (1854)1  Macq 461 (H.L), ( 1 8 5 4 )2 3  L.T 
(OS) 315,  (H.L), Guinness Pic, v. Saunders (1988)4  BCC 377 (CA), (1988)  2 All 
ER.940, (1988)1 W.L.R.863, (1988) B.C.L.C. 607
48- North-West Transportation Co Ltd. v. Beattv [1887] 12 App. Cas 589  
(P.C), 3 TLR 789; In Aberdeen Railway Co.v.Blaikie Bros, supra n.47,  Lord 
Cranworth LC stated "It is a rules of a universal  application that no one,  
having [fiduciary] duties to discharge,  shall be al lowed to enter  into  
engagements  in which  he has or can have a personal interest  conflict ing  
or which pssibly may conflict with the interests of those whom he is bound  
to protect".
4 9 -  Companies (Table A To F) Regulat ions  (S.1.8 0 5 / 1 9 8 5 ) .  For 
consultation see, Walmsley K., Butterworths Company Law Handbook (16th  
edn.) 1987 (London, Butterworths 1987) at Part III.
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"a real sensibility of conflict". Lord Upjohn in B oardm an v. P h i p p s . 
indicated:
The phrase "possibly may conflict" [in the dictum of Lord Cranworth 
quoted above] requires consideration. In my view it means tha t the 
reasonable man looking at the re levant facts and circumstances of 
the particular case would th ink th a t  there  was a rea l sensible 
possibility of conflict; not tha t you could imagine some situation 
arising which might, in some conceivable possibility in events  not 
contemplated as real sensible possibilities by any reasonable person, 
result in a conflict.^1
According to the Companies Act 1985, directors who have or 
possibly may have an interest  in the transaction which may conflict 
w ith  those of their  shareholders  are under  a d u ty  to make an 
immediate  disclosure of the nature  of such interests . Additionally, 
giving any advice, v iews or o therwise  on the t ransac t ion  from 
d irec to rs  w hose  in te re s t s  are in conflict which  m ay  a rouse  
shareholders uncertainty and significantly deter  the proper conduct 
of the  t ransac t ion  may not be to le ra ted .  As a m a t te r  of self 
regulation, the Panel recognised the likely or the possible conflict of 
in terests  in takeovers  operations. It indicates tha t  it is clear tha t  
the  p a ram o u n t  du ty  of directors is to have due rega rd  to the 
interests  of the general body of shareholders  including employees 
and creditors in the advice they give or decisions they  take.  They 
are not allowed to benefi t  their  own in te res ts  or those of any 
special group or section at the expense of persons whose in terests  
they  are obliged to r e p r e s e n t . The Panel and its executive will
50- Ibid
51-  (1967)2  AC 46, at 124. See also Queensland Mines Ltd v. H u d s o n  
(1978)52  A.L.J.R 399 (P.C), 18 ALR 1, 3 ACLR 176: Movitex Ltd v. Bulfield  
(1986)2 B.C.C 99, 403
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ensu re  th a t  those in te re s ts  are  not  jeopardized ,  or th a t  the  
sh a re h o ld e r s  w ho  may re ly  on such advice are  den ied  the  
opportunity  to decide on the right offer.53 To il lustrate fur ther ,  a 
general principle of the City Code states that:
Directors of an offeror or an offeree com pany m ust always, in 
advising their shareholders, act only in their capacity as directors 
and not have regard to their personal or family shareholdings or to 
their personal relationship with the company....
As an example, the Panel identif ied th ree  major s ituations 
w here  the conflict of interests  is likely to exist. First, w here  there  
are cross shareholdings be tw een  parties  in offers. Second, w here  
there  are a num ber  of directors common to both companies. Finally 
w here  a person is a substantia l  shareholder  in both  companies 
involved.54 Hence, if directors who are deemed to be involved seek 
to express their  views on the merits or demerits  of offers they  are 
req u i red  f i rs t  and foremost  to set out and to explain  to the ir  
respective shareholders the na tu re  of the conflict. Rule 25 of the 
Code permits  directors to express individually their  v iews on the 
offer. While the possibility tha t  a director may express  his v iew 
from a combination of motives, or tha t  he may be influenced by 
different desires and interests, the Panel provides two alternatives. 
One relates to those having a position of effective control over  the 
com pany  in w hich  conflicts of in te re s t s  arise. The o th e r  is 
concerned  w ith  the d irec tors  split in the i r  v iew s  ab o u t  the 
desirabili ty or undesirabil i ty  of the offer. Concerning the fo rm er
52- See The City Code general principle 9.
5 3 -  See mainly,  Johnston A.. The Citv Takeover Code, p. 209  et  seq,  
supra n.88/Ch2
54-  See further discussion in Ch.6
234
alternative, Note 1 on Rule 25.1 of the Code places directors who 
occupy a position of de facto  control (below 50 %) under  a strict 
obligation toward  the minority shareholders.  They are obliged to 
examine thoroughly and properly the reason and motivation behind 
the advice they  furn ish  to their  shareholders .  The shareholders ,  
additionally, must be put in possession of all re levant  material facts 
which may affect their  interests.  However, al though the decision of 
the  controller  might be final  and should be accepted  by  the  
rem ain ing  shareholders ,  this does not mean th a t  d irec tors  are 
exempt from making any disclosure. Indeed, they are under  a du ty  
to provide all fair and reasonable justifications so th a t  th e y  may 
d ischarge the i r  o b l i g a t i o n s . 5 5  W here the  board of d irec tors  is 
divided in their  views on the merits or demerits  of offers, in the 
view of the Panel, if the board is so divided, each group of directors 
should publish their  views in a separate  way so tha t  shareholders  
will not be denied the opportunity  to make the right decision or be 
placed in a d i lem m a.56 Furtherm ore ,  under  the City Code, if a 
director has a conflict of interests, he normally should not be joined 
w ith  the rem ainder  of the board in the expression of his v iew  on 
the  offer. In consequence,  Rule 23.3 w i th  r e sp e c t  to  giving 
explanat ion  or advice to sha reho lders  s ta tes  th a t  the  d irec tor  
involved must take any responsibil ity incurred on his own. Where 
the whole board of directors of the target company is in conflict, it 
is argued tha t  if a majori ty of directors might be deem ed  to be 
personal ly  in te re s ted  in the t ransac t ion  and the ir  v iew s  m ay 
diverge, "a committee of independent directors, although not in theory
5 5 -  See the Panel's statement  in the Coral case in 1971,  noted b y  A. 
Johnston, at p. 209, supra n.88/Ch.2
5 6 - See the City Code, Rule 25.1, Note 2
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necessary, from a litigation stand point may be d e s i r a b l e " . 57 But in today's  
takeovers  practice, and in par t icu lar  the  p re se n t  s t ru c tu re  of 
com panies  and th e i r  r e la t ionsh ips  w i th  each  o the r ,  such a 
suggestion rem ains  open to doubt as to how to find a n eu t ra l  
committee to perform such a role instead. Surely, w here  conflicts of 
in t e r e s t  are p resen t ,  sh a re h o ld e r s  are, in fact , not  w i th o u t  
al ternatives  if they  disagree w ith  their  directors views. They can 
sell in the market,  refra in from selling and await  a be t te r  offer or 
consideration. To conclude, the most effective rem edy  to conflict of 
in terests  problems is to encourage competi tors. This may afford 
more choice for the ta rge t  company's  shareholders  to sell the ir  
shares to the more advantageous offeror instead of being locked 
with in  a single offer or be placed in a dilemma w h ere  directors 
views diverge about the merits of such an offer.
SECTION FIVE: DUTY TO SEEK ADVICE
According to the City Code, Rule 3.2, the board of the  ta rge t  
com pany is requ ired  to seek advice and, w h e re v e r  necessary ,  
independent  competent advice. This equally applies to the  offeror. 
In order to avoid any serious implication of violating the Code, the 
Panel recom m ends  tha t  part ies  to offers should ob ta in  advice 
before offers are announced and also in the midst of the period of 
offers, including any advice on a potential  revision of offers. This 
recom m enda t ion  equally  applies in France. However, the  chief 
purpose of obtaining such advice is as to w hether  or not the making 
of the offer is in the best  interests  of shareholders  to w hom  the 
offer is intended. Of course, the source from which advice may be
57- Lipton M., Takeover Bids in The Target Board Room, at p. 122 (d) and 
foot note 68, supra n.79/Ch.l.
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obtained may vary. It may be obtained from financial institutions, 
usually banks. It may also be obtained from auditors, accountants, 
lawyers and f requently  from the Panel itself in the U.K and C.O.B in 
France. The contribution of these bodies or persons is absolutely 
vital. In addition to giving advice, they may assist the offeror or the 
offe ree  com pany  in the  p re p a ra t io n  of docum ents ,  and the  
presentat ion  of concise and clear information to the  shareholders  
concerned.
Generally, an adviser may give advice in various contexts. He 
may advise his client about the the manner  of effecting a desired 
transaction, explain any re levant  ambiguous issue of the regulation 
and give genera l  advice on par t icular  k inds of operat ion .  For 
instance, an adviser may be involved in advising and assisting his 
client in the preparat ion of prospectuses, placing of assets, merger, 
purchase by the company of its own shares and more extensively in 
relation to takeovers.
The adviser 's role varies in accordance w ith  the type and kind 
of t ransac t ion  involved. W here  th e re  is a possible conflict of 
interests,  the Panel requires  the board of the offeree com pany to 
obtain independent  advice on the offer or proposal from the chosen 
s tockholders  and the substance of such advice m ust  be made 
known to its shareholders, together w ith  the board's views on the 
offer  or p ro p o sa ls .58 A l though th e  r e q u i r e m e n t  of hav in g  
in d e p e n d e n t  advice is more specific,  o b jec t ive  and  more 
constructive,59 the issue which should, actually, be pointed out, as
58-  Rule 15 (b) of the Code
59-  The panel regards an adviser as disqualified if he is in the same  
group, or w here  he is deemed to be significantly interested in or has a 
f inancial connection with  either the offeree or the offeror of such a kind  
as to create a conflict of interests.
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far as the City Code is concerned, relates to the kind of advice an 
offeror or the offeree company should have in re la t ion  to any 
m at te r  which  is deem ed  to be unclear  or might give rise to 
uncertainty and confusion. In its statement, the Panel explained the 
in te rac t ion  b e tw e e n  the sources from which  advice may be 
obtained. That is to say, the advice given by  the Panel and tha t  
which may be obtained otherwise,  principally legal advice. The 
Panel states that:
Given the emphasis laid down by the Code on the importance of the 
spirit as well as the letter of the Code and on the Panel itself as the 
proper source of interpretation, the seeking of legal advice cannot be 
regarded as a substitute for consultation.60
Correspondingly, seeking legal advice o ther  th a n  from the 
Panel could be to some degree inappropr ia te .  In consequence,  
parties to an offer in doing so may find themselves in breach of the 
Code.61 This means tha t  since the Code is not s ta tu tory  and seeking 
legal advice is by no m eans  a s u b s t i tu te  for  th e  Code's 
in te rp re ta t io n  th a t  is based  on the  sp ir i t  and com m itm en ts ,  
w h e th e r  explicit or implied, of those involved in takeovers  and 
mergers activities. In other words directors are not, in the context, 
u n d e r  a legal or common law principle  of f id u c ia ry  duties .  
Fur therm ore ,  whils t  the Panel recom m ends  par t ies  to offers to 
consult their  own advisers on the issues under  their  consideration 
and in the extreme situation to seek independent  com petent  advice, 
p re s u m a b ly  it does not  also m ean  th a t  f inanc ia l  adv ise rs ,  
accountants, auditors or lawyers have to abstain or abdicate their
60-  Panel statement on Tuner and Newal pic/  AE pic, Oct. 17th, 1986,  
noted bv Morse G. ( 1 9 8 7 H.B.L 140 et seq.
6 1 - Ibid.
own judgement as to the proper application of the City Code rules. 
Therefore, once a conflict of interests,  uncertainty  or o ther  area of 
doubt arises, an adviser should seek Panel guidance in advance. In 
this connection one may wonder  how the Panel operates  its advice 
machinery.
First  of all it is w o r th  re i te ra t ing  th a t  the  Panel,  in the  
perfo rm ance  of its role and duties,  exercises an im m ense  and 
ef fec t ive  po w er  in advis ing ,  p rom ulga t ing ,  a m e n d in g  and 
in te rp re t in g  its code of practice. Such a power could also be 
dis t inguished from the invo lvem en t  of the Code in tak eo v e rs  
practice. In o rder  to keep  the Code’s flexibility, the  Panel  may 
waive or modify its rules as it sees practicable. Similarly, the Panel 
is also en t i t led  to investigate,  take  actions or m ay r e p o r t  the 
offender’s conduct to the relevant authority. But the Panel, in doing 
so, does not concern itself with  the beneficial aspects of takeovers;  
tha t  is a matter  for shareholders to decide, nei ther  does it consider 
the impact of such an offer on competi tion or the w ider  issues of 
public interest; these are the governm en t’s concern. The Panel is a 
regulator of the conditions under  which an offer is conducted, not 
an arbiter  of the offers themselves.62 This s ta tem ent  highlights the 
P an e l ’s at t i tude to the issue in question th a t  its invo lvem en t  in 
takeovers  activities is to ensu re  the  good pe r fo rm ance  of the 
process and to provide an orderly  m arke t  w ithin  which  takeover  
offers are contemplated.
In its capacity as regulator  of specific activity  in par t icu lar  
situations,  the Panel acts as re feree  during the contes t  on any 
misunderstanding of interpretation of the Code and any implication
62-  The Panel statement , 19 8 8 /2  of Jan. 28th, 1988 , noted by Morse G 
(1988) J£L 322 at 323
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th a t  might entail.  This is consistent  w i th  the  Panel  c h a i rm a n ’s, 
s t a te m e n t  th a t  the  Panel sys tem  seeks to reso lve  p rob lem s 
informally while they  are live and before i r revers ib le  action is 
taken  so tha t  the offer may proceed on the r ight basis .63 Since 
takeovers  may involve one or a series of complex transactions, in 
par t icu lar  w h e re  carr ied  out on the  Stock Exchange and the 
consequences may be equally complex, parties to offers, so as to 
avoid any violation, are genera l ly  urged to seek the  Panel 's  
guidance so tha t  their  offers may go in the right way.
S E C T I O N  S I X :  I N S I D E R  D E A L I N G  A N D  D I R E C T O R S ’ F I D U C I A R Y  
D U T I E S
In essence, insider  dealing genera l ly  takes  place w h e re  a 
com pany is the subject of a possible takeover  offer. To pu t  it 
clearer, insider dealing, because of the increasing in te rdependence  
of companies including many other commercial, technical, financial 
or economic as well as family relationships, almost always occur a 
few hours or days before the announcem ent  of offers. Take, for 
instance, the Geoffrey Collier affair  in Britain. As a p rev en t iv e  
measure, most British institutions possess and administer  in-house 
regulations. These regulations often provide tha t  employees should 
not deal in any securities to the prejudice of clients w h e re  the 
dealer ,  acting on his behalf ,  is in possess ion  of p r iv i leged  
information "confidential and price sensit ive"64 about a particular
63- Robert Alexander's statement, Observer, June 5th, 1988,  p.57
6 4 -  For further reading with  respect to price sensi t ive  information,  
see the Stock Exchange and the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers Joint 
Statement  on The announcement of price sensi t ive matters,  ( 1 9 7 7 )  April 
24th,  noted by Weinberg k  Blank, Takeovers and Mergers, at paras 2 7 2 2 6  
and 27235,  supra n l9 /C h l .
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transaction such as a takeover .65 Equally, such regulations require  , 
tha t  all personal dealings should be carried out in accordance with 
in -house  r u l e s . 66 in  violation of the above s ta n d a rd  practice, 
Collier, who was the head of securities at bankers  Morgan Grenfell, 
bought 50,000 shares in the target company, a company called A.E, 
th rough  the American Branch of another  b roker  in the  nam e of 
Cayman Island Holding Co. only a few minutes before a takeover  
bid for such a ta rge t  company was announced by  a com pany for 
which  Morgan Grenfell was acting.67 In July 1987, Collier was  
convicted of insider dealing. In consequence he was fined £25,000 
and given a one yea r  suspended  prison sentence and a bill for 
£7000  costs.68 He, as a disciplinary measure, w as  expelled from 
Stock Exchange membership.69
6 5 -  S.I.B's regulation,  for example ,  Rule 5.21 prohibi ts  securi t ies  
market f irms from carrying out transactions as principal on its ow n  
account if one of its officers or employees  come within  the scope of  the  
Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act, 1985.  However,  exemptions  
may be granted only and only if (a) the only  reason w h y  that officer or 
em p loyee  was  so prohibited w as  because of his knowledge  of the  f irms  
intentions, or (b) none of the officers or employees  of the firm involved in 
effecting or arranging for the effecting of the transactions on behalf  of 
the firm knew or ought to have known of the circumstances giving rise to 
that prohibition...; Corresponding provisions can be found in the T.S.A, 
r.750,  the FIMBRA, r.4.24, the A.F.B.D, r. 5.17.7,  and the I.M.R.O, Ch.IV, 
r .11.06.  for further reading see mainly,  Hannigan B., I n s i d e r  Dealing  
(London, Kluwer Law Publishers, 1988), at Ch. 6, p .137.
6 6 -  For an extens ive  analysis  see, Rider B.A.K and Ffrench H.L , T h e  
Regulation of Insider Trading (London, The Macmillan Press Ltd., 1979)
6 7 -  Collier, having delivered his advice to a client (Hollis) on a bid to be  
made the next day for a Company, called A.E, began dealing in the relevant  
secur it ies  of  the target  com p an y  on his ow n  b eh a l f  prior to the  
announcement of the offer. See Collier Rise and Fall, the Independent,  2nd 
July, 1987.  A corresponding case is discussed by  Herzel L. and Katz L., 
Insider Trading: Who Loses, (1987)165 Lloyds Bank Rev., p.15.
68-  Noted by King M. and Roell A., Insider Trading, ( 1 9 8 8 )  E con om ic  
Eflljgy 165. at p.167; Hannigan B.. Insider Dealing, supra n.66
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Trading in advance of the announcement of a takeover  offer on 
the basis of confidential information, appears clearly detr im enta l  to 
the  in te re s ts  of investors  especially of those involved  in the  
operation and unaware of it.70 But it is uncertain w h e th e r  dealings 
in the  company's securities before a potential  offer is announced 
could be deemed un law fu l71
Who is an insider? What sort of information may an insider  
discloses or r e f ra in  from disclosing? Should he disclose the  
percentage of shares so acquired or to revea l  any profits made 
therefrom as well? Does the scope of the present regulations extend 
to cover manipula t ion? Finally should it be accepted th a t  any  
person dealing too close to an announcement of a potential takeover  
offer be presumed to have knowledge of it? Such questions are all 
controversial  and obviously it is not be possible to discuss such 
matters here in detail. It is equally complex to mention tha t  insider 
dealing as it may be carried out directly by the person w ho is in 
possession of confidential information such as a person pr ivy  to the 
negotiation or who contributes in the decision to make a takeover  
offer. It may also be affected by other persons i.e., t ippees and sub-
6 9 -  Collier's case coincided with  greater awareness of insider dealing  
which  fol lowed the passing of the Companies Securities (Insider Dealing)  
Act 1985. Since then the maximum penalty of two years imprisonment has 
been increased to 7 years by the passing of the Criminal Justice Act, 1987.
7 0 -  The contrary v iew  of insider trading is expressed by  Herzel L and 
Katz, supra n.67, at p.15.
7 1 -  Prev ious ly ,  in France, insider dea ling  action w a s  not  i t s e l f  
prohibited.  Accordingly, an insider was  perfectly at l iberty  to indulge  in 
this type of activities, provided he discloses his transaction in accordance  
with Art.162.1 of the Loi No.66 -537  (O.J. 24 July, p.6402).  But if such a person  
(insider) did not fully disclose his transaction, and he was  in consequence  
thereof convicted, the court were  em pow ered  to order the defaulter to 
refund his profit from the transaction. For further reading see, Rider and 
Ffrench, at p.74 and 198, supra n.66.
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t i p p e e s .72 T ippees’ practice exists w h ere  any person  w ho  has 
knowingly obtained inside information from a person who, in the 
exercise of his function or involvement,  noticed it. Sub-tippees are 
person who knowingly obtained inside information not directly by 
an insider  bu t  th rough  o ther  persons or chain of persons.  For 
instance w h ere  "A" insider passes confidential  in form ation  to ”B" 
(tippee) and "B" communicates it to "C" sub-tippee and "C" circulates it to 
another person who exploits it at the appropriate  t ime.73 It is also 
important  to mention tha t  insider information may be domestically 
used or passed through territories. This might be to a considerable 
extent true, because of the present  wide range of in te rdependence  
of com panies’ relationships. The later type of abusive t rad ing  is 
perhaps the most difficult situation to unearth. Worse is w here  such 
insidious behavior is contemplated across territories, it renders  not 
only the national supervisory  bodies powerless, bu t  also it makes 
the issue more difficult to ascertain or investigate especially, in the 
absence of any cooperation or unders tand ing  b e tw e en  s ta tes .74 
Presum ably  because of obstacles tha t  still exist, in particular  w ith  
re spec t  to fore ign  blocking and secrecy  s ta tu te s  w h ich  v a r y  
depending on the in teres t  which the foreign country  perceives in 
safeguarding information located with in  its jurisdiction. Blocking
7 2 -  The term "obtained" and "received" w ere  the subject of the Court 
decis ion,  see  A t to rn ey  General's r e f e r e n c e  No.l  ( 19 8 9 ) ,  s e e  The  
Independent,  April 14th, 1989, at p. 14. It is worthwhi le  to mention that the  
US supreme court has recently upheld a financial  journalist's conviction,  
see Insider Dealing Judgement Upheld, Financial Times, Nov. 17th, 1987; See  
JLLtd.v. Morgan Ltd & Others. The Independent 5th April 1990.
7 3 -  See Timetable of a Market Leak, The Times, 15th August, 1988; Rider 
and Ffrench, at p. 164 et seq, supra n.66.
7 4 -  Recently both the U.K and France, have  introduced provis ions  
relating to reciprocity. In Britain, see the 1989 Companies Act, Section 82.  
Compare with the French Loi No.89-539,  supra n.5/Ch.4.
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laws often r e p re s e n t  an in v es tm en t  of nat ional  significance in 
certain types of information such tha t  the government may prohibit 
or control its communication outside the terr i tor ia l  boundar ies  of 
the  country ,  secrecy laws, in contrast ,  set up r ights  by  which 
individuals can require  others to maintain the secrecy of specific 
in f  or m a t i o n . 7  ^ in  the light of the  above outl ine it is w o r th  
highlighting tha t  most securit ies m arke t  regulations, in o rder  to 
diminish the likely detr imental  effect on the interests  of investors, 
introduces rules to deal w ith  insider dealing. The.E.C. Commission 
for its part, as far as harmonisation be tw een  national laws of the 
m em ber  states are concerned, has proposed a d irective dealing 
specifically with the problems created by abusive practices such as 
insider trading 76
In France, the problem of insider trad ing  was t rad it ional ly  
dealt  w i th  by the provisions of the Criminal Code, Article 419 
per ta in ing  to genera l  aspects. Article 419 of the  Code Penal  
prohibits  any person from circulating false rum ours ,  or using a 
fraudulent  device to create false impressions and therefore to affect 
the price of securities. But since the scope of such provisions against 
the  increasingly  wide use of abusive practice such as ins ider  
trading is limited, the French governm en t  in troduced a new  Loi 
specifically to prohibit insider trading.77 Such was em bodied in the 
1966 Loi on Commercial Companies (Les Societes Commerciales)
7 5 -  Farrara R.A and Mackintosh J.T, Legal Representat ion,  in the  
International Securities Market (1989)10  Co.Law. p.94
7 6 -  COM (87) III Final, (1987)  O.J C 153/8; amended proposal COM (88) 549  
Final ( 19 8 8 )  O.J C 2 7 7 / 3 ;  Dine J, The Insider  Trading Direc tive,
( 19 8 9 ) Law.Soc.Gaz .. p.23; Tridimas T., Securities  Regulation in The EEC, 
(Working Paper), (Institute of Advance Legal Studies), 6th July 1989.
7 7 -  Rider and Ffrench, at p.232 et seq, supra n.66.
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and the Ordonnance No.67-833 of 28 September,  1967 relating to 
the establishment,  functions and powers conferred on the C.O.B 78 
As it stands, the 1967 Ordonnance confers a wide range of powers 
on the  C.O.B. to police secur i t ies  m a rk e t  conduct  and, most 
im portan tly ,  the protection of investors  w h e th e r  or not a public 
offer is involved.  This Ordonnance, along w i th  the  1966 Loi, 
additionally covers a wide range of persons who are deem ed to 
have inside knowledge which is not publicly disclosed or give rise 
to suspicion pertaining to their  dealings in the com pany’s re levant  
securities. According to the 1966 Act on Commercial Companies 
(Societes Commerciales)79 persons who by reason of their  status, their  
in v o lv e m e n t  in technical ,  f inanc ia l  as w el l  as com m erc ia l  
circumstances and operations of the company, or by  v ir tue  of their  
professional position or family relationships, make use, w h e th e r  
d irectly  or th rough  tippees,  pr ivileged in form ation  before  the 
public become aware of it is convicted of insider dealing. Conviction 
of insider dealing carries a fine of the maximum monetary  penalty  
of 10,000,000 F.F. If such a person has made a profit as a result, the 
amount of the fine may not exceed the profit tenfold. However, any 
monetary  penalty  is largely dependen t  on the seriousness of the
7 8 -  Art 485-1  refers the term "insiders” to include: chairman, directors 
and general  managers (directeurs generaux) members  of the conseil  de 
surveillance, the directoire and those employees  whom the C.O.B expects to 
have access to privi leged information regarding the company's affairs.  
Besides, the provision of Art. 485.1 extends  to cover parent companies,  
subsidiaries and affiliated companies as wel l  as w ives  and minor children.  
Accordingly, in order to discharge from any liability, any person involved  
is required to disclose and report any acquisition of shares to the C.O.B for 
publication.  Loi No.6 6 - 5 3 7  concernant les Societes Commerciales,  supra  
n.71.
7 9 -  Art 162.1 of the Loi 1966 No 66 -537 ,  supra n.71,.as amended by the 
latest  Loi No 89-531  of 2nd August, 1989 relating to transparency of the  
market, supra n 5/Ch2.
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breach. Yet in case of sanction, the am oun t  imposed upon th e .  
charged  pe rson  is paid to the  T re a su ry  (Tresor  Public) .80 
Employees, including civil servants,  if acting outside the ord inary  
performance of their  functions, communicate privileged information 
to a th ird  person who may exploit it, such em ployees  may be 
charged or convicted of imprisonment varying be tw een  one month 
to six months in addition to fine of 10,000 F.F to 100,000 F.F or one 
of those sanctions as the case may be.8 * Discretion rests  w ith  the 
Tribunal de Grand Instance de Paris.82
Due to the growing concern voiced by the financial community, 
the re  was a considerable  change in the governm en t 's  a t t i tude  
toward the legitimacy of i n s i d e r  d e a l i n g . 83 At the p resen t  time, the 
regulation of insider dealing in the U.K., al though shared  be tw een
8 0 -  Art 9.1 of the Loi 8 9 -5 3  1 of 2nd August, 1989 am ending the  
Ordonnance 67 -833  of 28 September, 1967, supra n.5/Ch2.
81- Art 8 inserted into the Ordonnance 67.833 Art 10.1, supra n.5/Ch2.
8 2 -  A rt.11 of the 89.531 Loi inserted a new  provision 12.2 into the  
ordonnance of 1967 No 67 -833  establishing C.O.B.
8 3 -  As for the legality  of transactions entered into, Section 8 (3 )  of the  
Companies (Insiders Dealing) Act 1985, provides that "no transaction is void  
or voidable..." This does mean a breach of this Act results in a transaction  
being illegal under the civil law of contract. It is held that fa ilure to 
disclose a material fact w hich might influence the shareh old ers’ decision  
does not give the right .to avoid the contract’ per Lord Atkin in Bell v. Lever  
Bros Ltd. (1932) A.C , at 227, noted by Rider and Ffrench, at p. 158, supra n.66. 
For an extensive  discussion about insider dealing see mainly, W hite Robin 
C.A, Towards a Policy Basis for The Regulation of Insider Dealing, (1 9 7 4 )  90 
L.O.Rev.. p.494; Morse G., Insider Trading, (1973 )  J.B.L.119; King and Roell, 
Supra n.68; Sugaman D.,(1981) 2 Co Law 13; Herzel L. and Katz L., Insider  
Trading: Who Loses, supra n.69; Rider and Ffrench, The Regulation of 
Insider Trading, supra n.66; Rider B A K, Insider Dealing (Jordan and Sons 
Limited, 1983); Mitchell Phil., Directors Duties and Insider Dealing (London  
Butterworths, 1982); W einberg and Blank, Takeovers and M ergers (4th  
edn), at Ch 23, Paras 2301 et seq, supra n 19/C hl; Johnston A, The City 
Takeover Code, at Part XIII, supra n.88/Ch2; Suter J., The Regulation of 
Insider Dealing in Britain (London, Butterworths, 1989).
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the .governm ent  and self regulations, is s ta tu tor i ly  r egu la ted .8 4 . 
What is interesting to note, quite apar t  from questions of proof, is 
tha t  while the Companies Securities (Insider  Dealing) Act, 1985 
focuses on individuals, self regulation places a res tra in  on member 
firms.85
Under the Insiders  Dealing Act 1985 the m anner  in which 
insider t rad ing  is approached  p resupposes  a ce r ta in  degree  of 
connection between  the target company and the insider. According 
to the Act an insider perta ins to a person connected w i th  a the 
company who either "received" or "obtained"86 unpublished price- 
sensitive information by v ir tue  of his position or invo lvem ent  and 
would  reaso n ab ly  be expected  not to rev ea l  it. How n ea r  a 
connection with a company should be established so as to convict of 
an insider of a criminal offense.
According to the Act a connected person includes directors of a 
com pany  or re la ted  com pany,  officers or em p lo y ees  of th a t  
com pany and any person w ho occupies a position involving a 
professional or business relationship, including any person having 
or may reasonably be expected to have access to confidential price 
sensitive information and which it would be reasonably to expect a 
person  in his posit ion not to disclose except  for the  p ro p e r  
performance of his duties and function.87 In France, by  contrast,  
with  respect to the concept of "connection", Article 10.1 of the 1967
84-  Before 1980 insider dealing w as not a criminal offense in the U.K. 
For further discussion See, Morse G.K. and others, Companies Consolidation  
Legislation 1987 .. at p.596-97 , supra n.l/Ch.4; Johnston A, The Citv Takeover  
£&d£, p .155, supra n.88/Ch2.
85- Supra n.64
8 6 - Supra n.72.
8 7 -  The Companies Securities (Insider Dealing) Act 1985. Section  9 
(herein after C.S.A)
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Ordonnance on which the E.C proposed Directive for the Regulation • 
of Insider Trading is modelled, distinguishes between  principal and 
incidental or occasional insiders. The la tter  consists of persons who 
possess unpublished information 'incidental to the exercise of their  
profession or functions'. This reformulat ion  of link or connection 
produced uncertainties.  Commentators, in france, argue th a t  the 
concept of connection is not necessary to establish a finding. In this 
respect ,  a taxi  d r iv e r  w ho  inc iden ta l ly  ob ta ins  u n p u b l i s h ed  
inform ation  overhear ing  a conversat ion  b e tw een  two direc tors  
should be considered in principle as an insider.88 A Corresponding 
example in Britain relating to the person who informed his host  at  a 
wedding reception tha t  he might be late as 'he was involved in 
merger negotiation’. The host on the ground of the release (whether  
deliberately or not) of such unpublished information made a profit 
of £1100. As he was entirely  unconnected, he was not deem ed  as 
insider.89
When it comes to the question of duties  bo th  regu la t ions  
remain  silent.90 Of utmost importance for the re levant  au thori ty  is 
tha t  a sufficient disclosure must be provided. But who must provide 
the information in question? According to the City Code, the  du ty  
and responsibility in respect of insider dealing rests  with  the whole 
board of directors of both the offeror and the offeree undertaking.
88- Gavalda C, Droits et Devoirs des Inities Dans les Societes par Actions: 
An Example de Collaboration Entre la C.O.B et la Justice Penale (1 9 7 6 )  
Rev.Soc.. p.589. at 597
8 9 -  See the Panel statem ent, Feb 11th, 1976, noted b y  Rider and 
Ffrench, at p .165, supra n.66.
90 -  See in U.K. for instance, P erc iva l v. Right , supra n.7. In this case, 
the directors w ere  held not to be in a fid u c iary  position, P rofessor  
Pennington argue that it is not justifiable. Pennington R.R, Company L aw , 
supra n . l7 /C h l
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General principle 6 of the Code provides tha t  "...all parties to takeover 
transaction must use every endeavour to prevent the creation of a false market 
in the securities of an offeror or offeree company”. Additionally, it has 
s tressed the vita l  importance of absolute secrecy which  m ust  be 
maintained prior to any announcement of an offer.
In order  to p reven t  any leak of information which might be 
used at the  expense of investors  generally ,  in addi t ion  to the 
requ irem en t  of good faith and secrecy, the French authorit ies once 
an offer document is submitted to the C.B.V, suspends quotation. In 
the U.K. the Panel stresses the obligation of both parties involved in 
offers to keep "price sensitive information" secret. Besides, Rule 2.1 
of the City Code stress that:
all persons privy to confidential information, and particularly price- 
sensitive information, concerning an offer or contem plated offer 
must t rea t  tha t information as secret and may only communicate it 
to another person if it is necessary to do so and if th a t  person is 
made aware of the need for secrecy. All such persons must conduct 
themselves so as to minimise the chances of an accidental leak of 
information.
Equally, offerors ' and offeree's advisers,  accountants and any 
pe rso n s  invo lved  are  ail bound  by the  sam e d u t ie s  and  
responsibilities for any leak of unpublished information. In relation 
to even ts  prior to the announcem ent  of an offer, the  ques t ion  
w h e th e r  the p reven t ive  measures  bearing on secrecy could be 
deemed enough to preserve  the good and order ly  conduct of an 
offer. The Panel, however,  did not stop at this  level,  b u t  also 
requ ired  parties involved to make a p re l im inary  an n ouncem en t  
w hereve r  it is regarded appropriate . According to the City Code, a 
pre  an n o u n c em e n t  of an offer in pa r t icu la r  price sens i t ive
information which could be used by an insider at  the  expense of * 
their  investors, is required to be made w hen  the target  undertaking 
is reasonab ly  confident th a t  an offer would  be made or w h en  
negotiations or discussions were  about to be extended to embrace a 
wider  group of interested persons. P re-announcem ent might also be 
requ ired  w hen  the ta rge t  under taking is the subject of tu rnover  
and speculative buying shares and also when following an approach 
to the offeree undertaking, there  is an untoward  m ovem ent  in its 
share price. However, rum ours  and speculation may have serious 
consequences upon the target com pany’s m arke t  price of its quoted 
securities. In this connection, the Panel considers tha t  w h en  there  is 
no public exp lana t ion  for this e v e n t  and th e re  has  b ee n  no 
approach to the ta rge t  company, it is likely tha t  it is the  act of a 
potential offeror ei ther through inadequate security or th rough  the 
purchase  of shares,  which have led to the re su l ted  in a false 
market.  For this and other reasons, under  the City Code, the  prime 
responsibility to make the appropriate announcement lies w ith  the 
o f fe ro r  and  th e  o f fe re e  b o a rd s  of d i r e c t o r s . 9 ! P r o m p t  
announcement is required to be made when, following an approach 
to the offeree company, there  is an un tow ard  m o v em en t  in its 
share price or when  a potential offeror has been nam ed in rumours .  
Rule 2.2(d) makes it clear tha t  when, before an approach has been  
made, the  offe ree  com pany  is the  sub jec t  of r u m o u r s  and 
speculation or un tow ard  price m ovem ent  and th e re  reasonab le  
grounds for concluding tha t  it is the potential  offerors '  activities 
(w he the r  th rough  inadequa te  securit ies,  purchas ing  of offeree
91- Noted by Morse (1988) JLILL. 70; Panel's statement of 10th September, 
1987. A movement of 10% in the absence of any explicable facts is deem ed to 
be untoward., Rule 2.3 of the City Code.
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company shares or otherwise) which have led to the situation. The 
offeror should, therefore ,  keep  a close w atch  on the  potentia l  
offeree company's share price for signs of any untoward movement. 
Taking into account the effect of rum ours  and speculation which 
cannot sometimes be avoided, at an early  stage of an offer, the 
Panel stresses tha t  the absence of a price rise, w h en  o ther  factors 
merit  an announcement,  does not justify failing to announce. In 
response to the arguments  which might be advanced by  an offeror 
th a t  an announcem ent  in such an even t  (when the  proposals are 
still tentative) might in itself be misleading, the Panel w arned  them 
tha t  this can be avoided by a proper explanation and th a t  is not a 
just if ica t ion for allowing existing u n ce r ta in ty  to c o n t in u e .92 
Additionally, w hen  prior to a f irm intention to make an offer is 
notified, the re  is a discussion and talks about an offer, the  Panel 
requires  a brief announcement for tha t  purpose should be made at 
the  o u tse t .93 In addition, Note 1 on Rule 4.2 of the  City Code 
restricts any person from dealing or procuring others to deal before 
the announcem ent  of the offer, if the offeror has b een  supplied 
w ith  confidential price sensitive information in the course of the 
offer discussion. A corresponding restr ic tion in respect  of dealings 
in the target company securities is placed on any person, not being 
the offeror, who is privy to confidential price sensitive information 
concerning an offer or contemplated  offer. A similar prohibit ion 
applies to offerors  who have been  supplied  w i th  or rece ived  
confidential price sensitive information in the course of a takeover  
d iscuss ion  f rom  w h a te v e r  sou rce .94 In f u r th e r a n c e  to such 
restrictions, the Code also prohibits persons who are pr ivy  to such
92- Ibid, at p.71.
9 3 - City Code, Rule 24
94- City Code, Rule 4.
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information from making any recommendation to any other parties . 
as to dealing in the relevant securities or procuring others to deal.
Where, following a pre-announcement tha t  talks and discussion 
are in progress, no dealings may be allowed to go ahead  in the 
re levant  shares of the ta rge t  company w he the r  by the offeror or 
any  person  p r ivy  to unpub lished  price sensi t ive  inform ation .  
Prohibition under this rule also extends to cover dealings which are 
p re s u m e d  to be c o n t ra ry  to pub l ished  advice f u rn i s h e d  to 
shareholders  by their  represen ta t ives  or financial advisers,  w h en  
their  intention is disclosed. However, although the Panel's  decision 
lacks legislative power, if a breach of the Code is noticed, the Panel 
may have recourse to pr ivate  rep r im an d  or public censu re  or 
warning as the case may be. The Panel may also repor t  the suspect 
to other  regula tory  authorit ies namely, the D epartm ent  of Trade 
and Industry ,  the Stock Exchange, the S.I.B. or the re levan t  S.R.O. 
Depending on the degree of breach involved, penalt ies  may be 
prosecution,  w i th d ra w a l  of recognition, cold shou lde r ing  the  
defau l ter  or to inst i tu te  a te m p o ra ry  or definite suspens ion  of 
listing.
Dealing w ith  inside information by persons, legally speaking, 
may en ta i l  civil and cr im inal  rem ed ies .  Unlike m a n y  o th e r  
countries, for instance France, the British Government plainly made 
it clear both prior to the introduction of legislation and during the 
passage of the 1980 Companies Act, th a t  the pu rpose  of th a t  
provision was not to provide compensation for those who might be 
said to have  suffered  loss as the re su l t  of ins ider  dea l ing .9 5 
Although there is no realistic basis as to w hy  civil action w as  not
9 5 -  C.S.A.1980. For further reading see, Rider B.A.K, (1980 )1  C o .L a v .. 
p.279.
a c c e p t e d ,  i n  t h e  v i e w  o f  t h e  g o v e r n m e n t  t h e  r e a s o n s  w h y  c iv i l  
r e m e d i e s  h a v e  b e e n  p u t  a s i d e  w a s  t h a t  "civil remedies or proceedings 
are likely to be expensive, time consuming and an insufficient deterrent...".96
The second point, which is also controversial,  concerns the 
exclusion of companies from the scope of insider dealing regulation. 
Following the omission of such issues, it has been argued th a t  the 
distinction be tw een  individuals  and companies is clearly open to 
abuse, for companies can, and often do, par t ic ipate  in insider  
dealing. Since o ther  countries  enacted  legislation to cover this 
matter, it surely was not beyond the legislator to include companies 
with  the scope of the re levant  insider dealing regulation.97 Yet, the 
government 's  chief aim was to exclude companies as such because 
they  as legal entit ies cannot breach the regulation. Violation are 
always made by h u m an  beings w h e th e r  or not acting for the 
account of such companies and therefore, would be*liable for doing 
so since th e y  are individuals  such as directors,  officers including 
shadow directors officers and employees. What is clear, however,  is 
tha t  the  British legislature, in policing insider  dealing, combine 
disclosure requirements  and criminal sanctions.
In conclusion, it can be noticed tha t  insider trading is a criminal 
offense in most legislations. As far as civil liability is concerned, 
while in Britain it is not an accepted m easure ,98 in France the
9 6 -  Unlike the present statutes, the 1973 Bill made provision  and 
proposed sanctions for both criminal and civil remedies. In the 1978 Bill a 
distinction  w as  draw n b etw een  cases for w h ich  there w e r e  crim inal  
sanctions and other deals for which there w ere  civil rem edies, the latter  
did not appears either in the 1980 Act nor in the 1985 Act. see Morse, 
-Companies_Consolidation Legislation. 1987 . at p.596, supra n.l/Ch.4.
9 7 -  Jenkins Committee report (1 9 6 2 )  Cmnd.1749; The Conduct of  
Companies Directors (Cmnd 7037); See Sugarman, supra n.83.
9 8 -  The contrary v ie w  is expressed by the Jenkins Committee. It states
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legislator regards civil remedies as part  of the breach. Additionally, 
u nder  the  British Company (Securities dealing) Act, 1985, any 
contract en tered  into with  an insider is valid in accordance with  
p r iva te  law of contract.  In France, a l though th e re  ap p e a rs  no 
explanation on such an issue, it is implicitly deemed to be lawful as 
well. Accordingly, an explanation, normally, should be provided as 
to w h y  such a contract of sale or purchase rests  valid b u t  not void 
or voidable. The E.E.C. in tu rn  nei ther  provides an explanation on 
the issue of penalties nor on the validity of a contract en tered  into 
with  insiders. Art.l 1 of the E.C. Directive on Insider Dealing leaves 
the  n a tu re  of offenses and d e te rm in a t io n  of the  ap p ro p r ia te  
penalties to the national authorit ies.  That is to say the situation 
remains am b ig u o u s ."  Finally, it should be pointed out tha t  the  U.K 
re levan t  authorit ies effectiveness to encounter  insider dealing is 
p resen t ly  under  threat .  Commentators argue tha t  Britain should 
have a legal supervisory body with a rigorous and w ider  legislative 
power similar to the US SEC or Corresponding to w ith  the  French 
C.O.B. The option would be to bring the power of the D.T.I, the  S.I.B 
and the Stock Exchange under a uniform single body endowed with  
of legal power so tha t  to resolve the problem of 'who does what ,  
when  and where ' .100
that a director 'who in any transaction relating to the securities  of his 
company or any other company in the same group, makes improper use of 
a particular piece of a confidential information w hich  might be expected  
m aterially  to affect the va lue  of those securities , should be liable  to 
com pensate a person w ho suffers from his action in so doing, unless that  
information w as known to that person' Jenkens Report, (1 9 6 2 )  Cmnd. 1749,  
at para 99(b).
99- Insider Dealing Case Collapses, The Gardian, 24th Jan, 1990; Blake A., 
The Proposed Crime of Insider Dealing (1978) Preston Law Rev. 3 9 -4 8 ,  noted  
in (1980)1 Co.Law.
100- Ibid.
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CHAPTER SIX 
OFFERORS’ AND OFFEREE’S TACTICS
In the previous chapters discussion was on both the protection 
of shareholders  and the directors’ f iduciary duties. There are also 
other param ount and closely related matters  concerning p rem ature  
and formal announcement.  The purpose of the announcem en t  of 
offers as well as information disclosure is designed fundam enta l ly  
to p re se n t  to public inves to rs  a ce r ta in  m in im um  degree  of 
t ransparency  which, on the one hand, enables the shareholders  to 
identify the controllers of their  company as well as the location of 
its key assets, and, most importantly, to detect the likely effect on 
the good performance in the re levan t  marketplace on the  other. 
Generally, once offers are announced, parties to take over offers are 
placed under  s tr ingent  provisions which are designed to ensure  
tha t  shareholders  to whom offers are made are fair ly t rea ted  and 
accurately and concurrently informed. Sometimes, directors of the 
ta rg e t  under tak ing  may be unwilling to change control  w hich  
offerors seek to obtain. Alternatively  they  may em ploy  var ious  
tactics at their  disposal to keep the independence of their  company. 
Although varied, such tactics have become common place. Here, it is 
w o r th  highlighting th a t  the  e f fec t iveness  of such tac t ics  is 
d e p e n d e n t  la rgely  on the  s ta te  of the  ta rg e t  com pany ,  the  
dynam ism  of its d irec tors  as well  as the  co l labo ra t ion  and 
u n d e r s ta n d in g  of sh a reh o ld e rs .  F u r th e rm o re ,  an y  d e fen s iv e  
technique tha t  is conceived of and implemented  either prior to an 
offer or at the time the offer is publicly announced is almost always 
ad o p ted  and im proved  in the light of ail r e le v an t  facts  and
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surrounding circumstances namely, legal, financial, economic, social 
and even political. But defensive or offensive tactics which  are 
typically appropriate to one offer in one country may be wholly or 
partly inappropriate  or even illegal in another. For instance, in the 
U.K., directors of the ta rge t  undertak ing  may f ree ly  reac t  to any 
offer whilst in France, they  are much more restricted.
Whilst  the re  is now w idespread  concern about  the  kind of 
defensive m easures  th a t  are used by the  board  of the  ta rg e t  
company against unwanted  offerors, there  is much less discussion 
about how far and w hat  kind of strategy the offeror might use to 
gain control. Hence this chap te r  will, f irst,  exam ine the  legal 
implications of the offeror’s tactics employed to avoid the ta rge t  
co m p an y ’s defensive s t ra tegy  and thus  secure control. In this 
context, it is interesting to mention th a t  the implications of the 
offeror’s techniques may be legal, financial, economic and social, or 
any combination of these aspects. Second, this chapter  will discuss 
bo th  the  p rev en t iv e  and rem ed ia l  defens ive  m easu res  of the  
offeree in the hope of frustrating unwanted offerors. In the light of 
this environment,  this chapter  will look closely at the a t t i tude  of 
the re levant regulator in the field.
SECTION ONE: OFFEROR’S TACTICS
1.1- OFFER CONDITIONS
Naturally, like the board of the ta rge t  company, offerors may 
employ a s tra tegy tha t  is most suited to itself. As a p reven t ive  
measure,  a potential offeror tries to construct the terms of the  offer 
to its advan tage .  F u r th e rm o re ,  in o rd e r  to avoid an y  legal 
implications, the offeror almost always rese rves  the r igh t  to set
256
aside any s ta tem ents  which are expected to be made during the 
immediate period of an offer. Nowadays, it is becoming customary 
tha t  any offer is always made to shareholders conditional upon the 
am ount of acceptance stated in the offer document. If the s tated 
am ount  of acceptance is not reached, such conditions allow the 
offeror to discharge without prejudice from any binding obligations 
and responsibilities. The most common conditions contained in any 
offer document are those which enable the offeror to accept or not 
the  amount of shares offered tha t  exceeds the te rm ed  percentage 
level sought to be attained. Moreover, if the num ber  of acceptance 
falls below the am ount  of shares  sought to be purchased ,  the 
offeror may or may not accept the par t  of shares offered a t  all.* 
For tactical or f inancial reasons, the offeror may always p refer  
keeping the amount of shares received from shareholders.  When a 
takeover  climate permits, the holder may quickly consider making 
a swift purchase and thus increase its position of control. Thus the 
first implication in relation to the la tter  form of acquisition is tha t  
under  the City Code as well  as the  1989 Companies Bill, each 
fu r the r  acquisition might be the subject of disclosure. Additionally, 
unlike the  City Code, clause 91 of the  Companies Bill 1989 
advocated th a t  “When a person has acquired more than 15% of the nominal 
value of the share capital of a company, he shall come under the obligation to 
make an offer for the remaining share capital of that company”.2
1- For financial reasons offerors do often  accept the proportion of  
shares being offered even  though it is not satisfactory. Hence offerors m ay  
either consider a sale to the successful offeror at a premium or, keep  such a 
percentage as investm ent in the offeror company.
2- Clause 91 of the Bill was not incorporated in the C.A.1989.
1.2- PRELIMINARY CONTACT OR APPROACH 
When a potential offeror has determined tha t  at least a par t  of 
its growth and expansion should be accomplished through takeover  
ra ther  than internal effort, a takeover decision is vital. It should be 
made with full understanding of the implications. As pointed out, 
the board of the target  company may oppose any takeover .  They 
may also, depending on the state of their  company, suppor t  or seek 
a buyer  for the purpose. Nevertheless,  offerors, w h e th e r  potential  
or actual, often start  their  action by a mutual approach in the hope 
of getting the  ta rge t  co m p an y ’s recom m endat ion .  In s i tuations 
w here  a fr iendly approach has been rejected or the re  is no answer 
at all by the target  com pany’s directors, or w here  it is expected to 
be tu rned  down, the offeror has to find a more sophisticated means 
of c ircumventing d i rec to rs ’ opposit ion. At this stage, th e re  are 
various techniques to secure a position of control, or at least  to 
enforce tha t  control, albeit  they  are not wholly identical.  As a 
preamble to its takeover strategy, the offeror may gradually  begin 
buying on the market.  He may also gain his ba t t le  of control 
th rough  a proxy fight. But the  success of both  tactics assum es  
sufficient financial and other al ternate support.  Finally the offeror 
tr ies  to use the most popular  and the quickest  a l te rn a t iv e  i.e 
takeover  offer, in par ticular  w h e n  resis tance is expected .  The 
question at issue is w he the r  the offeror should launch its offer and 
wait for the end result? Should the offeror seek outside suppor t  to 
at ta in  the desired objective? Should the offeror in te rvene  in the 
market  before as well as during the immediate  period of the offer? 
Some of the following tactics which the offeror might em ploy  in 
conjunction with  its offer will be discussed below in turn .  These
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include seeking financial support,  collecting a prior commitment,  
making a dawn raid, buying from a warehouse, and inducing other 
par t ies  to act in concert  w i th  it, including the  publ ic i ty  and 
advertising campaign. It is w orthy  of note tha t  the str ictness of the 
re levan t  regulation relating to such techniques v a ry  grea t ly  from 
one country  to another, though all tactics form one com ponent  of 
the whole takeover operation.
1.3- COLLECTION OF IRREVOCABLE PRIOR COMMITMENTS
Perhaps one of the most delicate devices to secure a sufficient 
pe rcen tage  of voting control is th rough  the collection of pr ior  
commitments as to acceptance. Prior commitment to accept an offer is 
not a new method. It is often used by an offeror, e i ther  prior to 
making a formal offer or during the immediate period of tha t  offer, to 
induce the holders of a substan tia l  proportion of shares  carrying 
unres tr ic ted  voting control to accept i r revocably  its proposal.3 At 
the beginning of 1970 irrevocable prior com m itm ent  to accept an 
offer technique was the subject of growing concern. Technically, the 
shut  out offer appears  to have a significant d e t e r r e n t  effect  on 
potential competitors and shareholders.  This is so w here  directors of 
the target  company have determined, for w hatever  reason, to ensure  
tha t  no competi t ive offer could be made or accepted even  if it is 
made at a higher price. Such an understanding or agreem ent  which is 
concluded by the directors of the vulnerable company would, indeed, 
ha rm  subs tan t ia l ly  the  in te re s ts  of sha reho lde rs  and th e  good 
performance and reputation of the market.
Prior to the City Code, a potential or actual offeror could obtain
3- In Britain, this method is known as " shut out offer". See Johnston  
A. The Citv Takeover Code., at p , 7 7  and 99 s u p r a  n R R / C h ?
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effect ive control simply by approaching  f inancial  ins t i tu t ions ,  
substantial  shareholders,  or even directors w ithout making a general 
offer to all the shareholders .^  Besides, the holders of a significant 
percentage of the voting control in the ta rge t  company could often 
make an alternative deal on much more favourable te rm s than  were  
in practice offered to the res t  of the shareholders .5 In the light of 
experience which dem onstra ted  the seriousness of such dealings, 
seve ra l  ru les  w ere  in t roduced  in add i t ion  to the  s u b s e q u e n t  
a m e n d m e n t  of the  th e n  existing rules.  These provis ions  w e re  
primarily  designed to c ircumvent marke t  malpractice. Accordingly, 
the Panel requires, nowadays, any potential or actual offeror, which 
has any reason to believe tha t  it can im plem ent its offer in full, to 
include, amongst other things, details of any existing holding in the 
offeree company in respect of which it has received an ir revocable 
com mitm ent to accept its proposal. In addition, tha t  offeror should 
also set out details in respect of which the offeror involved holds an 
option to purchase.  Hence as a fu r th e r  r e q u i r e m e n t  par t ies  to an 
offer, especially offerors, are obliged to specify in w ha t  circumstances 
commitments  to accept an offer will cease to be binding.^ This has 
its origin in the Panel s ta tem ent of 1971, which indicated, in ter  alia, 
that:
...when more than one party  has made an approach to a board and 
seems to be contemplating a bid, no shut out bids should be allowed 
without all parties being aware that a potential competitive situation 
exists and being given an opportun ity  to make a s ta tem en t to 
shareho lders  of the offeree com pany before  the  sh u t  ou t is 
given."7
4- Ibid, at p.76
5- Ibid.
6- City Code, Rule 2.5
7 -  The Panel's note of practice no.7 of 1971, noted b y  Johnston A., at 
p.178, supra n.88/.Ch,2.
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In France any agreement is deemed invalid unless notified to 
C.O.B. in advance.8
1.4- FRUSTRATION OF A POTENTIAL MERGER PLAN 
It is possible to assume th a t  b idders ,  w h e th e r  f inancially  
supported  by a banker  or not, may buy or invest  in a company 
which is most likely to be a potential rescuer.  They may also effect 
substantia l  transactions by stealth in tha t  company or in the  the 
company with which a bidder in the short or long te rm  may acquire 
(target).  It is w o r th  re i tera ting th a t  the  Panel policy rela ting to 
m arke t  purchase is generally  understood to mean th a t  w h e re  a 
potential offeror has not approached a target  company and is thus
i  '
not in possession of confidential information, such an offeror is 
regarded  as any other ord inary  m arke t  purchaser  and should be 
permit ted  to deal in the shares in the prospective offeree company 
or in the shares of any other company. But once the re  has been  
some contacts, potential offerors or any person acting in concert 
with  them are automatically precluded from dealing in the ta rge t  
company shares until the announcement of their  f irm intention  to 
make an offer. The question of concern to w hich  the  ensuing 
discussion re la tes  is how to f ru s t ra te  a po ten t ia l  m erge r  plan 
between  the vulnerable company and a rescuer or be a substantia l  
shareholder in the combined company?
A tactic which is often used by the target company to f rus t ra te  
a potential offeror’s action is through the search for a friendly  third 
company. The third company may either outbid the initial offeror 
with the support of the offeree's board of directors or directly enter
8- See the effect of prior commitments to accept an offer d iscussed in
Ch.l.
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into a merger  ag reem en t  w ith  the ta rge t  com pany by  passing a, 
resolution in a general  meeting. Such was the defense taken  by 
Trav is  and A rno lds  ( m e r c h a n t  b u i ld e r )  to d e f e a t  M eyer  
In te rn a t io n a l ’s ( t im ber  giant)  213m. offer. The la t te r  having 
a lready  acquired 28% of Travis voting control, indicated th a t  it 
in tended to increase fu r ther  its shareholdings. The directors of the 
ta rge t  company had strongly rejected the Meyer offer and w ere  
instead recommending Sandei Perkins'  143m merger offer, another 
company which operates in the same field of business e s  the target. 
In order  to discourage the th ird  company and to c i rcum vent  the 
res is tance  of the directors of the ta rge t  com pany ,9 the  initial 
offeror 's  cha irm an  pointed out th a t  even  though the  proposed 
merger w ere  to be approved by the holder of 50%, its company 
would inevitably  occupy a position of s treng th  in the combined 
structure.  Therefore, the rescuer should consider and th ink again 
about the advantages of the merger before being im p l e m e n t e d . ^  
Finally one may argue tha t  such a tactic is difficult to im plem ent  
because it involves timing, cost and probabili ty about w ho or which 
company might be a rescuer  of a vu lnerab le  company unless the 
acquirer is an insider.
1.5- DAWN RAID
The dawn raid is another technique to build up a sufficient 
percentage  of voting r ights control in the ta rge t  company. The 
purchase is always swiftly carried out at a price significantly higher 
than  the market price. Since this tactic is usually carried out before
9- Save question of d isagreem ent b e tw een  shareholders to w hom  the  
initial offer is addressed and their board of directors’ recom m endation  for 
the third offer merger.
1 0 - The Independent, 10th October.1988, p.25.
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the offer is officially announced, the offe ror’s in ten t ion  a t  th a t  . 
p re l im inary  stage may not be revealed.  Nonetheless it may be 
explained to the press as a mere investment.  Take this instance. 
Before the fierce bat t le  for the control of the British com pany  
Rowntree, a manufacturer  in the food sector, one of the potential 
Swiss com pet i to rs  (Jacobs Suchard)  before  making a fo rm a l  
approach,  bought approx im ate ly  15% of the  ta rg e t  c o m p a n y ’s 
(Rowntree) shares carrying unrestricted rights. The justification put 
forward  to the press by tha t  raider was tha t  it had no intention to 
make an offer, provided someone else did first. However, the  issue 
of the dawn raid is neither a new concept nor an improper tactic.11 
But, if left unregulated,  it will inevitably  h am p er  s h a re h o ld e r s ’ 
interests .  This is appa ren t  from the fact th a t  a daw n raid  is an 
operation which may be achieved not only within a matter  of hours, 
bu t  also creates an ill informed market. This assum ption  implies 
th a t  only a few (the well informed persons) will benef i t  at  the 
expense of other ill-informed shareholders. Take another  example, 
De Beers for the control of Consolidated Gold Fields. De Beers, after 
pu rchase  of a significant undisclosed th resho ld  in the  t a rg e t  
company (Consolidated Gold Fields), announced on 12th Feb, 1980 
tha t  it held either directly or indirectly 14% of the equi ty  capital of 
the ta rge t  company and tha t  it was considering making ano ther  
purchase to increase its position of control up to 25%. Indeed,  
following the  announcem ent ,  the des ired  level w as  p ro m p t ly  
increased in a matter  of or less than  a half an h o u r 12 on the same
11- The appearance of the practice of dawn raids w as the subject of 
growing concern and debate. See Rider B.A.K, Concert Parties Ending in  
Dawn Raid, (1 9 8 0 )  1_ Co.law.. p.218, Dawn Raids-Putting The City's House in  
Order (1 9 8 0 ) l .Cq.Law..p.303
12- Sugarman D., Fair Market Versus. Unfeterred Market ...,(1980)1 £&
263
day of the 12th.
The Stock Exchange’s underlying policy at tha t  time was tha t  
the re  was no justifiable im proper  conduct deriving from dawns 
raids practice.15 The Department of Trade and Indus try  showed no 
intention to become involved with  the regulation of " dawn raid " or 
m arke t  purchase. Those w ere  matters  considered to be far b e t te r  
left to the Stock Exchange and the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
w ith  the ir  intrinsic flexibility to c i rcum vent  any m alpract ice .14 
However, the Council for the Securities Indus try  (C.S.I.) considered 
the  issue differently. It  recom mended its m em bersh ip  to ref ra in  
from participating in dawn raids .15 Likewise, commentators  regard 
dawn raids as distorting the principle relating to equal t r e a tm e n t  
and o p p o r tu n i ty  for all sh a re h o ld e r s .16 They have  also been  
viewed as prejudicing investment judgements since a shareholder,  
faced w ith  a higher offer price for the ir  shareho ld ings  to be 
accepted within a couple of minutes or hours, has no choice bu t  to 
accept w i th o u t  seeking to know  w ho  the  b u y e r  i s .17 O t h e r  
comments focus on the change of control in any potential takeover  
offer in favour  of the purchaser.  In most instances, a th reshold  
between  25% to 30% of the voting rights in the ta rge t  company, or 
even far less than tha t  percentage threshold, can enable the holder
Law, p.255: Chaikin D. Can The "Dawn Raids” Rule Really Make for Fairer 
Takeovers Tactics (1981)2  Co.Law., p.228.
13- Rider B.A.K, Concert Parties Ending in Dawn Raid, supra n . l l ,  at 
p .218 and 304, (1981) 2 Co. Law, at p.2
14- A consultative document focussing on the disclosure of in terest in  
shares. Published by the DOT on the 1 1th of August 1980. See also Cmnd.988, 
paras 23-25, July 21st, 1980.
15- C.S.I. statement of 7th August 1980, noted in (1981)1 Co .Law, p.303.
1 6 - Supra n.12 and 14.
17- Sugarman D, Fair Market Versus. Unfeterred Market, p.255.,  supra
n.12.
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of a such p ropor t ion  to exercise an ef fec t ive  control.  I t  is 
worthwhile to mention tha t  the issue of dawn raids was considered 
to involve the practice of acting in concert .18 Accordingly, rigorous 
and specific rules have been introduced to deal w ith  m arke t  raids. 
These rules have been embodied in the City Code rules governing 
substantial acquisition of shares (SAR’S).19 A significant fea tu re  of 
the dawn raid provisions is, first, the period of the purchase should 
not exceed seven days. Second, for the purpose of the shareholders '  
protection, five days notice must be given to the Stock Exchange. 
The notice should, a t  least,  con ta in  the  following r e l e v a n t  
information: about the offeror and his fu tu re  intention, the  am ount 
of shares in tended to be acquired, and any concluded agreem ent  or 
unders tanding  be tw een  each other (the buyer  and the seller) for 
the purpose. Hence the main restriction in the context is th a t  the 
raider must not deal throughout the period of notice. Subsequently,  
the re levan t  rules w ere  ex tended  to cover, in addi t ion to daw n 
raids, other associated problem principally concert parties.  One of 
the fundam enta l  objective the C.S.I. intend to achieve, in an effort  
to p r e v e n t  d iso rder ly  swift m a rk e t  purchase ,  is, at  least,  to 
maintain the reputa tion and the integrity of the takeovers  market.  
Similarily, such provisions are not only designed to reduce  the  
speed of such market purchases but to ensure fairness of dealing, to 
secure  a m in im um  s ta n d a rd  of p ro tec t ion  and  to p ro v id e  
w idesp read  information as to dealings. Hence, as far  as m a rk e t
18- Rider B.A.K, supra n.l 1, at p.304
19- The Rules governing substantia l acquisition  of shares  (h ere in  
after SAR.), which came into force on 1 1 /1 2 /1 9 8 0 ,  had its origin in the C.S.I 
statement of 5th September and 3rd of October 1980 respectively. For further  
discussion, see Sugarman D, Fair Market Versus. Unfeterred Market p.303,  
supra n.12
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information is concerned, in view of the C.S.I., the five days notice . 
should be sufficient to allow the leas t  in fo rm ed  inves to r  an 
opportun i ty  to participate in the deal.20 However, the vital  issue 
which tr iggered concern within the financial com munity  was tha t  
the C.S.I, following the formulat ion  of the SARs' rules,  did not 
consider the m arke t  dealers* practice as well as the problem of 
selling short (selling shares you do not own) during the immediate  
period of pu rchase  o p e ra t io n .21 In 1985, af ter  re sum ing  its 
position, the Panel, introduced new provisions in the City Code to 
cover the category of market makers and fund managers.22
By vir tue  of the SARs’ rules , in addition to the 5 days notice, a 
person or anyone acting in concert w ith  him may not in any period 
of 7 days  increase  his shareho ld ings  in a co m p an y  if such 
acquisit ion, w h e n  aggregated  w ith  any  shares  or r igh ts  over  
s h a r e s 23 which he a lready holds, would am ount to a percentage 
b e tw e e n  15% and 3o% of the  voting  contro l  of the  t a rg e t  
com pany .24 Under the SAR’s rules restriction on acquisit ion does 
not apply if the acquisition of shares carrying unres tr ic ted  rights  
made in the preceding 6 days with the acquisition about to be made 
on th a t  day amounts to less than  10%.25 In order  to de te rm in e  
w he the r  or not an acquisition of shares falls within the scope of the
20- See mainly, Rider B.A.K, supra n.l 1.
21- Ibid. See also Chaikin D., Dawn Raid Rule as a Practical Tests, (1980)2 
CO.Law. p. 228
22- The Panel subjected both market makers and fund managers to the 
requirements of recognition and exemptions. The City Code, introduction.
2 3 -  Rights over shares are defined by the Code to include "any rights  
acquired by  a person by virtue of an agreem ent to purchase shares or an 
option to acquire shares or an irrevocable com m itm ent to accept an offer to 
be made by him.” City Code’s definitions.
24- Rule 1 of the SAR.
2 ^- Notes on Rule 1 of the SAR.
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SAR’s restrictions, calculation must be made by reference to shares 
already held, shares about to be acquired in the same business day 
and any other already acquired shares on tha t  day. Accordingly, if 
the aggregate acquisit ion is less th an  10%, fu r th e r  pu rchase  is 
allowed to be carr ied  on. But w h e re  the  aggregate acquisit ion 
exceeds 10%, purchase of shares may not be permit ted  unless such 
an acquisition is:
(a) from a single shareholders if it is the only such acquisition within 
any period of 7 days; or (b) pursuant to a tender offer in accordance 
w ith Rule 4; or (c) immediately before the person announces a firm 
intention to make an offer (whether or not the posting of the offer is 
to be subject to a precondition) provided th a t  the offer will be 
publicly recom m ended by, or the acquisition is made w ith  the  
agreement of, the board of the offeree company, and the acquisition 
is conditional upon the announcement of the offer.26
The significance of the SAR’s Rules ref lects  the  idea  th a t  
sha reho lders  m ust  be t rea ted  fa ir ly  and p rovided  w i th  equa l  
opportunities and sufficient time to make a well informed decision 
as to acceptance and the ta rge t  company should have  sufficient 
time to consider its position in the light of such purchases. Like the 
City Code, the  la tes t  Companies Bill, 1989 reco m m en d ed  th ree  
triggering levels; 3%, 10% and 13%. Accordingly, any person seeking 
to acquire or has acquired share in the ta rge t  company, is not 
allowed to increase the percentage  level of his sha reho ld ings  
beyond these percentage levels w ithou t  10 days separa t ing  the  
date of the f irs t  purchase and the subsequen t  acquisit ion.27 The 
obligation to make a general offer for the remaining share capital of
26- Rule 2 of the SAR.
27 -  Recommendations of the Companies Bill of Jan.3oth 1989 contained  
in Clause 220 A (1) w ere not incorporated in the C.A.1989.
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the target company arises w herever  the third triggering percentage 
level (15%) is exceeded.28 Besides, any offeror, coming under  the 
obligation, should make a s ta tem ent of his intentions for the fu ture  
management of tha t  company.29
1.6- WAREHOUSING30
A - DEFINITION UNDER THE TAKEOVERS REGULATION
The term "warehousing”31 is defined by the Panel as:
the practice w hereby  a person or company (or a group of persons 
and, or com panies) accum ulates, w ith o u t  public disclosure, a 
substantia l block of shares in a company w ith  a view  e ithe r  to 
making a takeover bid or to selling the block to someone else who 
then makes a bid.32
Since the w arehouser  is able to avoid disclosure, it is possible 
for effective control of listed public companies to be ob ta ined  
through such a body in a matter of days or hours. This would imply
28- Ibid.
29- Ibid.
30 It is b eyon d  the scope of the th es is  to deal in deta il  w ith  
w arehousing  practices. For reading on the subject, see Rider B.A.K and 
Ffrench H.L, The Regulation of Insider Dealing, p .13 to 14, 176 and 273, supra 
n.67/Ch.5; Johnston A., The Citv Takeovers Code, supra n .88/C h2, at p.69; 
Farrar J. H, Farrar’s Company Law. (2nd.edn),(London Butterworths, 1988) at 
p.549; Weinberg k  Blank, Takeovers and Mercers. (4th edn), supra n . l9 /C h l ,  
at paras 2 3 7 3 -2 3 7 4  and 2379; Savage N. k  Bradgate R., Business Law. (London, 
Butterworths, 1987), p.512; House of Commons, (H.C 176), (report on Westland  
case) (Session 1 9 8 6 /1 9 8 7 ) ,  paras 15-20; House of Lords, (H.L.218) (1 9 8 5 /8 6 );  
Rider B.A.K. Insider Trading. (Bristol, Jordans and Sons Ltd. 1983), p.234
3 1-  It is arguable that the expression of ‘ w arehousing’ is an American  
usage. See Johnston A. supra n.88/Ch2, at p.69
3 2 -  P an el’s definition noted by W einberg k  Blank, T a k e o v e r s  k  
MftTRer.S, supra n .l9 /C h l;  Johnston A., The Citv Takeover Code, p.69, supra  
n.88/Ch2.
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t h a t  the  pr incip le  of fa ir  t r e a t m e n t  is d i s to r te d  and  the  
transparency  of the market is potentially deterred. Hence, how far 
information disclosure should be used to resolve any problem is a 
matter for discussion.
B- WAREHOUSING-DISCLOSURE OF INTERESTS 
It is t rue  tha t  the initial percentage of voting control th a t  a 
w areh o u se r  accumulates before announcing his holding in the 
ta rge t  company is a major element in determining the incentives 
for a takeover  offer. Under the present re levant  regulations, there  
exist two tr iggering percentage levels of disclosure of in terests .  
One is legal which is provided by the Companies Act 1989, under  
which the amount of interest which should publicly be revealed is 
fixed at 3% or more of the re levan t  share capital of the  ta rge t  
company. Below tha t  level, the purchaser  is not obliged to reveal  
his shareholdings. The other is extra  legal and laid down by  the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers.33 Unlike the companies Act 
1989, the City Code requires a person to disclose his interests  once 
his shareholdings or his daily purchase  am ounts  to 1%.34 In 
France, the threshold required  to be disclosed is equal  or more 
than  0,005%, though takeover  activities are less deve loped  in 
comparison w ith  Britain. In general, albeit the re  exist no perfect  
system, the  regula tory  mechanisms in both countries  seem to 
work very  harmoniously and in a compatible manner.
3 3 -  A pparently  (w hether  or not com patib le  w ith  each  other) the  
former triggering percentage level is, in the main, concerned w ith  directors  
disclosure of in terests  in shares, w hereas  the latter is directed to share  
dealings. Both levels are, perhaps, intended to ensure market transparency  
and, most importantly, the protection of investors involved.
34 -  Rule 8.3 of the City Code requires a daily disclosure of dealings  
during the offer period.
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As regards the registration of interests acquired or transferred ,  . 
the 1989 Companies Bill,35 proposed th a t  the  ta rg e t  com pany  
whose shares have been acquired or disposed of should be entit led 
to oblige the holder to give particulars of the beneficial ownership  
of his past and present  in terest  in any shareholdings grea ter  than  
0.05% of the total equity  in its re levant  shares capital.36 Moreover,  
the company may also refuse the registration of t ransfer  of shares 
w here  the in s t ru m en t  of t ransfe r  rela tes  to a n u m b er  of shares  
greater  than  0.05, unless the name and address  of the  beneficial 
owner of the shares is disclosed.37
Concerning its powers of investigation, the 1985 Companies Act 
empowers companies to declare tha t  the shares under  inquiry  shall 
be subject to the restriction dictated by Par t  XV of the C.A 1985 
w h e r e v e r  full disclosure is not complied with .  The 1989 Bill 
suggested 7 days notice before imposing restrictions on s h a r e s . 38 
But, the practical difficulty is tha t  the companies involved are not, 
in the face of increasing development and complex share structures,  
able to trace the ownership or the beneficial owner of in te res ts  in 
their  share capital. The reasons, of course, may vary. One of the the 
fundam enta l  obstacles facing the company which is carrying out or 
about to launch its investigation process is due to the regula tion 
itself, ei ther, because such powers w ere  not expressly made clear 
by the legislator, or because, v e ry  often, both the Panel and the
35- No amendments in the context w ere incorporated in the C.A. 1989.
3 6 -  Para (c) in tended  to be incorporated into Section 211 of the  
Company Act 1985, by  the Companies Bill 1989, clause 91. But such a 
recommendation was not adopted by the C.A. 1989
37 - Clause 91, of the Companies Bill 1989, intended to insert Sub-section  
1A into Section 183 of the C A 1985. This Clause was not incorporated.
3 8 -  Companies Bill 1989, Section 2 1 6 .(A) w as not incorporated in the  
C.A.1985.
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Stock Exchange, where  a takeover  offer is involved, are re luctant to 
g ran t  consent as to the use of such restr ic t ions by  the  ta rge t  
company. This is especially so w hen  a takeover  offer is in progress. 
Therefore ,  the  ult imate  means for a com pany  to iden t i fy  the 
holders of its share capital is pursuant  to a court order.
To conclude, f i rs t  of all one might note th a t  the  r e le v an t  
regulations (whether  legal or ex tra  legal) have not  gone as far as 
distinguishing be tw een  the practice of concert parties, nominees 
and w areh o u s in g .  They  are  t r e a te d ,  so long as d isc losure  
requirem ents  are concerned, by similar provisions. P resum ably  the 
regula tor’s underlying policy in avoiding such a dist inction is tha t  
since these th ree  phenom ena are contingency-based, information 
disclosure is a significant de te r ren t  and a good alternative to ensure 
both market transparency and the freedom of dealing as well as the 
p ro tec t ion  of s h a re h o ld e r s  involved .  N atura l ly ,  in fo rm a t io n  
disclosure serves  th ree  principal functions: first, it ex tends  the 
boundar ies  of knowledge by making information available to all 
shareho lders  on an equal  footing; secondly, the in fo rm at ion  so 
disclosed enables shareholders not only to know in whom control is 
vested, or about w ha t  is going on throughout the takeover  offer, bu t  
also to enable them to reach an informed decision as to acceptance; 
and finally it entit les the target  company to identify the  beneficial 
owner as well as its present  shareholders. But the objection is tha t  
the am ount  of information shareholders  must have in o rd e r  to 
make an intelligent and rational decision is a core problem about 
informed judgement as to acceptance. Unfortunately, the regulator  
is faced with great  difficulties in formulating adequate  guidelines 
necessary  for determining  the materia l i ty  o f . in form ation  to the
decision making process. Indeed, the f irs t  problem here  lies w ith  
th e  i n t e r p r e t a t i o n  of w h a t  is m a t e r i a l  i n f o r m a t i o n ?  
Correspondingly, parties to an offer, may sometimes disclose less 
information than  they  think they  should disclose or provide only 
the information tha t  is required to be disclosed.
Concerning the quality of information, it has been  pointed out 
that:
...the long-term decisions of investors are similar in principle to the 
strategic decisions of management, but the present differences and 
the quality of information available to the two groups contributes to 
the perceived communications gaps between them .39
Experience has shown no connection be tw een  the  qual i ty  of 
i n f o rm a t io n  p ro v id e d  in a n n u a l  r e p o r t s  an d  th e  m ore  
co m p reh en s iv e  in fo rm ation  p rov ided  in p ro sp ec tu ses  and in 
t a k e o v e r  docum en ts ,  w h e r e  co m p an ie s  w a n t  s h a r e h o ld e r s '  
support.40
Registration of shares (whether  bought or sold) appears  vital. 
The re levant  regulations impose a strict obligation on companies to 
keep an up to date register  containing the inform ation  which  is 
disclosed to them in respect of shareholdings acquired, disposed of 
or exchanged be tw een  inter  connected companies.  The reg is te r  
document is requ ired  to be made available for inspection at the 
company office. The chief reason behind registration is designed to 
ensure  t ran sp a ren cy  and to enable mem bers  or o ther  in te res ted  
competitors to have an idea of w ha t  is in the register. As discussed
3 9 -  The Independent, May 17th 1988, p.24; The Ind epen d en t, 10th  
October 1988, p.25 relating to 'price sensitive information'. See also, The Stock 
Exchange and the Panel joint Statem ent on price sen sit ive  in form ation ,  
supra n.70/Ch.4
40- Ibid
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above, the crucial and controversial  point which at tracted  concern 
re la tes  to the  d if fe ren t  r e q u i r e m e n ts  in re spec t  of tr iggering 
percen tage  levels.  Normally, i r re spec t ive  of the  in te rm in ab le  
philosophical meaning of te rm s namely, "voting control", "voting 
interest", "voting power" and "voting right" or share in terests  so as 
to avoid areas of confusion or vagueness of the req u irem en t  in the 
subject,  th e re  should be some balance b e tw e en  the  s ta tu to ry  
provisions and the self regulatory requirements .  In o ther  words a 
less than  1% percentage s tandard  level would appear  appropria te  
and desirable.
SECTION TWO: OFFEREE'S DEFENSIVE TACTICS
2.1- PREVENTATIVE TACTICS
As discussed in the first chapter, a company may be acquired, 
not because of its vulnerabil i ty  caused by the poor performance of 
its management,  or because of a financial, commercial or economic 
crisis, b u t  because of the mere dynam ism  of its directors ,  its 
characte r is t ics  i.e, the popu la r i ty  and r e p u ta t io n  of its b ran d  
w o r ld w id e ,41 in addition to its field of activities, or the re  may be 
o th e r  inexp l icab le  m otiva t ions .  T here fo re ,  th e  q u e s t io n  of 
vulnerabil i ty  of a company to takeover  offers appears  to have  no 
precise criteria. There is no doubt th a t  the common des ire  of 
potential or actual acquirers is to construct companies of a size to 
compete w ith  and to match the considerable extension of m arkets  
beyond the national te rr i tory  so as to satisfy investors’ worldwide 
needs. Evidently,  the quickest  w ays of doing so is th ro u g h  the 
acquisition of companies ra ther  than going through in te rna l  efforts
41- The Financial Times, 27th April 1988.
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which involve a significant degree of risk, are time consuming and 
involve advertising costs.42 However, w h a t  is said above does not 
m ean  th a t  d irec tors  of the  t a rg e t  com pany  are le f t  w i th o u t  
a l ternatives  to defend their  company against p reda tors .  Indeed, 
th ey  may adopt various ant ic ipatory  measures  to r e n d e r  the ir  
com pany unat tract ive  to takeover  offers. Questions of cons tra in t  
and prohibit ions arise.  For public listed companies,  the  Stock 
Exchange re lev an t  authorit ies ,  for instance in Britain, are  more 
often re luctant to permit  any company, w he the r  or not a potential  
ta rge t ,  to in troduce  any res tr ic t ions  on its t r a d e d  securit ies .  
Additionally, in both  countries, in te rna l  changes in a com pany  
(whether  or not being vulnerable  to offers) such as reconstruction 
of capital or am endm en t  of its articles of association, may not be 
allowed to be carried out without the approval of shareholders  in a 
genera l  meeting. Thus, knowing th a t  th e re  are a n u m b e r  of 
p rev en ta t iv e  and rem ed ia l  defensive m easures  at the  offeree 
b o a rd ’s disposal as well  as legal or ex tra  legal prohibit ions and 
re s t ra in ts ,  the  u l t im ate  ques t ion  is how far  d irec to rs  of the  
vulnerable  company could under take  such a defense and w h a t  are 
the responses or the atti tudes of the re levant  regulator.
A- CONCLUSION OF SERVICE CONTRACTS
In the ordinary course of business nei ther the re levan t  law nor 
self regulation could p reven t  directors from enter ing into service 
contracts w ith  the company so long as these are not characterized 
by any aggravating or adverse detr imenta l  effects on shareholders  
i n t e r e s t s . 4 3 If a harmful effect is likely to take place in the  fu tu re
42-  One study in the U.K demonstrates that the advertising cost for n ew  
brands amount to 7m and 10m. during the first year. See Financial Times, 
supra n .l 14/Ch.l.
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and such a contract is f raudulently  validated in a general  meeting, 
it is still difficult for the minority shareholders  to challenge the 
substance of such a contract.44
Section 319 of the Companies Act 1985 requires tha t  directors ' 
contracts of em ployment for more than 5 years  must be approved 
by a resolution of the company in a general  meeting and, in the 
case of a director of a holding company, by a resolut ion of th a t  
com pany  in a genera l  meeting. Subsection 5 of sect ion  319 
stipulates:
A resolution of a company approving such a term  ...shall not be 
passed at a general meeting of the  com pany unless a w r i t te n  
memorandum setting out the proposed agreement incorporating the 
term  is available for inspection by members of the company at (a) 
the company register office for not less than 15 days ending w ith  
the date of meeting and (b) the meeting itself.
The purpose of this section is threefold:,first, it assumes tha t  a 
resolution may not be passed which is either made in contravention 
of this section45 or is a f raud  on the minority.46 Second, such a 
provision is designed to p rev en t  abuse against d irectors and to 
ensu re  the ir  fu tu re  status, and jobs. Thirdly, it sa feguards  the
43-  See respectively, the Companies Act 1985, Section.318 and 319; the  
Stock Exchange's Admission of Securities to Listing 1984, supra n.36/Ch.4; the 
City Code on Takeovers and Mergers 1988.
4 4 -  Apparently, because of the rule laid down in Foss v. H a r b o t t le  
w hich  provides that minority shareholders may initiate a derivative  action  
pursuant to their rights v e s ted  in the com pan ies  on ly  in excep tion a l  
circumstances, supra n .54 /C h .l .  Discussed by W einberg & Blank, T a k eo v ers  
and Mercers. (4th edn), supra n .l9 /C h l ,  at paras 2 4 0 1 -2 4 0 2  and para. 212.
4 5 - Section.319, Subsection.6
4 6 -  Fraud on the m inority  is v ie w e d  b y  the Jenkins Com m itte  
(Cmnd.1 7 4 9 /1 9 6 2 )  as an act which in fact does not necessarily involve fraud  
in the technical sense. It may be sufficient if there is no conceivab le  
b en ef it  to the m inority e v e n  through the controlling sh areh o ld ers  act 
w ithout any intention to mislead or harm.
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in terests  of shareholders  by requiring a particular contract to be 
approved by resolution in a general  meeting and to be open for 
inspection at the com pany’s regis tered  office. The question tha t  
arises is, should the directors be permit ted  to conclude contracts of 
services w here  they  are de term ined  to take action to deter  any 
potential offer? In 1945 the Cohen Committee advocated tha t  any 
service contract en tered  into within one yea r  prior to an offer be 
deemed to have been made in contemplation of the offer unless 
ratified by the company in a general meeting before the offer is 
carried out o therwise the director involved loses his contractual  
r igh ts .47 The p resen t  regulation in both the U.K. and France calls 
for cons iderab le  disclosure r e q u i r e m e n t s .48 The City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers imposes restrictions on directors enter ing a 
particular contract e i ther w here  the board of the ta rge t  company 
believes it is desirable to take action to f rus t ra te  a potential offeror 
or, in the belief of receiving a substantial amount of compensation 
for loss of office resulting from change of control.49 Rule 21 of the 
Code stipulates that:
47-  Cohen Committee report, para.92(3) and p.53, Cmnd 659 (1945) .  It is 
w orthw hile  to m ention that the Cohen Com m ittee’s recom m endation  w as  
neither adopted nor referred to in the Jenkins Committee report (1 9 6 2 )  Cmnd 
1749.
48- Supra at Chapter 4.
4 9 -  A corresponding requirem ents are dictated by C.O.B regulation  of 
1989. Art.4, for instance, stipulates that, once an offer document is submitted  
to the C.B.V, any agreement or contract which may be deem ed to be harmful 
to investor interests or expected to distort shareholders decisions about the 
significance and the merit of such an offer, save w h ere  va lidated  by  the 
court, must be notified to the "conseil d'administration ou au directoire des 
societes concernes.” Such contracts must also concurrently  notified  to the 
C.B.V and C.O.B. If so concluded, parties to contracts must prom ptly publish  
them to the public in a daily national financial newspaper.
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During the course of an offer, or even before the date of the offer if 
the board of the offeree company has reason to believe that a bona 
fide offer might be im m inent, the board m ust not, except in 
pursuance of a contract entered into earlier, without the approval of 
the shareholders in general meeting..., enter into contracts otherwise 
than in the ordinary course of business".50
Note 6 on Rule 21 of the Code clarifies fu r ther  the Panel policy 
w ith  respect to service contracts. It states tha t  the Panel will not 
allow any action taken  by the directors to amend, create or v a ry  
the te rm s of em ployment or en ter  into service agreements  if such 
m easures  cons t i tu te  an unusua l  or abno rm a l  increase  in the  
directors’ emolument or a significant im provem ent in their  te rm s of 
service. But the Panel will not prohib it  any such im p ro v e m e n t  
which derives from a genuine promotion or new appointment.  In 
ei ther  case the  Panel urges part ies  involved to be consulted  in 
advance. Although one may not genera l ise  on this  m a t te r  of 
directors employment contracts or about their  ethical reasoning or 
intentions at the time the terms of service contracts are s tructured  
and approved in a general meeting compared with the whole issue 
of takeover  defense, it is difficult to assume the absence of any 
harm ful  impact on shareholders  in te res ts .51 That is to say it may 
remain always open to doubt.
5 0 -  Rule 21 is an implementation of general principal 7.
5 1 -  W einberg, pointed out that "One of the  ch ie f  o b s ta c le s  to 
shareholders seeking redress against the directors for the taking an action  
w hich he considered an improper defensive measure against takeover bids is 
the difficulty of establishing w hether the motive behind the action w as  to 
protect the directors against the takeover bids or w as som e other quite  
legitimate factors". Weinberg, Takeovers and amalgamation Paras 2404 , (2nd  
edn) 1967. Foss v  H arb ott le . supra n.54/Ch. 1. See further Pennington  R.R, 
Pennington's Company law (5th edn.) (London, Butterworths 1985.), Ch.18, 
p.724.
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B -  U S E  OF V O T E L E S S  A N D  W E I G H T E D  S H A R E S .
Usually, takeover  offers are made for the purchase of shares 
carrying voting control. In this the buyer  is willing to pay more on 
a per share basis than  he would be willing to pay if the shares were  
not par t  of the controlling stock. In o rder  to r e n d e r  the  ta rge t  
company less at tractive to the bidders,  the directors  (w herever  
pe rm it ted  to do so) may in troduce into their  com pany  severa l  
restr ictions relating to re levan t  share capital. The use of voteless 
shares, for instance, may induce any potential offeror to w i thd raw  
his interests . Therefore, it is one of the most prevent ive  measures  
through which the interests  of the controllers are p reserved .52
A large num ber  of companies have recently  issued vote less  
shares  by w ay  of capitalization issues.55 In consequence ,  the  
controllers are given the opportunity  to realize par t  of their  holding 
without  even affecting or reducing their  threshold.54 Recently, the 
regula tor  expressed  concern to provide adequa te  protection, in 
p ar t icu la r  w i th  re sp e c t  to small inves to rs  by  hav ing  r igh ts  
adequa te ly  defined. If o rd inary  shares  ca rry  no voting control, 
restr icted voting rights or weighted rights, they  must be designated 
"no voting" or " r e s t r i c t e d  vo t ing  right"  in the  i n v e s t m e n t  
certificate.55 However, despite the debate amongst those in favour  
of "non voting" shares, and those seeking to abolish such a class of 
shares,56 it appears to be generally agreed tha t  no body denies the
52- For the meaning of the terra "controllers” see Section 207  (4)of the  
F.S.A 1986; Banking Act. 1987, Section 105
5 3 -  W einberg and Blank, Takeovers and Mergers, (4 th  edn), supra  
n.l9/Ch.2, at para. 2427.
54- Ibid.
5 5 -  The Stock Exchange Listing regulation, supra n .36/Ch.4
56 Weinberg, (4th  edn.), at paras 2429  e t  Seq, supra n . l 9 /C h l ;  The 
Jenkins Report (Cmnd 1 7 4 9 /1 9 6 2 )  para 136; Companies Bill 1973, Clause 22.
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serious implications of non voting rights upon potentia l  offerors’ 
in te res t  in control. Apart  from questions of inves tm ent ,  voteless 
shares, as far as change of control is concerned, are des truc t ive  
defensive measures.  This means voteless shares discourage offerors 
and operate as a safeguard against takeovers.
Directors might also consider making certain in te rna l  changes 
in the company articles of association, to render  their  company "bid 
proof" and, the re fo re ,  u n a t t ra c t iv e  to p o ten t ia l  o ffe rors ,  by 
in troducing provisions to enable them  to w eigh t  the i r  existing 
voting  con t ro l57. Like French law, U.K. com pany law does not 
p reven t  companies from making themselves  bid proof.58 Indeed, 
severa l  companies  a l ready  use w eigh ted  or re s t r ic ted  voting  
r igh ts .59 There are also a var ie ty  of cases i llustrating the use of 
restr ic ted or weighted voting rights. Take for instance Bushell  v. 
Faith60 in which the com pany’s articles of association incorporated 
a provision giving directors weighted  voting sha res .61 A nother  
co m p an y ’s articles of association also contained similar clauses 
re la t ing  to w e ig h ted  vo t ing  r ights ,  i.e. Rights and  I s s u e s  
Investm ents  Trust Ltd. v  Stvlo Shoes.62 As a matter of fact, double
The 1978 Bill advocated a registration of such classes of shares. Pennington  
R.R, Takeover Bids in The U.K. (1 9 6 9 )1 7 .A.M.1 C.Law. p .159; Yoran A, Advance  
D efen sive  Tactics A gainst Takeover Bids (1 9 7 3 )2  1 A.M.T C.Law.. p.531;  
Wooldridge F.( Some Defences to Takeover Bids (1974)  l.B.L 202.: Gower L.C.B, 
The Principles_of Modern Company Law, supra n.36/Ch.l
5 7 -  Right,and Issues Investm ent Trust Ltd. v  Stylo Shoes. (1 9 6 5 )  Ch.250, 
(1964 )3  W.L.R 1077, (1964)3  All ER 628; Weinberg & Blank, Takeovers and 
Mergers, at para 2426, supra n . l9 /C h l .
5 8 -  Wooldridge F., supra n.56, p.207; Bushell v  Faith (1 9 6 9 )2  W.L.R 106 
(H.L); The Times, 26 May 1988; The Financial Times, 26 May 1988.
59 -  Gr.eenhalgh v. A rd en e  Cinemas Ltd. (1946 )  1 All ER 512; Pickering  
M.A, Shareholders Voting Rights, supra.n.58/Ch. 1.
60 - Supra n.58.
61- Wooldridge, Some Defences to Takeovers, supra n.56.
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votes or weighted voting rights control are designed to increase the 
likelihood of the successful acquisition of a target by one particular 
offeror and p reven t  or impede competing offers by o ther  potential 
rivals. Accordingly, w he the r  voteless or weighted shares, both have 
a lmost identical implications for acqu ire rs ’ in te res ts  in control. 
Therefore  any var ia t ion  of such k inds of shares  (voteless and 
shares carrying voting rights control) may increase or decrease the 
chance of an offeror obtaining control.
C -  CROSS,  C I R C U L A R  A N D  P Y R A M I D  S H A R E H O L D I N G S
In order to establish firmly their  position of control, the ta rge t  
company's directors may use various other al ternatives ail of which 
are solely designed to defeat any takeovers a t tem pt  namely,  cross, 
circular and py ram ida l  shareholdings.  A few decades ago such . 
issues  w e re  co ns ide red  by  the  Jenk ins  C o m m i t t e e . This 
Committee demonstrated various situations w here  cross or circular 
shareholdings can be made not only to defeat any potential offeror 
but also to secure their removal from office. It pointed out:
Where ... th ree  companies (with a common board of d irectors or 
with boards which agree to act in concert) each has a holding of 26% 
of the ordinary voting shares of each of the other companies..., the 
board of directors of each company, w ith  the association of the 
boards of the other companies, command a majority and therefore
6 2 -  (1 965)C h.250. Discussed by Weinberg& Blank, T ak eovers  And  
Mergers, Su pra ,n .l9 /C h l;  Wooldridge, Some Defence..., supra n.56. See also 
Bamford and Others v. Bamford and Others (1969) 2 W.L.R.1107; (1970 )  Ch.212; 
(1969)1 All ER 969.
6 3 -  The Jenkins Report (Cmnd 1 7 4 9 / 1 9 6 2 ) .  Sh areho lders  in one  
com pany may also use similar sorts of arrangem ents to aggregate their  
voting control. See G r een h a leh  v. Millar ( 1 9 4 3 ) 2  All ER 2 3 4 .  For further  
discussion see Pickering M.A, Shareholders Voting Rights, supra n .5 8 /C h l,  at 
P . 2 5 6
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cannot be removed by the remaining shareholders
This argument denotes two situations: One is w here  the re  is an 
in te r lo ck in g  d i rec to ra te .  The o th e r  is th r o u g h  o w n e r s h ip  
a r rangem ents .  Any pa r ty  to an ag reem ent  will be bound by the 
express te rms of their  arrangement.64
As rega rds  both  cross-holding and circular  shareho ld ings  
between companies, The Jenkins Committee indicated:
A similar situation arises in practice where  two or more companies 
have substantia l cross-holdings in each other even though these  
provide something less than  majority. Then there  is the so-called 
circular ownership: Company A holds 40% of the o rd inary  voting 
shares of company B, which holds 40 percent of the ord inary  voting 
shares of company C which is in tu rn  holds 40% of the o rd ina ry  
voting shares of company A. The directors of all three  companies, if 
they then act in concert, can in practice prevent the removal of any 
of them by the other shareholders.165
Another ingenious w ay  of keeping off a potential offeror and 
enhancing the  controllers '  posit ion is the  use of in ter locking  
holdings associated with the shareholders  voting agreement .  This 
may take the form of a "pyramid". It exists where  companies begin 
establishing a chain, each of them w ith  a subs tan t ia l  minori ty  
shareholdings in the other, but none of which is a subsidiary of the 
others.  Such a technique is, in fact, solely u n d e r ta k e n  for the
6 4 -  In France, the threshold is lim ited to less than 10%. Moreover, 
according to C.O.B regulation, except w h ere  perm itted by  legislation , any  
m em ber to an agreem ent enjoys an absolute right to w ithdraw . Such an 
agreement, if entered into at the time w here an offer is in progress, cannot 
be forced against the initiator. See Art.4 of the C.O.B Regulation N o.89-03  of 
1989, supra n.l/Ch3.
6 5 -  Weinberg &. Blank, supra n . l9 /C h l ,  at paras 2408; Pickering M.A, 
supra n .58/C hl, p.248 et Seq.
281
purpose of reinforcing the position of control of the in te re s ted  • 
parties in the target  company and therefore preventing any chance 
of sudden  change or subs t i tu t ion  of such control. Hence, the 
in t e re s t e d  com pan ies  s t a r t  en te r in g  in to  a g re e m e n t s  w i th  
sh a reh o ld e rs  up to obta ining the m ajori ty  of contro l .66 The 
obvious aggravating effects of such a device appears principally to 
impede the increased use of takeovers. Besides it could be deemed 
to be an obstructing measure for even a potential m em ber  of any 
of the contracting companies to obtain or to reinforce his position 
of control.
I t  is obvious th a t  these measures  can be v e r y  effect ive if 
considered and effected at the time w here  the re  is no actual or 
potential offer at all. But w here  a takeover  offer is imminent ,  the 
conclusion of such tactics appear far less effective and falling within 
the f ram ew ork  of prohibit ions and restr ictions.  On the one hand, 
the re levan t  regulators  p reven t  directors from taking any  action 
likely to f rus t ra te  a bona fide potential offeror. On the o ther  hand, 
since takeover offers, in particular competitive ones, involve a great  
deal of money the professional investor’s decision has always been 
made on both financial and commercial grounds.67 In o ther  words, 
for the institutional shareholders,  it is not expected from them tha t  
such a beneficial opportunity  be left to directors to be f ru s t ra te d  
unless  th e re  is convincing ev idence  t h a t  g re a t  p ro f i t s  are  
forthcoming from the intended resolution (entering into a chain of
6 6 -  Pickering, supra n.58, at p.265 -2 6 7 . See also Hadden T, Company Law  
and Capitalism. (2nd edn) (London, Weindenfeld & Nicolson, 1980).
6 7 -  It is generally  agreed that the v ie w  of shareholders about the  
merits or dem erits  of offers is not a lw ays identica l to their d irectors  
assessm en t or prediction. They, in fact, o ften  advance their short term  
interests w h en  facing rival offers.
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circular and cross shareholdings).
In practice, the  use of cross-holding, circular  or py ram ida l  
shareholdings tactics to defea t  takeover  offers and to es tablish  
firmly directors’ positions of control, i.e safeguard fu r the r  their  job 
status, appears  to create no difficulties, while it is, in fact, more 
complex and more ambiguous. In addition there  are more obscure 
means of achieving the above tactic.68
At the p resen t  time almost all legislation in any  developed 
co u n t ry  re l ies  e n t i r e ly  on in fo rm at ion  d isc losure  of sh a re s  
ow nersh ip  so as to stop the  sp read  of such devices.  This is 
sometimes impossible to solve by a simple restrictive or prohibitive 
provision. Although the Jenkins Committee long ago recognized or 
p red ic ted  the  po ten t ia l  d e t r im e n ta l  im pac t  on s h a r e h o ld e r s ’ 
in te res ts  and advocated tha t  any rem edia l  action would  be too 
complex for adoption. It  would be difficult, it is subm it ted ,  to 
de te rm ine  which of two companies holding shares  in the  o ther  
short of control loses its voting rights.69 The Committee therefore  
recom m ended an effective system to keep  m arke t  t r a n sp a re n cy  
and to afford sufficient safeguards for the investors in teres ts .70 At 
the p resen t  time, in France, only cross shareholdings devices are 
restr icted w hereas  circular or pyramiding shareholders fall beyond 
the scope of the 1966 Loi on Societes Commerciales.
C- PLACING ASSETS OUTSIDE CONTROL
Defensive measures  of placing key  asse ts71 outs ide  control
6 8 -  Som etim es it extends to en listing the social re la t ion sh ip s  and 
fr ie n d sh ip s .
6 9 -  Jenkins report, paras 151-2, noted by Hadden T., supra n.66, at p.39; 
Weinberg 8 c  Blank, Mth edn.), supra n ,19/C hl, at paras 2 4 0 6 -  2407..
7 0 -  Ibid, Jenkins’ report, at para 153.
7 1 -  For the purpose of the City Code the term "assets" mean fixed assets
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may preventively be used to reduce the likelihood of takeovers. But 
the typical period of implementing it is before a takeover  offer is 
m ade .72 There are several  means w h ereb y  the placing of assets 
can be carried out. It can be made through an es tablished share 
option scheme, a pension scheme such as proposals involving the 
application of pension funds surplus, a mater ia l  increase in the 
financial com m itm ent  of the ta rge t  company w ith  regards  to its 
pension scheme or a change to the  consti tut ion of the  pension 
scheme.73 There is no doubt tha t  directors f requently ,  w h e n  they  
believe tha t  a potential offer is coming soon, ei ther  on the basis of 
the com pany’s vu lnerab i l i ty  or other inexplicable circumstances,  
shed some of the vital and valuable assets of their  company. Their 
main reason  is to induce potentia l  offerors to w i th d r a w  the ir  
interests . In this context, however, both the French C.O.B. and the 
British Panel on Takeovers  and Mergers are f irm. They place 
rigorous restrictions on the directors’ discretionary power to use or 
displace the company's funds without  seeking the ir  shareho lders  
approval in a general meeting. An especially important  provision of 
the U.K City Code is tha t  which prevents  any action being taken  by 
the directors which f rus t ra tes  a bona fide offer w here  an offer is 
p r e m a tu re ly  or fo rm ally  announced  w i th o u t  the  a p p ro v a l  of
shareholders in a general meeting. This includes:
(a) issue of any authorized but unissued shares; (b) issue or grant
plus current assets less current liabilities. See Notes 2 (c) on Rule 21 of the  
City Code as amended.
7 2 -  When using such a method, directors must have entire confidence  
and be certain w ho their friends actually are. Furthermore such placing  
should be made in secret so as to avoid triggering bidders attention to the  
value of the assets at issue. See further W einberg & Blank, Takeovers and 
Mergers, supra n . l9 /C h l ,  at para 2442 et seq
7 3 -  Hogg v. Cramphorn Ltd and Others (1966) 3 All ER 420; (1966 )  3 WLR 
955, (1 9 67)Ch.254; City Code Notes on Rule 21.
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options in respect of any unissued shares; (c) create or issue, or 
permit the creation or issue of, any securities carrying rights of 
conversion into or subscription for shares; (d) sell, dispose of or 
acquire, assets of a material amount; (e) or enter into contracts 
otherwise than in the ordinary course of business”.74
The typical situation is exemplified by the battle for the control 
of the  Savoy Hotel Ltd,7  ^ the effect of which was to pu t  Berkley 
Hotel outside control.76 The question w h e th e r  d irectors have  a 
part icular  power which they  pu rpo r t  to exercise or not may be 
de term ined  in the light of the directors f iduciary duties.77 This 
automatically leads to a consideration of two param ount  questions. 
First, can directors '  im proper  actions78 be val ida ted  or tu rn ed  
down by the majority of shareholders in a general meeting so as to 
rem ed y  directors’ wrong actions.79 Second, w h e th e r  individual or
7 4 -  Rule 21 of the City Code. Note 2 on Rule 21 laid down three main  
criteria to determine w hether or not a disposal or acquisition is of "a material 
amount" that "(a) The value of the assets to be disposed or acquired compared  
w ith  the assets of the offeree company; (b) w here appropriate the aggregate  
value of the consideration to be received or given compared w ith  the assets  
of the o fferee  company; and (c) w h e r e  appropriate n e t  profit  (after  
deducting all charges except taxation and excluding extraordinary item s)  
attributable to the assets to be disposed of or compared w ith  those of the  
offeree  company". A relative va lue of 10% is deem ed by the Panel as a 
material amount. But in the case of references to MMC a 15% rather than a 
10% test would normally be applied". Note 4 on Rule 21.
7 5 -  Milner Holland report noted by Gower L.C.B. in (1 9 5 5 )6 8  Harv.L  
Rev, p .1776.
7 6 -  Based on the device of a sale and lease back of the hotel so as to 
hinder a potential offeror in which the directors action w as thought as one  
for improper purpose.
7 7 -  See Ch.5 "Directors Fiduciary Duties".
7 8 -  Situations in vo lv ing  the d eterm ination  of d ire c to rs ’ im proper  
purposes is likely to be sometimes v ery  difficult to handle. See Smith Ltd v  
Amool Petroleum Ltd (1974) AC 821 at 83 5
7 9 -  Weinberg noticed the difficulties to distinguish  b e tw e e n  actions  
taken by directors w here the prime motive is to give commercial benefit  to
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minority  shareholders  can s ta r t  lit igation if th ey  consider such 
action is de tr im enta l  to the ir  interests . The la t ter  category seems 
unable to challenge directors '  actions unless th e re  is ev idence 
beyond reasonable doubt as to directors’ misconduct.80 The former 
approach is becoming accepted nowadays.81
D- THE ISSUE OF NEW SECURITIES
Along with the creation of cross-holding, circular shareholdings 
and the  use of non voting shares,  weighted  or res tr ic ted  voting 
rights, as well as placing assets outside control, the re  are o ther  
analogous tactics des igned to make actual or po ten t ia l  r iva l  
takeover  offers more difficult to succeed. Moreover,  th ey  afford 
directors of the target  company the ability to fight from a position 
of strength. The issue of shares in trusts,  pension fund institutions,  
employees scheme or otherwise is one device which may have a 
wide range of implications on actual or potentia l  offerors. The 
obvious consequence of the issue of new  shares  by the  ta rg e t  
company is to raise the financial cost of the offer against which it is 
skillfully executed. Legally the use of this tactic or device raises 
several  questions and it is the subject of various cases. Take for
the company and actions taken by directors w hich is aimed substantia lly  at 
the protection of their own position of control or of those of the existing  
substantial shareholders, Weinberg & Blank, Takeovers And M ergers.(4 th  
edn.), para. 2410, Supra n .l9 /C h .l .
8 0 -  ijflgiL v. £Lajnp.hor.n, supra n.73; Bam ford  v. Bamford. supra n.62; 
Foss v. Harbottle. supra n.54/Ch.l.
81 P rev iou sly  directors fa ilure to act bona f id e  w a s  not apt for  
ratification. See Gower L.C.B., The ^Principles of Modern Company Law (3rd  
edn) at p. 5 6 6 -6 7 ,  supra n.36 and 6 1 /C h l.  Such an approach w as adopted by  
the British regulation and considered valid if directors seek prior approval 
of shareholders in a general meeting or is ratified thereafter. See Hogg v.  
Cramohorn. supra n.73.
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instance, Hogg v Cramohorn Ltd.82 In this case, the directors of the 
target  company had issued shares with  special voting rights to the 
trus tees  of a scheme established for the benefi ts  of the company's 
employees in an a t tem pt to defeat a takeover offer made by Baxter. 
It was held tha t  though used for improper purposes, a majori ty in a 
general meeting of the company could ratify the issue of shares.8  ^
Take another case involving competitive offers for the control of R 
W. Miller (holding) Ltd. A competi t ive offer had been  made by 
Howard Smith Ltd. and Ampol Petroleum Ltd. Ampol w ith  another  
associated company (Bukships) owned 55% of Miller’s shares which 
left Howard Smith Ltd. w i th  no o ppor tun i ty  to ob ta in  control. 
Fortunately, the directors of the target company favoured Howard's 
offer  because  of its adva n tag eo u s  t e rm s  aga ins t  the  l ikely 
d e t r im en ta l  effect if control would  pass to Ampol. Therefore ,  
Miller’s d irec tors  proceeded  w ith  the  issue of a s u b s ta n t ia l  
percentage of shares to Howard which rendered  Ampol in a weak 
position. Consequently, Ampol's chance of obtaining control was 
significantly reduced. Miller’s d irec tors’ action was challenged by 
Ampol on the ground tha t  the issue of shares was invalid. In the 
course of his judgement,  Lord Wilberforce indicated:
...It must be unconstitutional for the directors to use their fiduciary 
powers over the shares in the company purely for the purpose of 
destroying an existing majority, or creating a new majority which 
did not previously exist. ...Directors are of course entitled to offer 
advice, and bound to supply information re levant to the making of 
such division, but to use their fiduciary power solely for the purpose 
of shifting the power to decide to whom and w hat price shares are 
to be sold cannot be related to any purpose for which the power
82- Hogg v. Cramohorn Ltd. supra n.73.
8 3 -  Further notes on such case are made by Sealy L. S., Cases and 
Materials in Company Law (3rd edn), p. 2 7 5 -76 ,  supra.n.l/Ch4
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over the shares capital was conferred upon theirs...84
However, in exceptional circumstances, an issue of shares may 
be made w ithou t  the approval  of shareho lders .8  ^ For instance, 
w here  the issue of new shares is solely made for the  purpose of 
raising the needed  capital just ified by the  com pany 's  financial 
crisis. Equally w h ere  a purchase of shares  is u n d e r t a k e n  by  a 
rescuer which would otherwise trigger the application of rule  9 of 
the Code. But such a purchase should only be taken  as a rem ed y  of 
last  re so r t  before de te rm in ing  the fu tu re  of the  com pany  in 
question. But the exemptions under  the City Code may not be 
generalised or in te rp re ted  otherwise. This tends  to exclude any 
purchase of shares from a substantial  shareholder other  th an  from 
the com pany itself which is in need of rescue. F u r the rm ore ,  a 
rescue operat ion may have its significance in the course of the 
company's ordinary  course of business. This means tha t  the Panel’s 
permission is unlikely to be given w here  a com peti t ive offer is 
announced or expected to be made soon. Similarly, any  rescue 
operation, other than those cited above, should be expected to give 
rise to an obligation to make a general offer in accordance w ith  the 
City Code’s provisions.
2 . 2 -  R E M E D I A L  OR C OR R E C T I V E  T A C T I C S
After the offer is launched, the offeror's main objective is to 
gain control through the use of various devices either those used in 
anticipation of the offer such as buying gradually on the market,  by 
a " daw n raid" technique or, concurren t ly  w i th  his offer,  by
84- Ibid, at p.279.
85 -  Weinberg & Blank, Takeovers and Mergers, supra n . l 9 /C h l ,  paras. 
2411-2421.
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collecting irrevocable commitments,  buying on the m arke t  and so 
forth.
Resistance of de te rm ined  directors  may usually  d e fea t  an 
unwelcome offer. In fighting an unw an ted  offer, directors  more 
often rely on loyalty of their  shareholders, seek outside help, buy 
their  company shares, en ter  into resolutions (split the stock, raise 
capital, put key assets into fr iendly hands, and announce dividend 
increases). The o f fe ree ’s directors may also launch a publicity  
campaign criticizing the offeror and his terms. Directors often seek 
the help of the re levant  authority to block the offer on the basis of 
severa l  g rounds no tab ly  competi t ion and public in te res t .  It  is 
w orthw hi le  to mention th a t  some of the correct ive techn iques  
discussed the re in  will almost invariably  requ ire  the  approval  of 
shareholders of the company in a general meeting.
Within the stock market,  as soon as rum ours  s ta r t  circulating, 
dealers begin buying and selling securities to profit from the less 
experienced and ill-informed investors because of the fear  tha t  the 
m arke t  share price will fall sharply  accompanied by ru m o u rs  of 
r e fe ren ce  for invest iga t ion.  This may not  affect in s t i tu t io n a l  
investors. It is reasonable to assume tha t  well minded shareholders  
f requently  wait  until the offer document is available to them. They 
are, after all, responsible for the funds of their  investors and could 
not be expected to decide on the fu ture  of a company from simple 
speculation or rumours .86
The re levan t  regulators  in both countries  often s tand  in an 
impartial  position neither hindering potential or actual offerors nor
8 6 -  Experience w ith in  the Stock Market has educated them  that those  
w ho take advantage of a sudden selling opportunity usually lose out in the  
long term. See further The Independent, April 14th 1988, p.27.
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favouring the target  undertak ing  directors w here  they  decide to 
take  defens ive  action. They may only  in te rv e n e  w h e n  th ey  
reasonably  believe tha t  the rules are being infringed. Their  main 
task, however,  is to ensure  t ransparency  of share dealing and to 
afford more safeguards to the  investors  in terests .  In particular ,  
those, to whom the offer is intended.
A- SEEKING OUTSIDE SUPPORT
Naturally, directors know most about the underlying value of 
assets and prospects  of the ir  company. Hence d irectors ,  w h e n  
takeover  offers are imminent for the control of their  company, may 
em ploy  the  whole range of conceived defense in an e f fo r t  to 
maintain the company’s independence and, therefore, their  position 
of control. If a competi tive offer is successful change of control is 
inevitable. Furthermore,  not all directors ' defensive m easures  are 
allowed. Every d irectors’ action is requ ired  to be re fe r re d  to the 
consent of shareholders in a general meeting.87 The s t ra tegy  then  
is clear. Directors wishing to defeat  an unw anted  offeror have  to 
convince their  shareholders about the desirability of entering into a 
merger deal, seeking a rescuer who outbids the unsuited  r ivals ,88 
or await  until  each competi tors '  docum ent  is com m unica ted  to 
them. In essence, the success or failure of the directors’ de term ined  
strategy is, in fact, largely dependen t  on the device and the ir  skill 
and speed in implementing it. In circumstances w h ere  potentia l  
offers are imminent, after which change of control is unavoidable,  
one alternative tha t  might be adopted by the opposition is to work
87- City Code general.principle 7 and Rule 21.
8 8 -  Commentators often use the term "defensive merger" to denote both  
merger schem es and rescuer tactics. Actually both tactics are distinct from  
each other.
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\out p re l im inary  m erger  negotiat ions w i th  a f r iend ly  company. 
Conscious of the  even tua l i ty ,  the  ta rg e t  com pany 's  board  of 
directors may ask for a general meeting of shareholders  to pass a 
merger resolution. As a practical matter, however,  passing a merger 
resolution in such a situation may be less effective if at the time the 
com peti t ive  offer is announced a conflict of in te r e s t  b e tw e e n  
shareholders  and directors occur. Generally such conflicts often 
resu l t  from the divergence of v iew b e tw een  directors and the ir  
institutional shareholders. These inst itutions in their  capacity as a 
fiduciaries primarily  serve the interests  of their  investors. In this 
connection, in order  to meet  the ir  obligations, the  ins t i tu t ions  
involved often balance their  investors’ commercial in terests  against 
any sentimental or emotional a t tachment to the company under  the 
offer.89 This has been evidenced in an offer involving the  control 
of the Scottish and Newcastle (S&N) company. Following the  S&N 
company's directors failure to win their  shareholders  support ,  one 
manager stated tha t  "when you are investing other people's money there is 
no place for sentiment. The heart says that it would be nice to keep control of S 
k  N in Scotland, but ultimately the decision will be made on commercial 
grounds'.90 Their support  of the res is tan t  directors may only be 
made to the extent  tha t  the merger proposition is f inancially and 
commercially based on more advantageous te rm s com pared  w ith  
w ha t  are actually offered. The other alternative is to seek a rescuer  
to outbid the initial offeror91 or competitors as the case may be.
8 9 -  For further reading in relation  to in st itu t ion a l in v e s to r s  see  
mainly, Manne H.G, The "Higher Criticism” of the Modern Corporation  
(1 9 6 2 )6 2  Colum Law Rev., p.399 at p.419 et seq.; L ow einstein  L Pruning  
Deadwood in hostile takeovers, at p.297, supra n.77/Ch.l
9 0 -  The Elders' offer for the control of S k  N Brewers. The Sunday  
Times, 23th Oct.1988, p .12.
9 1 -  Guinness and Argyll for the control of Distillers.
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Take for instance ,  a r ece n t  exam ple  am ongs t  s e v e ra l  o th e r  
publicized situations in the press. At the time of the competitive 
offer for the control of Rowntree which was launched by the two 
Swiss companies; Nestle and Jacob Suchard, the re  was  increasing 
m arke t  speculation on the fu ture  of the British confectionary and 
soft dr inks group Cadbury Schwepps.  The focus was  on the  US 
General Cinema as a potential  offeror. As a protec tive  m easure  
against any sudden  change of control, Cadbury (target) t ipped Coca 
Cola as a possible "white night" against any potential offeror.92
Finally it is reasonable to argue that, apart  from "merger plan", 
seeking a "white night" in the sense tha t  it will outbid the  initial 
offeror is preferable,  w hether  or not the company directors support  
it. Since it creates a competitive climate, quite apart  from directors’ 
support, it is hard ly  to be considered as a defensive tactic, because 
in either case not only the shareholders benefit, bu t  also the ta rge t  
company becomes dependent  on one of the successful competitors.
B -  S H A R E H O L D E R S  C O M M U N I C A T I O N S
Where directors determine to remain independent ,  perhaps  the 
most typical tactic, which is becoming common nowadays,  is to 
communicate with the shareholders to urge them not to accept the 
proposed offer. This may be performed through various means: by 
phone calls, individual letters, or through newspapers.  However, no 
m a t te r  how convincing the a rgum ents  contained in the  ta rg e t  
company's defense document,  the most typical, though the re  are 
several  o ther ,9  ^ are the arguments  concerning the inadequacy  of
9 2 - The Times, May 28 1988, p.25-36.
9 3 -  The Rowntree Company in its defence docum ent stated that the  
bu sin ess  can be best  d eveloped  in the in terests  of shareh o ld ers  and  
em ployees as an independent group. The Financial Times, April 27th  1988; for
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the price being proposed; criticizing the offeror's intentions about 
the fu ture  of the company and its employees; tha t  the company will 
be less profitable and jobs would be less secure if control would 
pass to the offeror. Such sta tem ents  may arouse sha reho lders’ and 
employees’ uncertainty. Hence they  may provide support  and back 
their  managements defensive action. But this is not always the case. 
In the  most v u ln e ra b le  public  l is ted com panies ,  n o w ad ay s ,  
inst i tu t ions are the ir  major shareholders .  These organs are, of 
course, v e ry  aware of their  company's prospects  and weaknesses .  
Therefore, they  may not make a hurried  decision on the merits or 
demerits  of offers unless they are real ly convinced or satisfied tha t  
f u r t h e r  b en e f i t s  may be ga ined  if the  co m p a n y  r e m a in s  
in d e p e n d e n t .  Legally, the  p rov is ions  su b jec t in g  d i r e c to r s '  
s ta tem ents  to urge shareholders not to accept offers are contained 
in both countries regulations. In the U.K. for example, Rule 20 of the 
City Code relating to sta tements made by parties to offers stipulates 
tha t  "Parties to an offer must take care not to issue a statement which, while 
not factually inaccurate, may mislead shareholders".94 The purpose of such 
a rule  is p robably  of a prophylactic  na tu re .  In this  connection 
parties  to offers are w arned  in advance not to issue s ta tem en ts  
which are untrue or ambiguous, w he the r  at tr ibutable  to the  offeror 
or the offeree. Untrue s ta tem ents  are likely to have an unsettl ing 
consequence on the market and thus harm shareholders interests .
C -  P R I C E - R A I S I N G  D E V I C E S
Along with  urging shareholders not to accept the offer and to
Plaisly defence against GEC bid. The Times, August 7th  1989.
9 4 -  A similar requirem ent is contained in C.O.B’s Regulation of 1989,  
Art.6 para 2 and Art.3 para 1, supra n.l/Ch.3.
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await  till the  la tes t  possible t ime prior  to the  exp i ry  of the 
proposal,9  ^ directors of the target company may under take  various 
other sophisticated tactics to maintain the company's independence. 
The defens ive  tactics which  rem a in  at the  d i rec to rs ’ disposal 
include, d ividends increase, stock split, capitalization issue and 
u l t im ate ly  the purchase of the  company 's  own shares.  Mention 
should also be made of some other  incidental  defensive tactics 
especially w here  offers are launched by foreigners for the control 
of a domestic com pany such as seeking political support;  t rade  
union pressure and their  shareholders loyalty. However, the  prime 
concern of the regula tor  is reflected in the  genera l  principles. 
General principal 7 of the Code, for example, requires that:
...at no time after a bona fide offer has been communicated to the 
board of the offeree company, or after the board of the  offeree 
company has reason to believe tha t a bona fide offer might be 
imminent, may any action be taken  by the board of the offeree 
company in relation to the affairs of the company, w ithou t the 
approval of the shareholders  in general meeting, w hich  could 
effectively result in any bona fide offer being fru s tra ted  or in the 
shareholders being denied an opportunity to decide on its merits.96
This ru le  has  f u r t h e r  e n h a n c e d  s h a r e h o l d e r s  se lf  
de term inat ion .  It also imposed a ban  on directors  to take  any  
decision in respect of the company affairs which may f ru s t ra te  an 
advantageous offer.
D- DIVIDEND INCREASES
Normally the method of announcement of dividend increases is 
almost always carried out in anticipation of an offer. But it is, in the
9 5 -  To avoid any binding agreem ent shareholders often  d elay  their  
acceptance. Delay may also be made for financial purposes.
96- See also Note 3 on Rule 21.
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extreme case, announced concurrently with  takeover  offers. While 
such a device may be effective to f rus t ra te  or to raise fu r the r  the 
offeror’s financial costs, it not always reliable tha t  the company will 
keep its promise after defeating the unsuited offeror. As a practical 
matter,  a company, w h e th e r  or not faced w ith  a takeover  offer, 
proposing a dividend increase, assumes tha t  it has sufficient funds 
to cover its proposition. The clear objection to on the change in 
d iv id e n d  policy, w h ich  has  se r ious ly  b e e n  q u e s t io n e d  by  
c o m m e n ta to r s  and the  r e l e v a n t  a u th o r i ty ,  is w h e r e  it  is 
im p lem en ted  concurren t ly  w i th  the an n ouncem en t  of tak eo v er  
offers. The obvious consequences of dividend increases may not 
only render  the company unattractive to potential offerors bu t  also, 
if implemented during the offer period, induce the actual offeror to 
w ithdraw  its interest. Additionally, as indicated earlier, announcing 
a dividend increase which is made otherwise than  in the ord inary  
course of business seems to operate  against the  com pany’s fu tu re  
growth and expansion. Furthermore, in the view of the regulator,  it 
is expected to operate  against the in te res ts  of sha reho lders  and, 
therefore, violate the re levant rules.
E- MARKET PURCHASE TECHNIQUES
A company that  has determined to remain independen t  usually 
has the choice of using various devices and techniques to keep  off 
any unsuitable offeror. One of the alternatives at the disposal of the 
target  company, however, is the redemption  or purchase of its own 
shares. Defensive measures of such a sort almost invariably require  
the approval  of shareholders  of the ta rge t  company in a genera l  
meeting. Certainly this is p e rhaps  the  f i rs t  res tr ic t ion  on the
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directors’ power to preserve the company from being taken  over by 
outsiders. Under the City Code, if the ta rge t  co m pany’s board  of 
d i rec to rs  have  dec ided  to r e d e e m  or p u rchase  th e  o fferee  
com pany’s securities, in part icular  w h en  they  know  or ought to 
have known tha t  a bona fide offer is forthcoming, they  m ust  not 
take any action without the approval of their  shareholders.97
Normally, m a rk e t  purchases  in tended  by  unwilling ta rge ts  
assume th a t  sufficient funds are at  the disposal of the  com pany 
seeking to purchase its shares. A corresponding al ternative may be 
tha t  if such companies are financially weak, they  will inevitably  
seek outs ide  fund  support .  This is usually  p ro v id ed  th ro u g h  
merchant banks, unit trusts,  pension fund inst itutions and building 
societies. The most likely effect, under  the  City Code, upon those 
who are willing to purchase the target company's shares (the board 
of directors or any other substantial shareholders) is the triggering 
obligation to make a general offer once their  holdings or any person 
acting in concert with  them exceeds 30% of the voting right control 
at the general meeting of tha t  company. Accordingly, Rule 37.1 of 
the Code stipulates tha t  "when a company redeems or purchases its own 
voting shares, a resulting increase in the percentage of voting rights carried by 
shareholdings of the directors and persons acting in concert with them will be 
treated as an acquisition for the purpose of rule 9". In the  light of this  
provision, which is, in fact, a second ban upon any person seeking 
to obtain a position of control, any person, subject to sha reho lders ’ 
approval, is free to purchase as many shares as he can, provided 
the triggering level of 30% is not attained. This, indeed, is one of the 
most fundamental  features of the Code. Additionally, if a meeting is 
called for, the  provision of the  City Code obliges th e  t a rg e t
97-  Rule 37.3 (a)
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com pany’s directors to make available all material  facts to their  
shareholders about the offer or any anticipated offer in the notice 
convening such a meeting.98
Finally if a m arke t  purchase operat ion is fruitless,  it does not 
follow tha t  the target  company is deprived  of the opportunit ies  to 
use other a l ternatives  namely, establishing a ne tw ork  of social or 
political communication with  the company. The ta rge t  com pany’s 
directors may sometimes use the re levan t  regulation as an an t i ­
takeover tactic, including instigating a lawsuit. Both devices will be 
considered below in turn.
F- TRIGGERING SOCIAL AND POLITICAL SUPPORT
As indicated earlier, one of the most commonly used defensive 
tactics by unwilling targets  is the init iation of a com munication  
campaign urging their  shareholders  to re f ra in  f rom  selling the ir  
shares to offerors. The basic argument of such a t tem pts  is tha t  the 
long te rm  profits to shareho lders  of not offering the i r  sha res  
exceeds any short te rm benefits which could be obtained. Typically, 
whils t  professional and experienced sha reho lders  often  rem a in  
silent,  d i rec to rs  of the  ta rg e t  com pany,  w ho a re  n e g a t iv e ly  
re sp o n d in g  to offers ,  g e n e ra l ly  e m p h a s iz e  t h a t  a n y  poor  
perfo rm ance  is simply contingent;  th a t  the  board  of d irec to rs  
anticipate  increased sales and profits; the offer en t i re ly  fails to 
recognize the curren t  performance and the existing prospects  of a 
highly successful company; the  offeror ignored the  under ly ing  
values of the business and its assets which include a particular ly  
wide range of brand names whose reputation is worldwide, channel 
of d is tr ibutions,  markets .  Finally, directors  may also argue  or
9 8 - City Code, Rule 37.3 (a)
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attract employees attention tha t  if the offer succeeds it could cause 
huge job losses. Occasionally, opposition to offers may extend across 
the political spectrum. Take for instance, Eider’s offer, an Australian 
Brewer, for the control of the Scottish and Newcastle Breweries, a 
British company based in Scotland. A Scottish National Par ty  leader 
stated tha t  Elder's offer must be resisted " by all sections of the Scottish 
Community. We must protect what is left of the basic core of our industrial 
base".99 Recent history has il lustrated tha t  "Scotland had paid the price 
with Anderson Strathclyde, Bells, Britoil and Distillers, he pointed out, adding 
tha t  "Scottish and Newcastle” must not be next".100 Some o ther  officials 
urged the governm en t  to refer  such a bid to the  Monopoly and 
Mergers Commission for an ultimate investigation. One conservative 
M.P indicated tha t  the Elder's offer must be r e fe r red  because it 
would have a "profound and wholly undesirable effect on competition in the 
brewing industries. It would be ludicrous for the bid not to be referred on 
competition policy grounds".101 Likewise, another labour M.P said “The 
Government cannot stand aside and let this vital part of the Scottish economy be 
handed over to people on the other side of the world”.102 It should be noted, 
additionally,  th a t  the S.&N’s re fe rence  to the  M.M.C w as  also 
supported by a form er  Scottish Office Minister .10  ^ Corresponding 
political support  was also expressed for the Rowntree 's  directors 
resis tance.104 What experience has shown, however, is tha t  in most 
bid cases, in the absence of harmful  effects on competit ion or the 
wider  issues of public interests,  al though they  arouse shareholders
99- The Glasgow Herald, Oct. 18th, 1988
1 0 0 - Ibid
101- Ibid
102- Ibid
1 0 3 - Ibid ; The Independent, Oct. 22nd, 1988, p .19
104- The Times, 27th April and May 27th, 1988 respectively.
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and offerors unce r ta in ty  about the  likely success, emotional  or 
political suppor t  often proves inefficient and not effective as a 
means of defense.
G- USING THE REGULATION TO DETER OFFERORS ATTEMPTS 
The regulatory regime in both countries is designed nei ther  to 
p roh ib i t  nor  to encourage  ta k eo v ers ,  b u t  to encourage  fa ir  
competition instead. It is also set up to provide fair  and equal  
t rea tm en t  of shareholders.  The marke t  should be as t r an sp a ren t  as 
possible and dealing in information should widely be disseminated 
to inspire investors’ confidence and to encourage new participants. 
These are the prevailing policies in the marketplace. It is equally  
im portan t  to mention the weight and significance of the regula tors’ 
role in policing the takeovers process. Their basic mission is not to 
favour  e i ther  pa r ty  to offers, bu t  by  applying the  principle of 
fairness to shareholders,  they do not, in fact, constrain w h a t  each 
offeror or offeree can do. In the U.K. one of the ultimate defensive 
tactics the directors may use when  facing a competitive offer is the 
re levant  regulation itself so tha t  offerors actions may be subjected 
to delay and p resu m ab ly  the offer will  lapse a c c o r d i n g l y . 1 °5 
Furthermore, the possibility of referring offers to the Monopoly and 
M ergers  Commission or the  E.E.C com m iss ion  add  f u r t h e r  
opportunities for delay so tha t  offers are requ ired  to lapse under  
the  City Code rules .  Granting r e f e r e n c e  to th e  M.M.C for  
investigation, the wors t  factor for any takeover  offer is uncerta in ty  
about the likely success of the referred  offer.100 However,  nothing
105-  Merger Control, 6 th  Report, Session  1 9 8 8 /8 9 ,  (H.L.31), supra  
n.l7 /C h .3 .
106- In France, clearance relating to competition issues are required to 
be obtained and a notification  is included in the o ffero r ’s offer  draft
2 9 9
arouses both shareholders’ and offerors’ uncertainty  more than  the 
referra l  decision. Such uncertainty  may also extend to other  stock 
marke t  intermediaries.  In case of reference, at the  v e ry  least  the 
offer will lapse until the clearance decision is obtained. Further,  a 
ban  is imposed upon offerors and any associates or persons acting 
in concert w ith  them to purchase shares in the ta rge t  com pany .107 
These obstacles will inev i tab ly  help  the  board  of the  t a rg e t  
company to reconsider their  fight in the light of new developments. 
Besides, sufficient time will be at their  disposal to reconstruct  their  
defensive measures or to work out a new suitor. It  is w o r th y  of 
note tha t  there  are various other obstacles tha t  might face offerors 
in the host country  or they  may require  prior clearance f rom its 
own country, notably the interaction be tw een  the regulation of the 
host coun t ry ’s and the offeror coun try ’s laws. Unlike Britain, the 
French regulators require every  thing to be cleared beforehand. In 
other words an offer will not be declared receivable by the C.B.V. 
unless it is satisfied tha t  all the requirem ents  have been  fulfilled or 
complied with, mainly C.O.B.'s visa and a positive confirmation from 
the competition authority. Finally, it should be noted tha t  using the 
regulation to deter offerors is not exclusive for unwilling targets.  It 
may also be adopted  by offerors against  each o ther.  Take as 
example, Argyll Group pic and Guinness Company pic for the control 
of Distillers pic. The fact of litigation w he the r  before the Court of 
Appeal, 1°8 or the Scottish court of Session*09 will below be outlined.
beforehand. See the C.B.V and C.O.B. Regulation, supra n .l/C h.3.
107- City Code, Rule 9.4, Notes 1 & 2;
108- Rg.gina v. Monopolv_and Merger Commission, ex parte Argyll Group 
X>l£i (1986)1 W.L.R. 763  (C.A); (1986)2 All ER 257, (C.A)
109- Argyll .Group.Pic And Others v. The Distillers Company o le . (1986)1
C.M.L.R.763 (C.S); (1987) S.L.T.514
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In the contest be tween  Argyll Group pic and Guinness pic for 
the  control of Distillers.pic, bidding was  s ta r ted  by  Argyll in 
decem ber  1985, and Guinness made its offer in J a n u a ry  1986. 
Argyll's offer for the issued share capital of Distillers not already 
owned by  Argyll was priced at 513p  per  share ,  thus  valuing 
Distiller s.pic at £1,8 6 4 m .1!0 Following the announcem ent  of the 
rival Guinness pic’s offer which was priced substantia l ly  higher,  
Argyll competit ively revised its offer bringing per share value to 
645p, thus evaluating Distillers at £2,343m. A fu r the r  revision was 
announced  in March 1986, However,  a p rob lem  arose w h e n  
Guinness was re ferred  by the Secretary of State to the M.M.C for 
investigation. Furthermore ,  under  the City Code, it is conditional 
tha t  once an offer is re fer red  to the M.M.C, such as th a t  made by 
Guiness, it lapses. Moreover, pending such an offer, ne i ther  a f resh  
offer is allowed to be made nor any share purchase is perm it ted  to 
be carried out. Meanwhile, while the other rival was ent ire ly  free 
from restrictions, Guinness, so as to avoid being locked in such a 
situation, accepted d iv e s tm en t  proceedings.  Consequently ,  the  
merger  b e tw een  Guinness and Distillers w as  cleared.  W ha t  is 
interesting, in this context, was tha t  Argyll as rival on the one hand 
faced b i t te r  opposit ion on the other.  In o rder  to f r u s t r a t e  the 
Guinness and Distillers' merger,  Argyll sought a judicial review, 
invoking in the f irst place, the M.M.C chairman's discretion, and in 
the second place arguing tha t  "both the first Guinness offer and the revised
110- Argyll's original proposal w as n ega tive ly  recom m ended  b y  the  
Distillers board. In January 1986, the board of Distillers decided that Argyll 
offer was likely to be accepted by the majority of Distillers shareholders, and 
accordingly start searching for an appropriate suitor so that Argyll offer  
could be turned down. Such was Guinness pic. Eventually, an agreem ent w as  
reached betw een  the boards as to the terms of such merger, see, supra n .110 -
112 .
3 0 1
offer would, if implemented, have created merger situations. The proposal to 
create such a situation had never been abandoned. The second bid was merely a 
variation on the theme of the first".111 This was argued w ithou t  success. 
Then Argyll appealed to the Scottish Court of Session on the ground 
of violation of Art.86 E.E.C. Lord Jauncey applied the formula of the 
"balance of convenience", thus the motion was refused. He stated:
It remains to consider the advantages to either party of granting or 
refusing interim interdict. If interim interdict is granted the  way is 
likely to be clear for the Argyll bid to be accepted to proceed 
unopposed and be accepted. If I refuse interdict both bids rem ain 
open to the DCL shareholders. I am informed tha t the costs incurred 
by Guiness in connection with their bid have been enormous. If both 
bids proceed and that of Argyll is accepted they have lost nothing by 
not obtaining interim interdict. If both bids proceed and Argyll lose, 
their possible loss which will be sustained by Guinness in the event 
of their being p reven ted  from presenting their offer to the  DCL 
shareholders. ..In all the c ircum stances..... I conclude tha t the balance 
of convenience requires tha t Argyll’s motion be re fused .1 12
Since the  likelihood of Argyll 's  success w as  s ignificantly  
reduced, the above citation seems reasonable as far as the in te res t  
of shareholders  is concerned as well as their  rational decision on 
the merits or demerits  of rival offers. But if the relevance of such a 
decision w as  mainly  concerned  w i th  ques t ions  of economic 
concentration and it was accepted by the authority  tha t  the re  was 
no justifiable ground of distortion, due regard was not taken  as to 
the legality of the agreements which w ere  concluded be tw een  the 
board of directors of Distillers and Guinness. Neverthe less ,  the  
Guinness affair reveals  severa l  possible insidious and abus ive  
practices principally, acting in concert, falsification of the company
1 1 1 - Supra n.l 10, at p.768 para (E)
1 12- (1986)1 C.M.L.R 763, supra n.l 10, at p.769, para 11
3 0 2
documents and accountant records, the f t  and conspiracy to break 
an t i  f r a u d  l a w s .113 This pa r t icu la r  ques t ion  is stil l u n d e r  
investigation and cannot be discussed in this thesis.
113- The Guardian, 22nd March 1989, 24th  March 1990, p,9. At the time of 
w ritt ing  this thesis , the Guinness affair ended  w ith  convictions of four  
persons all of whom  w ere found guilty of fraud, theft, and fa lse  accounting  
concerning an illegal share support operation  during the ta k eo v er  of 
Distillers company in 1986. See, The Glasgow Herald, August 28, 1990; The 
Independent, 28th August, 1990; The Times, August 28, 1990; The Scotsman 28, 
1990; The Guardian, 28th August, 1990.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONCLUSIONS
Although "takeovers" are becoming a well recognised subject in 
the securities market regulation, it is nowhere expressed in terms 
that it has a specific legal meaning. Moreover, the debate in both 
France and the U.K. did not extend to explore this aspect,
presumably because the technicalities as well as the methods 
available for effecting such transactions are varied. For example, 
control of a company may be acquired by legal mergers, share
mergers as well as by a reverse takeover offer. Control may also 
be acquired or be reinforced by one of several alternatives, by 
compulsory offers, by leveraged offers by tender offer or other 
looting transactions. It can also be secured by proxy machinery
and voting agreements and other trading arrangem ents. In 
addition, for offerors, any diversity of methods remains a question 
of choice between alternatives. It is also seen that the offeror’s 
motivation to acquire control of another company is often 
frustrated by the desire of the directors of the target company to 
remain in control. In this connection it must be stressed that
neither the concept of control, nor the directors' role in responding 
for or against an unwanted offer, has been made clear. 
Concerning the regulation of competitive offers, whilst in the U.K. 
the provisions of the City Code seem impliedly applicable, in 
France, (and the relatively recent E.E.C Commission proposal for 
the regulation of takeovers and other bids), the relevant 
regulation contains some specific rules governing such a technique 
for acquiring control.
Both countries' securities market regulations lay down basic
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principles and rules which, whilst in the U.K. for the most part 
have never been embodied in legal form, in France, the whole 
system is a legal one. However, the most important provisions are 
those which maintain the interest of shareholders without unduly 
impeding legitimate offers. The form of institutions and the 
powers conferred on their respective supervisory bodies appear 
to differ radically. In Britain, generally speaking, self regulating 
bodies prevail whilst in France, the whole range of institutions are 
public, endowed with legal power. The regulation with respect to 
societes commerciales, for all practical purposes, is contained in 
the Code de Com m erce, and adm inistra tive regu la tions 
promulgated thereunder. But in the U.K., because of the co­
existence of various laws and extra-legal regulations covering or 
governing the same field of business, it is extremely difficult to 
draw a reference to any universal regulation.
Most stock markets' relevant authorities seem to adhere to the 
same principle that dealings in the offeree company or in the 
offeror's securities is an event which should be as transparent as 
possible. In Britain, the Panel, with the co-operation of the Stock 
Exchange and the Securities Investment Board, in the face of a 
growing num ber of dom estic and cross-border takeovers 
involving the control of British companies, tends to ensure greater 
standards of transparency of share ownership. This tendency may 
also be seen in the light of the recent French Loi 89-531 of 1989. 
However, the British regulation along with the French, in respect 
of information disclosure, is highly developed compared with 
many other E.E.C member states. But as far as the U.K. provisions 
relevant to takeovers are concerned, it would seem more effective
305
if they were embodied in legal form.
In terms of policy towards the market, one of the most striking 
differences between U.K. and French takeover offers regulations 
relates to the rigidity of their provisions and the divergence of 
policies. In Britain, with the overwhelming belief in the free 
market, the regulator tends to leave parties to offers without 
interference to the extent that shareholders involved are fairly 
and equally treated. Procedurally, in France, in addition to their 
continuous involvement in takeover offers operations, the C.B.V. 
and the C.O.B prevent any intervention in the market, once a 
notification about an offer is made. At this time, the C.B.V. 
immediately suspends dealings in the target company's relevant 
shares. Suspension of quotations in the U.K. is deemed undesirable 
because, it is argued, it will distort the free market as well to 
hinder innocent controllers' interests. In France suspension it is at 
the heart of the whole regulatory system. Furthermore, whereas 
in the U.K. suspension of quotation is left to the discretion of the 
target company, in France it is subject to a legal requirement and 
becomes automatic if an offer is notified. Against the background 
of an increase in abusive conduct which results from or is 
associated with takeovers practice, including delays which often 
result from investigation, it appears that many problems could 
have been avoided if the U.K. would consider once again the 
significance of such measures. However it could be a more 
effective deterrant to insider dealing, speculation as well as 
rumours if such a measure were a statutory requirement as it is 
in France.
Concerning jurisdiction and powers, the French C .O .B .’s 
jurisdiction extends to cover the whole range of investm ent
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decisions, whether through takeovers, mergers or prospectuses 
and other related events. By contrast, the Panel’s jurisdiction 
seems to cover only m atters of takeovers and m ergers. 
Prospectuses and others investment decisions are matters for the 
Companies Act, 1985 as amended by the Financial Services Act 
1986 and the Companies Act 1989. Mention should also be made 
of investigative powers. In the U.K., the S.I.B may not be entitled 
to investigate the affairs of another self regulatory body or any 
person certified by it unless it is requested or, where it appears to 
the S.I.B that those members were unable to investigate. Under 
the French relevant regulation it seems that there exist no 
barriers to prevent the C.O.B from investigating the Bourse de 
Valeur institutions. In addition, where a suspicious practice is 
noticed, the Stock Market or the Panel in the U.K. may appoint an 
ad-hoc commission to investigate. Unlike the appointment of an 
inspector by the C.O.B in France, the designation of an ad hoc 
committee by the Stock Exchange or the Panel is a private 
decision. However, the vast majority of investigations in the U.K. 
appear either inconclusive or dem onstrate, for example, no 
identifiable insider trading. Furthermore, publication of findings 
that are based on probability or uncertainty may not be made 
public because of the fear of defamation and are not accepted by 
the courts as evidence for conviction. The courts require a proof 
beyond reasonable doubt for any criminal proceeding.
Reforms at Community level have inevitably contributed to the 
development of the national relevant laws and regulations, in 
particular in areas not already covered by their existing 
provisions. Recently, a new proposal for a Directive on Takeovers
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and Other Bids has been submitted to the European Council for 
approval. Apparently, the aim sought to be implemented by the 
proposal is twofold. First the proposal is directed to harmonise the 
existing regulations of the E.E.C. member states within the field. 
This implies that rules with respect to takeover offers should be 
at least clothed with a certain degree of legal form. Second is to 
enhance further the interests of investors and to curb market 
abuses which could not effectively be reduced without legal 
action. Concerning the relevant bodies, it is submitted that rules to 
protect the interests of those affected by takeover offers are 
unlikely to be effective unless they are policed by an official 
regulatory body. Further, although the designation of such a 
supervisory body is left to the member states' discretion, the 
Commission stresses that the body likely to be designated must 
have sufficient power to monitor effectively and efficiently 
takeover offers activities.
The likely implications of this proposal on the U.K. self 
regulating bodies notably the Panel on Takeovers and Mergers 
seem obvious. First and foremost, the proposal tends to bring such 
a body within a legal framework. However, according to the E.E.C 
proposal, if the status of the Panel is intended to be preserved, it 
may either be placed under the supervision of a new body 
endowed with legal power other than the S.I.B or be placed under 
the direct umbrella of the Secretary of State. It is worthy of note 
to mention that the 1989 Bill recommended an integration of the 
Panel into a regulatory framework. As regards the French C.O.B., 
since it already has such a legal power, it may not be affected by 
the E.E.C proposal. Furtherm ore, in order to secure the
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implementation of the Directive, numerous alternatives have been 
suggested by the E.E.C Commission. First, it is recommended that 
there should be a supervisory body clothed with legal powers 
responsible for the im plem entation of takeovers regulation. 
Second, the choice of the appropriate body, to whom a delegation 
of power is made, is left for the member state concerned. This 
means the proposal for a Directive leaves it, once a public 
authority is set up, to member states to designate any other 
appropriate body to perform such a function whether public or 
private, or a nationally or regionally organized body. Third, since 
the intended takeover offer Directive should be complied with 
throughout the Community, a contact committee is proposed 
under the auspices of the Commission. The E.E.C. Commission's 
approach to the problem of harmonisation seems fairly reasonable 
and flexible.
As far as information disclosure is concerned, such provisions 
are intended to ensure that neither offerors nor the directors of 
the target company mislead shareholders or deny them the 
opportunity of making an inform ed and rational decision. 
Therefore, a certain minimum standard of information disclosure 
is required to be concurrently made and fairly presented not only 
in the offer document but also throughout the period of the 
takeover offer. The major tests of such information are accuracy 
and materiality.
An aspect of company law, in respect of the shareholders 
position, is that both the U.K. and France recognize that the 
ultimate decisions with respect to the affairs of companies are, in 
fact, intended to be entirely reserved to the shareholders in a 
general meeting through the use of their power of election and
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removal. Correspondingly, the extent to which the directors are 
permitted to bind their company to third parties is circumscribed 
with the scope of fiduciary duties. Again, the philosophy with 
respect to investors' protection appears to be further enhanced in 
the takeovers field and both the U.K. and French regulators 
consider shareholders, principally those of the target company, to 
be the ultimate party determining the success or failure of offers. 
Besides, it must be stressed that most regulations emphasize the 
shareholders rights' of withdrawal. But it seems, nevertheless, 
differently regulated. In Britain, for instance, shareholders of the 
target company are permitted to use their rights of withdrawal in 
specific circumstances. In France, by contrast, such a right may be 
used at any time during the offer period. It is also particularly
vital to mention that the U.K. rules, with respect to the revised
offer conditions, are not radically different from  French 
legislation. Both regulations, for the purpose of ensuring equal 
opportunities, provide that if an offer (whether in itia l or 
competitive) is subjected to any revision during the offer period, 
offerors concerned are obliged to pay the increased consideration 
even to shareholders who had already offered their shares.
Concerning disclosure and existence of links between periodical 
information disclosure and disclosure in particular situations, for 
example takeovers, it seems to have been given little importance. 
For companies generally, whether public or private companies,
listed on the Stock Exchange or not, it is a statutory requirement 
that certain sensitive information, mostly of a financial nature,
should be made available for inspection on a periodic basis 
namely; accounting reports, balance sheets, profit and loss as well
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as directors’ and auditors' reports. It is also paramount that full 
and accurate information about the ownership of companies is 
available to enable shareholders to know with whom they are 
dealing and to identify who is in fact controlling their company. 
Besides, in the view of the regulators, whether in France or the 
U.K., acquisitions of interests or disposals should be transparent 
and that dealing in information should be widely spread to protect 
investors and to enhance their confidence in the securities market. 
Finally the remaining question is whether or not disclosure 
information requirements alone fulfill the goal of protection of 
investors' interest that almost any regulator seeks to achieve. The 
answer to this question is problematic. Nevertheless, at the 
moment information disclosure seems extensive and operates in 
favour of shareholders protection. However, the regulator, 
whether in the U.K. or France, must keep information disclosure 
under continuous review. Mention should also be made of the fact 
that inform ation, contained in an offer docum ent that is 
dispatched to shareholders at the time the offeror's firm intention 
to make an offer is officially and publicly communicated, is not an 
absolute standard of disclosure. It is true that an offer document 
contains some useful information which enables persons to whom 
the offer is addressed to form a preliminary opinion about 
offerors and their structured offers notably; the identification of 
each offeror, intentions and the amount of shares sought to be 
acquired as well as the percentage of shareholdings already 
owned in each other. But it remains far less effective in satisfying 
shareholders needs and in ensuring market transparency. Besides, 
the Stock Exchange requires a listing particulars, which is mostly
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of a financial nature, to be sent to shareholders in conjunction 
with the offer document. The latter (listing document) is also the 
subject of growing concern and debate on the way of improving 
the quality of information which should close the gap between the 
information provided during the company's usual business and 
that offered in takeovers documents where companies seek 
shareholders support. Finally, it could be argued that despite the 
unnecessary defect and disparities of legal systems, the protection 
afforded to shareholders seems extensive in both France and U.K.
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